## Baltimore Police Department Staffing Plan



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## Executive Summary

On April 7, 2017, the City of Baltimore and the Department of Justice (DOJ ) entered into a Consent Decree, which is a court enforceable agreement to resolve DOJ 's findings that it believed the Baltimore City Police Department (BPD) had engaged in a pattern and practice of conduct that violates the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and certain provisions of federal statutory law.

Sections 428 and 429 describe the Consent Decree Requirements concerning a staffing analysis and staffing plan:
"428. BPD will complete a comprehensive staffing study to assess the appropriate number of sworn and civilian personnel to perform the functions necessary for BPD to fulfill its mission, enable supervision, and satisfy the requirements of this Agreement."
"429. Based upon the staffing study, BPD will develop a Staffing Plan that provides for each of the following:

1. Personnel deployment to ensure effective community and problem-oriented policing;
2. Sufficient number of well-trained staff and resources to conduct timely misconduct investigations;
3. Sufficient number of officers in patrol in each district, without needing to resort to drafting, except in unforeseeable circumstances;
4. To the extent feasible, Unity of Command;
5. Sufficient number of supervisors; and
6. The BPD's and the City's existing and projected resources."

In May of 2019, Alexander Weiss Consulting, LLC was engaged by the City of Baltimore to prepare a staffing plan. The plan is designed to provide a "roadmap" to implement the staffing analysis that was prepared by the National Police Foundation.

In preparing the methodology for this study we reviewed the Police Foundation Analysis, the comments by the Department of Justice and the Monitor with respect to the plan, and we reviewed the Monitor's Second Semiannual Report (J anuary 2019). The staffing plan also addressed those areas as defined in the Consent Decree, as well as the areas that the Monitor and the Department of J ustice thought were not adequately addressed in the staffing analysis.

Our work focused on five areas:

1. We conducted a staffing analysis for all nine patrol districts
2. We developed a plan to ensure Unity of Command and an appropriate number of supervisors
3. We conducted a review of staffing, policy and procedure for the Public Integrity Bureau (PIB), IT, recruiting and the training academy
4. Reviewed staffing in all specialized units, particularly with respect to whether there are opportunities to redeploy some members of these units to patrol
5. We examined the use on nonsworn staff, particularly as it relates to increasing capacity for deployment of sworn positions.

It is important to acknowledge the context of this study:

- We were not asked to conduct a staffing analysis for every unit in the agency, but rather we focused on those units described above.
- It is important to understand that BPD is undergoing significant reform and transformation. Since we began our work there have changes in agency leadership, substantial reorganization, and new policy and procedure. All of this change is laudable, but it made our task more complicated. Some of circumstances that shaped our analyses changed in the weeks after we conducted our field work. Some of our interim recommendations were acted on immediately; some changes were implemented before we were able to suggest them.
- Our recommendations are based on the collective knowledge of our team of law enforcement executives, academics and consultants, all of whom have extensive experience working with large police organizations.

Below we list eleven key findings and the related recommendations of our study. The findings are highlighted in bold, and the recommendations appear with the finding. Detailed examination of these subjects appears in the main body of the report.

## Key Findings and Recommendations

## Patrol

1. The present patrol deployment and work schedule is based on the "constant." The constant defines the number of officers that must be on duty at all times. That number is based on the number of posts (beats) and sectors in each district. So, for example, if a district has 14 posts that means that 14 police officers must be in duty (one in each post). In addition, each shift must deploy a desk officer and an officer to staff the wagon. It requires 987 police officers to meet these staffing demands. This staffing scheme is nominally the same on all three shifts, and as a general rule if the number of personnel falls below that number those positions are filled through overtime. Because the number of officers currently available for duty to patrol is not enough (688 as of December 2019) to regularly meet the constant level, the agency must spend significant amounts on overtime.

- BPD should strive to increase officer availability through closer management of benefit time off, light duty, and long-term absence from duty
- BPD should adopt a work schedule that does not require that equal numbers of officers be assigned to the day and afternoon shifts
- Replace sworn officers at front desk with nonsworn staff, and required security and architectural improvements
- Reassign district operations officers to sector policing
- BPD should examine realigning or consolidating police districts
- We concluded based on our workload analysis that in order to provide adequate officer time to spend $60 \%$ of their time on community generated calls for service and $40 \%$ of their time on community outreach, proactive enforcement and problem-solving it will require 805 police officers, 115 sergeants, and 27 lieutenants.

2. Our review of calls for service suggests:
a) The second largest category of calls is "other," providing very little information about the nature of the call. ${ }^{1}$
b) BPD responded to many calls, including alarms, minor traffic crashes, and parking complaints, that may be better handled through methods other than dispatching a police officer.
c) A substantial fraction of calls involves disturbances or other forms of public disorder

- BPD should adopt policy to better manage demand for calls for service such as alarms, property damage crashes, and larceny from auto.

3. BPD officers enter their arrival time on calls in fewer than one half of all dispatched calls. Thus, we are unable to measure travel time.

- BPD should ensure that officers notify dispatch when they arrive on the scene of a call.

4. Dispatch queue time (the time from when a call is entered into the dispatch system until a unit is dispatched) is unusually long in Baltimore. This occurs, in our view, because of dispatch policy and procedures and an inefficient patrol deployment scheme.

- BPD should make necessary changes to the system so that they can track the process time (time from receipt of call to entry into the system) separately from the time the call is waiting for an available officer.
- BPD should re-think its policy of handling low priority calls in the event of a serious incident (G-2, G-3). This policy seems unnecessary given that the queue is dynamic. That is, as the incident unfolds, the effects on capacity will occur normally-it need not be artificially imposed.
- Call screening should be improved to reduce the likelihood of duplicate calls. For example, during our observations a call came in about a disturbance at a

[^0]business. A few minutes later the same complainant called 911 with a slightly altered set of facts, but at the same address. The call taker created a new call.

- Dispatchers can, at present, only see calls assigned to their district. This limits their capacity to see incidents occurring in other districts, and particularly, incidents occurring on streets that serve as boundaries for the districts.
- Communication center staff should work with field supervisors to ensure that as calls are closed, assigned units are released to return to service.
- Sworn Shift Supervisors should be returned to field duty

5. In the current patrol work schedule, there are three day-off groups. On each squad, the sergeant and one-third of the sergeant's subordinates are assigned to one day-off group, while the remaining officers are split between the other two. This means that a sergeant has limited contact with a substantial fraction of subordinates. This is a serious deviation from unity of command. (Report page 53).

- The three sergeants on a patrol shift should be assigned to the same day off group as their subordinates
- BPD should assign an additional sergeant to each shift principally as the shift administrative sergeant and to serve as a backup when shift sergeants use benefit time off. Under the present schedule this change will require 27 additional sergeants be assigned to patrol.
- BPD should consider work schedules that facilitate both span of control and unity of command and that ensure adequate field supervision.


## Patrol Support Services and Criminal Investigations

6. BPD maintains a wide array of support and investigative units. Some of these units are quite small and their mission highly particularized. This approach has many effects on performance:
a) There is a high risk of redundancy
b) Many units have a very small span of supervisory control (e.g. one sergeant for two or three officers.
c) Most units could not provide empirical evidence of their contribution to BPD
d) Communication is difficult, particularly when units are in different chains of command
e) When a unit has a highly specialized set of tools and qualifications it makes it more difficult to use them in different settings.

The following table summarizes our recommendations for these support units:

## Patrol Support Services

| SWAT | The BPD may wish to consider reducing the amount of daily and <br> weekly training time to advance service availability. As <br> discussed below, it may wish to consider assigning all warrant <br> service-related duties to this unit. This is the approach used by <br> the New Orleans Police Department, and the Nashville Police <br> Department. Doing so would ensure predictable, accountable, |
| :--- | :--- |
| and reliable warrant service strategies, techniques, equipment, |  |
| etc. This would allow SWAT unit officers to further refine their |  |
| skills in dynamic entry, as well as to serve as the single point of |  |
| command to prioritize warrant service. From our interviews, |  |
| we learned the SWAT unit is used frequently to support warrant |  |
| service efforts, all the more reason to have these activities |  |
| under one command. |  |$|$| The city should consider combining BPD and BFD marine |
| :--- |
| services to streamline service delivery and achieve cost |
| efficiencies. |


| Special Events and Overtime | The BPD should consider having sufficiently trained civilian staff, supervised by one lieutenant or sergeant, assume all these duties, thereby freeing other sworn personnel in the unit for other BPD needs. |
| :---: | :---: |
| Arson / Economic Crimes | Determine if Fire Department employees can be trained and cross-certified to perform all Arson-related investigations (excluding perhaps Homicide by Arson). Close the Economic Crimes Unit and decentralize its investigations. Return personnel of these units to other BPD duties. |
| Animal Abuse | Close the animal abuse function and reassign the detective to other BPD needs. |
| Witness Services | Close this function, transfer its duties to the Homicide unit, and reassign its detective to other BPD needs |
| Towing / Fleet Safety | The Towing function appears to be purely regulatory and therefore should be converted to a civilian unit, with sworn personnel reassigned to other BPD needs. The Fleet Safety unit appears to be primarily a disciplinary accountability function and should be realigned to either the Chief of Patrol, Internal Affairs, or Academy offices, supported by either one sergeant to evaluate findings or a sufficiently trained civilian. |
| Dirt Bike | Assign to METRO Division |
| Mobile Metro | Expand use as part of METRO Division |
| Special Events and Overtime | The BPD should consider having sufficiently trained civilian staff, supervised by one lieutenant or sergeant, assume all these duties, thereby freeing other sworn personnel in the unit for other BPD needs. |
| Mobile Training Unit | The BPD should consider closing this unit, transferring its responsibilities to the Academy, which can develop appropriate curriculum and content and maintain training records. This would allow sworn personnel in this unit to be reassigned to other BPD needs. |
| Bridge | Given the pressing demands for BPD patrol services, and the high likelihood that other government or private advocacy groups can perform the duties of this section, we recommend the BPD close this section or limit its staffing to one (civilian, sufficiently trained) liaison, freeing sworn staff here to serve other BPD needs. |
| Auxiliary and Chaplaincy | Given the pressing demands for BPD patrol services, and the high likelihood that other government or private advocacy groups can perform the duties of this section, we recommend the BPD close this section or limit its staffing to one (civilian, sufficiently trained) liaison, freeing sworn staff here to serve other BPD needs. |
| HOT | The BPD may wish to consider decentralizing work of the team to the most affected districts. |


|  |
| :--- | :--- |
| Youth Services |
| Administration |$\quad$| The BPD should have a properly trained civilian perform these |
| :--- |
| duties, freeing one officer and one detective for other BPD |
| needs. |

Criminal Investigations

| ICAC Sex |  |
| :--- | :--- |
| Trafficking | Considering the type of work that ICAC performs and the need <br> for highly specialized computer skills, the BPD should consider <br> consolidating this unit with the Special Activities Unit. This <br> would help ensure requisite knowledge, skills, abilities, and <br> equipment are standardized and accountable. |
| Special Activities | The specialized knowledge, skills, abilities, and equipment of <br> this new and emerging police investigative strategy are best <br> centralized so as to maintain standards and accountability. We <br> recommend maintaining this unit and investing in it as <br> necessary. This unit may require more BPD capital and <br> personnel expenditures in coming years. The BPD may wish to <br> consider re-hiring well-vetted retirees who could be trained as <br> needed in these critical fields. |
| Criminal <br> Intelligence | Consider a more strategic approach to the use of this unit. <br> HIDTA and ATF <br> The BPD should consider the partnerships that are valuable <br> from these assignments. At the same time, in reassessing this <br> work and reviewing it with federal partners, it should assert <br> that the primary mission of BPD members must be the needs of <br> the BPD in its service to Baltimore. |
| WATF | Given the specific techniques of this unit as well as the <br> equipment partnerships it requires with other agencies, the <br> BPD should consider placing this unit within the SWAT command <br> so as to provide better continuity in mission, accountability, <br> techniques, and strategies. |
| Gangs | Given the Iow commitment of personnel to this unit, the BPD <br> should consider disbanding it. |


| GVED | The BPD should consider disbanding this unit and training District and <br> detective-unit supervisors to oversee these investigations. This would <br> allow reassignment of 1 sergeant and 2 detectives to other needs. |
| :--- | :--- |
| Undercover <br> Squad | The BPD should consider a more strategic use of these resources. This <br> would free 1 sergeant and 11 detectives to BPD needs. |
| Homicide <br> Operations | The BPD may wish to consider consolidating this unit with the SWAT <br> unit, which may be better equipped, staffed, and supported for <br> serving subpoenas. |
| Homicide | We suggest that homicide detectives only work homicide cases, with <br> other death cases shifted to District detectives after sufficient <br> training, and with homicide detectives available to consult on cases <br> as needed. This would permit 50 homicide detectives to adopt six new <br> cases yearly, or a total of 300. |

In addition, we propose a strategy to significantly improve BPD capacity to deploy rapidly, and strategically, and to be much more responsive to district and neighborhood problems. This plan consists of creation of the Metro Division, commanded by a major. The key attribute of this unit would be flexibility and capacity to address a myriad of issues. The new division will be constructed by combining several existing units. There are two critical elements. First, although members would be specialists (e.g. K-9 or Motors) they would not be limited to those skills. Their tasks will be defined by the mission. Some tasks will require uniformed responses, while others may not. Second, all members of the division must agree, as condition of joining the division, that they will work whenever and wherever the department needs them, subject, of course to standard HR procedures.

## Public Integrity

7. BPD Is experiencing a significant backlog in the investigation of complaints lodged against employees. Moreover, the consent decree will require greater resources to ensure that complaints are handled according to best practices.

- In order to address its backlog and anticipated workload the Public Integrity Bureau will have to add 46 investigators.


## Recruitment

8. BPD, like many other law enforcement agencies, has struggled to recruit high quality individuals to serve as police officers. Moreover, the agency continues to experience the loss of officers through retirement, and other forms of separation at a pace that exceeds its capacity to add new sworn personnel.

- Increase the size of recruit classes. This would have to be examined relative to facility space and the ability to maintain instructional quality (e.g., by incorporating enough facilitators to assist instructors).
- Increase the annual number of academy classes. This would also have to be examined relative to facility and instructor availability. One option may be to look for opportunities to reduce the length of BPD training, as it currently is substantially longer than other training programs in the state, thereby making facilities and instructors more available.
- Reduce the current academy attrition rate of $18 \%$ An analysis of the difficulties recruits have during the academy and the reasons that they drop out or fail can help guide attrition reduction strategies.
- Reduce the overall attrition rate of the department. As noted above, there are many strategies the BPD can explore to boost officer retention and develop evidence-based strategies for reducing it.

Education and Training
9. Implementation of the Consent Decree will result in significant demands on the training staff for in-service programs. We anticipate that officers will spend 20 workdays in in-service training each year.

- More civilian staff to help create, deliver, and facilitate instruction. The city is becoming more flexible in hiring back sworn officers as civilians to facilitate training, considering compensation issues on a case-by-case basis. Nevertheless, some bureaucratic obstacles remain, such as the requirement for staff to wait 90 days between separating and being hired again.
- A civilian staff member to help input and maintain all training records.
- Assessing with a civilian analyst how to increase training efficiency. For example, staff report that the law course is the most difficult for recruits to successfully complete at the academy. It would be helpful to understand why this is the case and develop strategies (e.g., study groups, primers, group tutors, materials that can be reviewed earlier in the process) to assist the recruits. It would also be helpful to see how education level correlates with success at the academy in general and in the law courses in particular. Similarly, recruits report about four weeks of "down time" during academy training. Process assessments may illustrate ways to streamline operations and reduce the overall length of the academy.
- Improving training facilities so as to conduct the necessary training in a more efficient and professional manner. The Department recently signed a five-year lease to use space at the University of Baltimore in order to conduct much of the Department's training needs.


## Introduction

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1. We conducted a staffing analysis for all nine patrol districts.
2. We developed a plan to ensure Unity of Command and an appropriate number of supervisors.
3. We conducted a review of staffing, policy and procedure for the Public Integrity Bureau (PIB), Technology Division (IT), Recruitment Division, and the Education and Training Division (Training).
4. Reviewed staffing in all specialized units, particularly with respect to whether there are opportunities to redeploy some members of these units to patrol.
5. We examined the use on nonsworn staff, particularly as it relates to increasing capacity for deployment of sworn positions.

## 1. Patrol Staffing

The National Police Foundation Staffing Analysis suggested the number of officers to be assigned to patrol by district. In review of the analysis, and in consultation with BPD, a deeper analysis would need to be conducted for the purposes of the Staffing Plan. In conducting a deeper analysis, a number of factors were considered:

- Our staffing analysis is based on partitioning officer time into obligated and unobligated time. That is, we built a model that is designed to ensure that officers have $60 \%$ of their time available for calls for service and $40 \%$ of their time available for community outreach, proactive enforcement and problemsolving.
- We examined factors related to officer recruitment and retention. Many law enforcement agencies struggle with the timely replacement of officers that leave the agency. Understanding this process in Baltimore will assist the agency to predict those vacancies and introduce steps to ensure consistency.
- Patrol performance is significantly influenced by policy and procedure in the communication center. We examined how calls for service are handled to see if there are efficiencies that can free up officer time.
- Most agencies care a great deal about response time but may not fully understand the factors that influence how quickly an officer can arrive at a scene. We examined how long it takes to process calls prior to dispatch, how long calls wait in queue awaiting an available officer, and travel time.

2. Unity of Command and Officer-Supervisor Relationship

The Staffing Plan examines how BPD is organized to ensure an effective officersupervisor relationship. The goal has two components: first, the span of control to be narrow enough to allow effective supervision (six to eight officers per supervisor). Second, BPD must organize so that every officer has one (and only one) supervisor and that their work schedules align to maximize their contact time.
3. Staffing in Public Integrity Bureau (PIB), Information Technology (IT) and the Training Academy

Introduction of the reforms articulated in the Consent Decree will place significant administrative requirements on PIB, IT and the Training Academy. While these units were assessed by the Police Foundation, it is clear from the DOJ and Monitor comments that additional analysis was necessary, including the influence of improved technology or processes on increasing capacity for operations personnel.
4. Specialized Units

In police agencies, the use of specialized units have a significant impact on patrol deployment. Among the impacts are:

- vacancies in specialized units are typically filled by patrol officers, even when the patrol division may be understaffed. This appears to be the case with BPD where vacancy rates in specialized units are much lower than in patrol.
- difficulty in reassigning officers in special units back to patrol.
- If left unchecked, specialized units may deploy resources in a manner that does not consider patrol operations.

5. Civilianization: Use of Nonsworn Staff

Many law enforcement agencies use sworn officers to perform tasks that could be better performed by professional nonsworn staff. When sworn personnel are used for administrative tasks, the agency underutilizes the skills and training that has been invested into sworn officers. Whereas, professional nonsworn staff can often better perform such tasks for which they are highly skilled. BPD has already made efforts to address the use of nonsworn staff and this Plan expands on that work.

## Patrol Operations

## A Framework for Understanding Police Staffing

In the face of increasing costs and shrinking revenues, many communities are asking how many police officers are required to ensure public safety. Put another way, what number of officers would help an agency most cost-effectively meet the demands placed on it? This is a fundamentally different question than how many officers does a community want or can support; yet, answering the need question effectively frames a discussion about want and affordability. ${ }^{2}$

Law enforcement administrators have few resources to guide them in determining the number of officers they need. There are multiple approaches to answering this question, ranging from the simple to the complex, each with a range of advantages, disadvantages, and assumptions.

The sections that follow highlight common staffing approaches and demonstrate how agencies may develop and use a workload-based assessment of patrol staffing needs that incorporates performance objectives for discretionary time. Where feasible, workload-based approaches are superior to others in that they can help provide a better and more objective way to determine staffing needs. Additionally, comprehensive assessments for patrol help to answer a host of critical questions regarding resource allocation and deployment.

Traditionally, there have been four basic approaches to determining workforce levels: per capita, minimum staffing, authorized level, and workload-based. Each differs in its assumptions, ease of calculation, usefulness, validity, and efficiency. We review each below to provide context for developing an evidence-based approach to police staffing.

## The Per Capita Approach

Many police agencies have used their resident population to estimate the number of officers a community needs. The per capita method compares the number of officers with the population of a jurisdiction. To determine an optimum number of officers per population-that is, an optimum officer rate-an agency may compare its rate to that of other regional jurisdictions or to peer agencies of a similar size. Although it is difficult to determine the historical origin or justification for the per capita method, it is clear that substantial variations exist among police departments.

Advantages of the per capita approach include its methodological simplicity and ease of interpretation. The population data required to calculate this metric, such as census

[^1]figures and estimates, are readily available and regularly updated. Per capita methods, which control for factors such as crime rates, can permit communities to compare themselves with peer organizations.

The disadvantage of this method is that it addresses only the relative quantity of police officers per population, but not how officers spend their time, the quality of their efforts, or community conditions, needs, and expectations. The per capita approach also cannot guide agencies on how to deploy their officers.

Agencies using the per capita method may incorporate biases introduced elsewhere in using a per capita approach to determine an appropriate number of officers. The principal reason for this is that a generally accepted benchmark for an optimum-staffing rate does not exist. Rather, there is considerable variation in the police rate depending on community size, region, and agency structure and type. For example, police rates are substantially higher in the northeastern states when compared to the western states. When comparing individual jurisdictions, it is not uncommon for similar communities to have per capita rates that are substantially different.

Given the disadvantages, experts have strongly advised against using population rates for police staffing. The International Association of Chiefs of Police warns, "Ratios, such as officers-per-thousand population, are totally inappropriate as a basis for staffing decisions. Defining patrol staffing allocation and deployment requirements is a complex endeavor which requires consideration of an extensive series of factors and a sizable body of reliable, current data." ${ }^{3}$

## The Minimum Staffing Approach

The minimum staffing approach requires police supervisors and command staff to estimate a sufficient number of patrol officers that must be deployed at any one time to maintain officer safety and provide an adequate level of protection to the public. The use of minimum staffing approaches is fairly common; it is generally reinforced through organizational policy and practice as well as collective bargaining agreements.

There are two principal reasons a jurisdiction may use a minimum staffing approach. First, policymakers in many communities believe a minimum number of officers are needed to ensure public safety. This may be particularly common in small communities where there are relatively few citizen-generated demands for police service, yet residents expect a minimum number of officers to be on duty at all times. Second, police officers themselves may insist (often through collective bargaining) that a minimum number of officers be on duty at all times. In some communities, the minimum staffing level is established by ordinance.

[^2]There are, however, no objective standards for setting a minimum staffing level. Agencies may consider population, call load, crime rate, or still other variables when establishing a minimum staffing level. Yet many agencies may determine the minimum necessary staff level by perceived need without any factual basis in workload, presence of officers, response time, immediate availability, distance to travel, shift schedule, or other performance criteria. This may result in deploying too few officers when workload is high and too many officers when it is low. To be sure, the minimum staffing level is often higher than what would be warranted by the agency workload. Ironically, even when the minimum staffing is not workload based, it is not uncommon to hear police officers suggest that an increase in the agency's workload should warrant an increase in the minimum staffing level.

Minimum staffing levels are sometimes set so high that it results in increasing demands for police overtime. When staffing falls below the minimum standard, police managers typically must have officers work overtime to satisfy the minimum staff requirement. It is not uncommon for some agencies to have officers work nearly every day due to absences by other officers for sick leave, vacations, or other reasons.

Additionally, some agencies may use a very narrow definition of available staffing. For example, agencies may have an officer work overtime to fill a vacancy in patrol, even though there are a number of other officers on the street, including those in traffic, school resource units, and supervisors. Inefficiency increases when there are minimum staffing levels on overlapping shifts, leading to a higher number of officers on duty at a time that may not coincide with workload demand.

Most police officers would prefer to have more officers on the street, lending credence to a minimum-staffing model. Nevertheless, increasing the minimum staffing level will not, by itself, improve agency performance or necessarily increase officer safety. In fact, officers working extra shifts to maintain staffing levels are likely to be fatigued, increasing the risk of injury to themselves or others.

Minimum staffing can also decrease the extent to which an agency can be nimble and flexibly deploy officers based on changing workload demands.

Finally, in some agencies the minimum staffing level may become, by default, the perceived optimal staffing level. In these situations, agencies often use the minimum level as a method to decide whether an officer can take a benefit day off. Others build work schedules so as to ensure that the minimum level is on duty. In these situations, staffing decisions are based on meeting the minimum level rather than optimizing the available resources to meet workload demand.

## The Authorized Level Approach

The authorized level approach uses budget allocations to specify a number of officers that may be allocated. Although the authorized level may be determined through a formal staffing assessment, it is often driven by resource availability and political decision-making. The authorized level does not typically reflect any identifiable criteria such as demand for service, community expectations, or efficiency analyses, but may instead reflect an incremental budgeting process.

The authorized level can become an artificial benchmark for need, creating the misperception among police leadership, line staff, and the community that the agency is understaffed and overworked if the actual number of officers does not meet the authorized level. Additionally, unless an agency staffs above the authorized level, fluctuations in recruitment, selection, training, and attrition may lead to the actual staffing levels falling below authorized levels.

Because the authorized level is often derived independently of workload considerations, an agency may be able to meet workforce demand with fewer officers than authorized. Still, the perception of being understaffed, resulting when officials bemoan the department operating below authorized strength, can diminish morale and productivity and make it appear that the community is not adequately funding public safety.

## The Workload-based Approach

A more comprehensive attempt to determining appropriate workforce levels considers actual police workload. Workload-based approaches derive staffing indicators from demand for service. What differentiates this approach is the requirement to systematically analyze and determine staffing needs based upon actual workload demand while accounting for service-style preferences and other agency features and characteristics. The workload approach estimates future staffing needs of police departments by modeling the level of current activity.

Conducting a workload analysis can assist in determining the need for additional resources or reallocating existing resources (by time and location), assessing individual and group performance and productivity, and detecting trends in workload that may illustrate changing activity levels and conditions. Furthermore, a workload analysis can be performed at every level of the police department and for all key functions; although it is more difficult to assess workload for some units than others. The importance of the workload-based approach to staffing is evidenced by it being codified as a standard (16.1.2) by the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies: The agency allocates personnel to, and distributes them within, all organizational components in
accordance with documented workload assessments conducted at least once every three years. ${ }^{4}$

Unfortunately, there is no universally accepted standard method for conducting a workload-based assessment. Defining and measuring work varies by agency. Knowing that staff decisions are based upon calls for service and the time required to respond to them, officers may not have an incentive to be efficient in their response to calls or even to engage in activities that reduce calls. Learning how to conduct a workloadbased assessment may be challenging for police administrators. Typical workload models are complicated and require intensive calculations. They also require decisions on a wide array of issues that are very difficult for officials and communities to makesuch as how frequently streets should be patrolled-and do not uniformly account for discretionary activities, such as time for community policing and other officer-initiated activities.

Even with shortcomings, allocation models based on actual workload and performance objectives are preferable to other methods that might not account for environmental and agency-specific variables. Agencies could benefit from a more popularized workload-based methodology of staffing analysis that is easy to learn and comprehend, is employed by administrators, and, importantly, helps to effectively manage discretionary time. No single metric or benchmark should be used as the sole basis for determining an agency's staffing level. Rather, agencies should consider metrics in light of professional expertise that can place them in an appropriate practical context.

Another way to think about law enforcement staffing is more contextual. Figure 1 illustrates this. We discuss each of its elements below.

[^3]

## Figure 1 Framework for Staffing Analysis

Many agencies use some form of deployment model to allocate resources. These models, however, have some limitations.

- Many of these models are very complex, require lots of data, and are based on problematic underlying assumptions. For example, some models require users to specify a "patrol interval," or how frequently a patrol car should patrol a given location. If asked, some citizens might suggest having a patrol car pass on their street every 30 minutes. This would require a substantial increase in department size-perhaps 10- or 20-fold-and may, ironically, also lead residents to believe that the neighborhood is dangerous.
- The data used in these models is often troublesome. Most of these models use "calls for service data" but every computer-assisted dispatch (CAD) system defines that differently. Disaggregating citizen-generated calls from other types of calls is difficult.
- Workload based models do not work well for off-peak hours or for places with relatively few calls for service. Estimating staffing on midnight shifts, for example, can be problematic.

Work schedules are a critical component of resource allocation, but often they are treated as though they are not related. For example, a recent request-for-proposals from a police department sought to determine how many officers the department "needed." The department also indicated that changing the work schedule (no matter how inefficient) could not be done. Another common phenomenon is that agencies adopt work schedules in order to motivate or reward officer performance. While we can appreciate the desire to motivate performance this way, agencies should not
reduce their capacity to deploy efficiently. Most agencies, we believe, develop a work schedule based on the number of officers that they have rather than what they need.

Many agencies use specialized units, and this may impact deployment. Among the problems that specialized units can pose to deployment are:

- Understaffing of patrol operations. When vacancies occur in specialized units, they are typically filled by officers assigned to patrol, even if the patrol division is understaffed.
- Difficulties for some agencies in reassigning special-unit officers back to patrol.
- Deploying specialized officers in ways that do not consider patrol operations. For example, one agency we recently studied has 1,000 sworn officers and about 150 officers who are assigned to investigations or special operations. All but 8 of those 150 officers work day shift ( 8 a.m. to 4 p.m.) from Monday through Friday.

Policing in the United States is decentralized and fragmented. In recent years there has been considerably more discussion about sharing services, either through consolidation, merger, or contracting. These approaches are highly controversial, but provide extraordinary opportunity to reduce duplication of services, provide more career opportunities for officers, and, in many cases improve the quality of service delivery.

Much discussion about police deployment revolves around the supply of police services. Many agencies are finding much can be done in managing demand.

- For many years, communities have sought ways to better manage incoming calls. Such efforts led to development of 311 as a number for nonemergency calls. The Baltimore Police Department, for example, was one of the first to adopt a 311 system. In the first year of the program, the department experienced a 25 percent reduction in 911 calls, with those in the lowest priority category dropping 99.7 percent. ${ }^{5}$ A 2005 study found that Baltimore reduced calls to 911 by 34 percent as well as garnered high community satisfaction with the use of 311 for noise, parking, abandoned vehicle, and similar complaints that comprise a substantial proportion of police calls in most communities. ${ }^{6}$
- Many agencies will not send an officer for events such as
o Traffic accidents with no injuries
o Found property that does not pose a health or safety risk and is not evidence in a crime
o Offenses that are not in progress and for which there is no evidence or suspect information (e.g., shoplifting)

[^4]o Medical calls not requiring police intervention

- Many agencies handle a substantial fraction of calls by phone or through on-line reporting. ${ }^{7}$

Agencies must closely examine their use of non-sworn staff. Many departments continue to use sworn officers to perform tasks that could and should be performed by non-sworn staff. Evidence suggests that

- Increasing non-sworn staff frees up time for sworn officers to do community policing and other tasks
- Non-sworn staff often have skills more appropriate for the immediate task
- The cost of non-sworn personnel is typically less than that of sworn personnel.

Finally, it seems obvious, but every staffing study should include a discussion about the agency mission, or what the agency hopes to accomplish. That is, if agencies are to free up officer time by using civilian staff or on-line reporting, then what would they want the officers to do with that time? Put another way, staffing studies should always ask four core questions.

- What does the department do?
- What does it want to accomplish?
- How does it do it?
- Are there better ways to do what it does now?


## District Patrol

## Calls for Service

The Baltimore Police Department (BPD) has considered workload-based approaches in the past. The National Police Foundation Staffing Analysis drafted in 2018, for example, reviewed calls for service data and found that, from July 1, 2016 to J une 30, 2017, BPD patrol officers responded to $1,102,121$ calls for service (CFS). Based on this data, the analysis suggested that the BPD would need 910 officers assigned to patrol, assuming patrol officers spent 60 percent of their time on calls for service and 40 percent on other activities. ${ }^{8}$

However, the assertion that BPD responded to nearly 1.1 million CFS did not seem likely. We based that concern on our recent experience conducting similar analyses in cities both larger and the similar size as Baltimore (population approximately 605,000). In those studies, we found the following number of community generated calls for service: ${ }^{9}$

[^5]- Chicago (2.7 million)
- Louisville METRO $(685,000)$
- Albuquerque $(560,000)$
1.4 million calls for service per year 580,000 calls for service per year 400,000 calls for service per year.

To address these concerns, we reviewed BPD Records Management System (RMS) data for 2017 and 2018. ${ }^{10}$ Based on this review, a different analysis was conducted and we found that there were 366,927 uniqu CFS for 2018. Of those calls, there were 79,780 "911/ No Voice" calls, or calls when someone inadvertently dials 911 and there is no voice on the line when the 911 call taker answers the phone. After extensive discussions with BPD Staff and a critical review of the actual data, however, it was concluded that only 3,811 of these calls resulted in a dispatch of a police officer. ${ }^{11}$ After adjusting for this anomaly, the number of unique calls was reduced to 290,943 .

Figure 2 illustrates the distribution of CFS city-wide by hour of day. Peak demand for BPD services is in the late afternoon. The number of calls at 4:00 PM, 20,805, is nearly seven times as those that occur at $4: 00 \mathrm{AM}, 3,007$. This is critical because under the current patrol deployment scheme in BPD patrol the number of officers on duty at 4:00 PM is nominally the same as the number on duty at 4:00 AM.


Figure 2 CFS by Hour of Day
Figure 3 illustrates this more broadly. It shows the distribution of calls by shift (Day 7AM to 3PM, Afternoon 3PM to 11PM, and Night 11PM to 7AM). Note that the day and afternoon shifts are relatively similar in their numbers of calls for service, but that the night shift has significantly fewer calls.

[^6]

Figure 3 CFS by Shift

Figure 4 illustrates the CFS distribution by day of week. With the exception of Sunday, most days have a similar volume of calls, between 41,000 and 44,000 .


Figure 4 CFS by Day of Week
Figure 5 shows the CFS distribution by month. Not surprisingly, the warm weather months have a higher volume of calls.


Figure 5 CFS by Month

Now we turn to the nature of the calls for service. The following table illustrates the most common call categories, i.e., categories for which there were at least 2,000 CFS. There are several important observations in this data:

- The second largest category of calls is "other," providing very little information about the nature of the call. ${ }^{12}$
- BPD responded to many calls, including alarms, minor traffic crashes, and parking complaints, that may be better handled through other methods than dispatching a police officer.
- A substantial fraction of calls involves disturbances or other forms of public disorder.

[^7]| CATEGORY | NUMBER |
| :--- | :--- |
| DISORDERLY PERSON | 45438 |
| OTHER | 36158 |
| NARCOTICS OUTSIDE | 24472 |
| SILENT ALARM | 19580 |
| ACCIDENT AUTO | 16631 |
| COMMON ASSAULT | 11080 |
| LARCENY OTHER | 10820 |
| ACCIDENT HIT \& RUN | 9599 |
| LARCENY FROM AUTO | 7097 |
| DESTRUCT. OF PROPERTY | 6989 |
| SUSPICIOUS PERSON | 6640 |
| BURGLARY | 5645 |
| STOLEN VEHICLE/ OTHER | 5297 |
| FAMILY DISTURBANCE | 5184 |
| LOUD NOISE | 4922 |
| PARKING COMPLAINT | 4153 |
| INVESTIGATE AUTO | 4068 |
| MISSING PERSON | 4012 |
| NARCOTICS | 3882 |
| 911/ NO VOICE CALL 13 | 3811 |
| JUVENILE DISTURBANCE | 3402 |
| ACCIDENT PERSON INJ. | 2638 |
| SUPERVISOR COMP 14 |  |
| OVERDOSE | 2613 |
| FOLLOWUP | 2327 |
| REQUEST ASSISTANCE POLICE | 2202 |
|  | 2009 |

Table 1 Most Common Call Categories

BPD further classifies calls by priority, using the following criteria.

