City of Valdez Emergency Operations Plan

Prepared by the City of Valdez

June 2023

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Promulgation Statement

City of Valdez Emergency Operations Plan

Promulgation Letter

The City of Valdez (COV) Emergency Operations Plan describes a process that will be used to manage the mitigation of, preparation for, response to, and recovery from natural and man-made disasters and emergencies. It is an all hazard plan using the National Interagency Incident Management System (NIMS) Incident Command System (ICS) for comprehensive management of disaster or emergency relief forces and emergency operations.

This document is intended to meet disaster/emergency planning requirements for all federal, state, and city agencies having jurisdiction over such matters. It is further intended that this document be used as a reference and training aid for COV government, corporate and business leaders, emergency managers, and responders to ensure their efficiency, effectiveness, and timeliness.

This Emergency Operations Plan will be activated whenever there is a disaster or emergency of sufficient proportions to potentially threaten human health or safety, property, or the environment in or near Valdez, Alaska. The Plan identifies the Incident Management Team (IMT) that will manage disaster relief forces and operations and contains a series of checklists that serve as incident action guides and delegate responsibility for each checklist task.

COV leaders and officials present in the community when an incident threatens or occurs will use this Plan to act on behalf of the community. They will meet as often as needed, but no less than daily, until no threat remains. Upon declaration of a disaster, the IMT is authorized to appropriate the resources necessary to carry out the provisions of and exercise the emergency powers delineated in the Plan.

This document is considered a living document and shall be continuously updated and revised by the City Manager, or designee to reflect lessons learned during drills or actual incidents.

We officials, having been duly elected or appointed to our offices, hereby, adopt this Plan. It shall remain in effect without regard to any subsequent change of incumbents(s) in these offices, until it is revised or rescinded pursuant to Emergency Operations Plan procedures.

_____	_____
Mayor of Valdez, Alaska	City Manager of Valdez, Alaska
_____	_____
Date	Date

Approval and Implementation

The COV Emergency Operations Plan is designed to assist the City in responding to emergencies and disasters in a manner that results in the least possible amount of damage to human lives and property while maximizing continuity of services. This effort is led by a multi-disciplinary team, the Emergency Preparedness Team.

This Emergency Operations Plan for the City of Valdez is effective upon approval of the City Manager and presentation to the City Council.

This Emergency Operations Plan supersedes all previous versions of the City's Emergency Operations Plan.

Major revisions of this Emergency Operations Plan will be approved by the City Council. Minor revisions will be approved by the Emergency Manager with the concurrence of the City Manager. Resource lists and Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) may be updated at any time, without a senior official's signature, by the City Manager, Emergency Manager, or designee.

_____ _____

Mayor of Valdez Date

City Council Resolution Adoption

Record of Changes

Change #	Date	Part Affected	Date Posted	Who Posted
	6-29-2023	Update changes to basic plan and consolidation of contact numbers throughout EOP into Appendix E	6-29-2023	Aaron Baczuk EM

Record of Distribution

This EOP is distributed electronically to all jurisdictions, agencies, stakeholders, and officials listed below. The Official master copy will be maintained on the City of Valdez website. The public can access this EOP on the Emergency and Disaster Management page of the City of Valdez website.

Plan #	Office/Department	Representative	Signature
1	City Manager		
2	City Clerk		
3	Mayor		
4	City Council		
5	Police Chief		
6	Fire Chief		
7	Emergency Manager		
8	Alaska State Troopers		
9	Public Works Director		
10	Finance Director		
11	Assistant City Manager(s)		
12	IT Director		
13	Parks, Recreation, and Cultural Services (PRCS)		
14	Ports & Harbor Director		
15	Capital Facilities Director		
16	City Attorney		
17	Local Emergency Planning Committee		
18	Superintendent of Schools		

19	Prince William Sound College Director		
20	Valdez Native Tribe President		
21	Airport Manager		
22	Economic Development Director		
23	Planning & Zoning Director		
24	Providence Valdez Medical Center Director		
25	Valdez Medical Clinic Director		
26	Valdez Public Health Center Nurse		
27	The Alpha Doc		
28	American Red Cross		
29	Copper Valley Telephone Company		
30	GCI		
31	Copper Valley Electric Company		
32	Alyeska Pipeline Service Company – Valdez Marine Terminal (VMT)		
33	Ship Escort/Response Vessel System (SERVS)		
34	Petro Star (both facilities)		
35	U.S. Coast Guard		
36	Alaska Division of Emergency Management		
37	Alaska Department of Transportation		
38	Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation		
39	Alaska Defense Force		
40	Alaska National Guard		

Basic Plan

1. Purpose, Scope, Situation, and Assumptions

A. Purpose

It is the purpose of the City of Valdez (COV) Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) to define the actions and roles necessary to provide a coordinated response within Valdez. This EOP provides guidance to local government, quasi-government organizations, and private agencies with a general concept of potential emergency assignments before, during, and following emergency situations. This EOP is intended to:

a. Establish a single comprehensive, risk-based, all-hazard plan for providing emergency response and recovery services, using all available resources for the protection of life, property, and the continuance of government.

b. Identify and assign various responsibilities and tasks for emergency and disaster response operations to COV departments, agencies, and individuals.

c. Guide COV response in any situation in which individual COV departmental standard operating procedures (SOPs) are insufficient to handle emergencies that exceed the capabilities of routine emergency response.

d. Organize, coordinate, and direct the actions of the Incident Management Team (IMT) to assure a timely response in the event of a disaster.

e. Set forth SOPs using the "Incident Command System" (ICS) and to maintain compliance with the National Response Framework (NRF) and the National Incident Management System (NIMS).

This EOP is divided into a basic plan, functional annexes, incident-specific annexes, and appendices:

a. The basic plan provides an overview of COV's approach to emergency operations. It identifies emergency response policies, describes the response organization, and assigns responsibilities.

b. The functional annexes focus on critical operations functions and who is responsible for carrying them out. These annexes describe the specific responsibilities, tasks, and operations that agencies and departments carry out before, during, and after any emergency.

c. The incident-specific (natural hazard or threat) annexes identify specific procedures, policies, tasks, and responsibilities for emergency operations in certain incidents.

d. The appendices contain a list of Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs), a hazard vulnerability analysis, glossary and acronym list, sample disaster declaration, IMT call list, Emergency Operation Center (EOC) layout diagrams and phone numbers, and points of distribution plan.

B. Scope

This EOP applies to other participatory response organizations in the general Valdez area. Efforts will be made to notify, warn, and rescue (if necessary) residents outside of COV limits, after enough resources are available to address life safety and incident stabilization within city limits. This EOP applies to all members of the COV administration and staff, to all COV departments, and to any other agency or organization assisting in a local disaster.

C. Situation

1. General Overview of the COV

1. Government

The COV has a Council/Manager form of government with day-to-day municipal operations being the responsibility of the City Manager. The City Manager serves as the Chief Executive Officer of the City and may be advised by the Mayor.

2. Location

The COV is located on the north shore of Port Valdez, an 11-mile long deep-water fjord at the northeastern tip of Prince William Sound. Prince William Sound is separated from the Gulf of Alaska by two barrier islands, Hinchinbrook and Montague. The community lies 305 road miles east of Anchorage and 364 miles south of Fairbanks. The COV is located at approximately 61.130830° North Latitude and 146.34833° West Longitude.

3. Geography and Climate

The COV sits at Mile -4 of the Richardson Highway. Mile 0 is located at the entrance to Old Town Valdez. The mile markers have not been recalculated since the community was relocated four miles to the west following the 1964 Great Alaska Earthquake. The municipal boundaries encompass 277.1 square miles, including 222.0 square miles of land and 55.1 square miles of water.

Most of the roads, residences, and businesses are built at or slightly above sea level. Directly adjacent to the City infrastructure, the Chugach Mountains rise steeply, and with little approach, generally reach between 3,000 – 4,500 feet.

The COV is the northern-most tip of the temperate rainforest. Its summers are moist and cool, and its winters are cold and snowy. The COV averages 300 inches of snow each year (25 feet). The average summer high temperature is 60.8 degrees Fahrenheit (°F), and the average summer low temperature is 46.1°F. The average winter high temperature is 27.9°F, and the average winter low temperature is 17.9°F.

4. Demographics

The 2019 Commissioner-Certified population of Valdez was 3,876. The City estimates the COV population doubles in the summer months with tourists and seasonal workers.

