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AFFECTS: All Personnel

I. PURPOSE

This directive is designed to improve the Department's response to a Suicide Bomber incident, while meeting the Department's goals of providing outstanding police service, in partnership with the community, to maintain a safe environment that contributes to the quality of life. The directive is designed to serve as a training document as well as direct the department's response to a Suicide Bombing event.

II. POLICY

The preservation of life and the protection of property will be the foremost consideration of the Department in the event of a Suicide bomb threat or a suspected Suicide bomb threat. This includes the life of the suspected bomber. As a secondary response upon containment and stabilization of the situation, the Department will assume additional responsibilities, including:

- Assist in the evacuation of persons from the scene;
- Assist in the evacuation of the injured;
- The security of damaged buildings and structures;
- The security and preservation of the crime scene;
- Conducting criminal investigations regarding the incident;
- Pedestrian and vehicular traffic control.

III. DEFINITION

<u>Tactical Position:</u> A position that provides an officer with a significant advantage in the overall observance of an assigned area and/or possible threat.

IV. PROCEDURES

First responding officers should be aware of suspicious factors that may indicate a possible Suicide bomber. These factors should be considered collectively in assessing a possible threat. The following list of suspicious factors is intended to provide practical information for line officers, but may not encompass every threat or circumstance.

A. Suspicious Factors to Consider

- Possible Suicide Bomber Indicators A.L.E.R.T.
 - Alone and nervous;
 - b. Loose and/or bulky clothing (may not fit weather conditions);
 - c. Exposed wires (possibly through sleeve);
 - d. Rigid mid-section (explosive device or may be carrying a rifle);
 - e. Tightened hands (may be holding detonation device).

2. Passport History

- a. Recent travel overseas to countries that sponsor terrorism;
- b. Multiple passports with different countries/names (caution: suspect may have dual citizenship);
- c. Altered passport numbers or photo substitutions; pages have been removed.
- 3. Other Identification Suspicious Characteristics

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- a. No current or fixed address; fraudulent/altered: Social Security cards, visas, licenses, etc.; multiple ID's with names spelled differently.
- b. International drivers ID:
 - (1) There are no international or UN *drivers' licensees* they are called *permits*.
 - (2) Official international *drivers' permits* are valid for one year from entry into the U.S., they are paper-gray in color, not laminated, and are only valid for foreign nationals to operate in the U.S.
- 4. Employment/School/Training
 - a. No obvious signs of employment;
 - b. Possess student visa but not English proficient;
 - c. An indication of military type training in weapons or self defense.
- 5. Unusual Items in Vehicles/Residences
 - a. Training manuals; flight, scuba, explosive, military, or extremist literature;
 - b. Blueprints (subject may have no affiliation to architecture);
 - c. Photographs/diagrams of specific high profile targets or infrastructures; to include entrances/exits of buildings, bridges, power/water plants, routes, security cameras, subway/sewer, and underground systems;
 - d. Photos/pictures of known terrorists;
 - e. Numerous prepaid calling cards and/or cell phones;
 - f. Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) unit;
 - g. Multiple hotel receipts;
 - h. Financial records indicating overseas wire transfers;
 - i. Rental vehicles (cash transactions on receipts; living locally but renting).
- Potential Props
 - a. Baby stroller or shopping cart;
 - b. Suspicious bag/backpack, golf bag;
 - c. Bulky vest or belt;
 - d. Wheelchairs.
- 7. Hotel/Motel Visits
 - a. Unusual requests, such as:
 - (1) Refusal of maid service;
 - (2) Asking for a specific view of bridges, government buildings, etc. (for observation purposes);
 - (3) Electronic surveillance equipment in room.
 - b. Suspicious or unusual items left behind;