Priority 1- Emergency Calls-situations that require immediate police response and involves an imminent threat to a person's safety to include:

[^8]Priority 2-Prompt Calls- situations that require immediate police response and there exists a potential risk to a person's safety or immediate and substantial property loss or damage to include:

Priority 3-Routine Calls-situations that do not require immediate response to prevent imminent harm to a person or prevent significant property loss/ damage and indicating criminal activity for report purposes only:

Priority 4-Non-CriticalCalls- situations that do not require immediate police response to include:

Figure 6 summarizes CFS by priority. Priority one and two calls, both of which require "immediate response," represent 60 percent of all calls.


Figure 6 CFS by Priority

The Baltimore Police Department maintains nine police districts, each directed by a major. Figure 7 illustrates those districts, the sectors and posts.


## BALTIMORE POLICE DEPARTMENT <br> Area of Responsibility



FOUO//LES//Not for Publication//Prepared by ITS
Figure 7 BPD Districts and Sectors

Figure 8 shows the number of calls per district varies. Note, for example that the Northeastern District responds to twice the number of calls as the Eastern District. It is important to note that BPD plans to examine district staffing and design after the 2020 Census. This should be an opportunity to examine the allocation of calls between districts.


Figure 8 CFS by District

## Response Time Analysis

Law enforcement agencies often focus on response time goals, seeking to have officers arrive on scene within a specific timeframe. Sometimes this effort is misplaced because in most communities a relatively small fraction of calls requires an urgent response. In Baltimore the prioritization scheme used by the department indicates that priority one and priority two calls require an immediate response. It is instructive to understand how to measure that response.

Response time can be best understood in terms of three components:

1. Process Time describes the time from when someone answers the phone in the 911 center until the information about the call is entered into the CAD system and is available to dispatch. In most large agencies, this is a two-stage process involving a call-taker and a dispatcher. In some agencies, one person performs both tasks.
2. Queue Time describes the time from when the dispatcher is notified of the call until it is dispatched to an officer. Measuring queue time can be an effective approach to gauge officer availability.
3. Travel Time describes the time from when a call is dispatched until the time the officer arrives.

Thinking about response time in this way allows us to see that response time performance can be affected by different factors. For example, failure by the dispatch center to handle incoming calls expeditiously will slow the response. Failure by dispatchers to locate available officers will also slow the process. Finally, officers responding to calls may be hampered by long distances or by traffic congestion.

In Baltimore, our study of response time is constrained in two ways. First, the RMS data available does not record the process time. We only know when all information for a call has been entered and the call is ready for dispatch. As a result, we are unable to disaggregate the process time from the queue time. Second, BPD officers enter their arrival time in fewer than one half of all calls. Thus, we are unable to measure travel time.

Because of these limitations, we are forced to rely on two measures: received-todispatch (including process and queue time) and from when the called is dispatched until the call is complete (officer's total time).

Table 2 shows the average and median values for received-to-dispatch and dispatch-tocomplete for all calls (regardless of priority).

| All Call Time Values | Average | Median |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Received to Dispatch | $0: 20: 42$ | $0: 08: 00$ |
| Dispatch to Complete | $0: 24: 13$ | $0: 15: 06$ |

Table 2 Times for Performance Measurement: All Calls

Table 3 shows the same data for priority one calls.

| Priority 1 Call Time Values | Average | Median |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Received to Dispatch | $0: 12: 39$ | $0: 05: 00$ |
| Dispatch to Complete | $0: 28: 12$ | $0: 16: 00$ |

Table 3 Times for Performance Measurement: Priority One Calls
For this study, 45 minutes was used as the factor for the average time an officer spends responding to and closing a call. This reflects the average Dispatch-to-Complete time above plus an additional 15 minutes to account for BPD's paper-based process.

There are several observations about this data:

- For all calls the received-to-dispatch time is adequate, compared to other large cities we have studied.
- For Priority 1 calls requiring an "immediate" response, there is a wait of several minutes for a unit to be dispatched; longer than optimal. We will discuss this in more detail in our discussion of the 911 Center.


## Managing Calls for Service for BPD

While much of police agency staffing focuses on the supply of officers, there are also opportunities to manage the demand for police services. We highlight below five ways by which the BPD could manage demand for its services.

- 911/ No Voice. BPD Communications logs a call each time a 911 hang-up call is received. In 2018 there were approximately 78,000 such calls, of which an estimated 3,000 were actually dispatched. The BPD should monitor practices here to ensure there is consistency across dispatchers.
- Alarms. This is the biggest opportunity for improvement. Many agencies have adopted "verified response," in which the responsibility for responding to an alarm shifts from the police to the alarm provider. Note, for example, Milwaukee Police Department policy.

Public Safety Ordinance \#105-75-14-c-5 requires that alarm businesses provide a Private First Responder Service to respond to your activated burglary alarm to verify that a cause for the alarm exists prior to contacting the police department. If the alarm responder determines that a crime or an attempted crime has occurred or is occurring at the alarmed premise (a verified alarm), the responder will call for immediate police response. ${ }^{15}$

Prior to adoption of this policy, Milwaukee police responded to 30,000 burglar alarms annually, 97 percent of which were false. In recent years, Milwaukee police have responded to 800 burglar alarms annually, 70 percent of which are false. Put another way, the number of false burglar alarms to which Milwaukee police respond has, under this policy, decreased from more than 29,000 to less than 600.

- Property Damage Auto Accidents. Under Maryland law, most property damage accidents do not require a police investigation. Nevertheless, the BPD appears to dispatch a number of accident calls. There may be opportunities to handle more of these by phone or with non-sworn community service officers. Albuquerque, for example, uses police service aides (PSAs) for such calls. ${ }^{16}$
- Larceny from auto and destruction of property. Most of these offenses have no suspect or evidentiary information; thus, they are better handled by 311, the Telephone Reporting Unit (TRU), or web-based reporting. Other offenses are also better-handled through alternative methods.

[^9]Below, for example, are the offenses that can be reported on line in Seattle. ${ }^{17}$

1. Property Destruction
2. Graffiti
3. Car Break-ins
4. Theft of Auto Accessories
5. Theft
6. Shoplifting
7. Drug Activity
8. Harassing Phone Calls
9. Credit Card Fraud
10. Wage Theft
11. Identity Theft
12. Lost Property

- Parking Complaints. Civilians or other non-officer approaches would be appropriate for handling these.


## Shift Relief Factor

The next step in our staffing estimate is to calculate the shift relief factor. The shift relief factor tells us the number of officers to assign to a shift in order to ensure that a sufficient number of officers are on duty to meet performance objectives. The shift relief factor accounts for the average leave time (sick, vacation, light duty, days off, etc.) an officer uses and is permitted to not report for duty in patrol.

The formula for calculating the shift relief factor is as follows:

## SRF = Maximum Days Available to Work/ Actual Days Worked in Patrol

In other words:

$$
S R F=\frac{\text { number of days of work in a time period }}{\text { days worked by one person during that period }}
$$

Typically, we can obtain benefit time off data from an agency database. BPD data, however, were incomplete, so we had to use an alternative approach. We calculated the maximum number of benefit days that could be used as specified in the FOP contract. For vacation, we used 18 days (the value for officers with 11-13 years of service). For training, we estimated the time required for state mandated in-service training and enhanced training due to arrive next year. (These requirements may increase, which, in turn, would boost the value of the shift relief factor.) For FMLA and light duty we used an estimate of 20 days.

[^10]Table 4 lists the days off an officer may have by category. Note that the total days possible in a year is 365; subtracting the 207 total days off means an officer works 158 days that year. Dividing 365 by 158 yields a result of approximately 2.3. Put another way, to ensure that at least one officer is on duty for a given shift, 2.3 officers ought to be assigned to that shift.

| Category of Leave/Days Off | \# Days Off |
| :--- | :--- |
| Holidays | 13 |
| Vacation | 18 |
| Sick | 12 |
| Bereavement | 4 |
| Training | 20 |
| Long Term Leave/ Limited Duty Gaps | 20 |
| Regular Days Off | 120 |
| Total Days Off / Year | $\mathbf{2 0 7}$ |
| Calculating Shift Relief Factor (SRF) |  |
| Days Worked (365-207) | $\mathbf{1 5 8}$ |
| SRF (365/ 158) | $\mathbf{2 . 3}$ |

Table 4 Calculation of Shift Relief Factor

The shift relief factor is an important component of a staffing plan. If, for example, an agency established a minimum staffing level (e.g. the "constant" at BPD), one could multiply the minimum level by the shift relief factor to calculate the required number of officers. For example, if the minimum staffing level was 15 officers, and the shift relief factor was two, the agency would have to assign 30 officers to the shift to ensure that 15 would appear for duty.

Table 5 provides a workload-based staffing estimates for the nine police districts in Baltimore.

- Column 1 lists the three patrol shifts
- Column 2 lists the number of calls for service by shift.
- Column 3 are the number of calls requiring a backup based on $60 \%$ of column 2 . The $60 \%$ is based the percentage of all calls were priority one or two as illustrated previously in Figure 6.
- Column 4 reflects the sum of column 2 and 3 .
- Column 5 lists the number of hours consumed by all calls for service based on an average of 45 minutes per call. ${ }^{18}$
- Column 6 divides the total time on calls for service by 2920, the number of hours (8) a shift for every day of the year (365). $365 \times 8=2920$.
- Column 7 adds two officers, one for the station desk and one for the district wagon.
- Column 8 defines a minimum level for staffing. This number determined, in collaboration with BPD, is necessary because on some shifts there are too few calls to justify a workload-based estimate.
- Columns 9 through 12 show the required staffing at alternative allocations of time for calls for service, and community outreach, proactive enforcement, and problem-solving. Obligated / Unobligated

[^11]Alexander Weiss Consulting, LLC

1
2
3
4
5
6
78

| 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $66 / 33$ | $60 / 40$ | $50 / 50$ | $40 / 60$ |
| Split | Split | Split | Split |


|  | CFS | Backup | Adj | Hours | Units | Wagon <br> Desk | Min Floor | 1.5 | 1.6667 | 2.0 | 2.5 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |  | Central |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 7:00am | 14309 | 8585.4 | 22894.4 | 17170.8 | 5.9 | 2 | 12 | 11 | 12 | 14 | 17 |
| 3:00pm | 15568 | 9340.8 | 24908.8 | 18681.6 | 6.4 | 2 | 12 | 12 | 13 | 15 | 18 |
| 11:00pm | 5647 | 3388.2 | 9035.2 | 6776.4 | 2.3 | 2 | 12 | 6 | 6 | 7 | 8 |
|  |  |  |  |  | Southeastern |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 7:00am | 12451 | 7470.6 | 19921.6 | 14941.2 | 5.1 | 2 | 12 | 10 | 11 | 13 | 15 |
| 3:00pm | 15473 | 9283.8 | 24756.8 | 18567.6 | 6.4 | 2 | 12 | 12 | 13 | 15 | 18 |
| 11:00pm | 6301 | 3780.6 | 10081.6 | 7561.2 | 2.6 | 2 | 14 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 |
|  |  |  |  |  | Eastern |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 7:00am | 9231 | 5538.6 | 14769.6 | 11077.2 | 3.8 | 2 | 12 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 12 |
| 3:00pm | 9300 | 5580 | 14880 | 11160 | 3.8 | 2 | 14 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 12 |
| 11:00pm | 3222 | 1933.2 | 5155.2 | 3866.4 | 1.3 | 2 | 12 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 6 |
|  |  |  |  |  | Northeastern |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 7:00am | 17086 | 10251.6 | 27337.6 | 20503.2 | 7.0 | 2 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 17 | 20 |
| 3:00pm | 22055 | 13233 | 35288 | 26466 | 9.1 | 2 | 12 | 16 | 18 | 21 | 25 |
| 11:00pm | 5039 | 3023.4 | 8062.4 | 6046.8 | 2.1 | 2 | 14 | 6 | 6 | 7 | 8 |
|  |  |  |  |  | Northern |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 7:00am | 12745 | 7647 | 20392 | 15294 | 5.2 | 2 | 12 | 10 | 11 | 13 | 16 |
| 3:00pm | 13074 | 7844.4 | 20918.4 | 15688.8 | 5.4 | 2 | 12 | 11 | 11 | 13 | 16 |
| 11:00pm | 4521 | 2712.6 | 7233.6 | 5425.2 | 1.9 | 2 | 12 | 5 | 6 | 6 | 7 |
|  |  |  |  |  | Northwestern |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 7:00am | 13795 | 8277 | 22072 | 16554 | 5.7 | 2 | 12 | 11 | 12 | 14 | 17 |
| 3:00pm | 15439 | 9263.4 | 24702.4 | 18526.8 | 6.3 | 2 | 12 | 12 | 13 | 15 | 18 |
| 11:00pm | 4369 | 2621.4 | 6990.4 | 5242.8 | 1.8 | 2 | 12 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
|  |  |  |  |  | Western |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 7:00am | 11012 | 6607.2 | 17619.2 | 13214.4 | 4.5 | 2 | 12 | 9 | 10 | 12 | 14 |
| 3:00pm | 13060 | 7836 | 20896 | 15672 | 5.4 | 2 | 12 | 11 | 11 | 13 | 16 |
| 11:00pm | 2605 | 1563 | 4168 | 3126 | 1.1 | 2 | 12 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 5 |
|  |  |  |  |  | Southwestern |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 7:00am | 11552 | 6931.2 | 18483.2 | 13862.4 | 4.7 | 2 | 12 | 10 | 10 | 12 | 14 |
| 3:00pm | 14905 | 8943 | 23848 | 17886 | 6.1 | 2 | 12 | 12 | 13 | 15 | 18 |
| 11:00pm | 3581 | 2148.6 | 5729.6 | 4297.2 | 1.5 | 2 | 12 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 6 |
|  |  |  |  |  | Southern |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 7:00am | 13768 | 8260.8 | 22028.8 | 16521.6 | 5.7 | 2 | 12 | 11 | 12 | 14 | 17 |
| 3:00pm | 14834 | 8900.4 | 23734.4 | 17800.8 | 6.1 | 2 | 12 | 12 | 13 | 15 | 18 |
| 11:00pm | 5584 | 3350.4 | 8934.4 | 6700.8 | 2.3 | 2 | 14 | 6 | 6 | 7 | 8 |

Table 5 BPD Patrol Staffing Estimates

There are several caveats to consider while examining the table:

- Workload-based models do not perform well when the number of calls per service on a shift falls below 10,000.
- These estimates only include patrol officers handling radio assignments, the wagon and the desk. They do not include supervisors or command staff. These positions will be examined in subsequent sections.
- We assume that when a backup unit is dispatched two units remain on the scene for the entire time. We do not include those calls when more than two units are dispatched or when officers "self-dispatch."
- For each shift we report the number of officers that should be assigned in order to ensure that the appropriate number is working. It is important that the level of assignment be maintained. That is, if an officer on that squad is injured, or suspended, or detailed to another unit, it will likely mean that the number of officers appearing for duty will be below that which is suggested. This is particularly critical given the widely held view that on most days about $10 \%$ of the district officers are not available for full duty due to one of the shift relief considerations outlined previously.

The BPD crime control strategy calls for an allocation of 60\% calls for service time and $40 \%$ community engagement time. This will require 805 officers to be assigned to patrol. It will also require 115 Sergeants and 27 lieutenants.

Table 6 illustrates the staffing required at this level of allocation.

|  | On Duty 60/40 | P/O Staffing Requirement Shift Relief Factor | SGT Staffing Requirement | LT Staffing Requirement |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Units | 1.6667 | 2.3 | 8 | 6 |
| Central |  | 86 | 12 | 3 |
| 7:00am | 12 | 28 | 4 | 1 |
| 3:00pm | 13 | 30 | 4 | 1 |
| 11:00pm | 12 | 28 | 4 | 1 |
| Southeastern |  | 91 | 13 | 3 |
| 7:00am | 12 | 28 | 4 | 1 |
| 3:00pm | 13 | 30 | 4 | 1 |
| 11:00pm | 14 | 33 | 5 | 1 |
| Eastern |  | 89 | 13 | 3 |
| 7:00am | 12 | 28 | 4 | 1 |
| 3:00pm | 14 | 33 | 5 | 1 |
| 11:00pm | 12 | 28 | 4 | 1 |
| Northeastern |  | 108 | 16 | 3 |
| 7:00am | 14 | 33 | 5 | 1 |
| 3:00pm | 18 | 42 | 6 | 1 |
| 11:00pm | 14 | 33 | 5 | 1 |
| Northern |  | 84 | 12 | 3 |
| 7:00am | 12 | 28 | 4 | 1 |
| 3:00pm | 12 | 28 | 4 | 1 |
| 11:00pm | 12 | 28 | 4 | 1 |
| Northwestern |  | 86 | 12 | 3 |
| 7:00am | 12 | 28 | 4 | 1 |
| 3:00pm | 13 | 30 | 4 | 1 |
| 11:00pm | 12 | 28 | 4 | 1 |
| Western |  | 84 | 12 | 3 |
| 7:00am | 12 | 28 | 4 | 1 |
| 3:00pm | 12 | 28 | 4 | 1 |
| 11:00pm | 12 | 28 | 4 | 1 |
| Southwestern |  | 86 | 12 | 3 |
| 7:00am | 12 | 28 | 4 | 1 |
| 3:00pm | 13 | 30 | 4 | 1 |
| 11:00pm | 12 | 28 | 4 | 1 |
| Southern |  | 91 | 13 | 3 |
| 7:00am | 12 | 28 | 4 | 1 |
| 3:00pm | 13 | 30 | 4 | 1 |
| 11:00pm | 14 | 33 | 5 | 1 |
|  |  | 805 | 115 | 27 |

[^12]
## Patrol Supervision and Management

One of the significant challenges facing the BPD is providing an adequate level of patrol supervision and management. There are three components to address: span of control, unity of command, and providing resources to respond to the increased administrative tasks generated by the Consent Decree.

There have been several efforts to identify an appropriate span of control for supervisor/ police officer staffing, but best practices suggest that an optimal span of control is about one supervisor for eight officers. ${ }^{19}$ In most BPD districts, there are 14 or 15 officers on duty per shift, and two sergeants assigned to be on duty. So, in one sense, the BPD meets the 1:8 ratio. However, sergeants who are not on duty due to vacation, sick leave, or other time off typically have their position assumed by a police officer (OIC or office in charge). This strategy is less than ideal.

At present, each shift is staffed by three sergeants, two of whom are scheduled to be on duty with the third on a regular day off. We suggest that, to ensure that two sergeants are on duty every day, there should be 4 sergeants assigned to each shift and many days there may be three on duty. Under the 60/ 40 allocation plan there will never be more than 16 officers on duty, thus BPD can maintain a span of control of 1 supervisor to eight officers.

Another important concept is that of unity of command, a management principle that ensures an employee is responsible to only one supervisor, who in turn is responsible to only one supervisor, and so forth in the organizational hierarchy.

In BPD's current patrol work schedule, there are three day-off groups. On each squad, the sergeant and one-third of the sergeant's subordinates are on one day-off group, while the remaining officers are split between the other two. This means that a sergeant has limited contact with a substantial fraction of subordinates. This is a serious deviation from unity of command.

Finally, as the policies and procedures encapsulated in the Consent Decree are implemented, BPD sergeants will have additional responsibilities. BPD must be cognizant that these additional responsibilities may have an impact on field supervisory capacity.

To address these issues, we recommend the following.

- The three sergeants on a patrol shift should be assigned to the same day off group as their subordinates

[^13]- BPD should assign an additional sergeant to each shift principally as the shift administrative sergeant and to serve as a backup when shift sergeants use benefit time off. Under the present schedule this change will require 27 additional sergeants be assigned to patrol.
- BPD should consider work schedules that facilitate both span of control and unity of command and that ensure adequate field supervision.

We have examined several different approaches to patrol staffing. In our analysis, BPD will require:

- 787 officers in patrol to meet the 66/ 33 allocation
- 805 officers in patrol to meet the 60/40 allocation.
- 867 officers in patrol to meet the $50 / 50$ allocation.
- 974 officers in patrol to meet the $40 / 60$ allocation.

An important resource for district commanders are District Action Teams (DAT) that work on proactive enforcement and problem-solving missions and District Detectives (DDU).

DAT is an important resource for a district commander because they are not generally assigned to answer calls for service and thus can devote time on district level issues. The District Actions Teams are assigned to violent crime geographies to prevent, deter, and disrupt opportunity for criminal behavior. DAT is focused on making strategic arrests of key individuals that are perpetuating violent crime within their geographies. Table 7 illustrates the current staffing levels for DAT.

| District | Officers | Sergeant | LT | Total |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Central | 12 | 2 | 1 | 15 |
| Southeast | 8 | 1 | 1 | 10 |
| Eastern | 20 | 3 | 1 | 24 |
| Northeast | 7 | 1 | 1 | 9 |
| Northern | 7 | 1 | 1 | 9 |
| Northwestern | 5 | 1 | 1 | 7 |
| Western | 9 | 2 | 1 | 12 |
| Southwestern | 12 | 2 | 1 | 15 |
| Southern | 15 | 2 | 1 | 18 |
| Total | 95 | 15 | 9 | 119 |

Table 7 DAT STAFFING

DDUs are responsible for conducting criminal investigations of Non-Fatal Shootings, Robberies (except Commercial Robberies and Carjackings), Aggravated Assaults, and Burglaries. Table 8 illustrates the current staffing levels for DDU.

| District | Detectives | Sergeant | Total |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Central | 8 | 2 | 10 |
| Southeast | 8 | 2 | 10 |
| Eastern | 9 | 2 | 12 |
| Northeast | 8 | 2 | 10 |
| Northern | 8 | 2 | 10 |
| Northwestern | 7 | 2 | 9 |
| Western | 9 | 2 | 11 |
| Southwestern | 8 | 2 | 10 |
| Southern | 8 | 2 | 10 |
| Total | 73 | 18 | 92 |

Table 8 DDU STAFFING
BPD's proposed ratios of officers to sergeants in DAT and DDU is DAT 12:2 and DDU 18:3, thus more sergeants are needed for DDU. Both DDU and DAT share one lieutenant. This may not be optimal.

We learned that all nine Patrol Districts have property officers doing the same tasks. These positions be civilianized, resulting in a total of 10 officers who could be reassigned to BPD needs.

## Towards a New Model of Uniformed Service Delivery

In our report we have described the challenges facing BPD as it moves forward in its goal to make Baltimore a safer city. In the past several months the department has introduced a number of initiatives to improve performance and increase efficiency. Some of these changes have taken place at the same time that we have been evaluating agency units. This highlights the challenges of doing research in dynamic organizations. While we have pointed out a number of areas of concern there are several large structural constraints that affect the department, particularly with respect to uniformed service delivery. We describe them below.

In the most recent negotiation between the department and the FOP, the parties agreed to abandon the $4 / 10$ plan work schedule that was used in patrol. This was a significant accomplishment because these schedules generally require 20 percent more capacity than traditional 5/ 2 schedules.

Unfortunately, the newly adopted work schedule introduced new constraints for deployment. The present patrol deployment and work schedule is based on the "constant." The constant defines the number of officers that must be on duty at all times. That number is based on the number of posts (beats) and sectors in each district. So, for example, if a district has 14 posts that means that 14 police officers must be in
duty (one in each post). In addition, each shift must deploy a desk officer, and an officer to staff the wagon. This staffing scheme is nominally the same on all three shifts, and as a general rule if the number of personnel falls below that number those positions are filled through overtime. ${ }^{20}$

A critical effect of this deployment scheme is that it results in the same number of officers working during all three shifts. A related issue is that each 28 days the day and afternoon shift personnel shift, thus requiring that the staffing on the shifts be the same. Under the current collective bargaining agreement, it would be very difficult to implement a workload-based deployment model that reflects different demand over the course of the day.

We endorse the BPD strategy of shifting resources from headquarters to the districts, and we have identified a number of opportunities to do so. Under this new framework district commanders will have more flexibility and accountability to address problems.

One way to add capacity at the district level is to replace officers doing clerical work with civilians, so that officers can return to street duty. All the districts use officers to review police reports for accuracy and thoroughness before they are submitted to the Records Management Section. In our view this is a poor use of resources. First, reports should be reviewed by supervisors. Second, we understand that Records also conducts a review and is the final arbiter for accuracy.

District commanders are constrained because it is difficult for them to change work schedules in response to emerging crime patterns; unless, of course, it is done through overtime. We recommend that each district staff a mission team (using DAT resources) with a sergeant and eight officers. The team could be scheduled to work at night (e.g. 7PM until 3AM), with Monday and Tuesday off. However, members of the team would agree to flex their hours based on need. As more resources become available teams could be added.

## Patrol Support Services

This section is under the command of a lieutenant colonel and consists of those sections and units within the Operations Bureau that oversee investigations or specialize in services that are unique, not restricted to any particular geography, with some supporting district patrol during scheduled or unscheduled events. The three broad areas covered in this section are the Special Operations, Community and Youth Services, and Communications Sections.

Due to this group's irregularity with respect to time commitments and geographical areas, examination was made towards to what extent, if any, these units could be eliminated, consolidated, or decentralized to the districts, as well as whether there are opportunities to convert positions in these units from sworn to non-sworn. The

[^14]outline of this section is as follows: general observations, description of each unit's staffing and mission, and recommendations about each unit.

## General Observations

The BPD has limited useful data to analyze these patrol support units. The data that is available is incomplete and usually not linked to any valuable metric for evaluating the efficacy of a function. A common refrain during interviews from staff has been, "you can see we are short...we are understaffed...we need more people." When supervisors are asked how they "know" that they are short, they typically answer, "because we used to have X number, now we have Y ." Generally, there is no available analysis to suggest whether the prior staffing levels were appropriate.

We were particularly perplexed by the significant use of "detailed" staff. That is, many officers permanently assigned to a unit were detailed to another-often for a significant period of time. The agency has been working to address this issue. In the future, all movements will be transfers.

The only exception are for officers who are selected for special units on a "Trial" basis that will be detailed, or folks who are administratively reassigned due to discipline.

All light duty and medical status personnel are being moved to a centralized location (Administrative Duties Division), and then detailed out based on departmental need.

A department the size of the BPD has many units with staffing predicated, in part, by federal or state laws, certifications, or other constraints that are non-negotiable. These may include requirements for units such as helicopter pilots and equipment, bomb disposal units, underwater dive and rescue, and harbor police duties.

In units such as these, personnel and material funds should be spent in such a way as to ensure compliance with qualifications, statutes, and the political will to accept such functions.

As a general principal, the BPD appears to be moving to a decentralized strategy of investigating specific crimes, particularly non-fatal shootings and armed robbery, in addition to the property crimes already assigned to district detective units. This shift is in line with best practices. A disadvantage of having units that are specialized and centralized, patrol may assume or expect that they are no longer responsible for that specialized unit's focus. Decentralization, therefore, reinforces the core component of police work; that the district patrol command ensures accountability, responsibility, and resources to confront issues at the level closest to the community.

## Special Operations Section

The commanders interviewed provided specific information regarding their command's assistance to crime control. A jurisdiction the size of Baltimore likely needs to have units such as these staffed and supported. Their contribution to BPD crime control strategy is to offset uniformed patrol responsibilities (e.g., Marine Unit, Aviation), or to support as needed (e.g., SWAT, Warrant Service with SWAT).

The following units within Special Operations were examined:

- Administration
- Aviation (helicopters)
- K-9
- SWAT
- Bomb
- Marine
- Property Officers

Traffic
o Accident Investigations
o Motors (motorcycles)
o Mounted (horses)
o Towing/ Fleet Safety
o Dirt Bike
o Mobile Metro Unit
o Special Events and Overtime
o Mobile Training Unit

## Administration

Current Personnel
1-Major. 1-Lieutenant (Stadiums). 2-Sergeants. 5-Officers. 3-Civilians

## Description

Special Operations appears to be a standard unit that oversees highly specialized law enforcement units. Two exceptions are the use of a lieutenant assigned to sportsstadium duties, overseeing officers assigned to professional sports events, and a property officer who essentially maintains materials and equipment. Property officers can also be found in each district.

Recommendation: None at this time.

## Aviation

Current Personnel
1-Lieutenant. 3-Sergeants. 17-Officers. 4-Civilians.
Description

The aviation unit provides routine daily flyovers of the city and responds to radio dispatch needs (e.g., for vehicle pursuits). In providing this service, the BPD follows federal law and regulations regarding duties, requirements, equipment, and maintenance. Maintaining one helicopter in the air during all working hours of the unit by rotating aircraft ( 1.5 hours per flight) and crew is expensive. Nevertheless, it appears that the unit is operating within normal and expected parameters to maintain certifications and valuable service to the BPD.

The BPD appears to have a sound method for recruiting pilots, requiring significant experience of candidates. After identifying experienced candidates, the BPD sends new pilots to the police academy for training. Immediately upon finishing Field Training, the officer/ pilot is transferred to Aviation. Given the tremendous resources needed to create a flight-ready pilot, hiring from the private sector makes sense and appears reasonable and helps the BPD avoid the expense of training pilots and helping them obtain proper flight certifications.

Not all departments use sworn officers as pilots in their aircraft. Among those that recruit civilians for teaming with a sworn tactical flight officer or paramedic are:

- Maryland State Police
- Fairfax County Police
- Nashville Police
- San Bernardino County Sheriff
- Customs and Border Patrol (Air Interdiction Agent)
- Lee County, Florida
- Fort Worth, Texas
- Royal Canadian Mounted Police

Some agencies that hire civilian pilots see high turnover rates among their pilots. BPD's practice of linking piloting service with police service (and pension benefits), by contrast, gives pilots incentives to remain with the department, as BPD leaders believe.

The BPD also uses Tactical Flight Officers. These are police officers who are not pilots but serve as observers while the pilot flies. This can be good practice for the safety and efficiency of the flight mission and should continue.

Aviation is a notable exception to the general lack of data for managing functions. The BPD gathers and maintains ample data to manage the Aviation unit.

Recommendation: No recommendation at this time.

## Current Personnel

1-Lieutenant. 3-Sergeants. 17-Officers.
Description
The K-9 unit responds to calls as needed for their duties. It is not fully known how officers spend non-directed time; as with many other units, the BPD does not have sufficient data to analyze all unit functions.

The K9 unit is staffed by one lieutenant, three sergeants and 17 officers, with one sergeant vacancy and at least three officer vacancies. The unit may, however, be overstaffed. A significant portion of the K-9 officers are off between Friday and Monday. There is one training day per week and, if the daily one hour of officer/ K-9 preparation for a shift is not completed, officers are paid one hour of overtime. The department may wish to investigate how often K-9 officers are paid for this one hour of overtime.

Recommendation: If the BPD intends to maintain this level of K-9 staffing in the long term, then it should undertake a more careful analysis of the weekly work schedule. Further, as with many units, the use of on-duty K-9 resources to support privately funded "paid details" at professional sports events should be evaluated.

## SWAT

Current Personnel
2-Lieutenants. 4-Sergeants. 29-Officers.
Description
The SWAT unit operates on two shifts of eight hours, 7 a.m. to 3 p.m. and 3 p.m. to 11 p.m., rotating every two weeks. The day shift works Monday to Friday and dedicates its week to training, while the evening shift works Monday to Saturday with Thursday as its training day. The reason for the difference is most callouts of the unit occur during evenings. The evening shift also provides a uniformed presence in the "Block," a hightraffic area of bars and restaurants, and supports patrol functions when not serving warrants or carrying out other unit duties. Officers on both shifts also start their day with two hours of gym time and are required to be prepared for other duty by the third hour of the shift. This gym time, as well as the extensive daytime training for a unit whose operations typically occur in the evening, may be excessive.

Recommendation: The BPD may wish to consider reducing the amount of daily and weekly training time to advance service availability, as well as consider assigning all warrant service-related duties to this unit. From our interviews, we learned that the SWAT unit is used frequently to support warrant service efforts. Assigning these duties is the approach used by the New Orleans Police Department, and the Nashville Police

Department. Doing so would ensure predictable, accountable, and reliable warrant service strategies, techniques, equipment, etc. This would allow SWAT unit officers to further refine their skills in dynamic entry, as well as to serve as the single point of command to prioritize warrant service.

## Bomb Unit

## Current Personnel

1-Lieutenant (oversees Marine as well). 5-Officers.

## Description

This unit appears to be adequately staffed and supervised. It works two shifts-7 a.m. to 3 p.m. and 3 p.m. to 11 p.m. -supplemented by callout overtime. Most calls occur during day hours. Police bomb units in the United States must have training, guidelines, and equipment consistent with national requirements. If there is no regional bomb unit that the BPD could support, then the BPD must maintain this unit. This unit is among those dedicated to professional sporting events in the city, working as on-duty personnel, while other BPD personnel (excluding the lieutenant with full-time commitment to supervise these efforts) in these venues are on "paid detail." Some unit personnel are critical of this use of their on-duty time, which the BPD may wish to review.

Recommendation: No recommendation at this time.

## Marine

## Current Personnel

1-Sergeant. 7-Officers.

## Description

This unit currently has a vacant officer position. The unit supervisor notes that the U.S. Coast Guard only performs regulatory functions on the city's waterways, with no public safety duties or checks, and the State Department of Natural Resources has only one agent assigned to cover Baltimore City, Baltimore County, and Anne Arundel County. The unit does maintain sufficient information to suggest it has value for the city, particularly given that much of the waterfront and adjacent areas are populated and the unit is the only one in the BPD that can make scene visits upon a citizen's call. Nevertheless, there may be overlap with the Baltimore Fire Department's (BFD) rescue response capability to the estimated 5,000 residents living on boats in the harbor area, with both BFD and BPD responding to 911 calls in the area. While the BPD has more boats, equipment, and divers (mostly for body recovery or evidence), the BPD does not provide EMS services which must be provided by the BFD. Furthermore, BPD Dive Team
personnel are not attached to the Marine unit and provide part-time service, but are supported by the Marine unit for all necessary training and certifications.

In short, there could be a consolidation opportunity. The BPD may want to consider consolidating the Marine unit with the Fire Department or even eliminating it, returning its sergeant and officers to patrol and reducing cost/ services/ supplies/ equipment to the Fire Department. The BPD should also explore, and where possible limit or eliminate, its duty time to primarily provide a "free" service to other state and federal agencies that exercise regulatory duties within city waterways. While there is some belief that only sworn police officers could collect evidence in city waterways, this is unlikely given that BPD uses trained, non-sworn, crime scene technicians.

Recommendation: The City should consider combining BPD and BFD marine services to streamline service delivery and achieve cost efficiencies.

## Traffic Section

## Current Personnel

3-Lieutenants. 12-Sergeants. 38-Officers/ Detectives. 5-Civilians
Description
The Traffic Section undertakes several tasks. These are conducted through several units, including:

- Accident Investigations
- Motors
- Mounted
- Towing/ Fleet Safety
- Dirt Bike
- Mobile Metro
- Special Events and Secondary Employment
- Mobile Training

We review each of these below.
Accident Investigations

## Current Personnel

2-Sergeants. 12-Officers/ Detectives (2 Squads).
Description

Personnel of this unit investigate fatality incidents, all departmental vehicle accidents, and serious non-fatal accidents. The unit provides $24 / 7$ coverage, typically with two officers per shift. Some of its officers are certified to provide DWI investigations. The unit uses marked vehicles. One sergeant is DRE-certified; the crime lab also has a DREcertified lieutenant.

Recommendation: BPD Policy allows supervisors outside of the Accident Investigation Unit (AIU) to conduct accident investigation involving departmental vehicles when AIU isn't available. This raises the question as to whether there is a need for AIU to provide 24-hour coverage.

## Motors

Current Personnel
1-Sergeant. 7-Officers.
Description
Shifts are normally 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. and 4 p.m. to 12 a.m., with motorcycle work a priority, including in rain or snow. Days and hours for this unit can vary.

The unit is responsible for city-sponsored assignments at every stadium game, with support by the Traffic Enforcement Unit of the City's Department of Transportation. The Motors unit assists with entry and exit to stadium parking. After the start of the game, the unit helps in the Central and Southern Districts.