As of the 2010 U.S. Census, the median age in Valdez was 36.7. This is older than the statewide median of 33.8 but younger than most state median populations. Approximately 75% of the population is 18 or older, leaving one quarter of the population between birth and school age. Five and one-half percent (5.5%) of the population is over 65 years of age. Valdez can be considered a racially homogenous community with nearly 82% being White; 8% Alaska Native or American Indian; 2% Asian; 1% Black or African American; 1% Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander; 1% Some Other Race; and 5% a combination of two or more races. Fifty-three percent (53%) of the population is male, and 47% of the population is female.

Per the State Division of Community and Regional affairs, Valdez is home to 6.8% of the population living below the poverty level. Conversely, the same data show a median household income of $80,357. Nearly 94% of the community has an education level equal to or greater than a high school diploma, and 8% of the Valdez population is a veteran.

5. Economy

For its efforts in rebuilding, Valdez was voted an All-America City in 1965. Valdez was once again named an All-America City in 1982 for its diversified economic growth, which has stabilized, encompassing the oil industry, fishing, and tourism.

6. Infrastructure

Road

Valdez is accessible by only one road, the Richardson Highway, with the nearest town being Glennallen which is 110 miles away.

Harbor & Port

Valdez has five main water transportation sites: The Alaska Marine Highway Ferry Terminal, the John Kelsey Municipal Dock, the Valdez Container Terminal, the Valdez Small Boat Harbor, and an additional boat harbor that was completed in 2019. The Trans-Alaskan Pipeline Oil Terminal, or the Valdez Marine Terminal (VMT), is a private terminal on the South side of the Port of Valdez that serves as a private marine terminal for the loading of oil tankers. Petro Star Refinery produces aviation fuel and diesel for the community and the State of Alaska.

The VMT is a national asset and a potential terrorist target. Alyeska has its own emergency response team. Alyeska and the COV have a MOU, and the COV would also respond to fire emergencies at Alyeska. The response involving the VMT includes:

1. The Prince William Sound Maritime Security Plan will be implemented by the U.S. Coast Guard.
2. Department of Public Safety Valdez Response Protocol.

3. The Prince William Sound Fire Plan will also be implemented by the U.S. Coast Guard.

Airport

Valdez has one airport, Valdez Pioneer Field. It is operational and open to the public. There is one air traffic control tower at the airport, but there is not any fuel. The apron and runway are owned and operated by the State of Alaska, Department of Transportation and Public Facilities (ADOT&PF). The airport building is owned and operated by the COV Port Department. The 6,500-foot-long runway is capable of serving large jet traffic. It has a single wheel 75,000 lbs. weight limit, a 200,000 lbs. dual wheel weight limit, and a 300,000 lbs. double tandem wheel weight limit. For fuel, 100LL and Jet A is available from Vertical Solutions, and Jet B is available from Maritime Helicopters.

Currently, the community is not served by any statewide commuter airlines. There are several commercial helicopter companies that operate out of Valdez. In the summer, they often run sightseeing tours. In the winter, there are heli-skiing companies. In the summer, Valdez is also a popular destination for floatplane owners. The State of Alaska leases a dock at Robe Lake for use as a seasonal floatplane landing site, but there is currently no one maintaining it.

Emergency Services

The COV Emergency Services include the Valdez Police Department (VPD) and the Valdez Fire Department (VFD). Other agencies in the community also provide emergency assistance, if necessary. This includes the Alaska Wildlife Trooper and the Alaska State Parks Ranger stationed in Valdez. All search and rescue operations are performed by the Alaska State Troopers who have a MOU with the COV to provide services.

In the event an incident requires the activation of an EOC, COV staff members are assigned to fill the roles of IMT members within the NIMS ICS structure.

VALDEZ DISPATCH CENTER (907) 835-4560 (Emergency 9-1-1): 10 Public Safety Technicians (Dispatch/Corrections) provide 24/7, 365 coverage of the Valdez Dispatch Center. There are two consoles, with at least one staffed at all times. A third fully functional dispatch console is located in the VPD and can currently be utilized if the primary consoles become non-operational. Valdez Dispatch Center receives all 911 calls placed within Valdez, and up to approximately Milepost (MP) 60 of the Richardson Highway. They are responsible for dispatching VPD, VFD, and Emergency Services. Valdez Dispatch Center has the capability, via ALMR, to speak directly to the Alaska State Troopers, Providence Valdez Medical Center, U.S. Coast Guard, Alyeska, Petro Star, and MATCOM – among others. The Valdez Dispatch Center is equipped with a FEMA NAWAS phone. Backup Dispatch capabilities will also be located in the new fire station that is scheduled for completion in 2021 in the event that this primary Dispatch Center goes down and is non-operational.

POLICE STATION (907) 835-4560 (Emergency 9-1-1): 12 Police officers with a minimum of two sworn officers are on duty at all times. The VPD operates out of City Hall on Chenega Street.

STATE TROOPER POST (907) 835-4307: The State Trooper Post is located in the State Court Building.

FIRE STATION 1 (907) 835-4560 (Emergency 9-1-1): There are five bays housing two engines, one squad, and two advance life support ambulances. Fire protection, emergency services, back country search and rescue, and hazmat response services are provided at all times. There is a total of 10 paid firefighters/emergency medical technicians (EMTs) (10 full-time and 30 volunteers). There is a minimum of two paid staff on duty at all times in Station 1 downtown.

FIRE STATION 3: There is one engine and one tanker. Fire Station 3 is staffed by volunteers when responding to calls.

FIRE STATION 4: There is one engine, one tanker, and an advance life support ambulance. Fire Station 4 is staffed by volunteers when responding to calls. Across the road, there is a 1,100 gallons per minute well house utilized for a water supply to assist in fire suppression.

Emergency Management Team

The Emergency Management Team is responsible for day to day operations and consists of the following staff:

a. Emergency Manager.

b. Assistant Emergency Manager.

Emergency Preparedness Team

The following group of senior public officials may develop **non-emergent** policies, and in specific emergency situations, will discuss the economic, political, legal, and social implications of both the threat of and the response to emergency situations to determine the best general policy and procedures required for these events:

City Manager
Mayor
Public Information Officer
Emergency Manager
Assistant City Manager(s)
Police Chief
Fire Chief

The Emergency Preparedness Team operates according to Chapter 9.36.040 of the COV Charter.

Medical Facilities

Valdez has one hospital, Providence Valdez Medical Center (PVMC). The facility is owned by the COV and is operated by Providence St. Joseph Health Services in Alaska. The PVMC with Long Term Care has a normal capacity of 21 beds. See Annex G for a breakdown of available medical resources.

The Valdez Public Health Center (located in the PVMC) provides services to Valdez, Cordova, and Tatitlek and is staffed by a Public Health Nurse and an Office Assistant. Valdez Public Health Center staff collaborate with local organizations and coalitions, such as the LEPC, Sound Wellness Alliance Network (SWAN), Advocates for Victims of Violence (AVV), and local schools in order to promote health and well-being among individuals and communities.

Schools

Valdez City Schools serve just over 600 school-aged children, ages 5-18. The District is comprised of three different facilities: Herman Hutchens Elementary School, Gilson Middle School, and Valdez High School. The school facilities may also serve as emergency shelters. Valdez also has a Home School Program with approximately 36 students.

Valdez is home to Prince William Sound College (PWSC) that is now part of the Alaska University System. PWSC serves three Copper River Basin communities including Glennallen, Cordova, and Valdez. In Valdez, the campus has two separate locations, three residence halls situated between Pioneer and Alatna Streets, and the main academic facility. The main Valdez campus includes the Wellness Center; a full-service community health club facility; and the Maxine & Jessie Whitney Museum, a collection of Alaska Native artifacts and artwork, and Alaska animal mounts.

Electrical Utilities

Copper Valley Electric Association (CVEA) is a member-owned cooperative providing electrical service to all residential and commercial users within Valdez and the Copper River Basin. The exception is Alyeska Pipeline Service Company (APSC) at the VMT for the Trans-Alaska Pipeline. The VMT generates its own power supply. Electrical power is created through a combination of hydro, diesel generators, and a co-generation facility.

Solomon Gulch provides hydro power through the Solomon Gulch Hydroelectric Facility. The 12-megawatt Solomon Gulch hydroelectric facility is located on Dayville Road in Valdez. Power is generated by two Fuji Francis water turbines. The facility began providing power to CVEA customers in 1982. CVEA operates its dispatch center from this facility. The plant is manned 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Plant operators are responsible for the monitoring and control of up to five generation plants, all seven substations, and transmission and distribution assets at one time via remote control operations.

Allison Creek is the newest of CVEA's generation plants. After many years of studies and permitting, construction began in May 2014, and the project was commissioned on October 5, 2016. The plant is located at the end of Dayville Road next to the Alyeska Alaska VMT. Allison Creek is a run of the river project which backs up a small amount of water in the creek with a diversion structure, at an elevation 1,310 feet above sea level, and routes the water through a 42-inch, 2,000-foot long penstock to the power house. Power is then generated with a 6.7-megawatt, Canyon Hydro Pelton style turbine.