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- c. Use of lobby or other pay phone instead of room phone.
- 8. Thefts, Purchases, or Discovery of:
 - a. Weapons/explosive materials;
 - b. Camera/surveillance equipment;
 - c. Vehicles (to include rentals fraudulent name; or failure to return vehicle);
 - d. Radios: short wave, two-way, and scanners;
 - e. Identity documents (State IDs, passports, etc.);
 - f. Unauthorized uniforms.
- 9. Indicative Behaviors of Suicide Bomber Days/weeks before Event
 - a. No direct threat to target, but communicates threat to trusted third parties;
 - b. "Leakage" of intended plans to third parties;
 - c. Prepares a suicide note or video for later dissemination;
 - d. Gives possessions away and gets worldly affairs in order;
 - e. Emotions are more volatile;
 - f. May indulge in "worldly sins" that directly violate religious beliefs;
 - g. Pays for items in cash;
 - h. Behaviors become consistent with no future;
 - i. Shows arrogance and hatred toward Americans;
 - j. Engages in "private rituals" within hours of the bombing.
- 10. Indicative Behaviors of Suicide Bomber Minutes before Event
 - Keeps hands in pockets;
 - b. Repeatedly pats upper body;
 - c. Pale face from recent shaving of beard;
 - d. No obvious emotion;
 - e. Eyes focused and vigilant;
 - f. Does not respond to authoritative voice commands or direct salutation from a distance;
 - g. May appear to be in a "trance";
 - h. Possible strong smell of perfume (having prepared themselves for afterlife);
 - i. Walks with deliberation, but not running;
 - j. Just prior to detonation, may raise hands above head and shout a phrase; or will place hands and head close to the bomb (curl their body inward) to obliterate post-mortem identification.

B. Response

There are three general objectives that should be achieved by the initial responding officers. These objectives can be conducted simultaneously, but should be accomplished in the following sequence:

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Sound the Alert and Control the Suspect;

Protect the Public;

Look for Secondary Devices or Associates.

Note: On communicating over the radio near a suspected explosive device, a radio transmitter can detonate an electric blasting cap. The more powerful a radio transmitter, the larger the area over which it can detonate an electric blasting cap. Plano PD handheld radios utilize 3 watts when transmitting; Plano PD car radios utilize 30 watts when transmitting. The FBI Bomb Data Center offers the following guidelines for minimum safe distances when transmitting over the radio:

Average Transmitter Power In Watts

Minimum Safe Distance

0 to 29 (handheld radio) 30 meters (approx. 33 yards) 30 to 49 (vehicle radio) 50 meters (approx. 55 yards)

Proceed as follows in the event you respond to or encounter a Suicide bomber or suspected Suicide bomber:

1. First Officer on Scene - Primary Officer

- a. Sound the Alert and Control the Suspect.
 - (1) Assume a tactical position that affords cover;
 - (2) Order the suspect to stop all movement;
 - (3) Notify Dispatch of vital information:
 - (a) Location of suspect and your location;
 - (b) Description of suspect;
 - (c) Identify areas or streets that may be unsafe for responding units or the general public to enter;
 - (d) The number and location of innocent persons in close proximity to the suspect;
 - (e) Request assistance.
 - (4) If the suspect does comply with the Primary Officer's direction to stop:
 - (a) Compliance does not mean they are safe to approach;
 - (b) Direct the suspect to open the palms of both hands;
 - (c) Direct the suspect to open his clothing to reveal his/her torso area or any area of the body believed to conceal explosives;
 - (d) Direct the suspect to get prone on the ground;
 - (e) If the suspect is believed to no longer present a threat (no visual signs of explosive materials), the Primary officer should conduct an investigation;
 - (f) If explosive material is suspected, only members of the Bomb Unit will approach or remotely examine the suspect if the suspected device is still in the suspect's control, regardless or whether or not the suspect remains compliant.
 - (5) If the suspect does **not** comply with the Primary Officer's direction to stop:

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(a) Direct bystanders to leave the area;

- (b) Maintain a position of cover or for safety /tactical reasons, move to another cover position and monitor/report the actions of the suspect;
- (c) Based on the actions of the suspect, (i.e. the officers have established probable cause to believe the suspect is in possession of an explosive device) and the officer believes the suspect represents an immediate threat of death or serious bodily injury to themselves or others, officers will ensure they follow the Department's Use of Force policy. If deadly force is justified, officers should not direct gunfire at the suspected explosive material. International experience has indicated that "head shots" are the most effective option in these situations. However, officers must consider their skills and ability to place an effective "head shot" to stop the actions of the suspect. Errant shots may further endanger the public and reduce the officer's ability to bring the incident to a controlled conclusion;
- (d) Only members of the Bomb Unit will approach or remotely examine the suspect if the suspected device is still in the suspect's control, regardless of whether the suspect has been stopped (neutralized) or not.