Motors also follows up community complaints about traffic issues and analyzes accident data, using data on dangerous speeding areas to direct enforcement.

Recommendation: Considering the few resources dedicated to this unit, and the duties it must assume in support of the professional franchise sports, the BPD may wish to consider reassigning its personnel to other needs.

## Mounted

## Current Personnel

1-Sergeant. 3-Officers. 2-Civilians. 4-Horses
Description
This unit patrols the downtown and Mount Vernon areas. The unit limits access to the "Block" entertainment district between 12:30 p.m. and 2 a.m. on Fridays and Saturdays. It also provides coverage of parades and protests. Typically, the unit works on Fridays and Saturday evening and night shifts; otherwise it works according to the
need for visibility, with off-days on Sundays and Mondays. Officers not on a horse work in a car. From Tuesday to Thursday during the day they are in cars doing proactive work and community engagement, not responding to CFS.

Recommendation: This unit should be assigned to a unit where its capabilities are used more strategically.

## Towing/ Fleet Safety

## Current Personnel

1-Sergeant. 2-Detectives. 1-Officer.
Description
The Towing function undertakes regulatory duties such as tracking the licensed tow companies by the City to ensure they are providing adequate service and billing correctly.

The Fleet Safety function reviews all department accidents, including the Accident Investigations unit research on them, and determines whether the accidents were preventable. It assesses the accident against a disciplinary matrix, creates a recommendation for the officer's supervisory sergeant, and forwards the case to their supervising lieutenant for action. This work is primarily disciplinary.

Recommendation: The Towing function appears to be purely regulatory and therefore should be converted to a civilian unit, with sworn personnel reassigned to other BPD needs. The Fleet Safety unit appears to be primarily a disciplinary accountability function and should be realigned to either the Chief of Patrol, Internal Affairs, or Academy offices, supported by either one sergeant to evaluate findings or a sufficiently trained civilian.

## Dirt Bike

## Current Personnel

1-Sergeant. 2-Detectives.

## Description

Personnel of this unit perform enforcement citywide based on demand. Much of its work is "legwork" after an event. Personnel review video, tips, and other information for building a case against offenders. This unit works every Sunday. Typically, this work was a summer deployment, but recently the BPD decided to keep it year-round and staff accordingly.

Recommendation: The BPD should assign this unit to the newly formed Metro Division

## Mobile Metro Unit

## Current Personnel

1-Lieutenant. 3-Sergeants. 18-Officers.

## Description

The MMU is deployed to critical areas of the City to suppress the violence by conducting vehicle stops, foot patrol, business checks and proactive preventive patrols. They currently have two squads. One works day work and the other works until lam most nights. However, the capacity to change their hours when crimes occur outside their deployment times and the ability to shift them to the other end of the City at a moment's notice make them an integral part in the crime fighting strategy.

Recommendation: The BPD should use this resource as part of its crime control strategy.

## Special Events and Secondary Employment

## Current Personnel

1-Lieutenant. 3-Sergeants. 5-Officers. 3-Civilians.
Description
This unit oversees and plans for large special events and oversees all secondary paid details of Officers. The civilian staff manages contracts and associated paperwork.

Recommendation: The BPD should consider having sufficiently trained civilian staff, supervised by one lieutenant or sergeant, assume all these duties, thereby freeing other sworn personnel in the unit for other BPD needs.

Mobile Training Unit
Current Personnel
1-Sergeant. 1-Officer.
Description

This unit provides training throughout the BPD on specialized topics such as Citizen Response to Active Shooting Event and similar topics. It has reportedly trained 50 to 100 BPD officers since May 2019.

Recommendation: The BPD should consider closing this unit, transferring its responsibilities to the Training Academy, which can develop appropriate curriculum and content and maintain training records. This would allow sworn personnel in this unit to be reassigned to other BPD needs.

## City-Wide Crime Control Capacity

BPD has many units that purport to support service delivery. However, as our analysis suggests some of these units are duplicative and others have relatively low output. Moreover, many of these units utilize a small set of tools to accomplish their mission, potentially ignoring more comprehensive strategies.

We propose a strategy to significantly improve BPD capacity to deploy rapidly, and strategically, and to be much more responsive to district and neighborhood problems. This plan consists of creation of the Metro Division, commanded by a major. The key attribute of this unit would be flexibility and capacity to address a myriad of issues. The new division will be constructed by combining several existing units. There are two critical elements. First, although members would be specialists (e.g. K-9 or Motors) they would not be limited to those skills. Their tasks will be defined by the mission. Some tasks will require uniformed responses, while others may not. Second, all members of the division must agree, as condition of joining the division, that they will work whenever and wherever the department needs them, subject, of course to standard HR procedures.

The following table illustrates the units proposed to constitute the Metro Division, and the current staffing of these units.

| Unit | LT | SGT | PO |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| K9 | 1 | 3 | 17 |
| SWAT | 2 | 4 | 29 |
| Motors |  | 1 | 7 |
| Mounted |  | 1 | 3 |
| Mobile Metro | 1 | 3 | 18 |
| Homicide OPS |  | 1 | 6 |
| WATF | 1 | 7 | 32 |
| Total | 5 | 20 | 112 |

Table 12 Proposed Staffing for Metro Division

We believe that this division could be organized and deployed relatively quickly to provide much needed help for the late afternoon and evening deployment. There may
be other opportunities for including other units in this division. There may also be an opportunity to transfer a fraction of the lieutenants and sergeants to other assignments.

## Community and Youth Services ${ }^{21}$

Current Personnel
1-Captain. 2-Lieutenants. 6-Sergeants. 17-Officers/ Detective/Agent, 3-Civilians
Description
Community and Youth Services undertakes several tasks. These include coordination of volunteer chaplains, coordinating (with the Department of Corrections) inmate-reentry programs, and working with Scouts and schools. The units carrying out this work include:

- Administration
- LGBTQ Liaison
- Youth Services
- Bridge (school program)
- Auxiliary and Chaplaincy Programs
- Crisis Response Team (CRT), Homeless Outreach Team (HOT), and Law Enforcement Assisted Diversion (LEAD)

We review each of these below.
Community Services Administration

## Current Personnel

1-Officer. 1-Detective.
Description
These personnel perform data entry for HOT and CRT.
Recommendation: The BPD should have a properly trained civilian perform these duties, freeing 1 officer and 1 detective for other BPD needs.

[^15]
## LBGTQ Liaison

## Current Personnel

1-Sergeant (part-time).

## Description

This sergeant participates in community education and department awareness, serves as an instructor at the academy on cultural competency, provides in-service curricula advice, and serves as a liaison between the community and officers. The Police Commissioner has an advisory board on these issues that meets several times yearly, with liaisons from the offices of the Mayor, Council President, and State's Attorney. This sergeant follows up on some crimes (including hate crimes) whose reports reference the LBGTQ community. This officer speaks to victims about services available and monitors social media so as to improve BPD communications strategies. This position oversees the Safe Place program.

Recommendations: The BPD may wish to have the duties of this position be assumed part-time by an officer of sufficient rank in the Community Services Area.

## Youth Services

Current Personnel
1-Sergeant. 7-Officers,
Description
The Youth Services section works with Scout and other youth programs throughout the city. For example, it coordinates Explorers programs in three high schools.

Recommendation: There are significant components in the Consent Decree that focus on Youth and Community Policing, and this unit may play a key role in implementing those efforts.

## Bridge

## Current Personnel

2-Sergeants. 3-Officers.
Description
Personnel of this unit participate in elementary and middle school programs throughout the city, as well as in evening athletic leagues for youth. The unit was created after
the 2015 riots. The program uses a character-building model and enrolls about 50 (mostchallenged) youths from five schools.

Recommendation: Given the pressing demands for BPD patrol services, and the high likelihood that other government or private advocacy groups can perform the duties of this section, we recommend the BPD close this section or limit its staffing to one (civilian, sufficiently trained) liaison, freeing sworn staff here to serve other BPD needs.

## Auxiliary and Chaplaincy Programs

Current Personnel
1-Sergeant. 2-Officers.
Description


The BPD recently relaunched the Auxiliary program as an outreach program. It has currently recruited about 20 volunteers. The program trains volunteers for 12 weeks about the BPD and how to perform expected duties. Activities include helping with community events and traffic control. Auxiliary volunteers are not sworn, but semiuniformed personnel with sufficient training to handle stadium traffic control duties.

About 200 chaplains each volunteer about 20 hours per month. Linked to their neighborhood, chaplains ride with officers, partner with BPD on events, attend roll calls and events, and have BPD-issued shirts and credentials.

Recommendation: Given the pressing demands for BPD patrol services, and the high likelihood that other government or private advocacy groups can perform the duties of this program, we recommend the BPD close this program or limit its staffing to one (civilian, sufficiently trained) liaison, freeing sworn staff here to serve other BPD needs.

## CRT, HOT, and LEAD

## Current Personnel

CRT: 1-Sergeant. 2-Officers. 1-Full-time clinician (4 per-diem weekend clinicians).
HOT: 1-Sergeant. 2-Detectives. ${ }^{22}$
LEAD: 1-Lieutenant.
CRT
Description

[^16]The CRT responds with field officers each day from 11 a.m. to 7 p.m. There is a secondary response if notified for attempted or completed suicides and other mental health events. The unit provides BPD members with their first crisis response training, as well as the eight-hour annual continuing training session. To date, the CRT has trained 226 officers, or $25 \%$ of the current patrol force. The Consent Decree set a goal that $30 \%$ of patrol officers have crisis training.

Recommendation: BPD should continue its efforts to provide CRT capacity.

## HOT

## Description

The HOT works 7 a.m. to 3 p.m. Monday through Friday, with after-hour calls as well. Team personnel likely devote considerable time to meeting demands. The unit specializes in placing homeless persons in crisis (particularly families) in alternative housing, in-place shelters, or non-profit advocacy locations. Personnel work in the downtown area and seek to assist the homeless population with an understanding of the laws and safety net services for extreme weather conditions.

Recommendation: The BPD may wish to consider decentralizing work of the team to the most affected districts.

## LEAD

Description
The goal of LEAD is to improve public health and safety by reducing future harm and criminal behavior caused by individuals engaged in minor drug offenses and prostitution. Qualifying charges for LEAD referral include offenses in the Central District for simple possession, possession with intent if doing so for needed life-sustaining items, and prostitution. Offenders who qualify for LEAD are diverted to partner agencies or advocacy.

While a lieutenant provides an oversight role, no full-time staff are assigned to LEAD. The lieutenant is the commander of the Inner Harbor/ Lexington Market (a walking promenade type unit), with 3 officers assigned. The lieutenant ensures all officers $(\sim 120)$ of the LEAD PILOT ZONE have LEAD training.

Recommendation: Continue this liaison duty of the assigned lieutenant.

Recommendation: The BPD may wish to consider decentralizing work of the team to the most affected districts. BPD considering cross training all capabilities under section.

## Communications Section

The Communications Section consists of three major components: 911 call receipt and dispatch, 311 Call Center, and the Telephone Reporting Unit (TRU). While a comprehensive study of public safety communications is beyond the scope of this project, there are several things that BPD can do to affect performance.

In most communities public safety communications is provided by non-sworn staff, including, in many cases, non-sworn management. At BPD, Communications staff consists primarily of non-sworn (civilian) members, with a non-sworn director and shift supervisors, but also has the following sworn staff: One Captain that directs the sworn shift commanders

- Four Sergeants that serve as watch commanders
- Four police officers that do "information retrieval."
- A rotation of light duty staff in TRU.

In our view these positions are redundant. Questions about police deployment should be directed to field supervisors and managers, and thus it is not necessary to staff sworn personnel in the center.

A responsibility overseen by the sworn members is TRU. TRU is designed to take reports of crime and incidents so as to divert district officer time toward more urgent incidents and proactive activities. TRU is authorized to investigate the following incidents, but not limited to:

- Auto Accident (Excluding tow, injury, or government vehicle)
- Civil Matters
- Destruction of Property
- Lost Property
- Larceny
- Larceny from Auto
- False Pretense (Excluding identity theft)
- Hit and Run (Excluding those with identifying striking vehicle info)
-Nuisance Complaint (Parking Complaints - excluding blocked driveways and handicapped spaces)
- Out of Jurisdiction
- Stolen Auto (Excluding keys left in ignition - citation required; Enter into NCIC)
- Unauthorized Use (Must include in report narrative that caller was advised on criminal charging procedures; Enter into NCIC)
- 911 No-Voice (Must make contact with complainant. Officer must be confident there is no emergency, e.g. complainant advises the call was accidental or a child was playing on the phone). May code 911 No-Voice without speaking to complainant when no precise location is provided (Cell Tower)
- Review all CFS and contact all citizens who are awaiting police service longer than 25 minutes.


## General Exclusions:

- Domestic Related
- In-Progress (Excluding apparently no longer in-progress)
- Just Occurred (Excluding apparently no Ionger just occurred)
- Suspect on scene
- Tangible evidence to collect

At the time of our interview in J une, there were seven sergeants and 23 police officers assigned to the TRU. The unit is staffed by light duty officers, and while TRU provides a good setting to accommodate officers on light duty status, it is recommended that this work can be performed by non-sworn staff, and that a large fraction of these reports could be handled through on-line reporting and 311.

As we described earlier in the Response Time Analysis, the time from when a call is received in the 911 center and when it is dispatched is too long, particularly for high priority calls. The causes of this are multifaceted, but there are things that can be addressed in Communications to remedy this:

- BPD should make necessary changes to the system so that they can track the process time (time from receipt of call to entry into the system) separately from the time the call is waiting for an available officer.
- BPD should re-think its policy of how it handles low priority calls in the event of a serious incident (G-2, G-3). This policy seems unnecessary given that the queue is dynamic. That is, as the incident unfolds, the effects on capacity will occur normally-it need not be artificially imposed.
- Call screening should be improved to reduce the likelihood of duplicate calls. For example, during observations a call came in about a disturbance at a business. A few minutes later the same complainant called 911 with a slightly altered set of facts, but at the same address. The call taker created a new call.
- Dispatchers can, at present, only see calls assigned to their district. This limits their capacity to see incidents occurring in other districts, and particularly, incidents occurring on streets that serve as boundaries for the districts.
- Communications staff should work with field supervisors to ensure that as calls are closed, assigned units are released to return to service.


## Data Driven Strategies Division

## CitiWatch - WatchCenter

Current Personnel
1-Major. 2-Lieutenants. 4-Sergeants. 16-Officers/ Agents. 10-Research Assistants. 1IT Specialist. 1-Civilian.

These personnel are allocated by units as noted below.

## Description

This unit is overseen by 1 lieutenant and has the following units:
Crime Analysis: 5 civilians work two shifts Monday to Friday. This unit provides standard analysis of crime trends to assist in the deployment of officers.

ComStat: 1 sergeant, 1 officer, and 2 civilians. The unit is not currently producing a ComStat report. Rather, it is in transition as BPD leadership seeks to implement more modern software (e.g., ArcGIS).

The Watch Center: with 1 sergeant and 5 officers, provides continuous coverage of significant events and serves as the main point of contact for units responding to major crimes. The unit can also produce "work-ups" of suspects and other critical information.

The Tech Unit/ ID Room has 1 sergeant and 1 officer. This unit provides credentials for building access and assists the BPD, Watch Center, and Citi Watch in processing video surveillance from more than 800 cameras available to operators.

The Open Source unit has 4 civilians who monitor social media platforms and other publicly available (open source) data to assist the overall efforts of the Watch Center.

The Operations Unit is supervised by 1 lieutenant, 1 sergeant, and 3 officers, with 17 civilians serving to monitor camera feeds.

Recommendation: Given the growing importance of real-time analysis centers in monitoring crime, the BPD may wish to consider adding civilian and, where appropriate, limited numbers of sworn personnel to these operations.

## Criminal Investigations: Detectives Division

The Detectives Division has several principal sections, each with its own subordinate units. These principal sections are:

- Special Investigations
- Anti-Crime/ Criminal Intelligence
- Homicide/ Robbery

We review each of these below. Unlike patrol, there is little general research to guide staffing levels for support units, but there is some specialized research on detective units ${ }^{23}$ and field support units. ${ }^{24}$

## Special Investigations Section (SIS)

## Current Personnel

Total Counts: 1-Major. 5-Lieuteants. 11-Sergeants. 57-Detectives. 11-Civilians.
These personnel counts are for all subordinate units discussed below. We also present personnel counts for each subordinate unit.

## Description

The Special Investigations unit has several subordinate units. These include

- Arson / Economic Crimes
- Sex Crimes
- Family Crimes / Animal Abuse / Witness Services
- Child Abuse / Missing Persons / Internet Crimes Against Children (ICAC)
- Special Activities


## Arson / Economic Crimes

## Current Personnel

1-Lieutenant. 1-Sergeant. 4-Arson Detectives. 1-Economic Crimes Detective
Description
The Arson unit performs criminal investigations related to a Fire Department determination of Cause and Origin (as directed by City Charter).

[^17]The Economic Crimes unit has only one detective assigned to it. The Economic Crimes Unit (ECU) investigates reports of embezzlement, financial elder abuse, fraudulent checks, credit card crimes, and identity theft.

Recommendation: Determine if Fire Department employees can be trained and crosscertified to perform all Arson-related investigations (excluding perhaps Homicide by Arson). Close the Economic Crimes Unit and decentralize its investigations. Return personnel of these units to other BPD duties.

## Sex Crimes

## Current Personnel

1-Lieutenant. 4-Sergeants. 17-Detectives. 2-Civilians.
Criminal Intelligence section supplies the Commissioner and Command staff with timely intelligence to support direction of the department, areas of responsibility: terrorism, hate crimes, threats to public officials, conduct Shield program. In 2018 had 8 major investigations, 70 threat assessments among other duties.

Employees work day and evening shifts.

## Description

The Sex Offense unit has 10 detectives and two sergeants split evenly between two shifts and serves as the primary BPD lead for investigating adult sex crimes. Its commander reports clearance rates of 52 percent.

Its Cold Case unit has 1 sergeant and 2 detectives. Its duties include following up on old cases with new leads (e.g., from DNA tests), all cases of a survivor of child abuse who becomes known to the BPD, and any human trafficking investigations with other agencies. Current staffing appears adequate and appropriate.

The Sex Offender Registry traditionally had 8 detectives. It now has 5 with one civilian worker who are responsible for managing about 1,300 registrants. Given the security of space, records concerns, and the number of registrants, it appears this unit is staffed sufficiently at this time.

Recommendation: No recommendations at this time, however BPD is considering expanding this unit.

## Family Crimes/ Animal Abuse/ Witness Services

## Current Personnel

1-Lieutenant. 2-Sergeants. 10-Detectives. 4-Civilians.

## Description

The Family Crimes unit has two shifts, staffed by 2 sergeants, 8 detectives, and 1 civilian. It handles felony domestic violence crimes. The DDUs also handle serious nonfatal shootings, with the BPD also working with an advocacy group, House of Ruth, to review all domestic violence lethality assessments and monitoring and determining appropriate investigative response.

Recommendation: Decentralize the Family Crimes unit and maintain civilian staff to collect department-wide data as needed and coordinate with House of Ruth for data/ case monitoring.

Animal abuse is staffed by one detective who does follow-up work as needed.
Recommendation: Close the animal abuse function and reassign the detective to other BPD needs.

Witness Services is staffed by one detective who assists in locating witnesses for homicide cases (see overlap with Homicide/ Robbery Operations Section), assisting other agencies with safe house placement and locations, and checking on safe houses.

Recommendations: Close this function, transfer its duties to the Homicide/ Robbery unit, and reassign its detective to other BPD needs.

## Child Abuse Unit/Missing Persons/ ICAC

Current Personnel
1-Lieutenant. 3-Sergeants. 13-Detectives. 1-Civilian.

## Description

The Child Abuse Unit performs typical investigations.
Recommendations: BPD command recommends increasing staffing by 2 detectives. Given immediate concerns with staffing patrol, and reports that the unit is performing well, we make no recommendations at this time on staffing.

The Missing Persons Unit investigates missing youth and adults. It is staffed by 1 sergeant and 3 detectives.

Recommendations: BPD should decentralize the duties of this unit and reassign its sworn personnel to other duties. A civilian staff member of the Homicide unit can maintain records, NCIC notifications, and related tasks.

The ICAC / Sex Trafficking unit is staffed by 2 detectives and 1 civilian. Much ICAC work is computer/ internet-based.

Recommendations: Considering the type of work that ICAC performs and the need for highly specialized computer skills, the BPD should consider consolidating this unit with the Special Activities Unit. This would help ensure requisite knowledge, skills, abilities, and equipment are standardized and accountable.

## Special Activities

## Current Personnel

1-Lieutenant. 1-Sergeant. 11-Detectives. 1-Civilian.
The Cyber Crimes Unit is staffed by 3 detectives, the Advanced Technical Teams (ATT) are staffed by 7 detectives, and the Covert unit is assigned 1 detective.

## Description

The Special Activities Unit houses the foundations of the BPD's effort to create a digital forensic unit (DFU). A DFU providing investigative and evidentiary analysis for cell phones, computers, laptops, surveillance systems, etc., is becoming a critical tool for criminal investigations. Such units can capture and produce information and evidence that can increase clearance of crimes, particularly crimes of violence for which witnesses may not be willing or available to provide testimony.

Recommendations: The specialized knowledge, skills, abilities, and equipment of this new and emerging police investigative strategy are best centralized so as to maintain standards and accountability. We recommend maintaining this unit and investing in it as necessary. This unit may require more BPD capital and personnel expenditures in coming years. The BPD may wish to consider re-hiring well-vetted retirees who could be trained as needed in these critical fields.

## Anti-Crime / Criminal Intelligence Section

## Criminal Intelligence

Current Personnel
1-Lieutenant. 3-Sergeants. 6-Detectives. 1-Civilian

## Description

Criminal Intelligence section supplies the Commissioner and Command staff with timely intelligence to support direction of the department, areas of responsibility: terrorism, hate crimes, threats to public officials, conduct Shield program. In 2018 had 8 major investigations, 70 threat assessments among other duties.

This Section has three units: a Task Force unit staffed by 1 sergeant, 4 detectives, and 1 analyst; an Operations unit staffed by 1 sergeant and 2 detectives; and a BPD-Shield / Critical Infrastructure unit staffed by 1 sergeant and 1 detective.

Recommendation: Consider a more strategic approach to the use of this unit.

## Anti-Crime Section

Current Personnel
6-Lieutenants. 21-Sergeants. 118-Detectives.
Description
This section has several groups and units within it. These include

- High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA)
- Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF)
- Vice / Undercover / Homeland Security Investigations (HSI)
- Warrant Apprehension Task Force (WATF)
- Strike Force
- Major Case
- Gun Registry
- Gang
- GVED

We review each of these below.

## HIDTA and ATF

## Current Personnel

HIDTA: 1-Lieutenant. 2-Sergeants. 20-Detectives.
HIDTA personnel are organized into the following squads.

- Violent trafficker: 2-Detectives.
- Heroin Task Force: 1-Sergeant, 3-Detectives.
- Group 54 (wire-tape group for high-end targets): 1-Sergeant. 5-Detectives.
- Group 56 (interdiction at transportation ports): 4-Detectives.
- Group 57 (high-level dealer targeting): 1-Sergeant. 4-Detectives.
- HIDTA Watch Center: 1-Detective.

The ATF group is overseen by one lieutenant. Its groups and personnel are

- Strike Force 2 (gun violations): 1-Detective.
- Group 4: 4-Detectives.
- Group 6: 1-Detective.


## Description

Most of the work of these units is in support of federal cases. Few of the cases on which these units work revert to State prosecution.

Recommendation: The BPD should consider the partnerships that are valuable from these assignments. At the same time, in reassessing this work and reviewing it with federal partners, it should assert that the primary mission of BPD members must be the needs of the BPD in its service to Baltimore.

## Vice / Undercover / HSI

## Current Personnel

Vice A: 1-Sergeant. 3-Detectives.
Vice C: 1-Sergeant. 5-Detectives.

## Description

Vice A is responsible for enforcement of Alcohol Beverage Outlets regulations at clubs. It enforces laws against underage drinking in bars and investigates other Liquor Board violations. It collaborates with other City agencies and the Fire Department in seeking compliance with laws.

Vice $C$ enforces laws against prostitution, working with Homeland Security Investigations on suspected cases of child trafficking or adult human trafficking. It conducts occasional reverse "J ohn" stings. It also conducts investigations in hotels, usually regarding "escort" work. It works with advocacy groups to help prostitutes move beyond arrest and use turn-around programs. It works well-known areas for violations as well as targeted areas. The unit will debrief those arrested about other crimes (major and violent in the area) and send them to other units (Homicide, Non-Fatal Shooting, and Armed Robbery) as needed. It typically works weekdays, but alters its schedule as needed.

## HSI Staffing:

Current Personnel

1 Sergeant and 6 detectives
Description
HSI formed in 1995 to reduce drug trafficking, and money laundering with an international focus, attacks organizations that deals drugs through money laundering statutes. Work closely with final institutions to develop targets. In 2018, 46 arrests and 36 total cases handled.

Recommendations: Overall, this unit appears to provide valuable service to the BPD crime-fighting mission. The BPD should work to ensure that its work is fully coordinated by, and in collaboration with, the overarching crime-fighting plan of the department.

## Undercover Squad

Current Personnel
1-Sergeant. 11-Detectives.
Description
This unit creates its cases in most violent areas.
Recommendation: The BPD should consider a more strategic use of these resources. This would free 1 sergeant and 11 detectives to BPD needs.

## WATF

## Current Personnel

1 Lieutenant. 7-Sergeants. 31-Detectives
These personnel work as follows:

- 1 sergeant and 4 detectives work with Homicide and partner with the US Marshals and other law enforcement. When there are no active murder warrants, these personnel serve tier-1 robbery, domestic violence, and aggravated assault warrants. These personnel also work closely with the Homicide/ Robbery in its pursuit of witnesses for homicide cases.
- 5 detectives pursue warrants for non-fatal shooting investigations.
- 1 sergeant and 3 detectives pursue warrants for juvenile offenders.
- 1 sergeant and 4 detectives are assigned to a multi-jurisdiction warrant unit.
- 1 sergeant and 3 detectives pursue warrants for domestic violence.
- 1 sergeant and 6 detectives pursue warrants for felony robberies.
- 1 sergeant and 5 detectives pursue fugitive (intrastate or interstate) warrants.
- 1 sergeant and 1 civilian perform administrative duties.

The lieutenant works with investigating units to prioritize warrants for each of the squads above. All squads work 5 a.m. to 1 p.m. with mixed days off.

## Description

In addition to serving the warrants noted above, twice monthly all warrant teams and District Action Team (DAT) squads assemble to locate persons of interest for major crimes who also have active warrants. This assembly will use WatchCenter documentation in Lotus Notes for persons of interest for murder and violent crimes to assist in identifying persons.

Recommendation: Given the specific techniques of this unit, as well as the equipment partnerships it requires with other agencies, the BPD should consider placing this unit within the SWAT command so as to provide better continuity in mission, accountability, techniques, and strategies.

## Strike Force

## Current Personnel

1-Lieutenant. 1-Sergeant. 8-Detectives.
Description

The Strike Force is the result of a memorandum of understanding with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) on an effort to target the top 25 narcotic offenders in the city. It executes the same strategy as the HIDTA unit.

Recommendation: The BPD should consider the partnerships that are valuable from these assignments. At the same time, in reassessing this work and reviewing it with federal partners, it should assert that the primary mission of BPD members must be the needs of the BPD in its service to Baltimore.

## Major Case

## Current Personnel

1-Lieutenant. 2-Sergeants. 11-Detectives. Personnel are organized into East Side and West Side groups.

Description
This squad assists on the most-violent statewide drug cases. It focuses on mid-level and lower leaders but can build cases involving higher-level leaders for HIDTA to assume. These groups are critical to putting together mid-level cases. In the last several months 6 or 7 takedowns have occurred on violent offenders. They take the cases that Federal partners will not take and turn them around at a much faster pace.

Recommendation: No recommendation at this time.

## Gun Registry

Current Personnel
1-Sergeant. 2-Detectives.
Description
This unit is responsible for registering those arrested for gun violations who meet registry criteria. Its work is similar to that of the sex offender registry. This unit also works with probation and parole officers.

Recommendation: No recommendations at this time.

## Gangs

Current Personnel
1-Sergeant. 2-Detectives.

## Description

This work does follow-up work on complaints of gang activity (e.g., "tagging"). Its personnel may look for intelligence, sharing its information with Homicide. Personnel also work with jail personnel to track inmates and their influence on the street. Personnel meet with WatchCenter and district intelligence officers routinely and with district intelligence officers weekly.

Recommendation: Given the low commitment of personnel to this unit, the BPD should consider disbanding it.

## GVED

Current Personnel
1-Sergeant. 2-Detectives.
Description
This unit reviews all gun cases with the State's Attorney's Office. One of its detectives is assigned to the States Attorney's Office.

Recommendation: The BPD should consider disbanding this unit and training district and detective-unit supervisors to oversee these investigations. This would allow reassignment of 1 sergeant and 2 detectives to other needs.

## Homicide / City-Wide Robbery

## Homicide ${ }^{25}$ <br> Current Personnel

Homicide Operations: 1-Sergeant. 6-Detectives.
Homicide Detectives: 43-Detectives.
Description
Homicide Operations personnel primarily locate witnesses for detectives, including 288 witness locations through the first seven months of 2019. Each detective's case has a Lotus Notes form for assistance in identifying and finding witnesses who have not been interviewed. When detectives are unable to find a witness, they request help from

[^18]Operations. Some Homicide command personnel whom we interviewed think detectives should not fall back on this but rather find witnesses themselves to develop their skills and continuity of investigation. The State's Attorney issues witness subpoenas for detectives to serve. The detectives have also come to rely on Operations to do this, and the Sheriff's office does not serve subpoenas. If the service requires specialized techniques, such as those for reluctant witnesses, Operations will work with other agencies to locate witnesses.

Recommendation: The BPD may wish to consider consolidating this unit with the SWAT unit, which may be better equipped, staffed, and supported for serving subpoenas.

Homicide Investigations has 43 detectives on the "wheel" (rotational assignment of new cases to detectives, and not including 6 detectives temporarily unavailable). This means that, so far in 2019, there have been, on average, 5.2 new cases per detective. At the time of our interviews, there were 196 active homicide investigations, compared to 163 year to date in 2018, an increase of 22 percent. Homicide detectives also lead investigations on all unattended deaths (e.g., by overdose, suicide, or accident) $-1,003$ in 2018, and 565 through July 31, 2019. BPD leaders estimate that 60 homicide detectives are needed to handle current workload.

Recommendation: We suggest that homicide detectives only work homicide cases, with other death cases shifted to district detectives after sufficient training, and with homicide detectives available to consult on cases as needed. This would permit 50 homicide detectives to adopt six new cases yearly, or a total of 300. While over time the annual number of homicides may vary from this number, homicide detectives would now have reasonable time to handle cases and identify and locate witnesses (excluding those for whom a SWAT team would be needed). Unit leaders are considering establishing self-sufficiency in Operations, Cellebrite, and Digital Forensics. We suggest significant caution in these areas. The specialized knowledge, skills, abilities, equipment, training, and certification needed for these highly skilled areas suggest centralization to enhance accountability.

Additionally, the BPD may consider further decentralization of investigations of incidents such as unattended deaths currently investigated by the homicide unit to the district detective units, with proper training and support. This would help ensure that homicide unit staffing remains narrowly focused on homicides and closer to the expectation that homicide detectives investigate four to six new cases annually. The BPD should consider District Detective Unit personnel to be first detective responders on these cases, and to reassign such cases to the homicide unit should subsequent facts warrant. This would also allow homicide detectives time to identify and cultivate witnesses, relieving the Homicide Operations Section of this duty. We acknowledge that some fraction of these unattended death cases may be, in fact, homicides, however, we believe that with proper training and accountability this transition can be accomplished. This will likely result in a significant increase in workload for district detectives, and more district detectives.

## City-wide Robbery ${ }^{26}$

Current Personnel
1-Major. 1-Lieutenant. 2-Sergeants. 15-Detectives.
1-Lieutenant. 2-Sergeants. 12-Detectives.
Description
This unit is the primary lead investigative unit on all commercial robberies, carjackings, and patterns of related incidents as directed by BPD leadership or from information gleaned from Lotus Notes of DDU investigations. The Baltimore region reportedly leads the nation in bank robberies.

The unit reports a clearance rate of about $25 \%$ overall. Many of these cases are difficult to clear for reasons such as victims focusing on the gun used rather than the offender, or the victim being involved in other criminal activity. These cases also require a great deal of investigation and the increasing use of electronic evidence (e.g., recordings of witness or victim statements, electronic surveillance). The FBI task force helps with Cellebrite technology and a specialist from a Cellular Analysis and Survey Team who can plot cell site data. The unit also has trained detectives for Digital Evidence Recovery.

The unit works two shifts-9 a.m. to $5 \mathrm{p} . \mathrm{m}$. and $5 \mathrm{p} . \mathrm{m}$. to 1 a.m. - with on-call rotation to cover weekends. Nearly all work must be done manually. Lotus Notes, used by many BPD units as a quasi-case management system, requires about 45 minutes to create a new case. The unit has limited access to modern technology to create flyers and must use cell phone pictures and Microsoft Paint to make flyers. The building and resources available to the unit require significant repair.

## Regional Auto Theft

## Current Personnel

1-Lieutenant. 2-Sergeants. 10-Detectives.
Description
This team identifies stolen autos and carjacking crimes and pursues enforcement of applicable laws against these crimes.

[^19]
## Public Integrity Bureau

As a law and order agency, the BPD has the responsibility to offer vital security, and in doing so, be an organization that has integrity, agility, fairness, and transparency. To do this, it is critical that mechanisms be established that augment the confidence of the public in police officers. At the same time, the BPD must provide effective methods to help keep its members committed and exempt from actions that subtract from the effectiveness of the jobs they perform. The Public Integrity Bureau (PIB) seeks to fulfill this responsibility.

The PIB has its central administration personnel and their four investigative teams in one location. The investigative units are divided into General (also knowns as Internal Affairs), Special Investigation Response Team (SIRT), Ethics-Internal (or AntiCorruption) and Ethics-FBI investigations.

The General Investigations teams, distributed into six squads, are focused on administrative investigations against sworn officers and civilian employees presented by external and internal complainants, such as misconduct, neglect of duty, among others. These General Investigations teams also manage Court FTA ("Failure to Appear") investigations, which are those presented against sworn officers for failure to appear for trial in court. SIRT focuses on Level 3 uses of force where sworn officer might have harmed another individual. The Ethics-Internal team is focused on managing corruption and criminal behavior involving sworn officers; doing so through reactive investigations and proactive tests. Finally, the Ethics-FBI works together with the FBI in federal and highly confidential investigations.

The staffing analysis for the investigative units was conducted based on workload, considering regular demand of cases per month and active cases in backlog since 2017. The analysis will exclude minor infractions, such as neglect of duty and Court FTA cases, to be handled by Command Officers in the districts going forward, as established in Policy 321 as of September 11, $2019{ }^{27}$.

Before presenting the PIB staffing results, the workload-based approach used for analysis will be explained in detail. Then, results will be presented for each investigative unit, culminating with a summarized phased plan.

## Approach for Workload-Based Analysis

To conduct the workload-based analysis, data of total cases received and completed per period was combined with the average time it takes to conduct each type of investigation. This was done to calculate resources needed to manage regular demand, as well as to reduce the backlog of cases active since 2017. The process to calculate

[^20]average times per case type included interviews with PIB directives and focus groups with representatives of each unit, to be discussed next.