The Valdez Diesel Plant (VDP) was constructed after the 1964 Great Alaska Earthquake that caused the COV to relocate to its present location. The available capacity of the plant is 9-megawatts. The plant houses: three Enterprise DSR 46 units and two Caterpillar 3516B units. The two Caterpillar units were installed in 2016 and commissioned in 2017. These two units replaced a total of four aging, failing, inefficient 1960 and 1970 vintage units to provide more efficient, cost-effective, reliable power to CVEA consumers.

The Cogeneration Plant (Cogen) is a state-of-the-art facility located at the Petro Star Valdez Refinery on Dayville Road. The plant was commissioned in 2000 as a joint effort between CVEA and Petro Star. It is a 5.2-megawatt Solar Taurus 60 turbine that utilizes Light Straight Run, a less refined naphtha type fuel, as the fuel source supplied by the refinery. The exhaust heat from the turbine is diverted to a crude heater through a six-foot diameter insulated pipe, for Petro Star use in the refining process. The Cogen is the primary plant utilized during the winter months. The Cogen provides additional benefit to CVEA members as 80% of the heat sales back to Petro Star are credited directly to members as a heat credit on their power bills.

The Glennallen Diesel Plant (GDP) is the oldest of CVEA's three thermal plants. It has expanded over the years to meet the needs of customers. The available generation capacity of the plant is 9.3-megawatts. The GDP houses a total of four diesel engines: two Enterprise DSR 46 units, one Caterpillar 3516B, and one EMD 16-710 unit with a capacity of 2.8-megawatts.

CVEA's service areas are tied together with a 106-mile, 138-kilovolt transmission line that is owned and operated by CVEA. The transmission line provides the link to all five generating plants. Power can flow from any of the generating plants to end consumers. Historically, power flows from Valdez to the Copper River Basin in the summer months, as nearly all the power requirements are met with CVEA’s two hydroelectric plants. The transmission line traverses severe terrain between the two districts, and parts of it are in the Thompson Pass area, which is known for being one of the snowiest places in North America. In 2014, nearly four-miles of the transmission line through Thompson Pass were relocated to minimize the risk of avalanche danger and to mitigate the risk to CVEA’s linemen that would work on getting the line back together if it were struck by an avalanche, as it was on many occasions in the past.

The vast majority of heat and hot water, for both residential and commercial users, is through diesel fuel-powered furnaces and boilers. There are two local providers of heating fuel: Crowley Petroleum and North Pacific Fuel. Crowley’s product is shipped to Valdez via truck. North Pacific Fuel receives its diesel supply from the local Petro Star Refinery. Fuel is delivered via truck to individual homes and businesses, usually on a monthly basis. Both companies also supply propane. Some household and small commercial customers use propane for cooking or to power other appliances like dryers. Natural gas is not available.

Water, Sewer, and Waste Management

The Water and Sewer Treatment Utility is comprised of four full-time staff who are responsible for the daily operations of providing quality drinking water and treating domestic waste for the community. There are three Class A and one Class B public drinking water systems, providing over 1.8 million gallons of water per day to the COV. Eight pump stations are capable of moving approximately 920,000 gallons of sewage per day to the Valdez Sewer Treatment Plant facility where it is treated in an aerated, complete-mix, three-stage lagoon system. The staff also maintains a certified laboratory for performing microbiological analysis of drinking water.

The Utility maintains four water reservoirs located on lower Town Mountain near the entrance to Mineral Creek Canyon, Blueberry Hill, Airport Industrial Subdivision, and Robe River Subdivision. Approximately three quarters of the community are served by the public water system. The other quarter is served by private on-site wells. These Class C wells are not regulated by the State or the COV.

Approximately 60% of the community is served by the public sewer system. The remaining users (almost exclusively residential) are served by domestic on-site wastewater treatment systems, commonly known as septic systems. Installation of septic systems is regulated by both the State and the COV. The COV has jurisdictional authority over plan review and inspection for conventional septic system installation. The State of Alaska, Department of Environmental Conservation retains jurisdictional authority over engineered systems.

The COV operates a Class II landfill that provides solid waste disposal and a construction and demolition landfill.

Telecommunications

For over 50 years, Copper Valley Telephone Cooperative (CVTC), doing business as Copper Valley Telecom, has served the Valdez and Copper River Basin areas, providing high quality communication services including landline telephone for residents and businesses, calling features, long distance, high speed internet connectivity, and wireless voice and data. In addition, CVTC provides high capacity special access services for businesses and telecommunication carriers through their fiber and microwave network.

GCI also provides television, internet, and phone services in Valdez.

2. Hazard Profile

1. Potential Hazards

The COV is vulnerable to many types of natural and man-made hazards, varying widely in type and magnitude from local communities to statewide in scope. Disaster conditions could be a result of a number of natural phenomena such as avalanches, earthquakes, floods, tsunamis, volcanic ashfall, severe winter weather, fires, or epidemics.

Apart from natural disasters, Valdez is subject to a myriad of other disaster contingencies, such as aircraft accidents; transportation accidents involving chemicals and other hazardous materials, chemical oil and other hazardous material spills; leaks or pollution problems; dumping of hazardous wastes; building collapses; utility service interruptions; energy shortages; civil disturbances; applicable criminal acts; or a combination of any of these.

The table in Appendix B provides a hazard risk analysis summary from the 2019 COV Natural Hazard Mitigation Plan Update.

D. Planning Assumptions

1. Effective prediction and warning systems have been established that make it possible to anticipate certain disaster situations that may occur throughout the COV or the general area beyond the COV's boundaries.

2. A major emergency could happen at any time, and response often requires decisions to be made quickly under adverse conditions. The time of day, week, and year, as well as weather conditions are important variables that affect the seriousness of the incident and the COV's response capabilities.

3. It is the policy of the COV to safeguard life, property, and the environment by maximizing available resources to minimize the effects of natural, technological, and manmade disaster emergencies.

4. The resources normally available within the COV may not be sufficient to respond to a major emergency and/or disaster. Therefore, outside assistance may be necessary.

5. Outside assistance from State and Federal agencies as well as neighboring communities may be available. However, it may be hours or even days before these agencies are able to mobilize and render aid. Therefore, the COV must be prepared to carry out response on an independent basis to maximize the survival of people, prevent and/or minimize injuries, and preserve property and resources.

6. Local government officials and employees recognize their responsibilities for the safety and well-being of the public. Each is conversant with this EOP and is fully capable of executing their roles, responsibilities, and tasks. Government officials and employees complying with this EOP shall not be liable for injury, death, or loss of property except in cases of willful misconduct or gross negligence.

7. Emergency events can vary greatly in location and extent. For this reason, planning efforts are made as general as possible.

8. Initial actions to mitigate the effects of emergency situations or potential disaster conditions will be conducted as soon as possible by the COV.

9. Federal and State disaster assistance, when provided, will supplement, not substitute for, relief provided by the COV.

10. When a jurisdiction receives a request to assist another jurisdiction, reasonable actions will be taken to provide the assistance as requested.

It is the responsibility of the COV to protect life and property from the effects of hazardous events. No guarantee of a perfect response is implied by this EOP or any of its appendices, annexes, or references. Since COV government assets and systems are vulnerable to disaster events, they may be overwhelmed. For that reason, deviation from the EOP may be necessary; it is to be used as a guide. The COV will make every effort to respond based on the situation, information, and resources available at the time of the disaster.

2. Concept of Operations

A. General

1. There are four phases of disaster emergency management:

   a. **Mitigation:** the effort to minimize and eliminate hazards through hazard vulnerability assessments, prepositioning of resources, prudent planning practices, and the hardening of critical infrastructure.

   b. **Preparedness**: the effort to ready for an emergency including the planning, establishing MOUs, training personnel, having access to sufficient supplies, educating the public on preparedness issues, gathering pertinent information, and maintaining response plans.

   c. **Response**: the effort to react to an emergency including operations to save lives, protect property, minimize damage, supply victims with basic human needs, plan for restoration of essential services, and protect vital resources and the environment.

   d. **Recovery**: the effort to recuperate after an emergency, including repairing damages to property and the environment; transitioning from emergency sheltering and care of victims to temporary, but if necessary, longer-term housing and care arrangements; economic stabilization and recovery; and dispensing financial aid to qualifying public agencies and individuals.

   This EOP focuses on the last three phases.