2. The Second Officer on Scene - Backup Officer

- a. Protect the Public
 - (1) Warn bystanders to evacuate the area;
 - (2) If necessary, direct road/building entrance closures;
 - (3) Direct perimeter positions at an appropriate standoff distance.

3. Third Officer on Scene

- a. Look for secondary devices and suspect support personnel
 - (1) Search surrounding area for any possible secondary devices;
 - (2) Scan any on-lookers or bystanders for personnel who may be supporting the suspect. A Suicide bomber may have a "handler" to ensure the bomb is detonated in case the bomber fails to follow through:
 - (3) Initiate contacts/stops of any suspicious personnel who might be supporting the suspect;
 - (4) Notify Dispatch of the areas you have searched for secondary devices.

4. First On-Scene Supervisor

- (a) Confirm the existence of a Suicide bomber incident and notify Dispatch;
- (b) Establish a command post and inform Dispatch of the location;
- (c) Establish an Inner and Outer Perimeter.

5. Supervisor Assuming Role of Incident Commander

- a. Assume Command:
 - (1) Advise Dispatch over the air that you have assumed Command;
 - (2) Advise Dispatch of the location of the Command Post, if it changes from the original CP location.

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b. Assess the Situation:

- (1) Determine appropriate standoff distance, if necessary consult with Bomb Unit;
- (2) Ensure inner and outer perimeter locations are appropriate;
- (3) Determine and request special units/equipment;
- (4) Determine public protective measures shelter in place or evacuation;
- (5) Determine and direct secondary device searches;
- (6) Determine a staging area for responding equipment/personnel;
- (7) Identify and advise recommended route for responding personnel;
- c. Establish an appropriate Incident Command organization and give assignments:
 - (1) Assign an officer to supervise Perimeter Operations;
 - (2) Assign an officer to supervise Investigations and Intelligence Operations;
 - (3) Assign an officer to supervise Tactical and Hazardous Devices Operations;
 - (4) Assign an officer to supervise Evacuation Operations;
 - (5) Activate the Public Information Officer Unit;
 - (6) Assign an officer to coordinate Inter-agency Liaison Operations;
 - (7) Assign an officer to manage the Staging Area Operations.
- d. Direct operations regarding this incident.
- e. Provide regular status updates to Emergency Operations Center (EOC), if activated.
- f. Assign a supervisor to coordinate with Fire Department EMS by logging the number, type, identification, and destination of transported casualties.
- g. Ensure appropriate notifications are initiated regarding the incident.
- h. Coordinate with EOC to identify a media briefing area, if appropriate.
- Request Dispatch to Notify FBI

6. Supervisor of Perimeter Operations:

- a. Identify the Inner Perimeter area. Ensure there is enough standoff distance appropriate for the amount of suspected explosives. Consult with Bomb Unit personnel, if necessary;
- b. The Inner Perimeter should encompass the crime scene and contain the danger area;
- c. Determine Inner Perimeter security posts, which will ensure:
 - (1) No unauthorized persons can enter the Inner Perimeter area;
 - (2) The suspect cannot move outside the Inner Perimeter area without being observed;
 - (3) Ideal Inner Perimeter positions will provide physical barriers to ensure the suspect cannot leave the Inner Perimeter;
 - (4) Cover and concealment is available at Inner Perimeter security posts.
- d. Control and coordinate any access to the Inner Perimeter with the Incident Commander;

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- e. Take appropriate measures to ensure the protection of life by:
 - (1) Evacuation of personnel from the Inner Perimeter.
- f. Identify the Outer Perimeter area. Ensure there is enough standoff distance appropriate for the amount of suspected explosives. Consult with Bomb Unit personnel, if necessary.
 - (1) The Outer Perimeter is intended to provide a buffer zone outside of the Inner Perimeter;
 - (2) It should be of such size to allow for sufficient control of the response operations;
 - (3) Access points will be established to control the Outer Perimeter;
 - (4) Only designated personnel should be allowed access to the Outer Perimeter.
- g. Determine Outer Perimeter security posts, which will ensure:
 - (1) No unauthorized personnel can enter the Outer Perimeter area;
 - (2) Vehicular and pedestrian traffic is controlled.
- h. Control and coordinate any access to the Outer Perimeter with the Incident Commander;
- i. Take appropriate measures to ensure the protection of life by:
 - (1) Evacuation of personnel from the Outer Perimeter.
- j. Provide regular status updates to the Incident Commander.