Table 9 shows the distribution of 811 cases received through the first six months of 2019 divided into General, Ethics and SIRT; where Ethics only includes the internal ones, since the cases covered by the Ethics-FBI team are highly confidential and were not provided for Staffing Analysis.

|  | $\mathbf{2 0 1 9}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Investigation <br> Type | J an | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | J un | Total |
| General | 116 | 117 | 145 | 136 | 116 | 134 | 764 |
| Ethics | 7 | 6 | 10 | 7 | 7 | 6 | 44 |
| SIRT | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 4 |
| Total | $\mathbf{1 2 5}$ | $\mathbf{1 2 4}$ | $\mathbf{1 5 5}$ | $\mathbf{1 4 3}$ | $\mathbf{1 2 3}$ | $\mathbf{1 4 1}$ | $\mathbf{8 1 1}$ |

Table 10 shows the distribution of active cases in backlog with a total of $1752^{28}$ that need to be completed. For backlog, it is assumed that PIB detectives must complete the analysis for the cases currently in their pipelines, including minor infractions referred to in Policy 321.

|  | Active Cases as of August 12, <br> $\mathbf{2 0 1 9}$ |  |  |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Investigation <br> Type | $\mathbf{2 0 1 7}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 8}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 9}$ | Total |
| General | 6 | 595 | 975 | 1576 |
| Court FTA | 0 | 44 | 39 | 83 |
| Ethics | 3 | 27 | 50 | 80 |
| SIRT | 1 | 10 | 2 | 13 |
| Total | $\mathbf{1 0}$ | $\mathbf{6 7 6}$ | $\mathbf{1 0 6 6}$ | $\mathbf{1 7 5 2}$ |

Table 10 Distribution of Active Cases in Backlog since 2017

[^21]PIB's current database of investigative cases includes timestamps from when the complaints are received, to when the investigations and final reports are completed, known as total time or lead time per case. However, lead times are not helpful to calculate needed resources, presenting the need for the use of touch times per activity. Touch time is distinguished from total time as it is an estimation of the time an investigator dedicates to the case without interruptions. For example, even though a case may take 100 days to finish and submit a report, the touch time of the investigation can be a fraction of that lead time, assuming the investigator is working on several cases simultaneously during that period. To calculate the needed number of personnel for the investigative units of General, Ethics and SIRT investigations, the model of average touch time per investigation was used.

To establish main activities and average times, four focus groups with a total of 18 detectives and supervisors from all investigative units were held to discuss the steps or activities necessary to investigate a complaint, from the assignment of a case until the submission of final reports. Analysis was complemented by reviewing the protocols and manuals ${ }^{29}$ for intake, classification and investigation of complaints, as provided by PIB and CD staff. Then, as part of the focus groups, estimated average times per activity were discussed, considering different amounts of complexity per type of cases. As shown in Figure 9, the general process of an internal affairs investigation was divided into initial case analysis and notification, case interviews and investigations, and final report and hearings (if necessary). In addition, time for follow-up and data entry activities was considered by adding $30 \%$ to the total average time per investigation type.


Figure 9 General Approach for Estimating Average Time per Investigation
Once the main activities and average times of each type of investigation were validated, a representative sample of 87 case files that were completed in 2018 was analyzed to quantify the complexity of the investigations. Please refer to Table 11 to see the sample distribution. The sample review supported in identifying average number of interviews, frequency of analysis of video footage, frequency of area

[^22]canvasses or field investigations, need for surveillance, consults with attorneys and prosecution, and participation in administrative hearings or court trials, if necessary.

| Investigation <br> Type | Sample |
| :--- | :--- |
| General | 59 |
| Court FTA | 6 |
| EthicS | 15 |
| SIRT | 7 |
| Total | $\mathbf{8 7}$ |

Table 11 Distribution of 2018 Completed Sample Cases per Investigation Type

Currently, cases are investigated by a primary and secondary investigator, having the secondary investigator participating in area canvassing and interviews. Therefore, the calculation of average time per case will include the time dedicated by both investigators to the activities mentioned above.

The staffing results will be presented in the following sub-sections by investigative and administrative units.

## General Investigation Teams

As shown in Table 12, the General Investigations team counts with a total of 32 employees ${ }^{30}$, out of which eight are in either medical leave or light duty, resulting in 25 completely active employees. From the total headcount of 32, 24 are Detectives of which 19.5 are active, including one that does not belong to the PIB roster (belongs to the 408 (medical) roster). The General Team operates five days a week during one shift, while rotating two Detectives for night shifts to receive complaint calls.

| Current Resources - EOY 2019 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Position | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline \text { Team } \\ 1 \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Team } \\ & 2 \end{aligned}$ | Team <br> 3 | SubTotal | Medical Leave | Light Duty | Total |
| Detectives | 9 | 9 | 6 | 24 | 4 | 0.5 | 19.5 |
| Sergeants | 2 | 2 | 1 | 5 | 1 | 0.5 | 3.5 |
| Lieutenants | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 2 |
| Total | 1 | 1 | 1 | 32 | 6 | 1 | 25 |

Table 12 Resources Assigned to General Investigation
Currently, the caseload for General Investigators runs around 75-95 cases per investigator. The average lead time of cases completed in 2019 is 319 days per General Investigation and 308 days for Court FTA cases; for a combined average lead time of 318 days.

[^23]The analysis of the General Investigations' activities resulted in an average time of 30.5 hours per General Investigation case (Figure 10) and 21.6 hours per Court FTA case (Figure 11), including primary and secondary investigator efforts.


Figure 11 Distribution of Average Time per Court FTA Case
Looking forward, new rules have and will be implemented by PIB regarding the lead time of cases. The idea is that General Investigations will have to be completed in 90 days or less. This new rule will take effect once the new PIB Investigations Manual is made public and investigators are trained for the use of it. Such change is expected by the end of natural year 2019 or beginning of 2020. While the new rule takes effect, additional changes have been implemented: cases received after August $1^{\text {st }}, 2019$ should be completed in six months or less and cases received before August 1st, 2019 have 364 days to be completed.

As mentioned previously, calculation of staffing needs was divided into staff needed to complete regular demand of cases in 90 days or less and staff needed to complete the backlog of active cases. Backlog of active cases will continue to increase as time passes and not having enough personnel to address it, increasing the need of personnel. For active cases, the rules related to August $1^{\text {st }}$ will be applied. All these periods-90 days, six months and 364 days-include weekends and holidays, hence, actual working days were estimated to be used as available time for the calculations, and average vacation and sick days were subtracted. Also, for active cases, the average time per case was reduced by assuming that some of the initial steps of an
investigation were already completed. Table 13 shows the distribution of cases that are considered in each of the categories: regular demand (assuming 90-days rules), and active cases received before and after August $1^{\text {st }}$ (assuming 1 year and six months rules, respectively). For regular demand, the results from J anuary to J une 2019 were extrapolated-assuming the same trends continue for the rest of the year-resulting in 1,528 cases. On the other hand, the active cases from 2017 to 2019 is equal to $1,659$.

| General Investigation and Court FTA Caseload |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Investigation <br> Type | Regular <br> Annual <br> Demand | Backlog of Active Cases <br>  <br> Before <br> Aug 1 | After Aug <br> $\mathbf{1}$ | Sub- <br> Total |
| General | 1528 | 1541 | 35 | 1576 |
| Court FTA | -- | 82 | 1 | 83 |
| Total | $\mathbf{1 5 2 8}$ | 1623 | 36 | $\mathbf{1 6 5 9}$ |
| Table e 13 Distribution of General Investigation and Court FTA Cases used for Staffing Needs Calculations |  |  |  |  |

## Staffing Study Results for General Investigations

As shown in Table 14, the staffing results show that to manage the regular demand of General and Court FTA investigations, the PIB needs a total of 27.0 detectives. To manage the backlog of active cases, the PIB would need 18.7 additional Detectives. Therefore, to comply with the new lead-time rules, the PIB would need a total of 45.7 Detectives ${ }^{31}$. Given the average time per General and Court FTA investigation and to comply with the 90 -days rule, a General Investigations detective should have a caseload between $35-45$ cases.

Staffing Needs for Detective Role in General Investigations

| Investigation <br> Type | Regular <br> Annual <br> Demand | Backlog of Active Cases |  |  |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
|  | Before Aug <br> $\mathbf{1}$ | After <br> Aug 1 | Sub- <br> Total |  |  |
| General | 27.0 | 16.6 | 0.8 | 17.4 | 44.4 |
| Court FTA | -- | 0.8 | 0.7 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| Total | $\mathbf{2 7 . 0}$ | 17.4 | 1.5 | 18.7 | $\mathbf{4 5 . 9}$ |

Table 14 Distribution of General Investigation and Court FTA Cases used for Staffing Needs Calculations
According to the Consent Decree, there should be one sergeant for every 6-8 police officers. In PIB, they work with squads of five detectives and one sergeant, and one Lieutenant every two squads. Therefore, Table 15 shows the numbers of total Sergeants and Lieutenants needed, where 5.4 Sergeants and 2.7 Lieutenants are required for regular demand, and a total of 9.1 Sergeants and 4.6 Lieutenants are required for both regular demand and active cases.

[^24]| Total Staffing Needs for General Investigations |  |  |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Position | Regular <br> Annual <br> Demand | Active Cases | Total |
| Detectives | 27 | 18.7 | 45.9 |
| Sergeants | 5.4 | 3.7 | 9.1 |
| Lieutenant | 2.7 | 1.9 | 4.6 |

Table 15 Staffing Needs per Position in General Investigations Team
Comparing the calculated needs of General Investigations with the current active employees, results in a shortage of 7.5 detectives for regular demand and a total shortage of 26.4 detectives, including active cases, as shown in Table 19. Moreover, considering the needs for Sergeants and Lieutenants, results in a shortage of 10.1 resources for regular demand and 34.6 including active cases.

| Position | $\begin{gathered} \text { EOY } \\ 2019 \end{gathered}$ | Staffing Needs |  |  | Difference |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Regular Demand | Active Cases | Total | For Regular Demand | For Total Needs |
| Detectives | 19.5 | 27.0 | 18.7 | 45.9 | (7.5) | (26.4) |
| Sergeants | 3.5 | 5.4 | 3.7 | 9.1 | (1.9) | (5.6) |
| Lieutenant | 2 | 2.7 | 1.9 | 4.6 | (0.7) | (2.6) |
| Total | 25 | 35.1 | 24.3 | 59.6 | (10.1) | (34.6) |

Table 16 Comparison of Staffing Needs vs. Current Employees for General Investigations Team

If PIB decides to assign resources to manage both the regular demand and the backlog of active cases, that would require immediate hiring of resources for fiscal year 2020. However, such hiring process depends on availability of resources, new police academies, and other considerations. Hence, even though it would be ideal to recruit all needed resources in less than a year, this analysis assumes a phased recruiting process, attempting a recruitment of 14 new detectives or less per year. In addition, given the shortage of Sergeants and Lieutenants, the analysis assumes that some of the current Detectives will be promoted to Sergeant positions, as well as having Sergeants being promoted to Lieutenant positions. Similarly, the hiring process should consider attrition. According to BPD's Human Resources personnel, BPD has a yearly attrition rate of $9.0 \%$ Therefore, the staffing analysis will assume an exit rate of 2-3 positions per year.

Based on the considerations and variables mentioned above, Figure 12 shows a fiveyear phased plan that would allow for achieving the target Detective numbers. It assumes that achieving the desired recruiting levels to manage regular demand and backlog of active cases will require three years. After the first three years, BPD could relocate the resources used to manage the backlog and end with the 27.0 officers needed for regular demand. Number of years to achieve the expected results can be reduced if BPD is more aggressive in recruiting activities.


Figure 12 Five-year Phased Plan for the Assignment of Detectives Needed for General Investigations

## Ethics-Internal Investigations Unit

The Ethics-Internal and Anti-Corruption team is composed of three (3) Detectives, one (1) Sergeant and a shared Lieutenant (0.5). A Lieutenant is shared with Integrity Assurance unit. The annual regular demand of this unit is 88 cases with a backlog of active cases of 80 . The average lead time of the cases that have been completed in 2019 is 345 days.

As shown in Figure 13, the analysis of the Ethics-Internal investigations activities resulted in an average time of 61.7 hours per case, including primary and secondary investigator efforts. Given the anti-corruption and criminal investigations focus of this unit, their cases require a higher amount of video footage analysis than General Investigations; as well as the need for surveillance activities, that are typically not required in General Investigations.


Figure 13 Distribution of Average Time per Ethics-Internal Investigation Case

The lead-time rules that applied for General Investigations, do not apply for Ethics investigations. However, there is still a relatively high backlog of active cases for which resources should be calculated.

In addition to case investigations, the Ethics-Internal team is required to conduct proactive tests. Proactive tests can be either targeted, focused on suspect behavior, or random, focused on observing general behavior of officers. Proactive tests were suspended in 2017 due to lack of resources. According to the Ethics unit leaders, the proactive tests should occur at least once per week with a team of eight (8) detectives and two (2) sergeants.

Table 17 shows the results of the staffing analysis for the Ethics-Internal unit. The results show that the unit is currently well-staffed to manage regular demand. However, to manage the backlog of active cases in less than a year, the unit would require 1.8 additional detectives. Similarly, to manage proactive tests, the unit would need at least 8 additional detectives. In conclusion, to operate efficiently and effectively the unit would need 9.9 additional detectives and two additional sergeants than the current roster.

| Position | $\begin{aligned} & \text { EOY } \\ & 2019 \end{aligned}$ | Staffing Needs |  |  |  | Difference |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Regular Demand | Active Cases | Proactive Tests | Total Needs | For Regular Demand | For <br> Total <br> Needs |
| Detectives | 3.0 | 3.1 | 1.8 | 8.0 | 12.9 | (0.1) | (9.9) |
| Sergeants | 1.0 | 1.0 | -- | 2.0 | 3.0 | 0 | (2.0) |
| Lieutenant | 0.5 | 0.5 | -- | -- | 0.5 | 0 | 0 |

Table 17 Comparison of Staffing Needs vs. Current Employees in Ethics-Internal Unit

## Special Investigation Response Team (SIRT)

The SIRT team is composed of four (4) Detectives, one (1) Sergeant and one (1) Captain. The annual regular demand of this unit is 20 cases with a backlog of active cases of 13. The average lead time of the cases that have been completed in 2019 is 306 days.

SIRT investigations present a different level of complexity, requiring different approaches for managing area canvass or field investigations. Depending on the type of incidents, all the Detectives must participate of the live scenes where Level 3 use of force was used (e.g. shootings by police officers). Also, their cases require a higher amount of video footage analysis than General and Ethics-Internal investigations.

To give an example, three levels of complexity for scene investigations were identified during the focus group with the SIRT team. Scene investigations is the initial step in SIRT cases, followed by other activities such as analysis of video footage, surveillance, among others. Figure 14 shows the average time per level of complexity of scene investigations. The Simple level scenes occur when SIRT is alerted late or after the scene has been compromised. In these cases, the investigators can only conduct a shorter field investigation that lasts an average of 2.5 hours. These simple scene investigations account for $30 \%$ of the total cases. Most scene investigations are the Medium ones, taking between 4 to 6 hours per case. Therefore, an average of 5.5 hours was assumed for the medium level scenes, accounting for $50 \%$ of the investigations. Lastly, the most complex level of scene investigations occurs due to shootings or when one or multiple individuals have been injured. An average of 12 hours per case was assumed for these scenes, accounting for $30 \%$ of total SIRT investigations. Simple and medium scenes are usually handled by two investigators, while all available Detectives are activated for complex scenes. A weighted average time per scene investigation was then calculated, considering the percentages and the times for each scene investigation levels.


Figure 14 Distribution of Average Time per Scene Investigation for SIRT Cases

As shown in Figure 15 the analysis of the SIRT investigations activities resulted in an average time of 127.2 hours per case, including primary and additional investigators.


Figure 15 Distribution of Average Time per SIRT Investigation Case
Even though the SIRT investigations are the longest ones in terms of average hours per case, given the low number of cases received monthly or annually, the staffing analysis resulted in a need of 1.3 Detectives for regular demand and 0.5 Detectives to manage the backlog of active cases. However, due to the need to have enough trained resources to manage complex cases, the SIRT team requires a minimum staffing of four (4) Detectives. It is then concluded that the SIRT team is well-staffed.

## Ethics - FBI

The Ethics-FBI team is composed of two (2) Detectives, one (1) Sergeant, and one (1) Lieutenant. As mentioned previously, due to the high confidentiality of cases-managed in conjunction with the FBI-the information required to study the process used for investigations and the frequency of cases assigned per year was not made available. Therefore, it is assumed that the unit is well-staffed. If BPD feels more resources are needed to supply the FBI needs, a contract could be stipulated between BPD and the FBI, establishing the number of resources needed to operate, based on FBI requirements.

## Other Units

In addition to the investigative units, PIB includes 12.5 personnel in charge of activities such as intake and classification of complaints, managing requests from attorneys, service complaints, Body Worn Camera (BWC) violations, administrative hearings, as well as managing PIB property, payroll and front desk, among others. These 12.5 employees are divided into two units, as shown in Table 18 After analyzing the tasks carried out by these functions, both units are considered well-staffed with no need for additional resources.

Out of the 13 members seven (7) are civilians and six (6) are sworn officers. From the six (6) sworn officers, only one of the roles-Property Management-could be civilianized.

| Current Staff for Other PIB Units - EOY 2019 |  |  |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Unit | Function | Rank | Total |
|  | Lt. - Manager | Sworn- <br> Lt. | 1 |
|  | Service Complaints | Sworn- <br> Sgt | 1 |
|  | Legal \& State Attorneys' requests and <br> other tasks | Detective | 1 |
|  | Background checks for promotions and <br> other tasks | Detective | 1 |
|  | BWC violations | Civilian | 1 |
|  | Pursuits and email/ mail complaints | Civilian | 1 |
|  | CRB claims and requests | Civilian | 1 |
| Assurance | Digitalization of case files | Civilian | 1 |
|  | Lt. - Manager | Sworn- <br> It. | 0.5 |
|  | Administrative hearings | Sworn- <br> Sgt | 1 |
|  | Administrative hearings | Detective | 1 |
|  | Property and vehicle management | Detective | 1 |
|  | Payroll | Civilian | 1 |
|  | Front Desk (408) | Detective | 1 |

Table 18 Distribution of Resources in Other Units

## Summary

Table 19 shows the calculated staffing needs versus End of Year (EOY) 2019 personnel (excluding medical leaves). There is a shortage of 15.4 to manage only regular demand. Including personnel required to manage the backlog of active cases, then the total shortage equals 46.5.

| Unit | Position | Current <br> Active <br> EOY <br> 2019 | Staffing Needs |  |  | Difference |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | Regular <br> Demand | Active Backlog <br>  <br> Proactive | Total | Regular <br> Demand | Total |
| PIB | Major | 1.0 | 1.0 | -- | 1.0 | -- | 0 |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { General } \\ & \text { Investigations } \end{aligned}$ | Detectives | 19.5 | 27.0 | 18.7 | 45.9 | (7.5) | (26.4) |
|  | Sergeants | 3.5 | 5.4 | 3.7 | 9.1 | (1.9) | (5.6) |
|  | Lieutenant | 2 | 2.7 | 1.9 | 4.6 | (0.7) | (2.6) |
|  | Sub-Total | 25 | 35.1 | 24.3 | 59.6 | (10.1) | (34.6) |
| AntiCorruption/ EthicsInternal | Detectives | 3.0 | 3.1 | 9.8 | 12.9 | (0.1) | (9.9) |
|  | Sergeants | 1.0 | 1.0 | 2.0 | 3.0 | 0 | (2.0) |
|  | Lieutenant | 0.5 | 0.5 |  | 0.5 | 0 | 0 |
|  | Sub-Total | 4.5 | 4.6 | 11.8 | 16.4 | (0.1) | (11.9) |
| SIRT | Detectives | 4.0 | 4.0 | -- | 4.0 | 0 | 0 |
|  | Sergeants | 1.0 | 1.0 | -- | 1.0 | 0 | 0 |
|  | Lieutenant | 1.0 | 1.0 | -- | 1.0 | 0 | 0 |
|  | Sub-Total | 6.0 | 6.0 | -- | 6.0 | 0 | 0 |
| Ethics-FBI | Detectives | 2.0 | 2.0 | -- | 2.0 | 0 | 0 |
|  | Sergeants | 1.0 | 1.0 | -- | 1.0 | 0 | 0 |
|  | Lieutenant | 1.0 | 1.0 |  | 1.0 | 0 | 0 |
|  | Sub-Total | 4.0 | 4.0 | -- | 4.0 | 0 | 0 |
| Intake Classification/ Others | Civilian | 3.0 | 3.0 | -- | 3.0 | 0 | 0 |
|  | Detectives | 2.0 | 2.0 | -- | 2.0 | 0 | 0 |
|  | Sergeants | 1.0 | 1.0 | -- | 1.0 | 0 | 0 |
|  | Lieutenant | 1.0 | 1.0 | -- | 1.0 | 0 | 0 |
|  | Sub-Total | 7.0 | 7.0 | -- | 7.0 | 0 | 0 |
| Integrity Assurance | Civilian | 1.0 | 2.0 | -- | 2.0 | (1.0) | (1.0) |
|  | Detectives | 3.0 | 2.0 | -- | 2.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 |
|  | Sergeants | 1.0 | 1.0 | -- | 1.0 | -- | 0 |
|  | Lieutenant | 0.5 | 0.5 | -- | 0.5 | -- | 0 |
|  | Sub-Total | 4.0 | 5.5 | -- | 5.5 | (1.5) | 0 |
| Total | - | 53 | 63.2 | 36.1 | 99.5 | (11.7) | (46.5) |

Table 19 Total Resource Requirements
Reflecting the staffing needs presented previously, Figure 16 shows a seven-year plan that considers all roles, including Detectives, Sergeants, Lieutenants, Major, and Civilians. It assumes that achieving the desired recruiting levels to manage regular demand and backlog of active cases will require three years. After the first three years, BPD could relocate the resources used to manage the backlog and retain the resources needed for regular demand, as well as leveraging exits due to attrition.

As shown in Table 19 PIB staffs 53 personnel, excluding those in medical leave. The plan assumes the Lieutenant and Sergeant roles would be filled by promoting Sergeants and

Detectives, respectively during the first two years. It also assumes that the position of Property Manager would be civilianized on the first year. Finally, the phase-plan was built under the assumption that the hiring process depends on availability of resources, new police graduates, and other considerations. Hence, even though it would be ideal to recruit all needed resources in less than a year, this analysis assumes a phased recruiting process, attempting a recruitment of 16 new detectives or less per year to supply both General Investigations and Ethics-Internal teams. Number of years to achieve the expected results can be reduced if BPD is more aggressive in recruiting activities.

Moreover, this recommended plan assumes that once the backlogs are eliminated after the first four years, the surplus of General investigators could be relocated during 2024 to the Ethics-Internal team to conduct proactive tests. Similarly, during 2025-2026, the surplus of resources can be relocated to other units in the BPD. In case BPD determines that proactive tests should be conducted immediately, then eight (8) more detectives should be hired during the first three years.


Figure 16 Seven-year Phased Plan for the Assignment of Total Resources Needed in PIB

## Technology Division

The Technology Division is responsible for the planning, organization, implementation and maintenance of computerized information and communications systems of the BPD, in accordance with applicable laws, protocols, and regulations. It also oversees the delivery of geographic information system (GIS) services. It is led by a Chief Technology Officer (CTO) ${ }^{32}$ and who oversees Information Technology.

## Information Technology Section

The Information Technology (IT) section is responsible for implementing and maintaining computerized information systems. As of October 2019, it has 46 personnel, 43 of which are civilian, including its Chief Technology Officer. All staff report directly to the Chief of Technology, Director, and the Lieutenant Sub-Director, suggesting

[^25]challenges in span of control and accountability. Furthermore, complying with the Consent Decree will require additional personnel for modernizing legacy platforms and aging infrastructure and implementing new systems to eliminate paper-based processes.

To develop a plan for complying with the Consent Decree, the BPD hired Gartner Consulting. The resulting report in 2018 recommended development and implementation of several projects and structural changes throughout a five-year period. ${ }^{33}$ The suggestions, however, were considered aspirational, and in the planning phase of implementation. There are four projects considered in the Gartner study that are highly critical for compliance with the Consent Decree and for which resources are needed in the near future.

Our analysis of IT staffing needs first considers the current structure, focusing on day-to-day operations, then considers future IT needs and new projects to be implemented. We conclude our discussion of the IT section by discussing opportunities for having civilian employees fill positions.

## Current IT Structure

Table 20 shows the current distribution of functions among the 46 personnel in the IT Section. The current roster represents the basic structure needed to manage day-today operations while also developing and implementing projects that were already in pipeline. In addition, the Section needs personnel for Help Desk and supervisory roles.

Help Desk personnel currently work two shifts seven days weekly and a third shift five days weekly. This means there is no support for officers requiring IT assistance two nights weekly.

Given limitations to BPD systems, we could not gather data to calculate staffing needs here. Hence, our suggestion that an additional Support Staff member be added to provide coverage for all shifts on all days is based solely on schedule observations and conversations with the IT Director. Given that this need is only for two nights per week, a part-time employee or an additional employee working other tasks might suffice.

We consider supervisory roles in our discussion of future needs.

[^26]| Function | \# of Employees | Type |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Chief Technology Officer | 1 | Civilian |
| Director | 1 | Civilian |
| Sub-Director/Locator | 1 | Civilian |
| Office Support Specialist III | 1 | Civilian |
| Anal Prog II | 2 | Civilian |
| Business Analyst | 2 | Civilian |
| Communications Analyst I | 1 | Civilian |
| NCIC Computer Operator | 3 | Civilian |
| Computer Repair / Tier 2 | 1 | Civilian |
| Comm Contract Specialist | 1 | Civilian |
| Data Architect | 1 | Civilian |
| Developer | 3 | Civilian |
| GIS | 4 | Civilian |
| Support Staff (Help Desk) | 7 | Civilian |
| Support Staff (Hardware Help Desk) | 1 | Civilian |
| LAN Administrator | 1 | Civilian |
| Network Engineer | 2 | Civilian |
| Oracle Database Admin | 1 | Civilian |
| Project Manager | 5 | Civilian |
| SharePoint Developer | 1 | Civilian |
| Lotus Notes Maintenance | 1 | Civilian |
| Mobile App Developer | 1 | Civilian |
| System Administrator | 2 | Civilian |
| Tier 2/3 Technical Specialist | 2 | Sworn |
| Total | 46 |  |

Table 20 Distribution of Functions of IT Current Resources as of October 2019

## Future Needs

As noted above, the IT section has four pending projects that are critical for complying with the Consent Decree. These are for a Record Management System (RMS), a learning management system (LMS), a workforce management system (WMS), and an Early Intervention System (EIS).

Given the urgency to comply with the Consent Decrees, implementation of these projects should commence no later than 2020. At the time of our interviews, the request for proposals for the RMS project was pending. This project should be awarded by the end of the fiscal year 2020, with implementation beginning that summer. The IT staff has suggested that the EIS await RMS implementation.

The Gartner study presented staffing needs for each project, recommending dedicated resources for each, such as project managers (PM) and business analysts (BA), as well
as shared resources, such as technical analysts (TA). As of August 2019, the BPD had hired a new PM and BA for the RMS project. Given the temporary nature of projects, we do not recommend hiring full-time PMs and BAs for each of these projects because they could represent excess capacity once the projects are completed. We instead recommend adding contract personnel to manage each project simultaneously or delaying some project start dates, reducing the need for resources. We suggest hiring an additional PM and BA, so that at least two of the critical projects can be conducted simultaneously. These personnel could later help implement additional non-critical systems recommended by the Gartner study.

The Gartner study established that both the RMS and the EIS projects will require dedicated TAs, while the LMS and WMS projects could share a TA. Hence, the BPD needs at least 1.5 TAs in the near future.

The implementation of these systems requires proper training and oversight to ensure effective adoption of changes. Therefore, change management and training leads are essential. These personnel should be hired by the time the RMS pilot project commences. Given that there is still no set implementation plan, we estimate that these personnel should be hired by the end of 2020. In addition to change management and training leads, these projects will require subject matter experts to train those who will be providing training across Districts. The BPD should hire these personnel once implementation plans are established for each project.

Finally, by employing a five year strategic plan approach, the re-organization of the current structure should be conducted either before or in parallel with implementation of these new projects, with reorganization leading to additional new supervisors (years 1-3). Based on Gartner recommendations, BPD analysis ${ }^{34}$, and input from the new CTO, the initial year 1-3 IT Section could be grouped into three teams: (1) Infrastructure Services, (2) Application Services, and (3) IT Governance. During years 4-5 ITS would develop a new group focused on Cybersecurity for the entire BPD. For years 1-2, the Infrastructure team would oversee the day to day IT services, technical infrastructure, systems management, and configuration management. The Application Services team would manage the performance of current system resources, analysis of database structural requirements, application administration and operations, and database administration. The IT Governance Team would focus on the operational and administrative needs of the IT section to include project management, contract management, finance management, and business analysis. For years 4-5 the Cybersecurity group would focus on performing security assessments, penetration testing for all technologies, evaluating security for all technologies, and maintain CJIS compliance for both IT service and technologies. Each of these teams would require a supervisory lead and report to the CTO or designated deputy.

[^27]
## Civilianization

The IT unit currently has three sworn officers: a Lieutenant functioning as sub-director and two police officers in charge of Tier 2 and Tier 3 IT services and support. IT support from Sworn Officers will be critical towards ensuring that the implementation of technical solutions take into consideration both complexities and uniqueness of IT services for sworn officers. No consideration should be applied towards replacing these officers with civilian personnel.

## Personnel Summary

Table 21 shows a plan to hire additional personnel next two years. It includes the PM and BA who were hired in 2019. For 2020, it includes five personnel needed to conduct the projects required by the Consent Decree and to manage the changes and training requirements. It also includes three new supervisors. For 2020, it assumes hiring of two civilian personnel to substitute the current sworn officers in charge of Layer I Wiring. It also assumes that these sworn officers are not relocated until 2021, so as to ensure proper transition. Finally, it assumes the hiring of a part-time TA. Altogether, the plan shows how the IT section can overcome its current shortage of 8.5 personnel, as well as covert two sworn-officer positions to positions for civilian personnel.

## Recommendations

The BPD should consider creating a five-year strategic plan for the IT Section that appropriately collects system requirements for the functional and operational units while leveraging the Gartner study. The plan should include specific dates for implementation of projects so that final staffing needs per year can be determined. Generating a five-year plan should aid the BPD in complying with the Consent Decree regardless of any changes in the Technology Division's administration.

## Recruitment Division

To estimate staffing needs in the Recruitment Division, interviews were held in August with the major, lieutenant, two sergeants, and four detectives and officers to supplement and add context to the data analysis of unit documents. Additionally, interviews were held with staff from human resources to discuss exit interviews and retention issues.

One of the challenges the BPD faces is its inability to retain officers. That is, in most years since 2002, the number of officers leaving the organization has outpaced the number of officers joining it. Figure 17 and Table 21 illustrate this predicament.


Figure 17 BPD Attrition 2002-2019

| Year | Attrition | Hiring | Gain/Loss |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 2002 | 185 | 180 | -5 |
| 2003 | 208 | 211 | +3 |
| 2004 | 263 | 146 | -117 |
| 2005 | 338 | 188 | -150 |
| 2006 | 267 | 227 | -40 |
| 2007 | 273 | 266 | -7 |
| 2008 | 222 | 286 | +64 |
| 2009 | 172 | 175 | +3 |
| 2010 | 249 | 171 | -78 |
| 2011 | 203 | 202 | -1 |
| 2012 | 243 | 217 | -26 |
| 2013 | 265 | 151 | -114 |
| 2014 | 225 | 165 | -60 |
| 2015 | 243 | 91 | -152 |
| 2016 | 225 | 111 | -114 |
| 2017 | 204 | 207 | +3 |
| 2018 | 225 | 184 | -41 |
| 2019 | (as | 154 | 139 |
| $10 / 24 / 19)$ |  | -15 |  |

Table 21 BPD Annual Attrition
This deficit has led to significant concerns about understaffing and its effects on operations, morale, retention, and officer and community safety. Understaffing also limits the ability of the department to innovate its practices.

As staffing concerns have mounted, so have overtime hours that officers must work. While some officers may embrace overtime to maximize compensation, many officers do not want it, and all officers are affected by the number of hours worked.

Some issues affecting recruitment, such as other workforce opportunities as well as competition from other law enforcement agencies, are beyond the control of the BPD. For that very reason, however, the BPD needs to think more strategically about recruitment, hiring, training, and retention.

## Recruitment Strategies

The BPD Recruitment Division is currently in transition and has already made some significant changes to address issues in identifying qualified candidates, problem areas in selection and hiring, and making the process more efficient. Nevertheless, there are some additional opportunities to increase efficiencies in recruitment, as well as the potential to shift some recruitment positions to civilians.

It makes sense that sworn officers primarily are used to recruit new applicants. They are the face of the department. The BPD has six to seven officers assigned to recruitment, supervised by a sergeant. It is difficult to say whether this number is adequate or whether adding more officers to recruitment would result in more or better candidates. The department could make a more strategic determination of the number and types of recruitment events attended, determining which events produce the most or best applicants, and then change its strategy accordingly.

Applicants may not be hired for one of at least three reasons. First, they may decide they are not, after all, interested, and hence not complete the required paperwork and submit the necessary documents. The concierge program is one way the BPD is seeking to address this issue. Second, applicants may be dropped because of an issue (e.g., previous criminal record) appearing in their initial background check. Third, serious applicants apply to multiple agencies simultaneously and may be considering multiple offers. Applicants may, for example, 'slow-play' their BPD application while awaiting results on their other applications.

The point is that while there might be other community reasons to send recruitment staff to a wide range of events, the agency should also consider the value of individual events for producing applicants who are likely to complete their application, who do not have problematic backgrounds, and who are likely to be most serious about working for the BPD. The department can and should analyze data on recruitment events to discern where best to deploy recruitment officers.

The BPD has undertaken a marketing campaign that appears to have had success generating more interest in and applications to the department. Moving forward, the BPD should consider how best to brand the department and convey the reasons why it might be attractive to work at BPD. Currently, it appears recruitment officers use a variety of different strategies to promote the department, recruiting in whatever way they personally feel is best, but the department does not know what messaging is most effective. Every officer we interviewed was able to speak about what is unique about BPD and why an individual might want to work there rather than elsewhere. The BPD may want to build a recruitment strategy around these insights, and particularly those that make the BPD most appealing relative to other agencies. Among issues that recruiters discuss with potential recruits are the opportunity to work on different types of serious criminal cases, to be part of community change and growth, to work in a large agency, and to have potential for promotion and advancement. All these issues can be featured in a recruitment strategy, but the vision here should be consistently shared across recruiters.

It was clear that the individuals working in the recruitment unit believe in its mission and are working very hard to recruit strong candidates. Research also shows that there is also some value in recruiting "true believers" to assist with recruiting on an episodic basis. Such recruiters may be used at specific types of events or to attract specific types of applicants. For example, such a person might be a particular dynamic or motivating speaker able to present a lecture in a university criminal justice class.

The department should also consider different strategies to attract different types of applicants. The current recruiting focus appears to be on getting more applicants without concern for their skills, qualities, and attributes. Overall, the BPD has been successful in attracting and hiring a diverse pool of applicants. Recruiters could not pinpoint the reasons for the success, but we suspect that much of it is due to the fact that the agency is diverse at all levels. Nevertheless, there is value in recruiting using different methods directed at different audiences. For example, because the BPD wants to expand and embrace community policing, it may wish to attract more officers who are community and problem-solving oriented. This might mean expanding the college majors that recruiters seek, identifying applicants with past community service successes, and discussing a community focus when interacting with potential recruits. Attempting to attract officers who might embrace community policing work could also be tied to the overall branding of the department. Current recruiters could identify few tangible ways they assess and recruit for community policing attributes. This runs counter to one of the goals of the Consent Decree.