2. During emergency operations, COV departments and organizations will parallel normal day-to-day tasks and functions. However, it may be necessary to utilize employees' skills in areas of greatest need. Therefore, day-to-day tasks and functions that do not directly contribute to emergency operations may be suspended for the duration of the emergency. The efforts that would be directed towards those suspended tasks and functions will be redirected towards the accomplishment of emergency tasks and functions. To support employees, and to increase overall success of emergency response, the following training requirements apply:

3. When an emergency declaration is made, the COV will respond as outlined in this EOP to protect life, property, and the environment from the consequences of the emergency. When a major emergency exceeds the COV's capability to respond, assistance will be requested from the State government through the Alaska Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management (DHS&EM). If the magnitude of the event exceeds the State's capabilities, the State will request assistance from the Federal government.

4. The EOC will serve as a clearinghouse for response and recovery operations and for deployment of resources within Valdez.

5. Planning for recovery will take place as soon as the response operations begin. Preparations will be made for rapid deployment of resources necessary to facilitate recovery.

B. Operational Priorities

1. Protection of human life (highest priority), property, and the environment.

2. Protection of public health - meeting the immediate emergency needs of people, including rescue, medical care, food, shelter, and clothing.

3. Temporarily restoring facilities, whether public or privately owned, that are essential to the health, safety, and welfare of people (such as medical, sanitation, water, electricity, and emergency road repair).

4. Meeting the short-term rehabilitation needs of people, including provision of temporary housing and food.

5. Mitigating hazards that pose a threat to life, property, or the environment.

C. Levels of Plan Activation

Emergencies such as fires, emergency medical incidents, search and rescue operations, and violations of the law occur frequently. Infrequently, public safety departments are confronted with larger scale emergencies that go beyond normal operations. These events, which are distinguished as major emergencies, exceed the capacity of one or two departments to handle alone. There are three levels of EOP activation in response to these emergencies:

1. **Level 3, Normal Operations:** COV departments and agencies are conducting normal daily activities with incidents being handled with existing resources, policies, and procedures.
   a. The EOC is not activated.
   b. Conditions are monitored by appropriate departments and agencies.
   c. No written incident action plan (IAP) is required.

2. **Level 2, Partial Activation:** An emergency has developed, or is imminent, that requires COV departments and agencies to take coordinated action, which may

take multiple departments, go beyond SOPs, and require additional capabilities.

a. Partial or full activation of the EOC may occur during regular business hours or additional hours as needed.

b. Conditions are being monitored with information sharing between the EOC and the appropriate departments and agencies.

c. A written IAP is required for each operational period.

3. **Level 1, Full Activation:** An emergency has developed that requires the coordinated response of all levels of the COV government to save lives of a significant portion of the population and protect property and the environment. An emergency declaration is being considered or has been issued, and the appropriate departments and agencies are performing a coordinated response.

a. Full activation of the EOC on a 24-hour rotational basis with all trained COV staff participating or on call.

b. Conditions are being monitored with information sharing between the EOC and the appropriate departments and agencies.

c. A written IAP is required for each operational period.

D. Emergency Declaration

1. A declaration of a "State of Emergency" constitutes authority for special emergency provisions and the deployment and use of any emergency resources to which the EOP applies.

2. The Mayor or Mayor Pro-tempore has the authority to declare a "State of Emergency" within the COV if he or she finds that a disaster has occurred or that such occurrence is imminent or threatened.

3. When an emergency exceeds or threatens to exceed COV's normal emergency services' capability, the official in charge of the incident will inform the City Manager who will then request a declaration of emergency from the Mayor or Mayor Pro-tempore.

4. An emergency declaration activates the response and recovery aspects of this EOP and grants authority for the use of emergency procedures and assets to which this EOP outlines.

5. If the Incident Commander (IC) recognizes that the resources locally available to the COV will be insufficient to respond to and/or recover from the disaster or emergency, the City Mayor shall declare a "State of Emergency" and request assistance from the State of Alaska through the DHS&EM.

E. Incident Command System

1. The COV has established NIMS as its standard for incident command. This EOP incorporates command and management concepts from NIMS including the ICS,

Public Information System, and, if warranted, the Multi-Agency Coordination System (MACS).

2. ICS allows rapid incorporation of personnel from a variety of agencies into a common management structure. The COV utilizes ICS for day-to-day situations and major emergencies. In a small day-to-day incident, the IC and one or two individuals perform all necessary tasks and functions. In a larger incident, each task and function may be assigned to a separate individual. During infrequent major emergencies, the ICS structure will be expanded, and the EOC will be activated to support field operations.

3. The IC is the individual responsible for overall management of all incident operations at the incident site. In a large event with multiple emergency sites, overall coordination of Emergency Management reverts to the EOC.

4. Unified Command (UC) may be implemented during a large-scale emergency with multiple agencies sharing incident jurisdiction to ensure a coordinated, multi-agency response. Agencies work together through their designated IC at the EOC to establish a common set of objectives, strategies, and a single IAP.

5. The IMT is made up of the command and general staff members in an ICS organization. Persons to fill these positions for various types of incidents are often pre-designated to ensure that they have the necessary training and experience to fulfill specific roles and responsibilities of the ICS positions. City employees can fill basic to advanced roles during an emergency incident. The following minimum training is required

    a. All City employees: ICS 100 and 700.

    b. First-Line Supervisors: ICS 100, 200, and 700.

    c. Mid-Level Supervisors: ICS 100, 200, 300, 700, and 800.

    d. Senior Level Supervisors, Directors, and Command and General Staff of the IMT: ICS 100, 200, 300, 400, 700, and 800.

    e. Elected Officials: ICS 100, 700, and/or IS 908.

3. Direction, Control, and Coordination

The COV has the primary responsibility for Emergency Management activities.

A. Field Operations

1. Emergency Management is continually operating. Whenever an incident is discovered, the most-senior, first-on-scene person shall assume initial command of the situation. Once the first-response units from the designated response department arrive on scene, the senior qualified official on scene from this “lead department” will assume command. It will then be up to each department to decide if command is to be transferred should officials with greater seniority

arrive on scene.

2. The senior qualified official on scene will determine if the incident needs reporting to the Incident Management (IM) Short Team.

B. Incident Management Short Team

The IM Short Team will convene for all events to initially evaluate the scope of the incident and determine a further course of action when needed. The IM Short Team consists of the Incident and Deputy Commanders (City Manager and Assistant City Manager(s)), Operations Section Chief(s) (Police Chief and Fire Chief), Public Information Officer (Communications Director), and Emergency Manager. The IM Short Team initially meets in the VPD conference room.

COV INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SHORT TEAM



1. The IM Short Team will conduct initial assessments in the VPD Conference Room to determine if the initial assessments meet the criteria to make a decision on.
    a. When the IM Short Team determines that the scope or scale of an incident necessitates activation of the EOC, the following will occur:
        i. The Finance Director will assign an incident number for tracking all costs.
        ii. The City Manager will assign a record keeper and make a record of all meetings.
        iii. The IMT will be activated.
        iv. The Information Technology (IT) Director will set up the EOC for operations. See Appendix I for layouts and phone numbers.

C. Emergency Operations Center

1. The Fire Station training room is the primary EOC for all events (additional rooms and/or areas within the fire station as needed). Other city facilities may serve as an alternate EOC if a specific incident warrants another location i.e. Valdez Civic Center, Valdez Council Chambers or another viable location as decided upon by Incident Command.

2. Alaska State Emergency Coordination Center

   A fundamental principle of Emergency Management is that all disasters are managed locally. If local response is overwhelmed, the State Emergency Coordination Center may be activated to coordinate its response with the EOC. While the State will support local response, it will neither direct nor control local response operations unless requested to do so.

3. The COV EOC is the central location for planning, coordinating, and directing emergency management tasks and functions in the field. The EOC reconciles competition for resources and/or eliminates conflicting or duplicated efforts. The EOC's role does not eliminate the requirement that responding departments and agencies have for tactical level coordination of labor and resources. Common EOC tasks include:

   a. Taking a global view of the emergency in order to anticipate direct and indirect impacts, and interpret policy, financial, and legal matters.

   b. Assembling timely and accurate information on the emergency and current resources in order to make informed decisions on both short-term and long-term courses of action.

   c. Providing information to the public, and disseminating warning and emergency instructions through all available means.

   d. Determining the priority of response actions, coordinating their implementation, and providing resource support to field operations.

   e. Suspending or curtailing government services, recommending closure of schools and businesses, and organizing evacuations and shelter arrangements for evacuees.

4. The EOC may be activated by the City Manager and Assistant City Manager(s). If the City Manager and Assistant City Manager(s) are unavailable, the EOC may be activated by the IM Short Team.

5. When the decision is made to activate the EOC, the official activating the EOC will request the Dispatch Center to notify the IMT to report to the EOC. The IMT will take action to notify and mobilize the appropriate departments and agencies, which they are responsible for coordinating.