7. Terrorist Bomb Threat Stand- Off Distances

High Explosives (TNT Equivalent)

Threat	Explosive Mass	Building Evacuation Distance	Outdoor Evacuation Distance
Pipe Bomb	5 lbs	70 feet	850 feet
Suicide Belt	10 lbs	90 feet	1080 feet
Suicide Vest	20 lbs	110 feet	1360 feet
Briefcase/Suitcase	50 lbs	150 feet	1850 feet

Explosive Mass: Based on the maximum amount of material that could reasonably fit into a

container. Variations are possible.

Building Evacuation Distance: Governed by the ability of an unreinforced building to withstand

sever damage or collapse.

Outdoor Evacuation Distance: Governed by the greater fragment throw distance or glass

breakage/falling glass hazard distance. Note that pipe bomb, suicide belt/vest, and briefcase/suitcase bombs are assumed to have a fragmentation characteristic that requires greater standoff distances than an equal amount of explosives in a

vehicle.

8. Supervisor of Investigations and Intelligence Operations

- a. Gather as much information as possible about the suspect:
 - (1) Identification and background information;

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- (2) Religious/political/motivational affiliations;
- (3) Target of the assault;
- (4) Any known associates;
- (5) Vehicle information, if any;
- (6) Known diseases (Hepatitis B, AIDS, or other blood pathogens);
- (7) Other information.
- b. Gather as much information as possible about the device:
 - (1) Determine assault methodologies:
 - Direct versus remote activation;
 - Type of explosives;
 - Fragmentation.
 - (2) Liaison with other investigative/intelligence agencies to gather and exchange critical information about the suspect, the situation, the device, and any other related threats, intelligence, or investigative information. Maintain contact with other agencies in the event there are multiple incidents;
 - (3) Provide regular status updates to the Incident Commander.

9. Supervisor of Tactical and Hazardous Device Operations

- a. Coordinate and direct searches for secondary devices:
 - (1) Utilize Bomb Technicians, CSI Technicians, K-9, or other available personnel;
 - (2) Start with Incident Command Post and extend to the edge of the Inner Perimeter;
 - (3) Utilize enhanced electronic equipment, the bomb robot, and/or other specialized equipment for searching the Inner Perimeter;
 - (4) Continue the search into the Outer perimeter as warranted.
- b. Attempt to validate the extent of the threat to the public safety;
- c. Assess the situation and prepare/recommend tactical options to resolve/mitigate the incident using available technological and personnel assets;
- d. Provide regular status updates to the Incident Commander;
- e. Initiate tactical operations upon the direction of the Incident Commander.

10. Supervisor of Evacuation Operations

- a. Prepare for a building evacuation:
 - (1) Ensure the assembly areas are tactically safe.
 - (2) Brief your available staff on the status of the incident and the location of the suspect.
 - (3) Direct that no evacuation routes or officers traverse the Inner Perimeter.
- b. Have the designated assembly area swept to ensure there are not secondary devices;
- c. Upon the direction from the Incident Commander, initiate the evacuation; obtain contact

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information for persons evacuated and provide to Command Post.

d. Provide regular status updates to the Incident Commander.

11. Public Information Officer

- a. Establish a press briefing area;
- b. Coordinate press release information with the Incident Commander;
- c. Schedule and conduct periodic press briefings.

12. Supervisor of Inter-Agency Liaison Operations

- a. Coordinate access and designate an area for outside agency representatives to respond to the scene:
- b. Develop and maintain a list of all outside agency representatives who have responded to the scene:
- c. Provide status update briefings;
- d. Coordinate any requests for information or assistance from, or to, these agencies;
- e. Provide regular status updates to the Incident Commander.

13. Supervisor of Staging Area Operations

- a. Identify and secure a staging area location;
- b. Maintain a list of resources and assets that have responded to the staging area;
- Coordinate the deployment of staged resources and assets as directed by the Incident Commander;
- d. Ensure that Medical and Fire and Rescue equipment are staged such that they will be able to initiate an immediate response, if needed;
- e. Provide regular status updates to the Incident Commander.

14. Evidence Control

The Bomb Unit commander and Crime Scene Unit will coordinate with the Incident Commander all evidence collection related to a confirmed Suicide Bombing event.

15. Post Event Debriefing and Critique

The Incident Commander will schedule a post incident debriefing and critique at an appropriate time and place, after the incident concludes.