The recruitment unit currently uses social media. The BPD should maximize these efforts, as there is little expense to them and they can be used strategically to diversify the applicant pool. A civilian employee able to assist with social media messaging may help boost these efforts. The messaging on social media should be consistent with the wider vision of the recruitment strategy. There are also opportunities for making Public Service Announcements on music outlets such as Spotify and Pandora and to post on police jobs boards (e.g., Discoverpolicing.org, Policeapp, etc.). In addition, every academic criminal justice department in the country is likely to have a job or career fair. Although it is impossible for BPD personnel to attend all such fairs, it would take little effort to identify a large pool of contacts where job ads can be sent and distributed.

Research shows that agencies can obtain a sizeable portion of candidates by reaching out to previous applicants who, for whatever reason, did not complete the process. These are individuals who already know a little about the agency, expressed interest in it and a career in policing, and for whom the agency already has contact information. It was not apparent whether the BPD has mined this pool for potential applicants, but it may find it fruitful to do so.

Staff reports there is little cooperation between the Recruitment Division and other divisions units in BPD. This has led to many bottlenecks and misconnects. The BPD should work to build bridges between recruitment and other units and to leverage officers from throughout BPD as recruiters in strategic situations.

## Applicant Investigations Section

The hiring unit appears able to handle the current flow of applicants, and detectives reported being able to process applicants in a timely manner. There are occasional delays as well as variations by candidates, often because of the complexity of an
applicant's file (e.g., many past jobs or residences, military service). Concierges, discussed below, are also helping process candidate requests for information.

Electronic systems are helping to make the application process simpler and more efficient. Particularly helpful are systems that recruitment officers can use to have applicants apply on the spot. Systems such as e-spot and Kenteck also help make application processing easier.

Once an applicant has provided essential information, the hiring process is relatively straightforward. Detectives assigned to the section, each handling 18 to 25 applicants at a time, will check several databases to find potential criminal activity by recruits, conduct interviews, look for additional documents, and contact references. If approved, the candidate undergoes a polygraph examination as well as physical and psychological examination. Detectives may seek to review other policing applications by recruits to ensure information provided is consistent.

The BPD recruitment system is case-based. Each detective is given an applicant and is responsible for pushing the applicant through the process consistent with a timeline. All case files are reviewed by a sergeant before being recommended for hire, and over time staff have been required to articulate more specifically and objectively reasons for not recommending candidates (e.g., simply reporting that someone is "immature" is no longer sufficient). Additionally, the recruitment unit has developed an SOP manual that was approved and adopted last year. This has brought more consistency, standardization, and predictability to the process.

The concierge system, where three civilians and two cadets (overseen by a sergeant) help applicants along the process, appears to be considered a success. Concierges encourage applicants and build relationships in a way that helps obtain all information required to process the application.

The BPD, in cooperation with the Mayor's Office, developed and adopted RecruitStat, a data analysis tool to review weekly hiring activities. Data generated through RecruitStat is supposed to lead to adjustments and changes in recruitment strategies that result in more and better applicants. Some members of the Recruitment Division were familiar with this tool, but there was little evidence that the data was leading to changes in recruitment and hiring processes. This may be because the system is relatively new. There may also be potential to expand this program to assess the larger recruitment-hiring-academy-training pipeline for ways to increase the efficiency of identifying and processing high-quality applicants while limiting attrition in these early stages. ${ }^{35}$

The BPD may wish to consider whether it is imperative for sworn detectives to conduct background investigations of recruits. Civilians are already involved in BPD recruitment
${ }^{35}$ This program was used successfully in New Orleans
as part of the concierge system, and many other departments have moved to a mixedmodel where both civilians and sworn personnel conduct background investigations.

Should the BPD seek to move a portion of the hiring process to civilians, there are two models it could follow. First, civilians could process applications through one of the gates of the hiring process. For example, civilians could do comprehensive record checks through law enforcement databases. This would allow detectives to focus on interviews and investigating potential discrepancies in the application. Second, retired officers or civilians could complete all aspects of the hiring process. That is, they could be given a caseload just as detectives are and be responsible for evaluating candidates and processing them through hiring.

A civilian or retired officer might also help ease the heavy administrative burden early in the hiring process. A critical part of this process is identifying highly motivated candidates. Identifying such candidates can also help with subsequent retention issues, as we discuss next.

Overall, there appears to be little use of strategy, information (internal or external), and analysis to guide BPD recruitment. Recruitment staff did not appear to be guided by a plan nor could they recall discussions of different approaches and whether one might be better than another. Recruiters simply seemed to go about their business independently. Where innovation did occur, it appeared to be driven externally, such as by the mayor's office. The BPD should consider its recruitment processes much more systematically and draw upon existing sources of information to methodically design and implement a clear strategy tailored to its needs.

## Retention

The BPD has drafted a retention plan. Nevertheless, the department appears to have given little attention to understanding the size and reasons for attrition, assessing why it is concentrated among some groups of officers (or recruits) more than others; or to mitigating its causes and consequences. There was little discussion about retention in our interviews, even when we raised it, and it did not appear part of the strategic planning of the unit.

The human resources (HR) staff appear to be the most connected to retention in BPD. In partnership with HR, the mayor's office is reportedly assessing why officers are leaving the department, examining exit interviews, conducting focus groups, and engaging affinity groups (e.g., FOP). Nevertheless, it is not clear how well HR understands BPD attrition. Staff claims that most resignations are by officers with less than one year of service, but data it provided show that only 31\% of officers who recently resigned have one year or less of service. At the same time, more than $6 \%$ of officers who resigned had 15 to 21 years of service. Given their proximity to retirement with full benefits, one might expect attrition of this group to be very low.

Reasons HR gives for officer attrition include lack of internal procedural justice, challenges with promotional opportunities, better benefits at nearby agencies (especially the county), too much overtime and toll on family (with many officers working double or even triple shifts), difficulty of working in some violent districts, and problems with facilities/ infrastructure. One recruitment sergeant noted morale, working conditions, treatment of employees, and forced overtime are all among reasons that officers leave the force.

Staff suggested a few strategies to boost retention. One was to create health and wellness initiatives to help staff with their mental health. Another was to create processes to boost internal procedural justice: despite several command rank positions open, many officers are skipped over for promotions. A third was to provide guidance on career advancement, such as through a mentorship program. There is a department retention plan that has been developed.

The BPD collects data that can inform retention efforts, but such data appears to be little used. For example, the information gathered in the exit interviews appears to be fairly rich and can be even more valuable when combined with other existing information on staff (e.g., assignment, demographics) or even additional data collection efforts (e.g., "stay" surveys of existing staff; additional exit interview questions). The BPD should consider how to systematically use this information to increase retention.

Given that attrition is outpacing hiring, as well as the fact that the cost and effort needed to attract, hire, and train an officer is far greater than that needed to retain one, the BPD should become more strategic in its efforts to retain officers. This includes creating processes to understand the nature and characteristics of attrition, collecting and using data to guide its retention efforts, and identifying and exploring promising practices that specifically address its needs. A civilian analyst could help facilitate this process (there appears to already be an analyst in HR).

It is possible to estimate the net effects of hiring and attrition on net strength. At BPD's current rate of 4 classes of 36 recruits, there are 144 potential officers to be added to the force annually. However, current annual attrition among the sworn officers (including those undergoing academy training) is about $9 \%$ (or about 224 officers from a force of 2,494). Ultimately, this means BPD will experience a net loss of 80 officers, or just over $3 \%$ of force strength, after one year (144-224 $=-80$ ).

BPD's goal is to eventually hold 6 classes of 50 recruits annually, which could produce 300 new officers. Under this scenario, and assuming organizational attrition rates remain the same, in one year BPD would net an additional 76 officers (300-224 $=76$ ), increasing its net strength by about 3\% If BPD were meeting this goal today, it could increase its net strength by 100 officers in less than two years and over 300 officers in five years, as Table 22 shows.

| Year | $\mathbf{1}$ | $\mathbf{2}$ | $\mathbf{3}$ | $\mathbf{4}$ | $\mathbf{5}$ |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| academy <br> recruits | 300 | 300 | 300 | 300 | 300 |  |
| strength | 2494 | 2570 | 2638 | 2701 | 2758 |  |
| overall <br> attrition | 224 | 231 | 237 | 243 | 248 |  |
| net strength | 76 | 69 | 63 | 57 | 52 | $\mathbf{3 1 7}$ |

Table 22 Calculation of Training Requirements
Essentially, there are four ways BPD can increase the rate at which it increases its overall strength.

1) Increase the size of recruit classes. This would have to be examined relative to facility space and the ability to maintain instructional quality (e.g., by incorporating enough facilitators to assist instructors).
2) Increase the annual number of academy classes. This would also have to be examined relative to facility and instructor availability. BPD haslaunched this initiative.
3) Reduce the current academy attrition rate of $18 \%$ Analysis of the difficulties recruits have during the academy and the reasons they drop out or fail can help guide attrition reduction strategies.
4) Reduce the overall attrition rate of the department. As noted above, there are many strategies the BPD can explore to boost officer retention and develop evidence-based strategies for reducing it.

The importance of addressing attrition is highlighted in the following scenario. If BPD met its goal of 6 classes of 50 recruits, and reduced department attrition from 9\%to $7 \%$ it would net 125 officers in one year $(300-175=125)$.

It is difficult to estimate the amount of time recruiting, processing, and hiring applicants adds to the "time-to-strength" estimates. Recruiters contend that while processing time has diminished because of process improvements they have made, time-to-hire still varies substantially by applicants for many reasons (e.g., complexity of background, speed at which candidates submit information). Nevertheless, hiring time must be considered in future time-to-strength estimates.

## Education and Training Division

## Recruit Curriculum

Although the curriculum continues to be developed to meet the demands of the Consent Degree and streamline Entry Level Training, the general parameters of the curriculum for Entry Level Training (ELT) and Continuing Education (CE) are briefly discussed in this section. This is primarily a summary of the work that Major Bartness, Academic Coordinator Cordner and the staff have done to transition the ELT curriculum from a 38 week to a 30 week offering, develop and offer in-service training, and develop and plan to offer six academy classes per year.

The ELT is being transitioned to be delivered in a 30 -week time period. Appendix E provides the full listing of courses/ hours provided in this 30 -week period and Table 23 provides a general summary of the topics and provides an estimate of the number of hours (excludes Testing and Graduation Hours). A large part of the curriculum covers the law (163.5 hours), firearms training (161 hours) and defensive tactics (96 hours). The organizational processes topic is a general category of topics that includes overviews of policies, procedures, and process issues. Physical training is 67 hours. Traffic includes 54 hours and Emergency Vehicle Operations includes 50 hours of training. Training on controlled dangerous substances includes 40 hours, and community policing and other community issues cover 37 hours. Other training topics include Law Enforcement Emergency Medical Care Course (LEEMCC)(35 hours); CID (35 hours); Field Sobriety Training ( 35 hours), Integrated Scenarios ( 35 hours), Report Writing (29.5 hours); Behavioral Health Awareness (23 hours), Special Crimes and Victims (20 hours), and Ethics training (8.5). This training is provided by the ELT unit which currently consists of 19 officers.

| Topic | Hours | Topic | Hours |
| :--- | :---: | :--- | :---: |
| Law | 163.5 | LEEMCC | 35 |
| Range | 161 | CID | 35 |
| Defensive Tactics | 96 | Field Sobriety Training | 35 |
| Organizational Processes | 72.5 | Integrated Scenarios | 35 |
| Physical Training | 67 | Reporting Writing | 29.5 |
| Traffic | 54 | Behavioral Health Awareness | 23 |
| EVOC | 50 | Special Crimes and Victims | 20 |
| Controlled Dangerous Substances | 40 | Ethics Training | 8.5 |
| Community Policing and <br> Community Issues | 37 |  |  |

Table 23 Recruit Training Topics and Hours

## Continuing Education Training

It is expected that officers will have to complete approximately 20 days of in-service training annually. This will be a challenge as it increases the amount of training required at the same time there is an expectation for increasing the number of ELT classes. A portion of these in-service units will be able to be completed by enhancing e-learning options, but space and the logistics of covering these hours will be cumbersome.

The CE unit is responsible for all in-service and legal training, and it will also provide additional hours of training via e-learning and provide assistance in developing and delivering training to specific units (e.g., PIB and CID) There are currently 19 officers ( 15 sworn/ 4 civilian) who are assigned to the Continuing Education Unit (CEU).

There are a number of courses that are either required by the consent decree or are considered related to it. A two-day course on Use of Force and Fair \& Impartial Policing was delivered in 2019 for over 2,000 sworn personnel. This course included three prerequisite e-learning modules as well. A second scenario-based course on Stops, Searches, and Arrests and Fair \& Impartial Policing will begin in J anuary 2020 and the perquisite e-learning for this course began in December 2019.

Appendix F provides a listing of other courses covered by the CEU. Several courses are firearms-training related, including CEW, Handgun, Shotgun and Rifle training. Other courses include Safe Driving, Command \& Control, Health \& Wellness, Tactical Entry \& Safety, Tactical-Medical Care Emergency Response, and Youth Dialogue/ Outward Bound. Sworn personnel also completed numerous e-learning modules including sexual assault investigation, child sex trafficking, identity theft, intellectually and developmental disabilities, blood borne pathogens, and First Amendment Protected Activities. There is also long list of courses covering various topics that are elective course options.

There are several other types of trainings delivered to additional audiences. For example, in 2019, the following training goals were accomplished. First, FTO supervisors were trained or recertified. Second, leadership training of supervisors and administrators was provided. Third, instructors were trained on various topics to decrease the need for detailing external instructors to the Academy. These included courses to certify instructors on defensive tactics and emergency vehicle operations. Other courses delivered included courses on prisoner transport safety and mountain bike certification. In additional, a course on civilian self-defense was offered twice.

## Organization of Training, Current Staffing and Recommended Changes

Tables 24 and 25 provide current staffing and recommended changes in order to cover 6 ELT and CE classes in 2020. Tables 2 and 3 show that there are approximately 76 staff
members assigned to the academy. Most of the current staff are sworn officers and staff is organized by unit. Specifically, the Continuing Education Unit has 19 staff members, the Entry Level Training Unit has 19 staff members, the Range has 22 staff members, the Administration Unit has 5 staff members, Record/ Compliance Unit has 4 staff members, and the Academics Unit has 5 staff members.

Interviews and feedback from staff about areas of need calls for a recommendation to increase to a staff of 90 . In addition, it will be important to convert a large number of positions from sworn to civilian. Two specific areas identified for increased staffing include instructional development and firearms instructors. First, the Academic Unit should be increased by adding civilian staff with strong backgrounds in instructional development and design to focus specifically on curriculum. Currently, existing staff are asked to revise existing or build out any new required trainings, but such design is reactive to needs and staff are often pulled in multiple directions at once (providing instruction, developing new modules, etc.). These civilian staff hires should focus on building the ELT and CE curriculum, applying research on best practices in the area and soliciting and integrating input from subject matter experts into training modules and focus on developing or strengthening lesson plans across the curriculum. There are several areas where these new hires could focus their attention. First, the entire entry level curriculum is in transition as they are moving from a 38 to a 30 -hour entry level training curriculum. This transition requires the integration of training modules, the elimination of duplication of topics, and reworking content to make it more engaging. Second, the development of newly required training under the consent decree requires considerable new course development and revision. Third, these individuals could also assist with the evaluation of the training modules, integrating feedback into design changes. Finally, staff here can also think about integrating evaluation of training into all aspects of delivery, and these data can be ûsed to plan strategically and improve instructional delivery.

Added staff for firearms instruction would be helpful for ensuring that there are no bottlenecks in getting all new officers adequately trained as well as allowing for the recertification of current officers. The amount of training and recertification that occurs annually is substantial. Training includes recertification of all sworn personnel $(+2,000)$, training and re-qualifications for rifle school, training on taser, less-lethal beanbag shotgun, and FN303 and Pepper Ball, training on using weapon-mounted flashlights, after-action training, and grand jury training. In addition, a firearms instructor school is also provided. There are several additional challenges that increasing staffing in this unit will help alleviate as other trainings can be grown and enhanced.

| ACTUAL STRENGTH | Current | Suggested <br> 2020 staffing <br> (6 ELT <br> Classes) |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| MAJ OR | 1 | 1 |
| DIRECTOR | 1 | 1 |
| LIEUTENANTS | 3 | 3 |
| SERGEANTS | 15 | 15 |
| OFFICERS - (INCLUDING 5 <br> DETAILED IN) | 45 | 24 |
| 408 / 407 | 2 | 2 |
| O/ S | 1 | 1 |
| OAIII | 1 | 2 |
| OSS III | 1 | 1 |
| C/ S | 5 | 1 |
| CIVILIAN <br> INSTRUCTORS/ Academic Unit | 66 | 40 |
| TOTAL SWORN | 76 | 42 |
| TOTAL OVERALL |  | 90 |

Table 24 Breakdown of Staffing numbers at the Academy by rank and title

|  | Current |  | 2020 |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Sworn | Civilian | Sworn | Civilian |
| Major | 1 |  | 1 |  |
| Academic Director |  | 1 |  | 1 |
| Continuing | 15 | 4 | 10 | 9 |
| Education |  |  |  |  |
| Entry Level Training | 19 | 0 | 12 | 11 |
| Administration | 2 | 3 | 1 | 4 |
| Range | 21 | 1 | 15 | 11 |
| Records/ Compliance | 4 | 0 | 1 | 3 |
| Academics Unit | 4 | 1 | 2 | 9 |

Table 25 Recommended Staffing numbers for the coming year at the Academy

## Ancillary Únits

In addition to the units described in other sections we also reviewed departmental resources that provide opportunities for improvements in efficiency and staffing.

## Building Security

BPD devotes a substantial number of personnel to building security. First, the front desk at each district station is staffed 24/7. The cost of this is 62 police officers (9 stations $X 3$ shifts X SRF of $2.3=62$ ). In addition, there are 9 police sworn staff currently assigned to security at headquarters and City Hall. Thus, the cost to BPD for this activity is nearly $\$ 6,000,000$ annually.

Aside from the actual cost there is also the opportunity cost. Police officers should not be doing building security-as there are alternatives. Security for headquarters could be provided under contract, or the city could engage security staff for this service. In many police departments the front desk of a police station is staffed by a nonsworn memberperhaps a community service officer. This may require some changes to the physical space, but the cost is very modest when compared to the personnel costs. An example of such a facility is pictured below.


Figure 18 Example of Secure Police Reception Area

Another strategy is to limit the hours that district stations are open to the public. This can be facilitated by the use of emergency phones linked to the communication center and live video feed.

For example, in an effort to improve response times LAPD adj usted the hours of front desk services for several Area Police Stations, including Devonshire, West Valley, Southeast, and Southwest Police Stations. Front desk services are now provided from 7 a.m., to 11 p.m., while all other LAPD Police Station's front desks will currently remain open to the public 24 hours a day.

The changes in front desk services does not affect normal operations at the above Police Stations. Officers assigned to every Division will continue to handle calls for service 24 hours a day within these communities and LAPD officers will be staffed on premises 24/ 7. Red Call Boxes have been installed in front of these stations for the public's use in the event of an emergency during the hours the front desk services are not operational; the phones link directly to 911. Signs indicating the hours the front desk services are operational have also been affixed to these four stations. ${ }^{36}$

## Records Management Section

The Research and Records Section is divided into two areas: Central Records, with nine units, and Records Management, with five units. The main responsibilities of Central Records units are managing incident reports, criminal records, warrants, NCIC records, and other related records. The Records Management units focus on data entry of hard copy reports from the field.

## Staffing Calculation Methodology

To determine the staffing needs for both areas, we sought to obtain the frequency and touch time for unit activities. We obtained frequency information from statistics reports that each unit kept for its core activities for 2018. Touch time accounts for the time an employee spends working on specific tasks to complete an activity, such as entering an incident report into the Records Management System (RMS). We obtained touch time for different activities through interviews with unit supervisors and observing the activities. BPD is currently in the process of identifying a new RMS that will begin to be implemented by the end of calendar year 2020. The new RMS will also replace the use of Lotus Notes for case management.

From frequency and touch time, unit workload can be calculated. To account for other unit activities, we increased calculated workload from $10 \%$ to $25 \%$ depending on the level of effort required for tasks such as following work in progress, correcting reports and records, and still other tasks. Given that the level of effort for these tasks will vary by the nature of activities, we consulted with unit supervisors in choosing percentages by which to increase calculated workload.

To determine how many full-time employees are needed in a unit, we divided total workload by the available work time of a civilian employee. We calculated available work time by subtracting holidays, sick days, and vacation time, from available business days in a year.

We detail staffing need for two units: Central Records and Records Management. After presenting needs for each unit, we summarize staffing needs, identifying surpluses or shortages of employees in a unit.

[^28]
## Central Records

Central Records has a broad scope of responsibilities, ranging from the expungement of criminal records to the entry of warrants into NCIC. As shown in Table 26, the ten units in this area have 68 employees. Most area employees are in five units: Hot Desk, Staff Review, Warrants and Validations, Expungements, and Citizen Correspondence and Warrants. We focus on the staffing need for these key units.

| Unit | \# of <br> Employees |
| :--- | :--- |
| Hot Desk | 18 |
| Staff Review | 16 |
| Warrants and <br> Validations | 12 |
| Expungements | 9 |
| Citizen <br> Correspondence | 4 |
| Archiving | 3 |
| Identification | 2 |
| Property | 2 |
| BPD Mail Room | 1 |
| Online Reporting | 1 |
| Total | $\mathbf{6 8 3}$ |

Table 26 Distribution of employees for the Central Records Units as of Âugust 2019

[^29]
## Hot Desk

The Hot Desk unit is responsible for answering calls from the field, requesting and providing information, and entering information from incidents into the NCIC. Unit activities include entering warrants, missing persons, stolen/ recovered vehicles, and stolen guns/ articles into the NCIC. Each one of the records entered in NCIC have a Secondary Check by another group member. The Hot Desk also responds to calls about stolen guns/ articles, towed vehicles, missing persons, juvenile arrests, and warrant confirmations. The unit documents the frequency of these activities. Some of these activities, such as entering NCIC data, must be done by a Police Information Technician (PIT) with required certifications. Others, such as answering the phone and managing information in local systems, can be done by a Community Service Officer (CSO), a nonsworn position. This unit needs to have personnel available during three eight-hour shifts, seven days a week.

Figure 19 shows the distributions of frequency and touch time used to calculate workload for the Hot Desk Unit.


Figure 19 Frequency and Touch Time for Activities on the Hot Desk Unit for 2018

Using the staffing calculation methodology detailed above, and adding 15\%to account for other tasks, we estimate that the Hot Desk needs seven CSOs and eight PITs, distributed in proportion to the workload of each shift. It also needs one supervisor per shift and two additional supervisors to cover weekends and time off, for a total of five (5). Given the Hot Desk currently has 18 employees, we calculate a shortage of two employees.

## Staff Review

The Staff Review unit is responsible for reviewing all incident reports, completed by police officers in the field, in order to ensure their completeness and quality. All Part 1 and a portion of Part 2 reports are reviewed by this unit. If a reviewer finds that a report has errors or missing information, the report is sent back to the Police Officer who wrote it. After the reviewer approves the report, it is sent to the Report Data Entry unit to be entered into RMS. The work performed by the reviewers is checked by approvers who validate that the review was done correctly. In addition, there are individuals responsible for quality compliance. These individuals monitor reports that are delinquent, that is, reports that were never sent to Central Records or were sent back for corrections and have not been returned. This unit works only one shift Mondays to Fridays.

Figure 20 shows the distributions of frequency and touch time used to calculate workload for Staff Review activities.

Frequency of Activities
Activity Time (mins.)


Figure 20 Frequency and Touch Time for activities on the Staff Review Unit for Full Year 2018
Adding 25\% to our workload calculations to account for other tasks, we estimate the Staff Review Unit needs 10 reviewers, two approvers, and two quality compliance professionals, based on 2018 statistics. We also suggest one supervisor to manage this unit.

## Warrants and Validations

The Warrants and Validations unit has two teams, one responsible for entering records and the other that validates information entered into the NCIC. The team entering records is responsible for entering warrants into the RMS, protective orders into the NCIC, and criminal summons into Lotus Approach. ${ }^{38}$ The team doing validations reviews a sample of records entered into the NCIC by the Hot Desk Unit, checking that the information entered is complete and correct. This unit works only one shift during regular business days.

Figure 21 shows the distributions of frequency and touch time used to calculate workload for the activities in the Warrants and Validations Unit.

[^30]

Figure 21 Frequency and Touch Time for activities on the Warrants and Validation Unit for 2018
Adding $10 \%$ to our calculations to account for other tasks, we calculate the Warrant Unit needs five employees for data entry and six employees for NCIC records validation. We also recommend one supervisor to manage this unit. Given this unit currently has 12 employees, we conclude it is well-staffed.

## Expungements

The Expungements unit is responsible for processing requests to expunge criminal records. Steps in this process are: (1) Intake request and entry it into Lotus Notes, (2) Check record and determine if it can be expunged, (3) Enter arrest in Lotus notes and gather all documentation, (4) Match record with expungement court order, (5) Redact arrest report and expunge record, (6) Send compliance letters, (7) Destroy hard copy records. Steps (2) and (5) in this process can only be done by Criminal Record Technicians (CRT) while others can be done by those in other administrative support roles. This unit works only one shift during regular business days.

Figure 22 shows the distribution of frequency and touch time used to calculate workload for the expungement process.


Figure 22 Expungement process with 2018 Frequency and Step Touch Time
Adding $15 \%$ to our calculations to account for other tasks, including follow-up actions and corrections, we calculate the Expungements unit needs seven (7) CRT and nine (10) administrative support professionals.

This does not account for the current backlog of 25,778 expungements, requested in 2017 and 2018. Figure 23 shows the increase of expungement requests over time, primarily due to legislation changes that allow the expungement of additional types of criminal charges and an increase of community initiatives that help citizens with criminal records to submit expungement requests.


Figure 23 Expungements Requests from 2014 to 2018
We calculate that adding five CRT and nine administrative support professionals could eliminate the expungement backlog within 12 months. We also recommend two supervisors to this unit. Altogether, relative to current staffing levels, this unit has a shortage of 22 personnel.

## Citizen Correspondence and Criminal Records

The Citizen Correspondence and Criminal Records unit answers requests for records from citizens. To process citizen requests, members of this unit review the request, process the payments, and send the report to the requestor. This unit works only one shift on regular business days.

Figure 24 shows the distributions of frequency and touch time used to calculate workload for the activities in answering request of records from citizens.


Figure 24 Frequency and Touch Time for activities on the Citizen Correspondence Unit for 2018
Adding $25 \%$ to our estimates to account for answering calls received by the unit we estimate that the Citizen Correspondence and Criminal Records Unit needs three (3) employees to process requests. We also recommend one supervisor for the unit. Given there are currently four employees in this unit, we conclude it is adequately staffed.

## Records Management

The Records Management area enters data from Part 1 and Part 2 incident reports and Stop Receipts. It is also responsible for performing payroll, overtime slips, and other administrative tasks for the Records and Research section. As Table 27 shows, the five units in this area have 40 employees, most of whom are assigned Reports Data Entry or Stops Receipts. We only analyzed the staffing need for these two units; we assumed the others are adequately staffed.

| Unit | \# <br> Employees |
| :--- | :--- |
| Report Data Entry | 23 |
| Stop Receipts | 10 |
| Administrative Section | 3 |
| UCR Reports | 2 |
| Special Projects | 2 |
| Total | $40^{39}$ |



Table 27 Distribution of employees for the Central Records Units as of August 2019

## Reports Data Entry

The Report Data Entry unit is responsible for entering all Part 1 and Part 2 incident reports, written by officers in the field, into the RMS. After the report is entered, another member of the unit validates the information for completeness and accuracy. This unit works one shift on regular business days.

Figure 25 shows the number of reports in 2018 and touch time used to calculate workload for the unit.

Frequency of Activities


Figure 25 Frequency and Touch Time for the data entry of Part 1 and Part 2 reports for 2018
Adding 20\%to our estimates to account for data entry approval and corrections, we estimate the unit needs 23 employees for entering data and two employees for reviewing data entries. Currently, the unit has a backlog of around 62,000 reports that have not been processed. To eliminate this backlog within 12 months, the unit would need to add eight more employees. This might, however, not be necessary,

[^31]because of the introduction of a new record management system within the next 24 months that will eliminate the need for data entry operators.

Given current staffing levels and needs for regular data entry, we suggest the unit add four personnel. We also suggest two supervisors for managing the unit.

## Stops Receipts

The Stops Receipts unit is responsible for entering information from stop receipts into the RMS. This operation will be automated with the introduction of a new RMS. This new system will allow officers in the field to enter stop receipts information directly into the digital system. The implementation of this system will be completed within the next twelve (12) months. After this implementation, the Stop Receipts Unit will not be needed as it exists today. We therefore did not calculate the staffing need for this unit.

## Personnel Summary



As Table 28 shows, key units in the Research and Records Management section need to add 17 employees to cover regular demand and 39 employees to reduce current backlogs over a period of 12 months. Given that a Records Management System (RMS) will be implemented to facilitate the entry of incident reports in the field, the activities in the Report Data Entry Unit will not be needed. Civilian employees made available after the RMS implementation will cover the deficit of 14 employees in the Expungement and Hot Desk units and leave nine additional employees to help reduce backlog in the short-term for backlog and offset attrition in the long-term. Similarly, sworn officers that are detailed to the Stop Receipt unit can, if available, help reduce the backlog in other units. We do, however, recommend all positions in this section be filled with civilian employees.

| Unit | Staffing Needs |  |  | Current Employees | Difference |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Regular <br> Demand | Backlog | Total |  | For Regular Demand | For Total Needs |
| Central Records |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Archiving | 3 | N/A | 3 | 3 | 0 | 0 |
| Citizen Correspondence | 4 | N/A | 4 | 4 | 0 | 0 |
| Expungements | 19 | 14 | 33 | 9 | (10) | (24) |
| Hot Desk | 20 | N/A | 20 | 16 | (4) | (4) |
| BPD Mail Room | 1 | N/A | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Identification | 2 | N/A | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| Property | 2 | N/A | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| Staff Review | 15 | N/A | 15 | 16 | 1 | 1 |
| Online Reporting | 1 | N/A | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Warrants and <br> Validations <br> Rect | 12 | N/A | 12 | 12 | 0 | 0 |
| Records Management |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Administrative Section | 3 | N/A | 3 |  | 0 | 0 |
| UCR Reports | 2 | N/A | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| Special Reports | 2 | N/A | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| Stops Receipts | 10 | N/A | 10 | 10 | 0 | 0 |
| Reports Data Entry | 27 | 8 | 35 | 23 | (4) | (12) |
| Section and Areas Leads | 3 | N/A | $3$ | 3 | 0 | 0 |
| Total Before RMS Implementation | 126 | 22 | 148 | 111 | (17) | (39) |
| Total After RMS Implementation | 89 | 22 | 111 | 111 | 22 | 0 |

Table 28 Comparison of Staffing Needs vs. Current Employees
Figure 26 shows a five-year phased plan for meeting staffing needs in the Research and Records Management section. It assumes the use of personnel from the Reports Data Entry and Stop Receipts units for reducing backlog and eliminating the staffing need deficit, as well as currently planned technology implementations. After the first three years, the BPD could relocate the personnel used to reduce backlog, with attrition ultimately resulting in the proper number of staffing for future ongoing operations by 2024.


Figure 26 Five-year Phased Plan for the Assignment of Employees Needed for Research and Reports Section

## Other Findings

Throughout this report we have identified a significant number of recommendations for BPD staffing and deployment. It is important to acknowledge some limitations to that effort. Over the past few months, during the course of our study the department has introduced several strategic initiatives that affect staffing and deployment. Among these initiatives were:

- A significant number of investigators have been reassigned from headquarters to the police districts. It is too early to assess the utility of this approach
- BPD has launched efforts to reduce overtime
- The department has launched an effort to have patrol officers spend a larger fraction of their time on community engagement and "hot spots" policing.
- BPD is working on a new policy to manage the use of officers detailed to other units.

One of the striking things about police organizations is the almost universal notion that they are understaffed. Moreover, when you talk with officers they almost always report that they "go from call to call," even in agencies where officers handle one or two calls per shift. Our experience suggests that once an agency's leaders suggest that the agency is understaffed it becomes a self-fulfilling prophesy. Many members adopt behaviors that reflect that view.

We have attempted to identify a number of ways in which BPD can improve performance and efficiency so as to more effectively meet the challenge of crime control and public safety. Some of these changes will require negotiation with
employee groups, other will require investments in infrastructure or equipment, but with the strong leadership team currently at the helm we believe these things are well within reach.


## Appendices

## Appendix A: Project Team

For this engagement we assembled a highly skilled team including:

- Alexander Weiss
- Ronal Serpas
- Paul Evans
- Roberto Jimenez
- Steven Chermak
- Jeremy Wilson
- Keren Acevedo

Dr. Alexander Weiss (PhD, Northwestern University) has over forty years' experience as a public safety practitioner, researcher, trainer, and consultant. For nine years he was director of the Northwestern University Center for Public Safety and Professor of Management and Strategy at the J.L. Kellogg Graduate School of Management at Northwestern. He currently is adjunct professor of criminal justice at Michigan State University.

Prior to his appointment at Northwestern, Alex was a member of the faculty of the department of criminal justice at Indiana University, Bloomington. During that time, he also served as a senior advisor to the Indianapolis Police Department. Dr. Weiss has twelve years of experience with law enforcement agencies in Colorado. During his tenure with the Colorado Springs Políce Department he served as a field supervisor and directed the then newly created operations analysis unit.

Dr. Weiss is the co-author (with Dr. J eremy Wilson) of A Performance-Based Approach to Police Staffing and Allocation, published by the COPS Office, US Department of Justice. This methodology has been cited in a number of studies of police staffing in communities such as New Orleans ${ }^{40}$, Albuquerque ${ }^{41}$, Louisville, ${ }^{42}$ Denver ${ }^{43}$, San Diego ${ }^{44}$, and San Francisco ${ }^{45}$.

Dr. Weiss has conducted staffing analyses for a number of small, medium and large communities including:

[^32]- Peoria, Illinois Police
- Cook County, Illinois Sheriff's Police
- Delaware, Ohio Police
- Rockford, Illinois Police
- Holland, Michigan Police
- Chicago, Illinois Police
- Traverse City, Michigan Police
- Lansing, Michigan Police
- University of Notre Dame Police
- Evanston. Illinois Police
- Schaumburg, Illinois Police
- Buffalo Grove, Illinois Police
- Chicago METRA Railroad Police
- New Orleans, Louisiana Police
- Louisville Metro Police
- Grand Rapids Michigan Police
- Seattle Police
- Denver Sheriff
- Albuquerque Police
- Dona Ana County, New Mexico Sheriff
- Joliet, Illinois Police
- Cedar Rapids, Iowa Police
- Adams County Colorado Sheriff
- US Park Police
- Puerto Rico State Police

Dr. Ronal Serpas was a career police officer from 1980 to 2014, serving in three police agencies. He served as the Superintendent of Police, New Orleans Police Department from May 2010 until he retired in August 2014; as the Chief of Police of the Metropolitan Nashville Police Department from 2004 until May 2010; and was appointed as the 19th Chief of the Washington State Patrol in August 2001 and served until J anuary 2004. Serpas began his police career in J une 1980 with the New Orleans Police Department rising through all ranked positions and was appointed Assistant Superintendent of Police and the first Chief of Operations in October 1996, charged with implementing the COMPSTAT model in the New Orleans Police Department.

Dr. Serpas joined the Loyola University New Orleans Criminology and Justice Department as a Professor in August 2014. He is the founding Co-Chair of Law Enforcement Leaders to Reduce Crime and Incarceration, a project in cooperation with the NYU-School of Law Brennan Center, which unites more than 150 current and former police chiefs, federal and state chief prosecutors, and attorney's general from all 50 states to urge for a reduction in both crime and incarceration. Serpas is the Chairman of the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) Community Oriented Policing Committee, a member of the National Advisory Board for Cure Violence (Chicago Cease Fire) and an Executive Fellow to the Police Foundation. Serpas also serves as a National

Advisory Board Member for National Institute of Justice funded, National Police Research Platform (NPRP).