6. If a disaster occurs in an isolated area, or if the disaster requires extensive coordination or emergency service forces, an on-scene Incident Command Post (ICP) may be established. Incidents of different types or without similar resource needs are usually handled as separate incidents. A facility near the disaster site will be set up, and communications will be provided. An on-scene ICP Commander and staff will be designated by the IC. Selection of the Site Commander will depend upon the nature of the disaster and "lead department" requirements. An Area Command may be activated to address competition for

resources among multiple ICPs based on the complexity of the incident and incident management span-of-control considerations. An Area Command oversees management of multiple incidents, while the EOC coordinates support.

COV EOC CHAIN OF COMMAND



7. The EOC is capable of being operated continuously for the duration of a disaster. The IC will determine work periods. The hours of EOC operation will depend upon the disaster situation and the necessity of a 24-hour response.

8. Contact between the EOC staff and their departments will be maintained through telephone and/or radio communications. All field units will be in contact with the EOC through telephone and/or radio communications as well.

9. Only those individuals required to perform IM duties will be allowed in the EOC or by discretion of the IC.

10. Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) are the primary means through which the Federal and State governments provide assistance to municipal governments. The ESF structure unites various agencies and focuses their efforts with specific functions necessary to respond to the disaster. See Annexes for details on ESFs 1-15 (these are also known as functional annexes).

D. Plan Administration

1. Administration of this EOC is divided into five sections, using the ICS.

a. The Command Section

This section provides overall command, control, and coordination to the forces employed in responding to the disaster. It is composed of the IC and command staff, which may be designated on a per-incident basis.

i. Incident Commander (IC)

The IC will submit periodic situation reports to the appropriate authority during a major disaster using standard ICS formats.

ii. Command Staff

1) Public Information Officer (PIO)

The PIO is responsible for interfacing with the public and media with incident-related information.

2) Liaison Officer

The Liaison Officer is the IC's point of contact for representatives of other agencies [including government, Non-Government Organizations (NGOs), and/or private sector] to provide input, resources, and other operational support.

3) Safety Officer

The Safety Officer advises the IC on all matters relating to operational safety and ensures all personnel involved in a response remain safe.

b. The Operations Section

This section is composed of the department directors or their representatives that will coordinate implementation of response and recovery duties in the field. Each Operations official is responsible for directing or coordinating the personnel and resources of that functional area. The Operations Chief is responsible for the management of all operations directly applicable to the response and recovery effort. He or she activates and supervises operations and organizational elements in accordance with the IAP. He or she assists in the formulation and execution of field operational plans, requests or releases resources, and makes expedient changes to the IAP as necessary.

c. The Planning Section

This section is responsible for collecting and assessing data and making the information available to the Command and Operations Sections for use

in response and recovery. The Planning Chief is responsible for developing the IAP.

d. The Logistics Section

This section is responsible for providing the labor, equipment, and facilities needed in support of incident activities. The Logistics Section is responsible for all logistical details.

e. The Finance and Administration Section

This section keeps track of personnel, costs, and handles all financial transactions associated with the incident.

The Finance/Administration Section will be responsible for contracts, incident-related cost data, maintaining audit trails of billings and payments, developing a finance plan for response activities, claim processing, documenting financial actions taken during and after the emergency, and keeping the EOC updated on financial matters.

E. Command Responsibility for Specific Actions

1. Direction of Response

Responsible for overall direction of the incident response activities of all of the jurisdiction's departments and agencies. During emergencies, those responsibilities will be carried out normally from the EOC.

a. The City Mayor has the responsibility for a disaster declaration within the political jurisdiction.

b. The SEOC will be the point of contact to receive local declarations of disaster.

c. The SEOC functions to coordinate and execute the State's response and recovery operations, pursuant to a declaration of disaster by the Governor and under the Alaska Disaster Act. State and Federal officials will coordinate their operations through the jurisdiction's elected or appointed officials or their designated representatives such as the IC.

d. The City Manager or Assistant City Manager(s) has the responsibility for addressing threats once a disaster declaration has been made.

2. Assistance

If the jurisdiction's own resources are insufficient or inappropriate to respond to the emergency situation, a request may be made for assistance from other jurisdictions, the State, or Federal government. All response agencies are expected to fulfill mission assignments directed by the IC.

4. Organization and Assignment of Responsibilities

A. General

Most departments/agencies of government have emergency functions in addition to their normal, day-to-day duties. These emergency functions usually parallel or complement normal functions. Each department/agency is responsible for developing and maintaining its own Emergency Management procedures.

B. Organization

The organizational chart is located on page 16.

C. Assignment of Responsibilities

1. The Incident Commander
    a. The City Manager, Assistant City Manager(s), or designee in all cases.
    b. Provides the overall direction for the incident and is responsible for overall administration and strategic planning. Tasks include:
        i. Assessment of the situation.
        ii. Formulating, reviewing, and approving operational guidelines including the IAP.
        iii. As necessary, appropriate and expend funds; make contracts; and obtain and distribute equipment, materials, and supplies for disaster purposes.
        iv. Authorize and control information given to the public via the PIO.
        v. Make available and provide overall direction and coordination of disaster response and recovery forces and equipment.
        vi. Provide for the health and safety of persons and property, including emergency assistance to victims of the disaster, and recommend appropriate protective measures.
        vii. Appoint, employ, or provide disaster workers.
        viii. Establish shift schedule to permit 24-hour coverage of EOC as needed.

2. Command Staff

Appointed by the IC and may consist of a PIO, Safety Officer, and Liaison Officer to support the IC. Tasks include:

a. Public Information Officer
    i. Formulate and release information about the incident as directed by the IC.

ii. Maintain, throughout the incident, a summary of the incident information for release to news media and for general use by incident personnel.

iii. Distribute information as periodic news releases at briefings and in response to special requests.

iv. Continually act as official liaison between the news media, handling requests for meetings between media and incident personnel, and arranging interviews and incident observation trips.

v. Locate a news briefing area in a secure place away from the EOC.

b. Safety Officer

i. Obtain information from a variety of sources concerning the incident area and potentially hazardous conditions.

ii. Attend planning meetings, review strategies and tactics for safety factors, and advise staff.

iii. Investigate all accidents and injuries which occur within the incident area, and prepare an incident report for submission at the conclusion of the incident.

c. Liaison Officer

i. Contact cooperating and assisting agency personnel, and act as point of contact.

ii. Respond to requests from incident personnel for interagency contact.

3. General Staff Section Chiefs

Report to the IC, and along with the IC comprise the IMT. These are:

a. Operations Chief

The Operations Chief is selected by the IC, usually from the department with the most resources committed to the effort. The responsibilities are:

i. Participate in preparation of the IAP.

ii. Brief operations personnel on IAP.

iii. Supervise operations.

iv. Determine the need for additional resources.

v. Review the suggested list of resources to be released.

vi. Assemble response teams from resources assigned to Operations Section.

vii. Initiate recommendation for release of resources.

viii. Report special incidents and/or accidents.

ix. Coordinate emergency shelter effort.

b. Planning Chief

The Planning Chief is responsible for the collection, evaluation, dissemination, and use of information regarding the development of the incident and status of resources. Information is needed to understand the current situation, predict the course of events, prepare alternative strategies, and control operations for the incident. The major duties are:

i) Supervise preparation of the IAP.

ii) Activate Planning Section unit.

iii) Schedule and conduct daily briefings.

iv) May recommend reassignment of personnel to incident response positions.

v) Assemble information on alternative strategies.

vi) Identify need for use of specialized resources.

vii) Provide periodic predictions on incident potential.

viii) Compile and display incident status information including damage assessment.

ix) Advise EOC staff of any significant changes in incident status.

x) Prepare and distribute the IC's orders.

xi) Prepare recommendations for release of resources.

xii) Establish weather data collection system when necessary.

xiii) Resource, Situation, Documentation, and Demobilization Units.

1) The Resource Unit tracks the location and status of all resources assigned to an incident. They ensure all assigned resources have checked in at the incident.

The Resource Unit tracks resources continuously to manage resources effectively during an incident. They use the following status conditions for maintaining an up-to-date and accurate picture of resource status:

Assigned: Resources that have been checked in and assigned work tasks on an incident.

Available: Resources assigned to an incident, checked in, and available for a mission assignment, normally located in a staging area.

Out of Service: Resources that are checked in, but are not assigned and not available for assignment for mechanical, rest, or personnel reasons.

When a resource's status changes (e.g., a unit that was previously "out of service" is now "available"), the Unit Leader or the supervisor who approved the status change immediately notifies the Resources Unit Leader, who documents the status change.

2) The Situation Unit

The Situation Unit staff collect, process, and organize situation information, prepare situation summaries, and develop projections and forecasts related to the incident. They gather and disseminate information for the IAP. This unit produces Situation Reports (SITREP) as scheduled or at the request of the Planning Section Chief or IC. The Situation Unit frequently includes Geographic/Geospatial Information Systems (GIS) Specialists, who produce maps, and other technical specialists. The Situation Unit may also include Field Observers to gather information on the incident and/or response.

3) Documentation Unit

Documentation Unit staff maintain incident files and data for legal, analytical, and historical purposes, including a complete record of the major steps taken to resolve the incident. They also provide duplication services for incident personnel; compile, reproduce, and distribute the IAP; and maintain the files and records that are developed as part of the IAP and planning function.

4) Demobilization Unit

Demobilization Unit staff develop an Incident Demobilization Plan that includes specific instructions for all personnel and other resources to be demobilized. They begin their work early in the incident, creating rosters of personnel and resources and obtaining any missing information as check-in proceeds. Once the IC or UC has approved the Incident Demobilization Plan, Demobilization Unit staff ensure its distribution at the incident and elsewhere, as necessary. For major incidents, demobilization plans are dynamic and the staff in the Demobilization Unit may need to update them frequently.

c. Logistics Chief

The Logistics Chief is responsible for providing facilities, services, and material in support of the incident response and recovery. The Logistics Chief's duties include the following:

i. Identify, obtain, and coordinate the use of resources in support of the response and recovery effort.

ii. Participate in preparation of the IAP.

iii. Coordinate the logistical aspects of EOC operation (food, auxiliary power, etc.).

iv. Establish and maintain staging areas for the response and recovery.

v. Designate and maintain staging areas for inter/intra agency response.

vi. Establish and maintain a communications system for the EOC, field teams, and support agencies.

vii. May divide the Logistics Section into branches to maintain a manageable span of control by providing more effective supervision and coordination among the units. For example, the Logistics Section may be divided into two branches. The Service Branch may contain three units: communications unit, food unit, medical unit. The Support Branch may also contain three units: supply unit, facilities unit, and ground support unit.

1) Service Branch

a) The Communications Unit staff install and test communications equipment, supervise and operate the incident communications center, distribute and recover communications equipment assigned to incident personnel, and maintain and repair communications equipment on-site.

Most complex incidents have an incident Communications Plan. Staff in the Communications Unit produce this plan, as they are responsible for assigning radio frequencies; establishing voice and data networks for command, tactical, support, and air units; setting up on-scene telephone and public-address equipment; and providing any necessary off-incident communication links.

b) The Food Unit staff determine the food and hydration needs of personnel assigned to the incident and plan menus, order food, provide cooking facilities, cook and serve food, maintain

food service areas, and manage food security and safety.

Efficient food service is especially important for extended incidents. Food Unit staff anticipate incident needs, such as the number of people who will need to be fed and whether the incident's type, location, or complexity predicates special food needs. The Food Unit staff supply food to meet the nutritional needs during the entire incident, including all remote locations (e.g., camps and staging areas), and supply on-site food service to operations personnel who are unable to leave their assignments.

The Food Unit provides food for incident workers.

c) The Medical Unit staff provide health and medical services for incident personnel. This includes providing pre-hospital and acute medical care, mental health care, occupational health support, and transportation of ill or injured incident personnel. The Medical Unit staff, in coordination with the Safety Officer, assist in controlling the transmission of disease among incident personnel.

The Medical Unit Leader develops a Medical Plan, which is part of the IAP. The Medical Plan provides specific information on medical assistance capabilities at incident locations, off-site medical assistance facilities, and procedures for handling medical emergencies involving incident personnel.

Medical Unit staff assist the Finance/Administration Section with the administrative needs related to injury compensation, including obtaining written authorizations, billing forms, witness statements, administrative medical documents, and reimbursement as needed.

The Medical Unit provides medical services for incident personnel.

2) Support Branch

a) The Supply Unit staff order, receive, process, store, inventory, and distribute all incident-related resources. The Supply Unit staff are responsible for all off-incident ordering, including obtaining the following:

- Tactical and support resources (including personnel); and
- Expendable and nonexpendable supplies.

The Supply Unit staff provide support to receive, process, store, and distribute all supply orders. They handle tool operations, which includes storing, distributing, and servicing tools and portable, nonexpendable equipment. Additionally, the Supply Unit staff assist in projecting resource needs.

b) The Facilities Unit staff set up, maintain, and demobilize all facilities used in support of incident operations. This staff provides facility maintenance and law enforcement/security services needed for incident support.

The Facilities Unit staff set up the ICP(s), Incident Base, and camps (including trailers or other forms of shelter in and around the incident area) and ensure the maintenance of those facilities. This unit's staff provide and maintain personnel support facilities, including areas for eating, sleeping, sanitation and showers, and staging.

Staff in this unit order additional support items such as portable toilets, shower facilities, and lighting units through the Supply Unit.

c) The Ground Support Unit staff provide ground transportation in support of incident operations. They maintain and repair vehicles and mobile ground support equipment and perform pre- and post-use inspections on all ground equipment assigned to the incident. The staff supply fuel for incident mobile equipment, and develop and implement the incident Traffic Plan.

Additionally, during major incidents, Ground Support Unit staff maintain a transportation pool of vehicles (e.g., cars, buses, pickup trucks) suitable for transporting personnel, as opposed to tactical vehicles such as ambulances. Ground Support Unit staff also provide information to the Resources Unit on the location and status of vehicles assigned to the Ground Support Unit.

d. Finance and Administration Chief

The Finance and Administration Chief is responsible for cost accounting, purchasing, personnel, and related administrative functions. The Finance and Administration Chief's duties include the following:

i. Provide for all aspects of financial support for the response and recovery efforts.

ii. Compile cost estimates.

iii. Maintain records of personnel time and expenditures.

iv. Establish billing procedures.

v. Organize a system for compensation and claims.

vi. General Policies

This section outlines general policies for administering resources, including the following:

1) Appointment of Officials

Identify the positions of officials who have been appointed to participate in the decision-making process.

2) Funding and Accounting

Reference should be made to administrative requirements that are applicable to emergency operations (e.g., emergency purchasing procedures), which appear in other documents.

3) Records and Reports

The plan should include requirements for tracking the source and use of resources and expenditures.

a. Responsibility for submitting local government reports to the DHS&EM rests with each jurisdiction's Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness Director.

b. Each jurisdiction's Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness Director maintain records of expenditures and obligations in emergency operations. They should also support the collection and maintenance of narrative and long-type records of response to all declared disasters.

4) Assistance Stipulations

a. Local policies that have been established regarding the use of volunteers or accepting donated goods

and services should be summarized. Elements that should be addressed in this section include:

(1) Administration of insurance claims.

(2) Consumer protection.

(3) Duplication of benefits.

(4) Nondiscrimination.

(5) Relief assistance.

(6) Preservation of environment and historic properties.

vii. Additional Policies

4. Depending on the size of the response and recovery effort, Section Chiefs may have Branch Directors, Division Supervisors, or Group Supervisors reporting to them.

D. Support Functions

1. Support from the National Guard may be requested through the DHS&EM. Military assistance will complement and not be a substitute for local participation in emergency operations. Military forces will remain at all times under military command but will support and assist response efforts.

2. Support from other State government departments and agencies may be made available in accordance with the SEOC.

3. Private sector organizations within the jurisdiction may assist with a wide variety of tasks based on their capabilities.

4. Volunteer agencies, such as the American Red Cross, local church/synagogue congregations, and assistive organizations, such as the Salvation Army, are available to give assistance with sheltering, feeding, and other issues, as necessary.

5. Assistance from surrounding jurisdictions may be available through the execution of a MOU.

6. Appendix A has a complete list of MOUs.

E. Continuity of Government

1. Succession of Command

a. The line of succession for the Mayor is:

i. Mayor Pro-tempore.

ii. City Council Members in order of seniority (time served need not be continuous).

b. The line of succession for the City Manager is:

i. Assistant City Manager(s).

ii. The Department Director with the most seniority.

c. The line of succession for each Department Director is according to the established SOPs in each department.

d. During any period the City Manager is unable to fulfill the duties outlined in this EOP because of absence or disability, the person who assumes the position will have all of the powers and responsibilities of the City Manager. The successor's powers and responsibilities shall terminate upon the return of the City Manager or upon the temporary appointment of an interim City Manager approved by the City Council.

e. In order to ensure continuity in operations of City departments during a period of emergency resulting from disaster, a line of succession and the successor's powers will be specified by inter-departmental policy.