In October 2017 Dr. Serpas was designated by the membership as the $5^{\text {th }}$ Honorary President in the 125-year history of the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP). Dr. Serpas is a Past Vice President of the IACP, former Chair of the IACP Community Policing Committee, founding Co-Chair of the IACP Research Advisory Committee and a Past Parliamentarian.

Paul Evans served as Commissioner of the Boston, Massachusetts, Police Department from 1993 to 2003. He then served four years as the Director of the Police Standards Unit of Britain's Home Office, assessing and improving the performance of British police forces. Commissioner Evans is a U.S. Marine Corps veteran and has served on the Board of the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF).

During Commissioner Evans's more than 30-year career with the Boston Police Department, he held every civil service rank and command staff position from patrol officer to Commissioner. He addressed difficult policy issues concerning use of deadly force and protection of civil liberties, created innovative strategies that dramatically reduced crime, and engaged communities to reduce tensions and build community collaborations. Commissioner Evans consults with law enforcement agencies across the country on police operations and strategy.

Roberto Jimenez is Managing Director of Vision to Action (V2A) a Puerto Rican consulting firm that prepared the Staffing Analysis and Staffing Plan for the Puerto Rico Police Bureau as required by its Consent Decree. He currently leads V2A's Government Practice and has led dozens of government projects in areas such as human resource capacity assessments, organizational design, agency integration, transformation, strategic planning, lean/process reengineering and large-scale project/program management. From 1997 to 1999, Mr. Jiménez served as Economic Advisor to the Governor of Puerto Rico.

He began his business career as an auditor with Arthur Andersen. Mr. Jiménez is a licensed CPA and holds an MBA in Corporate Finance and Strategic Management from the Wharton School and a Bachelor Degree in Accounting and Finance from Georgetown University. He has also continued formal education via Executive Education Programs in topics such as Leadership and Change Management from Stanford University.

Dr. Steven Chermak (PhD The University at Albany) is a Professor in the School of Criminal Justice at Michigan State University. Dr. Chermak's research has focused on four general areas. First, he has completed several policing projects. This research includes the evaluation of strategies to reduce violence, a study of the intelligence practices of State, Local, and Tribal law enforcement agencies, and assessments of organizational change and implementation. Second, he has received funding from one of the Department of Homeland Security's Center of Excellence (The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism--START) to study the
criminal and terrorist activities of domestic far right extremists. Third, he is studying the sources of funding used by terrorist organizations, with a particular emphasis on examining their use of counterfeited products. Finally, he has studied the media's role in relation to crime and policing issues. For example, he has examined how community policing and other innovations are presented in the news, discusses the strategies police agencies use to market innovative programs, and how high-profile media cases impact police agencies.

Dr. Jeremy Wilson (PhD, The Ohio State University) is a Professor of the School of Criminal Justice at Michigan State University., Prior to joining MSU, Dr. Wilson was a Behavioral Scientist at the RAND Corporation, where he led the development of the Center on Quality Policing and the Police Recruitment and Retention Clearinghouse. He has held a wide variety of appointments and honorary titles at prestigious institutions around the world, and has served as an instructor for numerous law enforcement and brand protection training programs.

Dr. Wilson's research and commentary have been featured in numerous books, professional publications, academic journals, and Congressional and State testimony, and in various forms of national and international media. The Police Section of the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences recently honored him with the O.W. Wilson Award for his contributions to police research and practice.

Keren Acevedo is an engagement manager for V2A, and managed the Staffing Analysis for the firm's work with the Puerto Rico Police Bureau. She is highly qualified in strategic management consulting, capacity management, process and operational improvement, strategic planning and change management. Keren holds a BA in Industrial Engineering for the University of Puerto Rico, an MBA from Bowling Green University, and a Master's in Leadership and Accountability form Malmo University, Sweden.

## Appendix B: Calls for Service Analysis

The RMS data set provided to us also included well over one million records, but many were apparent duplicates. The following table illustrates this.

| CAD \# | CFS Recv Time | CFS |  | CFS Arrv | CFS <br> Comp |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Dispatched | CFS Disp |  |  |
|  |  | Date | Time | Time | Time |
| 180242022 | 16:35:11 | 2018/ 01/ 24 | 16:37:23 | 16:41:29 | 21:08:41 |
| 180242022 | 16:35:11 | 2018/01/ 24 | 16:37:23 | 16:41:29 | 21:08:41 |
| 180242022 | 16:35:11 | 2018/01/ 24 | 16:37:23 | 16:41:29 | 21:08:41 |
| 180242022 | 16:35:11 | 2018/01/ 24 | 16:37:23 | 16:41:29 | 21:08:41 |

Even though this is one CAD event, and one call for service, there are four records. Even though only two officers were dispatched, the data suggests that there were four officers assigned, all of whom, coincidently, were dispatched, arrived, and cleared at the same time. Importantly, if one were to only count the rows in the spreadsheet in which these data appeared, one might inadvertently conclude there were four calls rather than one. A cursory glance of the data might also suggest each officer spent more than four hours on scene, suggesting that the total time assigned to this call was 16 hours.

We discussed this issue with staff from communications and IT and learned our theory about duplicate records was correct. Communications and IT staff indicated that the Record Management System (RMS) receives data from different sources, with a row added for each source. They also indicated that this was how the data was delivered to the Police Foundation for its Staffing Analysis.

We also independently examined 2017 data and found similar anomalies. See the table below.

|  |  |  | CFS |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { CFS } \\ & \text { Comp } \end{aligned}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | CFS Recv | CFS Recv | Dispatched | CFS Disp | CFS Arrv |  |
| CAD \# | Date | Time | Date | Time | Time | Time |
| 171820016 | 7/1/2017 | 00:00:20 | 7/ 1/2017 | 00:07:05 | 00:07:25 | 03:10:40 |
| 171820016 | 7/1/2017 | 00:00:20 | 7/1/2017 | 00:07:05 | 00:07:25 | 03:10:40 |
| 171820016 | 7/1/2017 | 00:00:20 | 7/1/2017 | 00:07:05 | 00:07:25 | 03:10:40 |
| 171820016 | 7/1/2017 | 00:00:20 | 7/1/2017 | 00:07:05 | 00:07:25 | 03:10:40 |
| 171820016 | 7/1/2017 | 00:00:20 | 7/1/2017 | 00:07:05 | 00:07:25 | 03:10:40 |
| 171820016 | 7/1/2017 | 00:00:20 | 7/1/2017 | 00:07:05 | 00:07:25 | 03:10:40 |
| 171820016 | 7/ 1/2017 | 00:00:20 | 7/1/2017 | 00:07:05 | 00:07:25 | 03:10:4 |

Once again, this is one call for service. It is hard to imagine a call where seven officers were dispatched, but nonetheless there are seven records. It is even harder to imagine that all of the officers arrived at the same moment.

Based on our review of CAD data and discussions with key stakeholders, we concluded that the previous Staffing Analysis may have significantly overstated the number of calls for service as well as the time consumed on these calls. In a workload-based staffing model, such an analysis will result in a staffing estimate that is much higher than the actual need.

## Appendix C: Police Work Schedules

Work schedules are a critical component of resource staffing and deployment. Decisions made about the choice of a work schedule can significantly affect the agency's ability to optimize its capacity. To better understand these issues, this section will explain different forms of schedules.
Five-Day On / Two-Day Off

Police work schedules have many forms. Although each seems unique, they can be compared in some ways. Among the important components of a work schedule are:

- Average work week
- Shift length
- Number of consecutive work days
- Weekend time off
- Staffing by day of week.
- Percentage of officers on duty each day.

The next figure illustrates a common work schedule in which officers are separated into 7 work groups each with a five-day on / two-day off schedule with eight-hour days. This schedule includes

- Fixed days off
- Three groups of officers having a full or partial weekend off
- Equal staffing by day of week
- Typical on-duty cycles of five days.

| Group | S | M | T | W | T | F | S |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 1 | Off | Off |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2 |  | Off | Off |  |  |  |  |
| 3 |  |  | Off | Off |  |  |  |
| 4 |  |  |  | Off | Off |  |  |
| 5 |  |  |  |  | Off | Off |  |
| 6 |  |  |  |  |  | Off | Off |
| 7 | Off |  |  |  |  |  | Off |
| $\%$ On | 71 | 71 | 71 | 71 | 71 | 71 | 71 |

We observe that each day 71 percent of officers are assigned to be on duty, and that the number of officers on duty each day is the same. These are two important criteria that can be used in evaluating a work schedule.

The next figure shows a schedule that increases staffing on weekends. This schedule shows one way to increase staffing proportional to daily workload. Each officer is assigned a day-off group, but groups two and three each have two officers. This allows the reduction of staffing on some days, and the increase on others. This schedule is
particularly attractive to employees who want fixed days off. It works well for officers who are going to school and may help those who assist with childcare. The disadvantage is that a substantial portion of employees never get a weekend off.

| Group | S | M | T | W | T | F | S |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 1 | Off |  |  |  |  |  | Off |
| $2(2)$ |  | Off | Off |  |  |  |  |
| $3(2)$ |  |  | Off | Off |  |  |  |
| 4 |  |  |  | Off | Off |  |  |
| 5 |  |  |  |  | Off | Off |  |
| 6 |  |  |  |  |  | Off | Off |
| 7 | Off | Off |  |  |  |  |  |
| On | 7 | 6 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 7 | 7 |
| Off | 2 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| $\%$ On | $77 \%$ | $66 \%$ | $55 \%$ | $66 \%$ | $77 \%$ | $77 \%$ | $77 \%$ |

Another schedule that is based on an eight-hour day is commonly described as a "six and two" schedule. This schedule was once used by BPD. Over the course of the seven-week (49-day) duty cycle each officer will work the following pattern:

- 6 on 3 off
- 5 on 3 off
- 6 on 2 off
- 6 on 2 off
- 6 on 2 off
- 6 on 2 off

| Week | S | M | T | W | TH | F | S |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 1 |  |  | Off | Off |  |  |  |
| 2 |  |  |  | Off | Off |  |  |
| 3 |  |  |  |  | Off | Off |  |
| 4 |  |  |  |  |  | Off | Off |
| 5 | Off |  |  |  |  |  | Off |
| 6 | Off | Off |  |  |  |  |  |
| 7 |  | Off | Off |  |  |  |  |
| $\%$ On | 71 | 71 | 71 | 71 | 71 | 71 | 71 |

This schedule has several interesting attributes.

- The percentage of officers assigned each day is the same as a $5 / 2$ schedule
- There are rotating days off
- Each officer gets two three-day weekends during each duty cycle.


## Twelve-Hour Shifts

Next we observe the schedule currently used by the BPD patrol division. It is often called the 5/ 2, 5/ 3 schedule.

| Week | SUNDAY | MONDAY | TUESDAY | WEDNESDAY | THURSDAY | FRIDAY | SATURDAY |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 1 |  | ON | ON | ON | ON | ON |  |
| 2 |  | ON | ON | ON | ON | ON |  |
| 3 |  |  | ON | ON | ON | ON | ON |
| 4 |  |  | ON | ON | ON | ON | ON |
| 5 |  |  |  | ON | ON | ON | ON |
| 6 | ON |  |  | ON | ON | ON | ON |
| 7 | ON |  |  |  | ON | ON | ON |
| 8 | ON | ON |  |  | ON | ON | ON |
| 9 | ON | ON |  |  |  | ON | ON |
| 10 | ON | ON | ON |  |  | ON | ON |
| 11 | ON | ON | ON |  |  | ON |  |
| 12 | ON | ON | ON | ON |  |  | ON |
| 13 | ON | ON | ON | ON |  |  |  |
| 14 | ON | ON | ON | ON | ON |  |  |
| 15 | ON | ON | ON | ON | ON |  |  |
| $\%$ On | 66 | 66 | 66 | 66 | 66 | 66 | 66 |

This schedule results in two-thirds of officers being assigned to duty on any given day. BPD assigns officers and sergeants to one of three day-off groups. Unfortunately, this means that two-thirds of the officers assigned to a sergeant have a different day-off pattern, limiting direct contact and adversely affecting unity of command. This issue is examined further in the Patrol Supervision and Management.

## Appendix D: BPD Staffing Requirements

Table 29 illustrates BPD's recommended staffing required to meet their objectives. Table 30 illustrates the actual staffing as of $9 / 26 / 19$. Table 31 shows the difference between the recommended and actual levels for sworn staff. Note that detectives, detective sergeants and detective lieutenants are classified by rank rather than assignment. While these figures represent BPD's recommendations, some of these totals do not reflect all the recommendations made by this report.

| Bureau/ Office | Sworn + <br> Trainees | Sworn <br> Total | P/O | SGT | LT | Det | Det <br> SGT | Det <br> LT |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| OPS Subtotal | 2178 | 2088 | 1223 | 216 | 55 | 461 | 74 | 21 |
| Admin Subtotal | 224 | 224 | 149 | 42 | 12 | 14 | 4 | 0 |
| PIB Subtotal | 95 | 95 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 70 | 14 | 7 |
| Compliance Subtotal | 218 | 78 | 47 | 19 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| PC's Office | 35 | 35 | 9 | 1 | 0 | 20 | 3 | 1 |


| Grand Total | 2750 | 2520 | 1429 | 279 | 75 | 565 | 95 | 29 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |


| Bureau/ Office | Captain | Major | Lt. <br> Colonel | Colonel | DC \& PC | PO <br> Trainees |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| OPS Subtotal | 16 | 16 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 90 |
| Admin Subtotal | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| PIB Subtotal | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Compliance Subtotal | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 140 |
| PC's Office | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Grand Total | $\mathbf{1 8}$ | $\mathbf{2 2}$ | $\mathbf{3}$ | $\mathbf{2}$ | $\mathbf{5}$ | $\mathbf{2 3 0}$ |


| Bureau/ Office | Civilian <br> MGRs | Civilian <br> Supers | Civilian <br> Invest. | Civilian <br> Support | Civilian <br> Total |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| OPS Subtotal | 3 | 17 | 5 | 187 | 212 |
| Admin Subtotal | 6 | 28 | 89 | 208 | 331 |
| PIB Subtotal | 0 | 0 | 17 | 1 | 18 |
| Compliance Subtotal | 4 | 13 | 6 | 76 | 99 |
| PC's Office | 4 | 2 | 0 | 9 | 15 |
| Grand Total | $\mathbf{1 7}$ | $\mathbf{6 0}$ | $\mathbf{1 1 7}$ | $\mathbf{4 8 1}$ | $\mathbf{6 7 5}$ |

Table 29 Proposed BPD Staffing

| CLASSIFICATION | BUDGETED (FUNDED) | ACTUAL | VACANCY |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Commissioner | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Deputy Commissioner | 2 | 2 | 0 |
| Colonel | 2 | 2 | 0 |
| Lieutenant Colonel | 7 | 3 | 4 |
| Major | 25 | 24 | 1 |
| Captain | 16 | 12 | 4 |
| Lieutenant | 109 | 109 | 0 |
| Sergeant | 349 | 348 | 1 |
| Police Officer | 2141 | 1965 | 176 |
| SWORN TOTAL | 2652 | 2466 | 186 |
| CIVILIAN PERSONNEL | BUDGETED (FUNDED) | ACTUAL | VACANCY |
| Deputy Commissioner | 2 | 2 | 0 |
| Chief | 6 | 5 | 1 |
| Director | 11 | 10 | 1 |
| Civilian Personnel | 568 | 12 | 110 |
| Police Cadet |  | 475 | 112 |
| CIVILIAN TOTAL | 587 | 2941 | 298 |
| TOTAL BUDGETED STRENGTH | 3239 |  |  |
| Tan |  |  |  |

Table 30 Actual BPD Staffing as of 9/26/19

| Position | Recommended | Actual | Gap |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Police Officer | 1993 | 1771 | -222 |
| Sergeant | 373 | 345 | -28 |
| Lieutenant | 104 | 104 | 0 |
| Captain | 18 | 16 | -2 |
| Major | 22 | 23 | 1 |
| LT Colonel | 3 | 3 | 0 |
| Colonel | 2 | 2 | 0 |
| DC and PC | 5 | 5 | 0 |
| Total |  | 2520 | 2269 |

[^33][^34]
## Appendix E: Entry Level Training Topics and Hours

| 10-Codes | $\mathbf{0 . 5}$ |
| :--- | :--- |
| Accident Investigation / ACRS | $\mathbf{7}$ |
| Animal Abuse | $\mathbf{0}$ |
| Arrest Procedures | $\mathbf{3}$ |
| Arson / Alarm of Fire | $\mathbf{0}$ |
| Behavioral Health Awareness | $\mathbf{2 1}$ |
| Body-Worn Camera | $\mathbf{3}$ |
| BPD Rank \& Structure | $\mathbf{0 . 5}$ |
| Case Folders / Interview \& Interrogation (CID) | $\mathbf{3 5}$ |
| Characteristics of Armed Persons | $\mathbf{5}$ |
| Charm City Documentary Day 1 | $\mathbf{4}$ |
| Charm City Documentary Day 2 | $\mathbf{3}$ |
| Child Abuse | $\mathbf{0}$ |
| Citizen Contact Receipt | $\mathbf{0}$ |
| Civil, Criminal, \& J uv. Citations | $\mathbf{2}$ |
| Civil Matters | $\mathbf{3}$ |
| Classroom Protocol | $\mathbf{0 . 5}$ |
| Command Address | $\mathbf{0 . 5}$ |
| Communications 911 and Call center | $\mathbf{0}$ |
| Community Policing | $\mathbf{2}$ |
| Control Dangerous Substance | $\mathbf{4 0}$ |
| Crime Lab | $\mathbf{0}$ |
| Crime Prevention | $\mathbf{3}$ |
| Cultural Awareness | $\mathbf{4}$ |
| Cultural Awareness Reginald F. Lewis Museum Trip | $\mathbf{4}$ |
| Database Access \& Familiarization | $\mathbf{1}$ |
| Daily Activity Sheets | $\mathbf{0}$ |
| Death Investigations | $\mathbf{0}$ |
| Defense Tactics 01 | $\mathbf{4}$ |
| Defense Tactics 02 | $\mathbf{4}$ |
| Defense Tactics 03 | Defense Tactics 04 |


| Defense Tactics 05 | 4 |
| :---: | :---: |
| Defense Tactics 06 | 4 |
| Defense Tactics 07 | 4 |
| Defense Tactics 08 | 4 |
| Defense Tactics 09 | 4 |
| Defense Tactics 10 | 4 |
| Defense Tactics 11 | 4 |
| Defense Tactics 12 | 4 |
| Defense Tactics 13 | 4 |
| Defense Tactics 14 | 4 |
| Defense Tactics 15 | 4 |
| Defense Tactics 16 | 4 |
| Defense Tactics 17 | 4 |
| Defense Tactics 18 | 4 |
| Defense Tactics 19 | 4 |
| Defense Tactics 20 | 4 |
| Defense Tactics 21 BATON 1 | 8 |
| Defense Tactics 22 BATON 2 | 8 |
| Drill \& Ceremony | 0.5 |
| Equal Employment Opportunity Commission | 1 |
| Emergency Petitions | 0 |
| Equipment/ Belt Setup \& Policy | 0.5 |
| Ethical Policing Is Courageous (EPIC) | 7 |
| Ethics \& Integrity | 1.5 |
| Evidence - Based Policing | 2 |
| Evidence Control | 0 |
| EVOC 01 - Defensive Driving | 7 |
| EVOC 02 - Vehicle procedures | 8 |
| EVOC 03 - Backing and Parking | 0 |
| EVOC 04 - Course | 35 |
| Fair and Impartial Policing | 7 |
| Field Training \& DOR Briefing | 2 |
| Fire Extinguisher use | 1 |
| Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) | 1 |
| Gangs | 5 |


| Hate Crimes | $\mathbf{0}$ |
| :--- | :--- |
| Headquarters Visit | $\mathbf{7}$ |
| Health and Wellness | $\mathbf{2}$ |
| High Risk Car-Stops | $\mathbf{7}$ |
| History of Baltimore | $\mathbf{1}$ |
| Hostage Barricade | $\mathbf{5}$ |
| Human Trafficking | $\mathbf{0}$ |
| ID theft and fraud | $\mathbf{0}$ |
| Incident Command Structure | $\mathbf{4}$ |
| Incident Response to Terrorist Bombings (IRTB) | $\mathbf{7}$ |
| Insurance Briefing | $\mathbf{1}$ |
| Internal Affairs Briefing | $\mathbf{1}$ |
| Interpersonal Communications 1 | $\mathbf{2}$ |
| Interpersonal Communications 2 | $\mathbf{3}$ |
| Interpersonal Communications Scenario | $\mathbf{3}$ |
| Integrated Comm. \& Tactics (ICAT) | $\mathbf{1 4}$ |
| Law- 00 Phone Apps | $\mathbf{0}$ |
| Law- 01 Intro to the Legal System | $\mathbf{3}$ |
| Law- 02 The Criminal Justice System | $\mathbf{3}$ |
| Law- 03 Understanding Crimes | $\mathbf{3}$ |
| Law- 04 Crimes Against Property | $\mathbf{3}$ |
| Law- 05 Crimes Against Persons 1 | $\mathbf{3}$ |
| Law- 06 Crimes Against Persons 2 | $\mathbf{3}$ |
| Law- 07 Crimes Against Persons 3 | $\mathbf{3}$ |
| Law- 08 Crimes Against Public | $\mathbf{3}$ |
| Law- 09 Possession Crimes | $\mathbf{3}$ |
| Law- 10 Criminal Liability | $\mathbf{3}$ |
| Law- 11 Phase 1 REVIEW | $\mathbf{3}$ |
| Law- 12 Phase 1 Assessment | $\mathbf{3}$ |
| Law- 13 Scenario Communication Skills | $\mathbf{3}$ |
| Law- 14 Courthouse Visit | $\mathbf{3}$ |
| Law- 15 Charging Criminal Acts 1 | $\mathbf{3}$ |
| Law- 16 Charging Criminal Acts 2 | Law- 17 Seizures |


| Law- 19 Investigative Stops | 3 |
| :---: | :---: |
| Law- 20 Reasonable Force | 0 |
| Law- 21 Scenarios Investigative Stops | 0 |
| Law- 22 Law of Arrest | 3 |
| Law- 23 Warrantless Arrest 01 | 3 |
| Law- 24 Warrantless Arrest 02 | 0 |
| Law- 25 Scenarios Arrest \& Charging | 0 |
| Law- 26 Other Seizures | 0 |
| Law- 27 Searches | 3 |
| Law- 28 SSW Exceptions 1 | 3 |
| Law- 29 SSW Exceptions 2 | 4 |
| Law- 30 Scenarios SSW Exceptions 1\&2 | 7 |
| Law- 31 SSW Exceptions 3 | 3 |
| Law- 32 SSW Exceptions 4 | 0 |
| Law- 33 Scenarios SSW Exceptions 3\&4 | 0 |
| Law- 34 Interrogations 1 | 3 |
| Law- 35 Interrogations 2 | 3 |
| Law- 37 Phase 2 Assessment | 0 |
| Law- 38 Final Scenarios | 8 |
| Law- 39 Remedial Scenarios | 3 |
| Law- 40 Evidence | 4 |
| Law- 41 Court Prep | 4 |
| Law- 42 Mock Trial | 7 |
| Law- 43 Investigative Orders | 3 |
| Law- 44 First Amendment | 3 |
| Law- 45 J uvenile Law | 2.5 |
| Law- 46 DUI/ DWI Law | 3 |
| Law Enforcement Emergency Medical Care (LEEMC) | 35 |
| Media Relations (PIO) | 1 |
| Missing Persons | 0 |
| Mobile Field Force (MFF) | 14 |
| MD Police Training Comm. (MPTC) Rules \& Regulations | 1 |
| National Crime Information Center (NCIC) | 7 |
| Note Taking | 2 |
| Outward Bound | 7 |


| Patrol Operations 01 - Intro to patrol | $\mathbf{3 . 5}$ |
| :--- | :--- |
| Patrol Operations 04 - Calls for Service | $\mathbf{0}$ |
| Patrol Operations 05 - Domestic Violence Classroom (DV) | $\mathbf{7}$ |
| Patrol Operations 08 - DV Scenario | $\mathbf{0}$ |
| Personal History \& 95 Overview | $\mathbf{3}$ |
| Personal Protective Equipment | $\mathbf{0}$ |
| Physical Training | $\mathbf{6 7}$ |
| Public Information Office (PIO) | $\mathbf{1}$ |
| PowerDMS Training | $\mathbf{3}$ |
| Prep. for Duty | $\mathbf{3}$ |
| Prisoner Transport | $\mathbf{0}$ |
| Problem Solving | $\mathbf{4}$ |
| Procedural Justice | $\mathbf{3}$ |
| PT EXAM 01 INITIAL | $\mathbf{4}$ |
| PT EXAM 02 MID-TERM | $\mathbf{4}$ |
| PT EXAM 03 FINAL | $\mathbf{4}$ |
| Radio Use | $\mathbf{2}$ |
| Range Firearms 01 - Intro | $\mathbf{7}$ |
| Range Firearms 02 - Fundamentals | $\mathbf{7}$ |
| Range Firearms 03 - 10-Count | $\mathbf{7}$ |
| Range Firearms 04 - PPC Intro | $\mathbf{7}$ |
| Range Firearms 05 - Drills | $\mathbf{7}$ |
| Range Firearms 06 - Fundamentals NIGHT | $\mathbf{7}$ |
| Range Firearms 07 - Low Light Qualification | $\mathbf{7}$ |
| Range Firearms 08 - PPC Practice | $\mathbf{7}$ |
| Range Firearms 09 - Daytime Qualification | $\mathbf{7}$ |
| Range Firearms 10 - Remedial | $\mathbf{7}$ |
| Range Firearms 11 - Shotgun Intro | $\mathbf{7}$ |
| Range Firearms 12 - Shotgun Qual / Gas House | $\mathbf{7}$ |
| Range Firearms 13 - Rhombus 1 | $\mathbf{7}$ |
| Range Firearms 14 - Rhombus 2 | $\mathbf{7}$ |
| Range Firearms 15 - Rhombus 3 Firearms 17 - Taser Certification |  |
| Range Firearms 16 Less Lethal Training |  |
| Range |  |


| Range Firearms 18-Enhancement Training | 7 |
| :---: | :---: |
| Range Firearms 19-Combat Training / Admin | 7 |
| Range Firearms 20 - Active Shooter | 28 |
| Rape Investigation | 0 |
| Receiving | 3 |
| Report 01- Intro to Report Writing | 3 |
| Report 02- Victim Interviews 01 | 4 |
| Report 03- Boxes | 1 |
| Report 04- The 5 W's | 3 |
| Report 05-309 Forms \& Property Listings | 0.5 |
| Report 06- Victim Interviews 02 | 3 |
| Report 09- Lost Property | 3.5 |
| Report 10- UCR | 3 |
| Report 12- Crimes Against Persons | 3 |
| Report 13-Codeable Calls | 0 |
| Report 14 - Crimes Against Property | 3 |
| Report 15 - J uvenile Custody | 2.5 |
| Safety Briefing and Facility Orientation | 0.5 |
| Standardized Awareness Training (SAT) | 7 |
| Standardized Field Sobriety Testing (SFST) | 28 |
| Squad Assignments | 0.5 |
| Suspicious Packages | 0 |
| Surviving Traumatic Incidents | 2 |
| Telephone Use | 1 |
| Terrorism | 0 |
| Testing Procedures | 0 |
| Traffic Enforcement 1 Traffic Direction and Control | 5 |
| Traffic Enforcement 2 Transportation Articles | 5 |
| Traffic Enforcement 3 Towed/ Stolen/ Abandoned Autos | 4 |
| Traffic Enforcement 4 Moving/ Parking/ SERO citations | 7 |
| Traffic Enforcement 5 Car-Stop Procedures | 3 |
| Traffic Enforcement 6 Car-Stop Practical Day | 7 |
| Traffic Enforcement 7 Car-Stop Practical Night | 7 |
| Traffic Enforcement 8 Car-Stop FULL DAY WHOLE CLASS | 7 |
| Uniform Policy | 0.5 |


| Uniform \& Tattoo Inspection | $\mathbf{0 . 5}$ |
| :--- | :--- |
| Victimology | $\mathbf{3}$ |
| X - Graduation Rehersal | $\mathbf{5}$ |
| X - Graduation | $\mathbf{7}$ |

## Appendix F: 2020 In-Service Training

| CD Required/Related |
| :--- |
| FIP |
| Use of Force (Inc. Deadly Force) |
| Stop, Search, and Arrest Training |
| Behavioral Health Awareness |
| Transportation |
| Sexual Assault |
|  |
| Range |
| CEW |
| Handgun |
| Shotgun |
| Recert CEW |
|  |
| First Responder |
| CPR |
| CBRN |
| Narcan + First Aid |
|  |
| Departmental Requirements |
| EPIC (Peer intervention) |
| Youth Dialogue / Outward Bound |
| NCIC |
|  |
| eLearning Requirements |
| First Amendment Protected Activities |
| Child Sex Trafficking |
| Identity Theft |
| Blood Borne Pathogens |
| Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities |
| Sexual Assault Investigation |
|  |


| Elective Courses |
| :--- |
| Cellphone exploitation |
| Wiretapping 101 |
| Report Writing and Search Warrants |
| Building a Federal Drug Conspiracy or Racketeering Case |
| Testifying in Court |
| The EXILE and SOS Programs |
| Developing and Handling Confidential Informants |
| Responding to a fatal overdose |
| Effective Interviews and Interrogations |
| Maryland's new labor trafficking statute |
| Active Shooter Response |
| Arrest and Control Techniques |
| Close-Quarters Combat |
| Scene Control |
| Crime Scene Management |
| Homicide + Shooting Investigations |
| Child Abuse |
| Human Trafficking |
| NCIC and Database Familiarization |
| Leadership Training |
| CQC (range) |
| Room Entry (Long Weapon) |
| Duty Belt Familiarization |
| Tactical Positioning (Non-Range) |
| Deadly Force \& Near Miss Scenarios |
| Mobile Field Force (2 or 4 hour) |
| Characteristics of Armed Persons |
| Tactical De-escalation |
| TacMed |
| Command and Control |

One of the most interesting recent changes in police-work scheduling has been the widespread adoption of the 12 -hour shift. Hundreds of agencies have adopted this approach, and the number of implementations continues to increase. Evidence, both anecdotal and more systematic, suggests that this approach can be highly effective ${ }^{47}$.

The twelve-hour schedule is relatively straightforward. It has a fourteen-day duty cycle. The most common pattern consists of: 2 days on, 2 days off, 3 days on, 2 days off, 2 days on, 3 days off. This schedule results in a 42-hour average workweek. Over the twoweek cycle, officers would earn four additional hours. ${ }^{48}$ All officers are assigned to one of two groups. This schedule makes it easier for supervisors and officers to work on the same schedule.

[^35]| Group | Su | M | T | W | T | F | Sa |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| One |  |  |  | Off | Off |  |  |
| Two | Off | Off | Off |  |  | Off | Off |
| $\%$ On | 50 | 50 | 50 | 50 | 50 | 50 | 50 |

Officers have rotating days off during the duty cycle, but the pattern is repeated every two weeks. Thus, an officer could expect, for example, to be off every other Monday and Tuesday, as well as every other weekend.

At first glance, it looks like 12 -hour shifts actually reduce resource availability ( $50 \%$ of officers assigned to patrol are working on a given day), but recall that the agency needs only to staff two shifts per day therefore reducing the total numbers of officers needed to work on a given day. Staffing 7 officers on 12 -hour shifts is equivalent to staffing 10 officers assigned to eight-hour shifts.

Twelve-hour shifts, while growing in popularity, do have several disadvantages. These include

- Officers engage in more outside activities including outside employment, child care, hobbies, etc, thus not allowing adequate time for rest between shifts
- Officers are more willing to live farther from the community
- The potential of more off-duty court time
- More difficulty to schedule training
- Greater fatigue may lead to lower productivity for some officers
- May result in equal staffing by day of week and by shift
- Fewer work days per officer per year
- More difficulty to maintain communications

Such shifts also have several advantages. These include

- Easier administration of two shifts rather than three
- Fewer shift changes
- More days off per year
- More time for outside activities
- Fewer trips to and from work
- Less overtime
- Less sick leave
- Greater productivity for some officers
- Easier supervision

Agencies that adopt 12 -hour work schedules are particularly concerned about fatigue. The evidence on this issue is mixed. On its face, a 12 -hour shift seems very long, and one could easily predict an increase in accidents and injuries related to fatigue. The schedule, however, does provide significant amounts of time off, and
most agencies that adopted this approach have not experienced those more accidents or injuries. In fact, most agencies report that officers on 12-hour schedules use less sick time and have lower levels of stress and illness.

The key to successful implementation is effective management of off-duty time, particularly during the 12 -hour break between consecutive days on duty. It is critical that officers get sufficient rest during their time off. For the department, that means closely monitoring off-duty employment, court, and other obligations that may diminish the opportunity for sleep. ${ }^{49}$

[^36]
# BALTIMORE POLICE DEPARTMENT <br> LONG TERM STAFFING PLAN 

March 2020

In 2019, the Baltimore Police Department (BPD) hired Dr. Alexander Weiss and his research team to work with the BPD to develop a staffing plan that can establish the correct personnel requirements for the Department to properly cover all operational and administrative needs.

Among the key items for consideration are the following:
$>$ In 2019, there were approximately $\mathbf{4 4 1 , 0 0 0}$ calls for service for which BPD sent a police response.
> Based on workload analysis using 2019 data, the total number of officers required to properly staff police district functions of answering calls for service and community engagement throughout the City is estimated to be $\mathbf{9 5 6}$ police officers. This total does not include additional resources assigned to district action teams, detective units, specialized units, or administrative functions.
> In order to have close and effective supervision of these patrol officers, there should be $\mathbf{1 3 3}$ sergeants assigned to supervise patrol officers in operations.
> To manage all functions effectively department-wide, BPD will need approximately $\mathbf{2 7 8 5}$ uniformed members (to include sworn officers and trainees) and approximately $\mathbf{6 7 5}$ civilian personnel for a total of approximately $\mathbf{3 , 4 6 0}$ departmental employees.
$>$ As of February 24, 2020, BPD has 2,434 uniformed members (to include sworn officers and trainees) and 531 civilian staff. BPD needs an additional $\mathbf{3 5 1}$ officers and $\mathbf{1 4 4}$ civilian personnel to meet the goals of the staffing plan. The Department recognizes that achieving this goal will take time and resources as the BPD is currently budgeted for about 588 civilian and 2661 sworn positions.
$>$ The rate of attrition from 2002-2019 has varied between 175-250 members who separate per year. In order to replace officers lost to attrition, the long term staffing plan should be to budget for at least 230 trainees that will be on track to becoming full time officers.
$>$ In the next several years, however, BPD has a current goal of between 240-300 trainees being added each year in order to outpace attrition so we can grow the department to the recommended level in the plan.

This plan will be reviewed on July $1^{\text {st }}$ of each year to determine if assumptions are still valid, call volume is still comparable, and conditions are still applicable to justify allocation of staffing resources. As new information arises or new assumptions are updated, these staff allocations may change.

Using the analysis provided in the draft staffing plan which was submitted to the Federal Court and the Consent Decree Monitoring Team, the BPD has developed responses to the all the key findings and recommendations provided by Dr. Weiss and his team.
1.) The present patrol deployment and work schedule is based on the "constant." The constant defines the number of officers that must be on duty at all times. That number is based on the number of posts (beats) and sectors in each district. So, for example, if a district has 14 posts that means that 14 police officers must be in duty (one in each post). In addition, each shift must deploy a desk officer and an officer to staff the wagon. It requires 987 police officers to meet these staffing demands. This staffing scheme is nominally the same on all three shifts, and as a general rule if the number of personnel falls below that number those positions are filled through overtime. Because the number of officers currently available for duty to patrol is not enough (688 as of December 2019) to regularly meet the constant level, the agency must spend significant amounts on overtime. BPD is willing to move to a workload based allocation to determine staffing levels that vary on each shift, however we are currently bound to contractual obligations on work schedules. The current contract will expire on June 30, 2021 though the Department will start the collective bargaining negations later this year.