2. Relocation of Government

In the event the COV government requires re-location, the IC will designate a location.

3. Preservation of Records

In order to provide normal government operations following a disaster, vital records must be protected. Vital records are those considered essential to the continuous operation of government essential to the COV's ability to fulfill its responsibilities to the public. It is the responsibility of each Department Director to furnish all records to the Finance Department for the preservation of vital records before, during, and after emergencies.

Each COV department, agency, office, etc. is required to keep accurate records and logs of all actions taken and resources utilized during emergencies of any kind. All funds expended for materials or supplies must be accounted for by receipts and written records in detail. The COV will establish an incident number for each incident. The Finance Section will code all financial documents for that incident by the incident number. The IC names each incident.

5. Information Collection and Dissemination

A. Information about the disaster managed by the EOC is coordinated through Section Chiefs or their representatives. These representatives collect information from and disseminate information to their operators in the field. The Section Chiefs also disseminate information within the EOC that can be used to develop courses of action and manage emergency operations. Information will generally flow up and down the command structure.

B. Information will be disseminated to field operations from the IC through the Section Chiefs to their field operators. Information shall include all pertinent information for the field teams to carry out their respective missions.

C. Detailed procedures that identify the type of information needed, where it is expected to come from, who uses the information, how the information is shared, the format for providing the information, and the specific times the information is needed are maintained at the EOC.

D. Department Directors will take responsibility for ensuring their employees know how to clearly and effectively communicate incident information by practicing and assessing communication habits of employees.

6. Communication

A. Communication is the MOST IMPORTANT part of a coordinated and efficient response effort.

B. Communication should be clearly understood by the recipient. To achieve this, communication will:

1. Use simple, concise terminology when issuing commands and giving direction.

2. Be kept short and to the point. Ensure that descriptions are detailed enough to be understood, but not too detailed to confuse the recipient or make it difficult to retain.

3. Include questions to ensure that the recipient understands the instruction.

4. Make eye contact, when possible, and speak directly to people with their first name to ensure the best communication.

C. More information on communications protocols can be found in Annex C: Communications.

7. Plan Maintenance and Distribution

A. Development

1. The State DHS&EM Coordinator is responsible for coordinating emergency planning.

2. The City Manager is responsible for supporting emergency planning.

B. Maintenance and Distribution

1. Requirements

a. The City Manager will maintain and implement the EOP. The EOP components will be reviewed and updated by the appropriate personnel annually or as significant changes are noted within the COV. Whenever portions of this EOP are implemented in an emergency event or exercise, a review will be conducted to determine necessary changes. Changes to the hazards and vulnerabilities of the City shall also warrant a review of this EOP.

2. Distribution

a. Distribution

This EOP and its supporting materials are generally public documents, except that notification lists and personal information are not considered to be available to the public. Copies of the EOP will be distributed in an electronic format. The EOP will be distributed to appropriate agencies and individuals. Revisions to the EOP may be noted on the Record of Changes page.

8. Authorities and References

A. Legal Authority

1. Federal

a. PL 100-707 (The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, as amended)

b. PL 81-920 (Civil Defense Act)

c. PL 93-288 (Disaster Relief Act)

d. PL106-390 (Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000)

2. State

a. AS 26.20 (Homeland Security and Civil Defense Act)

b. AS 26.23 (Alaska Disaster Act)

c. AS 29.25.30 (Emergency Ordinances)

d. AS 29.35.40 (Emergency Disaster Powers)

e. Alaska Federal/State Preparedness Plan for Response to Oil and Hazardous Substance Discharges/Releases

f. Alaska Interagency Fire Management Plan

g. Alaska Mass Casualty Plan

h. State of Alaska Administration Plan for State Disaster Public Assistance, July 2003

i. State of Alaska Mental Health Disaster/Emergency Plan, March 2002

j. Joint Alaska Federal/State Sub-area contingency plans for Response to Oil and Hazardous Substance Discharges/Releases

3. Local

a. All COV Municipal Codes, including but not limited to Ordinance Numbers 6616 and 7705 as amended.

B. References

1. Federal

a. Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG) 101: Developing and Maintaining State, Territorial, Tribal, and Local Government Emergency Plans, November 2010.

b. Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP), April 2013.

c. National Incident Management System, FEMA, October 2017.

d. National Response Framework, Fourth Edition, FEMA, October 2019.

2. State

a. State of Alaska Emergency Operations Plan, September 2016, amended 2018.

b. State of Alaska Hazard Mitigation Plan, October 2018.

3. Local

a. Local EOPs

b. Applicable MOUs

City of Valdez
Emergency Operations Plan

Table 1. Emergency Responsibilities by Department

City of Valdez	Emergency Support Functions (ESF)															Natural Hazard Specific									Threat-Specific					
P: Primary Functional Responsibility S: Support Responsibility – Entities have potential responsibility but may not be activated for all instances Annexes address specific coordinating and supporting roles.	Direction, Control, and Coordination – ESF#5	Warning – ESF#2 & 5	Communications – ESF#2	Emergency Public Information – ESF#15	Population Protection (Evacuation or Shelter-in-Place) – ESF#6 & 13	Mass Care and Sheltering – ESF#6	Public Health and Medical Services – ESF#8	Logistics and Resource Management – ESF#7	First Responders – ESF#9 &13	Public Works and Transportation – ESF#1 & 3	Oil and Hazardous Material Response – ESF#10	Donation Management	Debris Removal	Mass Fatality and Reunification	Access & Functional Needs Population	Procurement and Contracts	Severe Weather	Earthquake	Avalanche	Landslide	Tsunami/Seiche	Flooding	Fire	Volcanic Eruption	Terrorism, Enemy Attack, and Civil Disturbance	Transportation Accident	Health Crisis	Energy Shortages	Dam Failure	Cyberthreat
Mayor																														
City Manager	P	P		P																										
City Clerk				P												S														
Finance Department								S				S				P														
Emergency Manager	S	S	P	S	P	P	S	S	S		S	S		S	P	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S		S
City Attorney	S																								S					
Fire and Emergency Services Department	S	S	S	S		S	P		P		P			P			P	P	P	P	P	P	P		P	P	S			
Police Department	S	S	S	S	P	S			P					P			P	P	P	P	P	P	S		P	P	S			
Public Works Department	S							P		P	S		P				S	S	S	S	S	S	S							
Information Technology			P																											P
Capital Facilities	S							P				P					S	S	S	S	S	S								
Dispatch Center		S	P	S																										
Port Operations											S		S				S	S		S	S	S				S				
Other Organizations	Emergency Support Functions (ESF)															Natural Hazard Specific									Threat-Specific					
Civil Air Patrol										S																S				
American Red Cross					S	S						S		S			S	S			S		S	S						
Airport Coordinator						S						S		S			S	S			S		S	S		S				
CV Telephone																														
CV Electric			S				P												S								P			
CV Telephone			S				P												S								P			
Public Health Nurse						S	P																	S						
School Administration	S					S	S																							
Hospital	S					S	S							S													S			
Local Radio Stations	S	S		S	S	S		S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S
Clinics						S																								
ADOT&PF										S			S					S	S	S		S				S				
SERVS											S																			
AST					S				S					S											S		S			

ANNEX A: Direction, Control, and Coordination

1. Purpose

The purpose of this Annex is to provide for the establishment and operation of the EOC, where key department and agency directors (or their representatives) will assemble during major emergency or disaster events to coordinate disaster response and recovery.

2. Situation

A. The COV is the local entity with the primary responsibility for coordinating emergency operations.
B. The COV trains its employees in the basic elements of NIMS and ICS.

3. Assumptions

A. Persons implementing this Annex are familiar with NIMS and ICS.
B. Departmental SOPs are established and regularly updated.
C. Associated MOUs have been established and updated.

4. Limitations

A. There are a limited number of personnel with the necessary level of training and a limited number of resources available to the COV.

5. Concept of Operations

A. Every aspect of emergency operation must be well-documented. To achieve this, the COV encourages all supervisors to assign a scribe with legible hand-writing, to accompany them and document all actions, information, and decisions.