- BPD should strive to increase officer availability through closer management of benefit time off, light duty, and long-term absence from duty. BPD agrees with this recommendation. In fact, new measures to ensure that limited/light duty personnel are being actively managed back to full health through the creation of the Administrative Duties Division has already resulted in over 100 officers returning to full duty.
- BPD should adopt a work schedule that does not require that equal numbers of officers be assigned to the day and afternoon shifts. BPD agrees with this recommendation in concept, however we are currently bound to contractual obligations on work schedules.
- Replace sworn officers at front desk with nonsworn staff, and add required security and architectural improvements BPD agrees with this recommendation.
- Reassign district operations officers to sector policing BPD agrees with this recommendation in concept, provided the duties of district operations officers can be sufficiently covered.
- BPD should examine realigning or consolidating police districts BPD is required by state legislation to review district boundaries by the year 2022. BPD will not only consider population changes in this process to determine district boundaries but also calls for service data to determine workload requirements for each district are equitable. BPD does not agree with consolidating police districts.

We concluded based on our workload analysis that in order to provide adequate officer time to spend $60 \%$ of their time on community generated calls for service and $40 \%$ of their time on community outreach, proactive enforcement and problem-solving it will require 805 police officers, 115 sergeants, and 27 lieutenants. BPD has completed a comprehensive review of 2019 calls for service data that can be leveraged for staffing analysis. Under the $60 \% / 40 \%$ split described above, BPD will require 956 officers, 133 sergeants, and 27 lieutenants to handle approximately 441,000 calls per service throughout the city per year. Data provided by BPD to the consultants in the draft staffing plan erroneously omitted calls for service data with no "end time" or "start time," resulting in approximately $\mathbf{1 5 0 , 0 0 0}$ calls for service being inadvertently omitted from the original analysis.
2.) Our review of calls for service suggests:
a) The second largest category of calls is "other," providing very little information about the nature of the call.
b) BPD responded to many calls, including alarms, minor traffic crashes, and parking complaints, that may be better handled through methods other than dispatching a police officer.
c) A substantial fraction of calls involves disturbances or other forms of public disorder

BPD should adopt policy to better manage demand for calls for service such as alarms, property damage crashes, and larceny from auto. BPD has already begun a comprehensive review of 2019 calls for service data to make determinations on how calls can be better managed. BPD fully supports the use of online reporting, telephone reporting, and alternative 311 responses for non-emergency calls. BPD will also conduct a review of the types of calls that are being categorizes as "other" to determine alternative response measures.
3.) BPD officers enter their arrival time on calls in fewer than one half of all dispatched calls. Thus, we are unable to
measure travel time. BPD should ensure that officers notify dispatch when they arrive on the scene of a call. BPD
agrees that better training must be implemented and better technology must be deployed to ensure officers are able to notify dispatch of arrival and closure of calls for service.
4.) Dispatch queue time (the time from when a call is entered into the dispatch system until a unit is dispatched) is unusually long in Baltimore. This occurs, in our view, because of dispatch policy and procedures and an inefficient patrol deployment scheme.

- BPD should make necessary changes to the system so that they can track the process time (time from receipt of call to entry into the system) separately from the time the call is waiting for an available officer. BPD is reviewing its Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) technology systems to determine if it can be configured to track data in this fashion. BPD is also reviewing all technology systems, including the CAD, to determine if there are improved systems that can be procured to provide better data management and burden reduction for field operations.
- BPD should re-think its policy of handling low priority calls in the event of a serious incident (G-2, G-3). This policy seems unnecessary given that the queue is dynamic. That is, as the incident unfolds, the effects on capacity will occur normally-it need not be artificially imposed. BPD agrees in concept and will review the effectiveness of this practice and consider discontinuing the practice if sufficient capacity exists in patrol.
- Call screening should be improved to reduce the likelihood of duplicate calls. For example, during our observations a call came in about a disturbance at a business. A few minutes later the same complainant called 911 with a slightly altered set of facts, but at the same address. The call taker created a new call. BPD agrees and will work in coordination with the Baltimore City Fire Department, who manages the call takers, to ensure that we can minimize the number of duplicate call entries into the dispatch system.
- Dispatchers can, at present, only see calls assigned to their district. This limits their capacity to see incidents occurring in other districts, and particularly, incidents occurring on streets that serve as boundaries for the districts. BPD is reviewing its Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) technology systems to determine if it can be configured to allow for dispatchers to view activity outside their assigned district.
- Communication center staff should work with field supervisors to ensure that as calls are closed, assigned units are released to return to service. BPD agrees with this recommendation.
- Sworn Shift Supervisors should be returned to field duty BPD will review the duties assigned to these supervisors to determine if civilian supervisors can augment or replace some of these positions, however, having some amount of sworn supervisors in the call center can be a valuable asset in ensuring supervisors in the field are closing classes and releasing officers to service.
5.) In the current patrol work schedule, there are three day-off groups. On each squad, the sergeant and one-third of the sergeant's subordinates are assigned to one day-off group, while the remaining officers are split between the other two. This means that a sergeant has limited contact with a substantial fraction of subordinates. This is a serious deviation from unity of command. (Report page 53).
- The three sergeants on a patrol shift should be assigned to the same day off group as their subordinates BPD agrees with this recommendation and will implement by the end of 2020.
- BPD should assign an additional sergeant to each shift principally as the shift administrative sergeant and to serve as a backup when shift sergeants use benefit time off. Under the present schedule this change will require 27 additional sergeants be assigned to patrol. BPD agrees with having an administrative sergeant for the patrol district, but not for each shift. There is not sufficient workload to warrant full time positions for administrative sergeants on evening and night shifts.
- BPD should consider work schedules that facilitate both span of control and unity of command and that ensure adequate field supervision. BPD agrees with this recommendation and will ensure alignment of leave groups with direct supervisors (unity of command) and to provide that no more than 8 subordinate officers are under the command of a patrol sergeant (span of control).
6.) BPD maintains a wide array of support and investigative units. Some of these units are quite small and their mission highly particularized. This approach has many effects on performance:
a) There is a high risk of redundancy
b) Many units have a very small span of supervisory control (e.g. one sergeant for two or three officers.)
c) Most units could not provide empirical evidence of their contribution to BPD
d) Communication is difficult, particularly when units are in different chains of command
e) When a unit has a highly specialized set of tools and qualifications it makes it more difficult to use them in different settings.
BPD agrees that all units that provide a specialized skill set or function for the department must have sufficient workload to justify a full time position. Units that are entirely redundant with other specialized units should be consolidated so that span of control is sufficient to warrant a full time supervisory position.

The following table summarizes our recommendations for these support units:

SWAT The BPD may wish to consider reducing the amount of daily and weekly training time to advance service availability. BPD agrees with this recommendation and has already begun implementation.

As discussed below, it may wish to consider assigning all warrant service-related duties to this unit. This is the approach used by the New Orleans Police Department, and the Nashville Police Department. Doing so would ensure predictable, accountable, and reliable warrant service strategies, techniques, equipment, etc. This would allow SWAT unit officers to further refine their skills in dynamic entry, as well as to serve as the single point of command to prioritize warrant service. From our interviews, we learned the SWAT unit is used frequently to support warrant service efforts, all the more reason to have these activities under one command. BPD does not agree with this recommendation at this time. The Warrant Apprehension Task Force (WATF) provides specialized support to the Homicide/Robbery Section and to the Chief of Detective's Office to clear warrants for individuals suspected of committing murders, shootings, and armed robberies. While SWAT provides support on executing high risk warrants, consolidating WATF into the same command structure as SWAT would detract from WATF's focus area on clearing these important cases.

Marine The city should consider combining BPD and BFD marine services to streamline service delivery and achieve cost efficiencies. BPD has reviewed this possibility, however, there are several tasks related to port security that do not fall under the purview of the Fire Department. In addition to providing life/safety services around Baltimore's waterways, the Marine Unit also provides security support to the Department of Homeland Security in protecting Baltimore's critical infrastructures, harbors and ports. The Marine Unit provides police services to the eight marinas in the Harbor. This includes a community of nearly $\mathbf{2 , 8 0 0}$ live-aboard boats, additional this number can increase exponentially during peak times in the summer. There are certain functions related to boat/vessel recovery that will be shifted to State level departments when needed so that the Marine Unit's focus can remain on security and safety.

Property Officers All BPD officer positions with property duties should be civilianized and officers holding these positions assigned to other department needs. BPD agrees with this recommendation. Additional civilian hires and the deployment of technology will be needed to enact this recommendation.

CITI WATCH Given the growing importance of real-time analysis centers in monitoring crime, the BPD may wish to consider adding civilian and, where appropriate, limited numbers of sworn personnel to these operations. BPD agrees with this recommendation and it seeking to implement a strategy that allows for deployment of additional civilian analyst resources at every patrol district to create what will be known as Baltimore Community Intelligence Centers (BCICs) that provide real time analytical capabilities to support enforcement and deployment strategies. BPD is also exploring a long term plan to create a Real Time Crime Center to support patrol operations that would be staffed with civilian capacity.

Motors Considering the few resources dedicated to this unit, and the duties it must assume in support of the professional franchise sports, the BPD may wish to consider reassigning its personnel to other needs. BPD agrees with this recommendation and will ensure that this unit is provided for traffic enforcement and investigation functions as well as supporting the efforts of the Mobile Metro Unit that assists with stabilizing neighborhoods and controlling traffic.

Towing / Fleet Safety The Towing function appears to be purely regulatory and therefore should be converted to a civilian unit, with sworn personnel reassigned to other BPD needs. The Fleet Safety unit appears to be primarily a disciplinary accountability function and should be realigned to either the Chief of Patrol, Internal Affairs, or Academy offices, supported by either one sergeant to evaluate findings or a sufficiently trained civilian. BPD agrees with this recommendation and will determine if a civilianization strategy can be implemented to cover these functions.

Dirt Bike Assign to METRO Division. BPD agrees with this recommendation. These personnel will move to the Mobile Metro Unit but continue play a lead role in Dirt Bike related investigations as needed.

Mobile Metro Expand use as part of METRO Division. BPD agrees with this recommendation, in part. The size of the Mobile Metro Unit will be increased to allow for greater capacity and support to patrol districts, however, the recommendations in the report related to consolidating Special Operations Section (SOS) and WATF into Mobile Metro do not represent, in our view, and appropriate reporting structure.

Special Events and Overtime The BPD should consider having sufficiently trained civilian staff, supervised by one lieutenant or sergeant, assume all these duties, thereby freeing other sworn personnel in the unit for other BPD needs. BPD agrees with this recommendation, in part. "Overtime" unit in this context refers to the management of secondary employment details that are filled by sworn officers from across the agency. Sworn supervisory personnel are currently needed to approve secondary OT requests. Special events management requires sworn perspective on safety plan/resource allocation for the hundreds of special event permits that BPD processes each year. Other administrative functions for the OT/Secondary Employment/Special events unit can be fulfilled by civilian personnel.

Arson If Fire Department employees can be trained and cross-certified to perform all Arson-related investigations (excluding perhaps Homicide by Arson). BPD does not agree with this recommendation. The Fire Department does not have sufficient capacity or jurisdiction to investigate Arsons. Personnel assigned to Arson crimes can be cross trained to handle other types of Special Investigations cases so that BPD can fully utilize their capacity.

Economic Crimes Close the Economic Crimes Unit and decentralize its investigations. Return personnel of these units to other BPD duties. BPD does not agree with this recommendation. The skill set required to investigate economic crimes is specialized, and it requires dedicated personnel to fully investigate these properly. Personnel assigned to economic crimes can be cross trained to handle other types of Special Investigations cases so that BPD can fully utilize their capacity.

Animal Abuse Close the animal abuse function and reassign the detective to other BPD needs. BPD does not agree with this recommendation. The skill set required to investigate animal abuse crimes is specialized, and it requires dedicated personnel to fully investigate these properly. Personnel assigned to animal abuse can be cross trained to handle other types of Special Investigations cases so that BPD can fully utilize their capacity.

Witness Services Close this function, transfer its duties to the Homicide unit, and reassign its detective to other BPD needs. BPD does not agree with this recommendation. This function plays a key role in coordination with the State's Attorney's Office to ensure witnesses are available for court.

Bridge Given the pressing demands for BPD patrol services, and the high likelihood that other government or private advocacy groups can perform the duties of this section, we recommend the BPD close this section or limit its staffing to one (civilian, sufficiently trained) liaison, freeing sworn staff here to serve other BPD needs. BPD plans to cross train all personnel within the Community and Youth Services Section to be able to provide maximum capacity for all neighborhood services functions.

Auxiliary and Chaplaincy Given the pressing demands for BPD patrol services, and the high likelihood that other government or private advocacy groups can perform the duties of this section, we recommend the BPD close this section or limit its staffing to one (civilian, sufficiently trained) liaison, freeing sworn staff here to serve other BPD needs. BPD plans to cross train all personnel within the Community and Youth Services Section to be able to provide maximum capacity for all neighborhood services functions.

Homeless Outreach Team The BPD may wish to consider decentralizing work of the team to the most affected districts. BPD plans to cross train all personnel within the Community and Youth Services Section to be able to provide maximum capacity for all neighborhood services functions.

Community \& Youth Services Administration The BPD should have a properly trained civilian perform these duties, freeing one officer and one detective for other BPD needs. BPD plans to cross train all personnel within the Community and Youth Services Section to be able to provide maximum capacity for all neighborhood services functions. BPD agrees that civilians should be performing these administrative functions where possible.

Internet Crimes against Children (ICAC) Sex Trafficking Considering the type of work that ICAC performs and the need for highly specialized computer skills, the BPD should consider consolidating this unit with the Special Activities Unit. This would help ensure requisite knowledge, skills, abilities, and equipment are standardized and accountable. BPD agrees with this recommendation. Personnel assigned to ICAC can be cross trained to handle other types of Special Investigations cases so that BPD can fully utilize their capacity.

Special Activities (also referred to as Special Investigations Section) The specialized knowledge, skills, abilities, and equipment of this new and emerging police investigative strategy are best centralized so as to maintain standards and accountability. We recommend maintaining this unit and investing in it as necessary. This unit may require more BPD capital and personnel expenditures in coming years. The BPD may wish to consider re-hiring well-vetted retirees who could be trained as needed in these critical fields. BPD agrees with this recommendation and will be assigning additional staff to support SIS functions.

Criminal Intelligence Consider a more strategic approach to the use of this unit. BPD agrees with this recommendation. Personnel assigned to Criminal Intelligence can be cross trained to handle other types of Special Investigations functions so that BPD can fully utilize their capacity.

HIDTA and ATF The BPD should consider the partnerships that are valuable from these assignments. At the same time, in reassessing this work and reviewing it with federal partners, it should assert that the primary mission of BPD members must be the needs of the BPD in its service to Baltimore. BPD agrees with this recommendation. We have strong partnerships with our Federal law enforcement counterparts in Baltimore. Our goal is to have the correct balance of personnel resources dedicated for these partnerships while ensuring their missions are fully aligned with a coordinated enforcement strategy.

Warrant Apprehension Task Force (WATF) Given the specific techniques of this unit as well as the equipment partnerships it requires with other agencies, the BPD should consider placing this unit within the SWAT command so as to provide better continuity in mission, accountability, techniques, and strategies. BPD does not agree with this recommendation at this time. The Warrant Apprehension Task Force (WATF) provides specialized support to the Homicide/Robbery Section and to the Chief of Detective's Office to clear warrants for individuals suspected of committing murders, shootings, and armed robberies. While SWAT provides support on executing high risk warrants, consolidating WATF into the same command structure as SWAT would detract from WATF's focus area on clearing these important cases.

Gangs Given the low commitment of personnel to this unit, the BPD should consider disbanding it. BPD does not agree with this recommendation, due to the fact that we will be pursuing a renewed strategy of focused
deterrence and gang/group violence interventions (GVI). BPD will consolidate the current function of this unit to the GVI effort.

Gun Violence Enforcement Division (GVED) The BPD should consider disbanding this unit and training District and detective-unit supervisors to oversee these investigations. This would allow reassignment of 1 sergeant and 2 detectives to other needs. BPD does not agree with this recommendation, due to the fact that we will be pursuing a renewed strategy of focused deterrence and gang/group violence interventions (GVI). This function plays a key role in coordination with the State's Attorney's Office. BPD will consolidate the current function of this unit to the GVI effort so that BPD can fully utilize their capacity.

Undercover Squad The BPD should consider a more strategic use of these resources. This would free 1 sergeant and 11 detectives to BPD needs. BPD agrees with this recommendation, in part. We are currently reviewing the roles and functions that undercover squads currently play to ensure that BPD can fully utilize their capacity.

Homicide Operations The BPD may wish to consider consolidating this unit with the SWAT unit, which may be better equipped, staffed, and supported for serving subpoenas. BPD does not agree with the recommendation to consolidate with SWAT, however, we do agree that the functions served by this unit need to be reviewed to ensure that BPD can fully utilize their capacity.

Homicide We suggest that homicide detectives only work homicide cases, with other death cases shifted to District detectives after sufficient training, and with homicide detectives available to consult on cases as needed. This would permit 50 homicide detectives to adopt six new cases yearly, or a total of 300. BPD does not agree with this recommendation at this time, due to a lack of trained capacity in the districts to be able to handle these cases. BPD does agree that staffing allocations of the Homicide unit should be increased to ensure that detectives are adopting no more than new 6 cases per year and we have already allocated additional staff to Homicide achieve this goal.

In addition, we propose a strategy to significantly improve BPD capacity to deploy rapidly, and strategically, and to be much more responsive to district and neighborhood problems. This plan consists of creation of the Metro Division, commanded by a major. The key attribute of this unit would be flexibility and capacity to address a myriad of issues. The new division will be constructed by combining several existing units. There are two critical elements. First, although members would be specialists (e.g. K-9 or Motors) they would not be limited to those skills. Their tasks will be defined by the mission. Some tasks will require uniformed responses, while others may not. Second, all members of the division must agree, as condition of joining the division, that they will work whenever and wherever the department needs them, subject, of course to standard HR procedures. BPD agrees with this recommendation, in part. The size of the Mobile Metro Unit will be increased to allow for greater capacity and support to patrol districts, however, the recommendations in the report related to consolidating Special Operations Section (SOS) functions and WATF into Mobile Metro do not represent, in our view, and appropriate reporting structure.

## Public Integrity

7.) BPD Is experiencing a significant backlog in the investigation of complaints lodged against employees. Moreover, the consent decree will require greater resources to ensure that complaints are handled according to best practices.

- In order to address its backlog and anticipated workload the Public Integrity Bureau will have to add 46 investigators. BPD agrees with the recommendation to increase the staffing, however, it will need to add personnel over several years in order to achieve the correct workload balance per detective. BPD has already begun this effort by assigning 7 additional staff to Public Integrity to increase capacity.


## Recruitment

8.) BPD, like many other law enforcement agencies, has struggled to recruit high quality individuals to serve as police officers. Moreover, the agency continues to experience the loss of officers through retirement, and other forms of separation at a pace that exceeds its capacity to add new sworn personnel.

- Increase the size of recruit classes. This would have to be examined relative to facility space and the ability to maintain instructional quality (e.g., by incorporating enough facilitators to assist instructors). BPD agrees with this recommendation, maximum capacity of classes has already been increase to $\mathbf{5 0}$ per class.
- Increase the annual number of academy classes. This would also have to be examined relative to facility and instructor availability. One option may be to look for opportunities to reduce the length of BPD training, as it currently is substantially longer than other training programs in the state, thereby making facilities and instructors more available. BPD agrees with this recommendation, and we have already shortened the length of BPD training by eliminating unnecessary down-time and creating a master training schedule. In the next few years, the annual number of academy classes should increase to 6 that start per year with up to 4 classes happening simultaneously under the new Academy facilities at the University of Baltimore.
- Reduce the current academy attrition rate of $18 \%$. An analysis of the difficulties recruits have during the academy and the reasons that they drop out or fail can help guide attrition reduction strategies. BPD agrees with this recommendation. A review of this data is ongoing.
- Reduce the overall attrition rate of the department. As noted above, there are many strategies the BPD can explore to boost officer retention and develop evidence-based strategies for reducing it. BPD agrees with this recommendation and is committed to following through on its Recruitment and Retention plan which is under development.


## Education and Training

9.) Implementation of the Consent Decree will result in significant demands on the training staff for in-service programs. We anticipate that officers will spend 20 workdays in in-service training each year. BPD agrees with this recommendation.

- More civilian staff to help create, deliver, and facilitate instruction. The city is becoming more flexible in hiring back sworn officers as civilians to facilitate training, considering compensation issues on a case-by-case basis. Nevertheless, some bureaucratic obstacles remain, such as the requirement for staff to wait 90 days between separating and being hired again. BPD agrees with this recommendation. Our goal is to start with the firing range to civilianize several of these positions and also add additional civilian capacity in E\&T to accommodate training needs without additional reliance on sworn resources. The total staff profile of the Education and Training division is provided at the end of this document.
- A civilian staff member to help input and maintain all training records. BPD agrees with this recommendation.
- Assessing with a civilian analyst how to increase training efficiency. For example, staff report that the law course is the most difficult for recruits to successfully complete at the academy. It would be helpful to understand why this is the case and develop strategies (e.g., study groups, primers, group tutors, materials that can be reviewed earlier in the process) to assist the recruits. It would also be helpful to see how education level correlates with success at the academy in general and in the law courses in particular. Similarly, recruits report about four weeks of "down time" during academy training. Process assessments may illustrate ways to streamline operations and reduce the overall length of the academy. BPD agrees with this recommendation. Our Academic Director has already developed a new master training schedule that eliminates unnecessary down time. We are also envisioning an expansion of training capacity through the addition of civilian instructors.
- Improving training facilities so as to conduct the necessary training in a more efficient and professional manner. BPD agrees with this recommendation. The Department recently signed a five-year lease to use space at the University of Baltimore in order to conduct much of the Department's training needs.


## Communications

10.) As we described earlier in the Response Time Analysis, the time from when a call is received in the 911 center and when it is dispatched is too long, particularly for high priority calls. The causes of this are multifaceted, but there are things that can be addressed in Communications to remedy this:

- BPD should make necessary changes to the system so that they can track the process time (time from receipt of call to entry into the system) separately from the time the call is waiting for an available officer. BPD is conducting a review of all technology applications used by the department, including the Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) system to determine if this can be accomplished with the current system or if a new system is required.
- BPD should re-think its policy of how it handles low priority calls in the event of a serious incident (G-2, G-3). This policy seems unnecessary given that the queue is dynamic. That is, as the incident unfolds, the effects on capacity will occur normally-it need not be artificially imposed. BPD agrees with this recommendation.
- Call screening should be improved to reduce the likelihood of duplicate calls. For example, during observations a call came in about a disturbance at a business. A few minutes later the same complainant called 911 with a slightly altered set of facts, but at the same address. The call taker created a new call. BPD agrees with this recommendation and will work with the Fire Department, who employs and trains the entry level call takers, to ensure this can be completed.
- Dispatchers can, at present, only see calls assigned to their district. This limits their capacity to see incidents occurring in other districts, and particularly, incidents occurring on streets that serve as boundaries for the districts. BPD is conducting a review of all technology applications used by the department, including the Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) system to determine if this can be accomplished with the current system or if a new system is required.
- Communications staff should work with field supervisors to ensure that as calls are closed, assigned units are released to return to service. BPD agrees with this recommendation.


## Building Security

11.) BPD devotes a substantial number of personnel to building security. First, the front desk at each district station is staffed 24/7. The cost of this is 62 police officers ( 9 stations $X 3$ shifts X SRF of $2.3=62$ ). In addition, there are 9 police sworn staff currently assigned to security at headquarters and City Hall. Aside from the actual cost there is also the opportunity cost. Police officers should not be doing building security-as there are alternatives. Security for headquarters could be provided under contract, or the city could engage security staff for this service. In many police departments the front desk of a police station is staffed by a nonsworn member perhaps a community service officer. This may require some changes to the physical space, but the cost is very modest when compared to the personnel costs. BPD agrees with these recommendations, in part. Private security will be used for HQ, but not for City Hall at this time. Desk officers at the district stations are responsible for direct interaction with the public who may need to file a police report. We agree that our building physical space in the front desks of the district stations require renovations to create more secure environments.

## Staffing Level Charts:

The following section provides the long term staffing levels recommended for the Baltimore Police Department based upon the workload analysis and a summary of the above key findings and recommendations.

To provide clarity, this section defines acronyms, abbreviations, and key terms that are used in the staffing level charts:

| Classification | Description |
| :--- | :--- |
| Trainees | Police Recruits in the Academy or in Field Training |
| P/O | Police Officer (sworn members to also include Flight Officers) |
| SGT | Sergeant - a front line supervisor |
| LT | Lieutenant - a mid-level supervisor |
| Det | Detective - same rank as police officer, but with case investigation duties |
| Det SGT | Detective Sergeant - a front line supervisor of detectives |
| Det LT | Detective Lieutenant - a mid-level supervisor of detectives |
| Capt | Captain - first level command staff rank - head of a section or executive officer of a district |
| Maj | Major - second level command staff rank - head of a section or senior commander of a district |
| LTC | Lieutenant Colonel - first level executive command staff rank - assistant chief of an operational division |
| Col | Colonel - second level executive command rank - chief of an operational division |
| DC | Deputy Commissioner - direct report to the Police Commissioner - head of a Bureau |
| PC | Police Commissioner - head of the entire agency |
| Civilian MGR | Civilian Manager - positions with titles that include Chief, Managing Director, Director |
| Civilian Superv. | Civilian Supervisors - positions with titles that include Deputy Director, Coordinator, Supervisor, etc. |
| Civilian Invest. | Civilian Investigators - contracted positions that perform investigations or administrative functions |
| Civilian Support | All other Civilian / non-sworn personnel classifications |


| Academic Section | Section within the Education and Training Division in charge of curriculum <br> development and management |
| :--- | :--- |
| Admin | any portion of a section or division for which administrative assignments requires <br> personnel support |
| Administrative Bureau | one of the four established bureaus of the BPD - led by a Deputy Commissioner - <br> encompasses all functions related to crime lab, evidence management, fiscal services <br> HR management, recruitment and applicant investigation, facilities, fleet, asset <br> management, medical and light duty personnel, officer safety and wellness, records <br> management |
| Administrative Duties Division | division within the Administrative Bureau responsible for managing the assignments <br> and investigating the medical status of all light duty and long term medical personnel |
| Adult \& Juvenile Booking | responsible for intake of inmates to the jail facility and juvenile detention facility |
| Adv. Technical \& Digital Evidence <br> Team | unit within the Anti-Crime Section responsible for collecting digital evidence and <br> supporting investigative efforts of the Criminal Investigation Division and the District <br> Detective Units |
| Anti-Corruption/Ethics Internal | a section within the Public Integrity Bureau - responsible for internal investigations <br> related to officer conduct that could violate ethics or corruption related laws or <br> policies |
| Anti-Crime Section | a section within the Criminal Investigation Division - responsible for coordinating <br> with federal agency task forces on joint enforcement efforts, undercover work, and <br> warrant execution |


| Asset Management Division | a division within the Administrative Bureau - responsible for maintenance and acquisition of fleet and facilities used by the department |
| :---: | :---: |
| ATF Task Force | unit within the Anti-Crime Section that coordinates with the Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms federal agency |
| Aviation Unit (+Flight Officers) | unit within the Special Operations Section in charge of flight operations / helicopter support |
| BCIC | Baltimore Community Intelligence Center(s) - formerly designated the Strategic Decision Support Centers - district level intelligence centers and real time analysis capabilities |
| Body Worn Camera Unit | unit within the Forensic Sciences \& Evidence Services Division responsible for reviewing all body worn camera footage and processing footage into evidence packages for case files |
| Bomb/ESU Unit | unit within the Special Operations Section responsible for coordinating response to emergency situations that involve or could involve explosives |
| Budget Management Section | section within the Finance Division that is responsible for developing and updating departmental budget requests |
| Cadets in Training | personnel ages 18-20 that are not yet qualified to serve as academy trainees, but are members of the department who are pre-cleared for hire as trainees once they reach the age of 20.5 |
| Casino | specialized assignment to patrol the area in and around the casino district within the Southern Police District |
| Central Booking | unit responsible for intake at the adult jail facility |
| Central District | one of nine geographical police districts |
| Chief of Patrol \& Dep Comm Offices | support staff for the Chief of Patrol and the Deputy Commissioner of Operations |
| Chief of Staff's Office | support staff for the Chief of Staff to the Police Commissioner |
| Child Abuse Unit | unit within the Special Investigations Section responsible for handling all crimes against children |
| CitiWatch | unit within the Data Driven Strategies Division responsible for monitoring camera feeds and reporting any evidence of crimes that have been captured on video by citiwatch cameras |
| City Wide Robbery | unit within Homicide/Robbery Section responsible for investigating city-wide patterns of robberies and investigating commercial robberies |
| Civilian Applicant Investigation | unit within HR Division responsible for investigating the background of all civilian position applications |
| Communications | section responsible for handling 9-1-1 dispatch and radio transmissions |
| Community \& Youth Services | section responsible for community engagement programs and youth outreach programs that are conducted by sworn members |
| Compliance Bureau | one of the four established bureaus of the BPD - led by a Deputy Commissioner encompasses all functions related to education and training, consent decree compliance, performance standards, audits \& inspections, and information technology |
| COMSTAT | a unit with the Data Driven Strategies Division responsible for managing all data provided for regular reporting used in the weekly accountability process known as COMSTAT |
| Consent Decree Implementation | a division within the Compliance Bureau - responsible for managing all efforts related to demonstrating and monitoring compliance with the federal consent decree |


| Continuing Education Section | a section within the Education and Training Division responsible for in-service annual training for sworn members to remain certified as law enforcement officers |
| :---: | :---: |
| Crime Analytics | a unit with the Data Driven Strategies Division responsible for managing crime data analysis needed to impact criminal intelligence gathering and enforcement efforts |
| Crime Laboratory | a section within Forensic Sciences \& Evidence Services Division responsible for processing all physical evidence collected for criminal investigations |
| Criminal History | a unit within the records management division that is responsible for running the criminal history of individuals at the request of patrol officers |
| Criminal Intel | a unit within the Criminal Investigation Division that conducts intelligence gathering to support situational awareness of enforcement operations and criminal investigations |
| Criminal Investigation Division (CID) | a division within the Operations Bureau that is responsible for central investigations of homicides, city wide robberies, family crimes, sexual assaults, child abuse, warrant enforcement, federal task force coordination, and major case investigations |
| Critical Response Team | a unit within the Community and Youth Services Section that is responsible for providing a secondary response to scenes of violent crime or situations where there a person in mental or medical distress that requires additional resources for deescalation |
| Data Driven Strategies Division | a division that reports to the Deputy Commissioner of Operations - responsible for data analytics, camera monitoring, accountability programs, and intelligence gathering |
| Dispatchers | civilian personnel responsible for handling 9-1-1 dispatch from the call center |
| District Action Teams | dedicated enforcement and proactive engagement units assigned to each patrol district |
| District Detective Units | district level detective units responsible for investigating all property crimes, robberies, shootings, and assaults that occur in a district |
| Economic/Arson/CyberCrimes | a unit within the Special Investigation Section that is responsible for investigating criminal activity that takes place online or crimes related to fraud and technology also responsible for investigating arson cases |
| Education and Training Division | a division within the Compliance Bureau - responsible for managing all efforts related to training of new members to the department as well as annual in service of all current members |
| Employee Affairs | a unit within the HR Division responsible for managing retiree benefits and previous members' death benefits |
| Employee Benefits | a unit within the HR Division responsible for managing current members insurance coverages, pension information, etc. |
| Employee Wellness | a section within the HR Division responsible for ensuring the well-being of current officers that experience trauma, mental stress, or financial hardship |
| Entry Level Section | a section within the Education and Training Division responsible for training recruits to become sworn members of the department |
| EOD Investigations | a section within the Public Integrity Bureau responsible for investigating cases where employees claim discrimination |
| Equal Opportunity | a section with in the HR Division responsible for managing intake and interfacing with employees that claim discrimination based on a status as a protected class |
| Ethics-FBI | a section within the Public Integrity Bureau - responsible for internal investigations related to officer conduct that could violate ethics or corruption related laws or policies where the FBI is required to assist |


| Evidence Control Unit | a section within Forensic Sciences \& Evidence Services Division responsible for storing physical evidence collected for criminal investigations |
| :---: | :---: |
| Executive Office Functions | Police Commissioner's staff support |
| Executive Protection Units | BPD personnel assigned as personal security for either the Mayor, State's Attorney, or the Police Commissioner |
| Facilities Management | a section within the Asset Management Division responsible for coordinating with the Department of General Services to manage all property used by the BPD |
| Family Crimes | a unit within the Special Investigation Section that is responsible for handling all crimes related to domestic violence |
| Finance Division | a division within the Administrative Bureau responsible for managing all budget, fiscal, and grants related functions of the department |
| Firearms Training Section | a section within the Education and Training Division responsible for ensuring all officers qualify on their service weapons on an annual basis |
| Fiscal Services Section | a section within the Finance Division responsible for managing all accounting, payroll, procurement, and fiscal transactions carried out by the department |
| Fleet Management | a section within the Asset Management Division responsible for coordinating with the Department of General Services to manage all vehicles used by the BPD |
| FOP Personnel | pursuant to the FOP agreement with the BPD, there are dedicated personnel funded by the agency to support FOP lodge business |
| Forensic Sciences \& Evidence Services Division | a division within the Administrative Bureau responsible for managing all crime lab, evidence, and records management functions of the department |
| General Investigations | a section within the Public Integrity Bureau responsible for investigating all cases of police misconduct or policy violations |
| Grant Management Section | a section within the Finance Division responsible for managing all grant requests and spending carried out by the department |
| HIDTA/DEA Task Force | unit within the Anti Crime Section that coordinates with the Federal Drug Enforcement Agency |
| Homeless Outreach Team | a unit within the Community and Youth Services Section that is responsible for providing a community engagement response to complaints related to homeless persons |
| Homicide Detectives | A unit within the Homicide/Robbery Section that is responsible for all death investigations, to include homicides, suicides, and unknown deaths |
| Homicide/Robbery Section | a section within the Criminal Investigation Division - responsible for investigating all deaths that take place in the city, and robbery patterns that take place in multiple districts, or impact commercial locations |
| Hot Desk/Chase | a unit within the records management division that is responsible for running the criminal history of individuals at the request of patrol officers |
| HQ and City Hall Security | a unit within the Asset Management Division that is responsible for securing City Hall and Police HQ for visitors to the building |
| HRIS Support | a unit within HR Division to ensure personnel movements that occur across the department are accurately tracked and managed in the payroll system |
| Human Resources Division | a division within the Administrative bureau responsible for all HR functions of the department |
| Information Technology Division | a division within the Compliance bureau responsible for technology functions of the department |
| Inner Harbor Patrol | specialized assignment to patrol the area in and around the inner harbor |
| Intake/Classification | a section within the Public Integrity Bureau responsible for determining the nature of police misconduct or policy violation complaints |


| Integrity Assurance | a section within the Public Integrity Bureau responsible for conducting integrity checks |
| :---: | :---: |
| Juvenile Booking | responsible for intake at the juvenile detention facility |
| K9 Unit | a unit within the Special Operations Section responsible for providing canine support for drug and explosive detection |
| Mail room/Copy Room | a unit within the records management division that is responsible for ensuring interoffice and external mail is properly delivered across the department and to outside recipients |
| Major Case / Gang Unit | a unit within the Anti-Crime Section that is responsible for long term investigations of gang activity |
| Marine Unit | a unit within the Special Operations Section responsible for harbor security, investigations of crimes that occur in the water, etc. |
| Missing Persons/Animal Abuse | a unit within the Special Investigations Section responsible for leading investigations on animal abuse cases and missing persons cases |
| Mobile Metro Unit | a unit within the Patrol Division that provides rapid response to stabilize areas that experience violence |
| Mounted Unit | a unit within the Special Operations Section responsible for providing crowd management support using horses |
| NCO Staff | Neighborhood Coordination Officers who serve as Community Policing and Problem-Oriented Policing specialists for each district. |
| Neighborhood Coordination | a unit within the Community and Youth Services Section responsible for overall management of city-wide community engagement efforts |
| Operations Bureau | one of the four established bureaus of the BPD - led by a Deputy Commissioner encompasses all functions related to patrol and investigation functions |
| Patrol Support Services Division | a division within the Operations Bureau that is responsible for providing support to Patrol operations, to include Special Operations Section, Communications, Community and Youth Services, and Adult/Juvenile Booking |
| Patrol Staffing (Day/Evening/Night) | patrol functions where officers are handling 9-1-1 calls and conducting community engagement, foot patrols, business checks, and visibility efforts - combines all staffing for the district on day, evening and night shifts together |
| Pawn Shop | responsible for cross referencing stolen property with pawn shop activity |
| PC's Office | office of the Police Commissioner |
| Performance Evaluations | a unit with HR that is responsible for ensuring all members complete annual performance evaluations |
| Performance Standards Section | a section with the Compliance Bureau responsible for audits and inspections of departmental functions and activities to ensure compliance with policy |
| Public Information Office | a section within the Police Commissioner's Office responsible for interfacing with media and public records requests |
| Public Integrity Bureau | one of the four established bureaus of the BPD - led by a Deputy Commissioner encompasses all functions related to internal investigations of police misconduct or policy violations |
| Quartermaster | a unit within the Asset Management Division that is responsible for providing all members with uniforms and BPD property |
| Radio Support Personnel | a unit within Communications Section that is responsible for managing all radios |
| Recon \& Anti-Violence Enforcement | RAVEN squad - a dedicated enforcement unit responsible for investigating high risk, multiple offenders that are responsible for armed robberies and shootings |
| Records Management Division | a division of the Administrative Bureau responsible for securing all police reports and records maintained by the department |


| Records Management System | a unit within the records management division responsible for inputting police reports into the records management system |
| :---: | :---: |
| Recruitment \& Applicant Investigation Division | a division of the Administrative Bureau responsible for recruiting and conducting background investigations on all applicants to become sworn members of the BPD |
| Recruits in Training | all police academy recruits |
| Re-entry Support Team | a unit within the Community and Youth Services Section responsible for assisting with re-entry programs |
| Regional Auto Theft Task Force | also known as RATT - represents BPD's participation in a multi jurisdictional effort to investigate auto thefts and car jackings |
| Secondary Employment | a unit within the Special Operations Section responsible for approving and filling of off-duty details |
| Sex Offender Registration | a unit within Special Investigations Section responsible for ensuring compliance with sex offender registry laws |
| Sex Offense/Cold Case Unit | a unit within Special Investigations Section responsible for investigating sex crimes and cold cases within the Criminal Investigations Division |
| Sex Trafficking Unit | a unit within Special Investigations Section responsible for investigating patterns and crimes related to sex trafficking |
| SIRT | Special Incident Response Team - a section within the Public Integrity Bureau responsible for investigating police shootings and critical incidents involving police |
| Special Events | a unit within the Special Operations Section responsible for approving and filling of special event details |
| Special Investigation Section | a section within the Criminal Investigations Division responsible for investigating several types of crimes that require specialized training, including sex crimes, domestic violence, child abuse, animal abuse, economic crimes, cyber crimes, and arson |
| Special Operations | a section within the Patrol Support Services Division responsible for providing specialized tactical resources, traffic management, and special event planning |
| Staff Review | a unit within the records management division that is responsible for reviewing reports for completion and accuracy |
| Strike Force | unit within the Anti-Crime Section that coordinates with several federal and state agencies on enforcement |
| Summons/Subpoenas | a unit within the records management division that is responsible for ensuring all officers who are subpoenaed or summoned to court receive notification |
| SWAT/Tactical | a unit within the Special Operations Section that provides specialized support for high risk enforcement actions |
| Sworn Applicant Investigations | a unit within Recruitment Division that is responsible for processing all background investigation of police applicants |
| Sworn Recruitment Unit | a unit within Recruitment Division that is responsible for actively recruiting new officers into the BPD |
| Traffic Enforcement | a unit within the Special Operations Section that provides traffic enforcement of speeding, red lights, and improper vehicle usage laws |
| Traffic Investigation (AIU) | a unit within the Special Operations Section that investigates vehicle accidents |
| Vice/Undercover | a unit within the Anti-Crime Section that is responsible for undercover investigations |
| Victim-Witness Asst | a unit within the Homicide/Robbery Section that is responsible for ensuring all victims and/or witnesses of cases are debriefed and ensure they are protected prior to court appearances |


| Warrant Apprehension Task Force | a unit within the Anti-Crime Section that is responsible for executing homicide, <br> shooting, robbery, and various other types of warrants in support of activity from <br> the Criminal Investigations Division |
| :--- | :--- |
| Warrants/Identification | a unit within the records management division that is responsible for running the <br> criminal history of individuals at the request of patrol officers |
| Watch Center | a unit responsible for data analytics, camera monitoring, accountability programs, <br> and intelligence gathering |
| Youth Services | a unit responsible for youth engagement programs conducted by BPD |


| Operations Bureau - Patrol Division | Sworn + <br> Trainees | Trainees | Sworn <br> Total | P/O | SGT | LT | Det | Det SGT | Det LT | Captain/ <br> Major | $\begin{gathered} \hline \text { LTC/ } \\ \mathrm{Col} / \mathrm{DC} \end{gathered}$ | Civilian MGRs | Civilian Superv. | Civilian Invest. | Civilian Support | Civilian Total |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Subtotals by Function | $\underline{1795}$ | $\underline{\underline{90}}$ | $\underline{1705}$ | 1257 | 198 | $\underline{40}$ | $\underline{150}$ | $\underline{\underline{27}}$ | 9 | $\underline{\underline{21}}$ | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | $\underline{38}$ | $\underline{38}$ |
| Chief of Patrol \& Dep Comm Offices | 14 | 1 | 14 | 5 | 2 | 1 |  | 1 | ใ | 3 | 3 |  |  |  | 2 | 2 |
| Mobile Metro Unit | 37 | U | 37 | 32 | 4 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Admin/NCO Staff/BCIC | 126 |  | 126 | 72 | 27 | 9 |  |  |  | 18 |  |  |  |  | 36 | 36 |
| Patrol Staffing (Day/Evening/Night) | 1206 | 90 | 1116 | 956 | 133 | 27 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| District Action Teams | 182 |  | 182 | 156 | 26 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| District Detective Units | 186 |  | 186 |  |  |  | 150 | 27 | 9 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Inner Harbor Patrol \& Casino | 44 |  | 44 | 36 | 6 | 2 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Central District | 217 | 10 | 207 | 154 | 24 | 5 | 18 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 4 |
| Admin/NCO Staff/BCIC | 14 |  | 14 | 8 | 3 | 1 | 1 | \% | 1 | 2 | , |  |  |  | 4 | 4 |
| Patrol Staffing (Day/Evening/Night) | 138 | 10 | 128 | 110 | 15 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |  |  |  |  |
| District Action Teams | 21 |  | 21 | 18 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |  |  |  |  |
| District Detective Units | 22 |  | 22 | 0 | 0 | U | 18 | 3 | 1 | 0 | U |  |  |  |  |  |
| Inner Harbor Patrol | 22 |  | 22 | 18 | 3 | 1 |  |  |  |  | (0) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Southeastern | 198 | 10 | 188 | 139 | 21 | 4 | 18 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 4 |
| Admin/NCO Staff/BCIC | 14 |  | 14 | 8 | 3 | 1 | $\theta$ | , | 1 | 2 | 1 |  |  |  | 4 | 4 |
| Patrol Staffing (Day/Evening/Night) | 141 | 10 | 131 | 113 | 15 | 3 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| District Action Teams | 21 |  | 21 | 18 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |  |  |  |  |
| District Detective Units | 22 |  | 22 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 18 | 3 | 1 | 0 | U |  |  |  |  |  |
| Eastern | 175 | 10 | 165 | 120 | 20 | 4 | 15 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 4 |
| Admin/NCO Staff/BCIC | 14 |  | 14 | 8 | 3 | 1 | 1 | \% | \% | 2 | , |  |  |  | 4 | 4 |
| Patrol Staffing (Day/Evening/Night) | 121 | 10 | 111 | 94 | 14 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |  |  |  |  |
| District Action Teams | 21 |  | 21 | 18 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |  |  |  |  |
| District Detective Units | 19 |  | 19 | 0 | 0 | U | 15 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Northeastern | 216 | 10 | 206 | 154 | 24 | 4 | 18 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 4 |
| Admin/NCO Staff/BCIC | 14 |  | 14 | 8 | 3 | 1 | Q | Q | , | 2 | , |  |  |  | 4 | 4 |
| Patrol Staffing (Day/Evening/Night) | 159 | 10 | 149 | 128 | 18 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |  |  |  |  |
| District Action Teams | 21 |  | 21 | 18 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |  |  |  |  |
| District Detective Units | 22 |  | 22 |  |  | 0 | 18 | 3 | 1 | 0 | II |  |  |  |  |  |
| Northern | 176 | 10 | 166 | 122 | 19 | 4 | 15 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 4 |
| Admin/NCO Staff/BCIC | 14 |  | 14 | 8 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | , | 2 | , |  |  |  | 4 | 4 |
| Patrol Staffing (Day/Evening/Night) | 129 | 10 | 119 | 102 | 14 | 3 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| District Action Teams | 14 |  | 14 | 12 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |  |  |  |  |
| District Detective Units | 19 |  | 19 | , | 0 | U | 15 | 3 | 1 |  | U |  |  |  |  |  |
| Northwestern | 186 | 10 | 176 | 131 | 20 | 4 | 15 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 4 |
| Admin/NCO Staff/BCIC | 14 |  | 14 | 8 | 3 | 1 | 1 | , | 1 | 2 | Q |  |  |  | 4 | 4 |
| Patrol Staffing (Day/Evening/Night) | 132 | 10 | 122 | 105 | 14 | 3 | 0 | ( | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |  |  |  |  |
| District Action Teams | 21 |  | 21 | 18 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | U | 0 |  |  |  |  |  |
| District Detective Units | 19 |  | 19 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 15 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 0 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Western | 175 | 10 | 165 | 120 | 20 | 4 | 15 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 4 |
| Admin/NCO Staff/BCIC | 14 |  | 14 | 8 | 3 | 1 | 0 | , | , | 2 | \% |  |  |  | 4 | 4 |
| Patrol Staffing (Day/Evening/Night) | 121 | 10 | 111 | 94 | 14 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |  |  |  |  |
| District Action Teams | 21 |  | 21 | 18 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |  |  |  |  |
| District Detective Units | 19 |  | 19 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 15 | 3 | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Southwestern | 184 | 10 | 174 | 126 | 20 | 4 | 18 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 4 |
| Admin/NCO Staff/BCIC | 14 |  | 14 | 8 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | , | 2 | 1 |  |  |  | 4 | 4 |
| Patrol Staffing (Day/Evening/Night) | 127 | 10 | 117 | 100 | 14 | 3 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| District Action Teams | 21 |  | 21 | 18 | 3 | 0 | U | U | U | 0 | U |  |  |  |  |  |
| District Detective Units | 22 |  | 22 | 0 | 0 | U | 18 | 3 | 1 | U | U |  |  |  |  |  |
| Southern | 217 | 10 | 207 | 136 | 21 | 4 | 18 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 4 |
| Admin/NCO Staff/BCIC | 14 |  | 14 | 8 | 3 | 1 | 0 |  | 1 | 2 | \% |  |  |  | 4 | 4 |
| Patrol Staffing (Day/Evening/Night) | 138 | 10 | 128 | 110 | 15 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | U | 0 |  |  |  |  |  |
| District Action Teams | 21 |  | 21 | 18 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |  |  |  |  |
| District Detective Units | 22 |  | 22 | 0 | 0 | U | 18 | 3 | 1 | 0 | , |  |  |  |  |  |
| Casino | 22 |  | 22 | 18 | 3 | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |


| Operations Bureau Criminal Investigation Division (CID) | Sworn + <br> Trainees | Trainees | Sworn <br> Total | P/O | SGT | LT | Det | Det SGT | DetLT | Captain/ <br> Major | $\begin{gathered} \hline \text { LTC/ } \\ \text { Colonel } \end{gathered}$ | Civilian MGRs | Civilian Superv. | Civilian Invest. | Civilian Support | Civilian Total |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| CID Totals | 384 | 0 | 384 | $\underline{29}$ | 7 | 3 | $\underline{281}$ | 45 | $\underline{13}$ | 2 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 20 | 21 |
| Admin Staff | 8 |  | 8 | 2 | 2 | 2 |  | 1 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 1 |  |  | 1 | 2 |
| Criminal Intel | 15 |  | 15 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 12 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Homicide/RobberySection | 107 |  | 107 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 86 | 14 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 8 |
| Homicide Detectives | 74 |  | 74 | U | 1 | U | 62 | 10 | 2 | 0 | 0 |  |  |  | 2 | 2 |
| Victim-Witness Asst | 7 |  | 7 |  |  |  | 6 | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  | 4 | 4 |
| City Wide Robbery | 15 |  | 15 |  |  |  | 12 | 2 | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Regional Auto Theft Task Force | 7 |  | 7 |  |  |  | 6 | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Admin Staff | 4 |  | 4 | 1 | 1 | U | 0 |  | U | 2 | 0 |  |  |  | 2 | 2 |
| Special Investigation Section | 106 |  | 106 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 85 | 14 | 4 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 9 |
| Sex Offense/Cold Case Unit | 29 |  | 29 | U | 0 | 0 | 24 | 4 | 1 | - | U |  |  |  | 1 | 1 |
| Child Abuse Unit | 22 |  | 22 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 18 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 0 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Family Crimes | 22 |  | 22 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 18 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 0 |  |  |  | 1 | 1 |
| SexTrafficking Unit | 15 |  | 15 |  |  |  | 12 | 2 | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Economic/Arson/Cyber Crimes | 7 |  | 7 |  |  |  | 6 | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Missing Persons/Animal Abuse | 4 |  | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |  |  |  |  |
| SexOffenderRegistration | 2 |  | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |  |  | 2 | 2 |
| Pawn Shop | 2 |  | 2 | 0 | 0 | \% | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |  |  | 3 | 3 |
| Admin Staff | 3 |  | 3 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | , | 1 | 0 |  |  |  | 2 | 2 |
| Anti-Crime Section | 148 |  | 148 | 25 | 3 | 1 | 98 | 15 | 5 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| Adv. Technical \& Digtial Evidence Team | 19 |  | 19 |  | , | , | 16 | 2 | 1 | , | 0 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Warrant Apprehension Task Force | 28 |  | 28 | 24 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Recon \& Anti-Violence Enforcement | 19 |  | 19 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 16 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Vice/Undercover | 22 |  | 22 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 18 | 3 | 1 | U | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |
| ATF Task Force | 7 |  | 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |  |  |  |  |
| HIDTA/DEA Task Force | 15 |  | 15 |  |  |  | 12 | 2 | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Major Case / Gang Unit | 22 |  | 22 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 18 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 0 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Strike Force | 14 |  | 14 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 12 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Admin Staff | 2 |  | 2 | 1 |  |  |  |  |  | 1 | 0 |  |  |  | 2 | 2 |


| Operations Bureau - <br> Patrol Support Services Division | Sworn + <br> Trainees | Trainees | $\begin{gathered} \hline \text { Sworn } \\ \text { Total } \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | P/O | SGT | LT | Det | Det SGT | Det LT | Captain/ <br> Major | LTC | Civilian MGRs | Civilian Superv. | Civilian Invest. | Civilian <br> Support | Civilian Total |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Subtotal | 188 | 0 | 188 | $\underline{118}$ | $\underline{36}$ | $\underline{12}$ | $\underline{12}$ | 2 | 0 | 7 | 1 | 3 | 18 | 5 | 128 | 154 |
| Special Operations | 133 | 0 | 133 | 88 | 21 | 7 | 12 | 2 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 10 | 13 |
| SWAT/Tactical | 38 |  | 38 | 32 | 4 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |  |  |  |  |  |
| K9 Unit | 21 |  | 21 | 17 | 3 | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Bomb/ESU Unit | 9 |  | 9 | 7 | 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Marine Unit | 8 |  | 8 | 7 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Mounted Unit | 5 |  | 5 | 4 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |  |  | 3 | 3 |
| Aviation Unit (+Flight Officers) | 19 |  | 19 | 15 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  | 1 |  | 2 | 3 |
| Traffic Enforcement | 8 |  | 8 | 6 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Traffic Investigation (AIU) | 14 |  | 14 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 12 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Secondary Employment | 4 |  | 4 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |  | 4 | 6 |
| SpecialEvents | 4 |  | 4 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | U |  |  |  |  |  |
| Admin Staff | 3 |  | 3 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 |  |  |  | 1 | 1 |
| Community \& Youth Services | 22 | 0 | 22 | 16 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 6 | 7 |
| Youth Services | 5 |  | 5 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Homeless Outreach Team | 5 |  | 5 | 4 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Critical Response Team | 5 |  | 5 | 4 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Neighborhood Coordination | 2 |  | 2 | 2 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Re-entry Support Team | 1 |  | 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Admin Staff | 4 |  | 4 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |  | 1 |  | 6 | 7 |
| Communications | 9 | 0 | 9 | 2 | 5 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 9 | 0 | 74 | 84 |
| Section Admin \& Supervisors | 9 |  | 9 | 2 | 5 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 8 | 1 | - |  |  |  |  |  |
| Radio Support Personnel | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  | 1 |  | 4 | 5 |
| Dispatchers | 0 |  | - |  |  |  | - | - | - |  | 0 | 1 | 8 |  | 70 | 79 |
| Adult \& Juvenile Booking | 19 | 0 | 19 | 12 | 4 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Central Booking | 1 |  | 1 | $\square$ |  | 1 |  | 1 | 0 | 1 | Q |  |  |  | 1 | 1 |
| Juvenile Booking | 9 |  | 9 | 6 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | U |  |  |  |  |  |
| Admin Staff | 9 |  | 9 | 6 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | U | U |  |  |  |  |  |
| Data Driven Strategies Division | 5 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 6 | 5 | 37 | 49 |
| Crime Analytics |  |  | Q | \% | A | 1 | \% | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 5 | 12 | 20 |
| Watch Center | 3 |  | 3 |  | 1 | 1 |  |  |  | 1 |  |  | 2 |  | 10 | 12 |
| COMSTAT | 1 |  | 1 |  | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 3 | 3 |
| CitiWatch | 1 |  | 1 | 0 | 1 |  |  | 0 |  | 0 | 0 |  | 2 |  | 12 | 14 |


| Administrative Bureau | Sworn + <br> Trainees | Trainees | $\begin{gathered} \hline \text { Sworn } \\ \text { Total } \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | P/O | SGT | LT | Det | Det SGT | DetLT | Captain/ <br> Major | DC | Civilian MGRs | Civilian Superv. | Civilian Invest. | Civilian Support | Civilian Total |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Total | $\underline{66}$ | 0 | $\underline{66}$ | $\underline{15}$ | $\underline{\underline{22}}$ | 8 | 14 | 4 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 6 | 28 | 89 | 201 | 324 |
| Bureau Personnel | 2 |  | 2 |  | 1 | 0 | ¢ | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |  |  |  | 1 | 1 |
| FOPPersonnel | 3 |  | 3 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 碞 | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Finance Division | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 20 | 24 |
| Fiscal Services Section | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 | , | Q | , | 0 | Q | , | 1 | 1 |  | 10 | 12 |
| Grant Management Section | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  | 1 |  | 5 | 6 |
| Budget Management Section | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  | 1 |  | 5 | 6 |
| Forensic Sciences \& Evidence Services Division | 9 | 0 | 9 | 0 | 6 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 5 | 70 | 76 | 153 |
| Evidence Control Unit | 3 |  | 3 | , | 2 | 1 | , | , | 1 | , | 0 | 2 | 2 |  | 70 | 74 |
| CrimeLaboratory | 3 |  | 3 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  | 3 | 70 |  | 73 |
| Body Worn Camera Unit | 3 |  | 3 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |  |  | 6 | 6 |
| Records Management Division | 7 | 0 | 7 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 11 | 1 | 68 | 80 |
| Mail room/Copy Room | 1 |  | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | Q | 1 | 0 | , | 0 |  |  |  | 4 | 4 |
| Staff Review | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  | 2 |  | 12 | 14 |
| Hot Desk/Chase | 1 |  | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  | 2 |  | 12 | 14 |
| Warrants/Identification | 1 |  | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  | 2 |  | 12 | 14 |
| Criminal History | 1 |  | 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 2 | 1 | 12 | 15 |
| Records Management System | 1 |  | 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 2 |  | 12 | 14 |
| Summons/Subpoenas | 2 |  | 2 |  | 2 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1 |  | 2 | 3 |
| Section Admin | 1 |  | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | - | $\square$ | $\square$ | 0 |  |  |  | 2 | 2 |
| Human Resources Division | 4 | 0 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 5 | 6 | 13 | 26 |
| Civilian Applicant Investigation | 0 |  | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | d | 0 |  | 1 | 6 |  | 7 |
| Employee Benefits | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |  |  | 3 | 3 |
| Employee Affairs | 1 |  | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |  |  | 3 | 3 |
| Performance Evaluations | 0 |  | U | 0 | 0 | 0 | U | U | U | 0 | 0 |  |  |  | 1 | 1 |
| HRIS Support | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |  |  | 3 | 3 |
| Equal Opportunity | 0 |  | 0 | U | 0 | U | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  | 1 |  |  | 1 |
| Employee Wellness | 3 |  | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |  | 3 | 5 |
| Section Admin | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |  | , | 0 | 1 | 2 |  |  | 3 |
| Recruitment \& Applicant Investigation Division | 20 | 0 | 20 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 14 | 4 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 12 | 1 | 14 |
| Sworn Recruitment Unit | 3 |  | 3 | 1 | 1 | \% | 2 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 |  |  | 2 |  | 2 |
| Sworn Applicant Investigations | 15 |  | 15 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 12 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |  | 10 |  | 10 |
| Section Admin | 2 |  | 2 | U | 1 | 0 | 0 |  | 0 | 1 | 0 |  | 1 |  | 1 | 2 |
| Asset Management Division | 15 | 0 | 15 | 9 | 4 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 19 | 23 |
| Fleet Management | 2 |  | 2 | , | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | (1) | , | 1 | 1 |  | 6 | 8 |
| Quartermaster | 2 |  | 2 | 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1 |  | 6 | 7 |
| Facilities Management | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  | 1 |  | 6 | 7 |
| HQ and City Hall Security | 11 |  | 11 | 8 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Section Admin | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | (1) | 0 |  | 0 |  |  |  | 1 | 1 |
| Administrative Duties Division | 6 | 0 | 6 | 0 | 4 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 3 |
| Management Staff/ Investigators | 6 |  | 6 |  | 4 | 1 |  |  |  | 1 |  |  |  |  | 3 | 3 |


| Public Integrity Bureau | Sworn + <br> Trainees | Trainees | $\begin{gathered} \hline \text { Sworn } \\ \text { Total } \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | P/O | SGT | LT | Det | Det SGT | Det LT | Captain/ Major | DC | Civilian MGRs | Civilian Superv. | Civilian Invest. | Civilian Support | Civilian Total |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Subtotal | $\underline{95}$ | 0 | $\underline{95}$ | 0 | 0 | 0 | 70 | $\underline{14}$ | 7 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 17 | 1 | 18 |
| Admin Staff | 3 |  | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  | 1 |  | 1 | 1 |  |  | 10 | 1 | 1 |
| General Investigations | 59 |  | 59 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 48 | 8 | 2 | 1 | 0 |  |  |  |  | 10 |
| Anti-Corruption/Ethics Internal | 8 |  | 8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Ethics-FBI | 4 |  | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Integrity Assurance | 2 |  | 2 |  |  |  | 2 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| SIRT | 7 |  | 7 |  |  |  | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Intake/Classification | 4 |  | 4 |  |  |  | 2 | 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  | 6 |  | 6 |
| EODInvestigations | 8 |  | 8 | 0 | U | U | 6 | 1 | 1 | U | U |  |  | 1 |  | 1 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Compliance Bureau | Sworn + <br> Trainees | Trainees | Sworn Total | P/O | SGT | LT | Det | Det SGT | Det LT | Captain/ Major | DC | Civilian MGRs | Civilian Superv. | Civilian Invest. | Civilian Support | Civilian Total |
| Subtotal | $\underline{\underline{218}}$ | 140 | $\underline{78}$ | $\underline{47}$ | $\underline{\underline{19}}$ | 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 14 | 6 | 81 | 105 |
| Information Technology Division | 2 | , | 2 | 2 | - | 1 | 1 | \% | \% |  |  | 2 |  | 6 | 17 | 24 |
| Consent Decree Implementation | 4 | 0 | 4 | U | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 5 |  | 17 | 20 |
| Performance Standards Section | 25 | 0 | 25 | 12 | 8 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 |  | 1 |  | 5 | 12 |
| Education and Training Division | 187 | 140 | 47 | 33 | 10 | 3 | U | 0 | U | 1 | 0 |  | 6 |  | 42 | 49 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Police Commissioner's Office | Sworn + <br> Trainees | Trainees | Sworn <br> Total | P/O | SGT | LT | Det | Det SGT | Det LT | Captain/ Major | PC | Civilian MGRs | Civilian Superv. | Civilian Invest. | Civilian Support | Civilian Total |
| Subtotal | 39 | 0 | $\underline{39}$ | 8 | 1 | 0 | $\underline{\underline{23}}$ | 3 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 4 | 2 | 0 | 9 | 15 |
| Executive Office Functions | 2 | , | 2 |  | 1 | \% |  |  |  | 0 | 1 | 3 | 1 |  | 3 | 7 |
| Executive Protection Units | 31 | 0 | 31 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 19 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 0 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Public Information Office | 4 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | $\square$ | 4 | 0 |  | 0 | U | 1 | 1 |  | 6 | 8 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| BPD Staffing Plan (By Bureau) | Sworn + <br> Trainees | Trainees | Sworn Total | P/O | SGT | LT | Det | Det SGT | Det LT | Captain/ <br> Major | Exec Command | Civilian MGRs | Civilian Superv. | Civilian Invest. | Civilian Support | Civilian Total |
| Operations Bureau | 2367 | 90 | 2277 | 1404 | 241 | 55 | 443 | 74 | 22 | 30 | 6 | 4 | 18 | 5 | 186 | 213 |
| Administrative Bureau | 66 |  | 66 | 15 | 22 | 8 | 14 | 4 |  | 2 | 1 | 6 | 28 | 89 | 201 | 324 |
| Public Integrity Bureau | 95 |  | 95 |  |  |  | 70 | 14 | 7 | 3 | 1 |  |  | 17 | 1 | 18 |
| Compliance Bureau | 218 | 140 | 78 | 47 | 19 | 7 |  |  |  | 4 | 1 | 4 | 14 | 6 | 81 | 105 |
| Police Commissioner's Office | 39 |  | 39 | 8 | 1 |  | 23 | 3 | 1 |  | 1 | 4 | 2 |  | 9 | 15 |
| Totals | 2785 | 230 | 2555 | 1474 | 283 | 70 | 550 | 95 | 30 | 39 | 10 | 18 | 62 | 117 | 478 | 675 |


[^0]:    ${ }^{1}$ This is, in our view a result of lack of oversight. There are many categories of call types; dispatchers should make greater effort to properly assign the call to the appropriate category.

[^1]:    ${ }^{2}$ Jeremy M. Wilson and Alexander Weiss. 2014. A Performance-Based Approach to Police Staffing and Allocation. Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. Available at
    https://cops.usdoj.gov/RIC/Publications/cops-p247-pub.pdf.

[^2]:    ${ }^{3}$ International Association of Chiefs of Police. No date. "Technical Assistance." Available at https://www.theiacp.org/technical-assistance.

[^3]:    ${ }^{4}$ Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies. 2006. Standards for Law Enforcement Agencies, 5th ed. Fairfax, VA.

[^4]:    ${ }^{5}$ National Institute of Justice. 2005. Calling 311: Guidelines for Policymakers. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice.
    ${ }^{6}$ Lorraine Mazerolle, Dennis Rogan, James Frank, Christine Famega, and John D. Eck, "Managing Calls to the Police with 911/311 Systems," Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice. Available at
    https://cops.usdoj.gov/RIC/Publications/cops-w0412-pub.pdf

[^5]:    ${ }^{7}$ https://coloradosprings.gov/police-department/page/report-crime-online?mlid=4841
    ${ }^{8}$ The Police Foundation Study was based on the continued use of a ten hour work schedule, which in general requires $20 \%$ more officers than an eight hour schedule.
    ${ }^{9}$ Our definition of calls for service does not include on-view incidents, officer initiated activity, or calls that are handled by the 311 system.

[^6]:    ${ }^{10}$ See Appendix B Calls for Service Analysis
    ${ }^{11}$ Only those calls in which the dispatch-to-close time was greater than five minutes were included because only those calls reflected the dispatch of an officer.

[^7]:    ${ }^{12}$ This is, in our view a result of lack of oversight. There are many categories of call types; dispatchers should make greater effort to properly assign the call to the appropriate category.

[^8]:    ${ }^{13}$ These represent calls that were dispatched
    ${ }^{14}$ These calls are handled by supervisors. They result when a complaint is made against an officer.

[^9]:    ${ }^{15}$ Milwaukee (WI) Police Department. No date. "Burglar Alarm Policy." Available at https://city.milwaukee.gov/Directory/police/Information--Services/Burglar-Alarm-Policy.htm\#.XZOBHC2ZPBI. ${ }^{16}$ A PSA assists officers on patrol with traffic accidents, misdemeanor offenses, delivery of paperwork, parking enforcement, and many other duties and responsibilities. The PSA program allows PSAs to learn about the Albuquerque Police Department's policies and procedures prior to entering the Police Academy as a Police Cadet.

[^10]:    ${ }^{17}$ https://www.seattle.gov/police/need-help/online-reporting

[^11]:    ${ }^{18}$ Because BPD still relies heavily on paper-based systems we added 15 minutes to the average time reflected in the CAD data. It is also consistent with studies we have conducted in other communities. 45 minutes per call is much closer to times that we have seen in previous studies.

[^12]:    Table 6 Required Patrol Staffing

[^13]:    ${ }^{19}$ Police Executive Research Forum, December 2008, Organizational Assessment of the San Francisco Police Department: A Technical Report. Washington DC: PERF; available at
    https://www.sanfranciscopolice.org/sites/default/files/FileCenter/Documents/14694-
    San Francisco Organizational_Review Final_Report.pdf; Troy Lane, October 2006, "Span of Control for Law Enforcement Agencies," The Police Chief.

[^14]:    ${ }^{20}$ We were informed that sometimes during the overnight shift some positions are not backfilled.

[^15]:    ${ }^{21}$ BPD is considering cross training all functions in this section for maximum capacity.

[^16]:    ${ }^{22}$ Since our site visit a sergeant and detective have been reassigned from HOT to district policing.

[^17]:    ${ }^{23}$ Cynthia Lum, Charles Wellford, Thomas L. Scott, Heather Vovak, and Amber Scherer, 2018, Identifying Effective Investigative Practices: A National Study Using Trajectory Analysis, Case Studies, and Investigative Data. Final Report to the Laura and John Arnold Foundation. Fairfax, VA: George Mason University. The authors find that, among agencies with more than 100 officers, as well as a subsample of the largest 100 agencies examined over a 32year period, 10 to 20 percent of annual budgets are devoted to investigations, especially for those of serious violence or property offenses.
    ${ }^{24}$ There is, however, a growing body of research to suggest such resources could benefit police work. For example, one recent analysis found, "Police departments should invest additional resources in the investigation of nonfatal gun assaults. When additional investigative effort is expended, law enforcement improves its success in gaining the cooperation of key witnesses and increases the amount of forensic evidence collected and analyzed. In turn, the capacity of the police to hold violent gun offenders accountable, deliver justice to victims, and prevent future gun attacks is enhanced." See Philip J. Cook, Anthony A. Braga, Brandon S. Turchan, and Lisa M. Barao, 2019, "Why do gun murders have a higher clearance rate than gunshot assaults?" Criminology and Public Policy, Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 525-551, available at https://doi.org/10.1111/1745-9133.12451.

[^18]:    ${ }^{25}$ Since our field work City-Wide Robbery has been merged with Homicide in October 2019.

[^19]:    ${ }^{26}$ This unit was consolidated with Homicide in October 2019.

[^20]:    ${ }^{27}$ BPD Policy 321 Expedited Resolution of Minor Misconduct - Draft 11 September 2019: https://www.baltimorepolice.org/321-draft-expedited-resolution-minor-misconduct.

[^21]:    ${ }^{28}$ As of August 19, 2019

[^22]:    ${ }^{29}$ OPR-CRB Protocol for Compliant Intake- DRAFT as of 25 March 2019, 306 Complaint Intake and Classification 12.28.18 PDMS, OPR Classification Protocol - 12.28.18 PDMS, DRAFT PIB Investigations Manual 8.14.19Confidential

[^23]:    ${ }^{30}$ As of August 19, 2019

[^24]:    ${ }^{31}$ Instead of showing rounded results, decimals are used to depict the option of hiring partial resources.

[^25]:    ${ }^{32}$ Filled as of September 2019.

[^26]:    ${ }^{33}$ BPD IT Assessment and Strategic Plan, Gartner Consulting, November 29th 2018 v5.0-D

[^27]:    ${ }^{34}$ See BPD IT Org. Chart Write-Up May 2019

[^28]:    ${ }^{36}$ http://www.lapdonline.org/home/news_view/63157

[^29]:    ${ }^{37}$ Includes employees Detailed In and Supervisors

[^30]:    ${ }^{38} \mathrm{BPD}$ is currently in the process of identifying a new RMS that will begin to be implemented by the end of calendar year 2020. The new RMS will also replace the use of Lotus Notes for case management.

[^31]:    ${ }^{39}$ Includes employees Detailed In, Temp Data Entry Operators and Supervisors

[^32]:    ${ }^{40}$ New Orleans Police Department Staffing and Deployment: Meeting the Demand of Citizen Calls for Service with Existing Resources. New Orleans Inspector General. May 2014.
    ${ }^{41}$ Albuquerque Police Staffing, Alexander Weiss Consulting, LLC December 2015.
    ${ }^{42}$ Louisville METRO Police Staffing and Allocation, Alexander Weiss Consulting, LLC. May 2015.
    ${ }^{43}$ Audit of Denver Police Department (DPD) Administration. September 2013.
    ${ }^{44}$ Performance Audit of Police Patrol Operations - City of San Diego, September 2013.
    ${ }^{45}$ Best Practices Related to Police Staffing and Funding Levels. City and County of San Francisco Board of Supervisors. J anuary 2016.

[^33]:    Table 31 Gap Analysis

[^34]:    ${ }^{46}$ Does not include trainee positions (230 in plan)

[^35]:    ${ }^{47}$ Jon Sundermeier. March 2008. "A Look at the 12-Hour Shift: The Lincoln Police Department Study." The Police Chief.
    ${ }^{48}$ Typically, one of the 12 hour shifts is reduced to eight hours to compensate.

[^36]:    49 https://www.policechiefmagazine.org/human-fatigue-in-247-
    operations/?ref=4e63e5c423ffc023857a2f5868da1a29