1. Initial Recognition, Notification, and Mobilization

a. The process of incident recognition and initial notification remain the same, no matter who initially recognizes the disaster.
b. The senior qualified official on scene will determine if the incident needs reporting to the IM Short Team.
c. Dispatch is notified by calling 911, and they dispatch the appropriate department(s) to the scene. Dispatch personnel document this entire process.
d. The IM Short Team will conduct initial assessments in the VPD Conference Room to determine if the initial assessments meet the criteria to make a decision on. Depending upon the situation, there are specific pre-designated "TRIGGERS" that will initiate a limited response from the COV. The "TRIGGERS" are intended to create a proactive response from the COV instead of a reactive one and will be used when a disaster is potentially imminent. These "TRIGGERS" include: 8 or more inches of rain in a 24-hour period, expected wind gusts of 100 miles per hour or more, snowfalls of 48 inches or more within 24 hours, severe expected ashfall or nuclear fallout, low reservoir water level, prolonged extreme cold, and an alert or warning from appropriate agencies. The COV begins testing each year when the weather service ground load measurement reaches 30 pounds per square foot with subsequent tests conducted each time an additional accumulation of 10 pounds is reported or after a significant weather event per the Valdez City Buildings Roof Snow Removal Plan. Routine strategy

removes the snow load at 40 pounds per square foot although priority and critical strategies are also included in the Plan.

e. The EOC may be activated by the City Manager and Assistant City Manager(s). If the City Manager and Assistant City Manager(s) are unavailable, the EOC may be activated by the IM Short Team. When the decision is made to activate the EOC, the official activating the EOC will request the Dispatch Center notify the IMT to report to the EOC. The IMT will take action to notify and mobilize the appropriate departments and agencies, which they are responsible for coordinating.
f. Call-up rosters are available in Dispatch and updated (at least annually) by the City Manager.
g. When the decision is made to declare an emergency and activate the EOC (or the potential exists), the DHS&EM will be notified.

2. Notification of Adjacent Jurisdictions

a. If appropriate, adjacent jurisdictions will be notified by the IC, to request or offer aid, or to alert them of a possible threat.

3. Initial Incident Assessment

a. Initially, assessment information will be forthcoming from responding volunteers who have seen damage as they respond to the check-in site. Information will include nature of the incident, estimated number of injuries or deaths, geographical area affected, apparent hazards, critical infrastructure affected, and property damaged. When first responders arrive at the scene, the senior qualified official on scene will determine if the incident needs reporting to the IM Short Team.
b. If the IM Short Team is convened, the VPD and VFD will conduct windshield surveys in affected areas and relay the information to IM Short Team members. Figure A-1 shows all 12 zones for Valdez.
c. Using the Level of Activation chart and the "TRIGGERS" identified in this annex, the IM Short Team will determine the seriousness of the event and determine the response priorities. If a disaster is declared and the EOC activated, the on-scene ICP commander will relinquish control to the EOC IC but will continue to monitor the scene.
d. All initial incident assessment information will be coordinated by the EOC IC to allow for a plan to be built to effectively develop and implement a solution to the incident.

4. After Incident Assessment

a. Private contractors that conduct damage assessments for the COV during a disaster will report directly to the Operations Sections Chief.
b. Damage Assessment
    i. Damage Assessment will be the responsibility of the Operations Section Chief and will be a cooperative effort between Capital Facility personnel.
    ii. Emphasis of initial efforts will be focused on critical infrastructure and key resources, assessed by the VPD and VFD, as they drive through the COV and report damages back.
    iii. Initially, Capital Facility personnel and private contractors may be used by the Operations Section Chief to conduct structural damage assessments (see

established MOUs), with priority on City buildings and any buildings that are used for shelters.

iv. Damage assessments for other public buildings will follow after critical facilities and be performed by the same department and contractors.
v. Damage assessments on private property will be last.
vi. If needed, the City may request damage assessment teams from the SEOC in order to assess local damage.
vii. Information will be collected, organized, and reported by the designee(s) of the IC, on the State of Alaska DHS&EM damage and needs assessment form. If the COV is declaring a disaster, the damage assessment will be a high priority, reporting to the State of Alaska SEOC within 36 hours.

TAB A-1: WINDSHIELD SURVEY ZONES






E Egan Dr
Mineral Creek Loop Rd
Richardson Hwy
Airport Rd
N Sawmill Dr
Atigun Dr
Glacier Haul Rd
McKinley St
Alaska Ave
Copper Ave
Wood Way
Skidder St
Falcon Ave
River Dr
Dayville Rd
Richardson Hwy
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
N
W
E
S
0 1,000 2,000 4,000 Feet
Date: 2/11/2019
Zones 5-9


6
9
1 Valdez Police Department Dispatch
2 Firestation No. 1
3 Valdez Medical Center
4 Valdez Clinic
5 Valdez Senior Center
6 Herman Hutchens E.S.
7 Gilson M.S.
8 Valdez H.S.
9 Valdez Pioneer Field
10 Firestation No. 4
N
W
E
S
0 650 1,300 2,600 Feet
Date: 10/1/2020
Zone 6
Damage Assessment Priorities


Copper Ave
Richardson Hwy
10
9
Port Valdez Dr
Terminal Access Rd
E Metering Rd
Quarry Dr
Dayville Rd
N
W
E
S
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Date: 2/4/2019
Zone 10


9
11
12
N
W
E
S
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Date: 2/4/2019
Zones 11-12


10
12
N
W
E
S
0 1,750 3,500 7,000 Feet
Date: 10/1/2020
Zone 12
Damage Assessment Priorities
1 Valdez Police Department Dispatch
2 Firestation No. 1
3 Valdez Medical Center
4 Valdez Clinic
5 Valdez Senior Center
6 Herman Hutchens E.S.
7 Gilson M.S.
8 Valdez H.S.
9 Valdez Pioneer Field
10 Firestation No. 4

ANNEX B: Warning

1. Purpose

The purpose of this Annex is to describe the framework for warning residents of Valdez to prepare for and respond to emergency situations to prevent loss of life and minimize damage caused by a disaster. Emergency public information is discussed in Annex D.

2. Situation

A. The need to warn the public is common to all disasters.
B. Disasters vary markedly in predictability and speed of onset. Time available for notifying the public ranges from ample to none.
C. The COV has many mechanisms for warning the public of impending disaster situations.

3. Assumptions

A. The COV will maintain a warning system and practice callout drills.
B. Due to the redundancy of warning methods used by the COV, most residents will receive some notification of an impending disaster.
C. In some types of disasters, public warning might be the only operational response possible.
D. No single warning system can guarantee contact with all vulnerable residents for every hazard.
E. The COV will utilize Nixle, the local media, the internet, and social media to provide updates and supplemental information to residents following the dissemination of a warning message.

4. Limitations

A. It is unknown whether there will be sufficient time and if the event will be a localized emergency to warn residents. For example, there was very little time to warn residents for the 1964 tsunami as the event was immediate.

5. Concept of Operations

A. General
   1. Citizens have the responsibility to prepare themselves and their families to cope with emergencies and to manage their affairs in ways that will aid the COV in managing emergencies. The COV will assist residents in carrying out these responsibilities by providing public information and instructions before, during, and after emergencies.
   2. The COV will ensure that emergency notifications include methods accessible to persons with disabilities including: open captioning, door-to-door notifications, mobile loudspeakers, or other available means such as social media, internet (COV webpage), TTY or TDD telephone system, and American Sign Language.
   3. The COV maintains sirens as a dedicated physical warning system which are tested weekly.
   4. Communications with the Emergency Alert System (EAS) activation station(s) will be maintained.
   5. The COV will coordinate warnings with adjacent jurisdictions when appropriate.

6. Local warnings with national significance should be relayed through the National Weather System (NWS). The COV monitors the National Alert and Warning System for imminent hazards or threats with local implications.
7. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) weather radio system may be used to augment dissemination of specific warning or emergency information.
8. The COV will endeavor to release timely and accurate emergency information to the public concerning emergency preparedness, response, and recovery in a cooperative effort with the media.

B. Receipt of Warning
1. The Dispatch Center monitors warning networks, including NOAA, FEMA, the Alaska Warning System, and the Tsunami Alert System.

C. Dissemination of Warning
1. The warning will come directly to Dispatch. When a warning is received, the Dispatcher will follow the procedures outlined below:
   a. Dispatch determines whether an immediate warning needs to be disseminated and outdoor sirens needs to be activated if:
      i. A strong earthquake or landslide occurs, resulting in the shaking of a building for a prolonged period of 30 seconds or if a strong earthquake makes it difficult to stand or knocks people out of their chairs.
   b. Dispatch has the authority to issue an immediate warning and convene the IM Short Team. "TRIGGERS" include: 8 or more inches of rain in a 24-hour period, expected wind gusts of 100 miles per hour or more, snowfalls of 48 inches or more within 24 hours, severe expected ashfall or nuclear fallout, low reservoir water level, prolonged extreme cold, and an alert or warning from appropriate agencies.
   c. Immediately pass the information, exactly as received, to the IM Short Team. The IM Short Team has the authority to determine when a warning shall be issued.
   d. Once the decision is made to activate a warning by the IM Short Team, Dispatch will order all sirens activated with the Warning Signal, along with the appropriate message.
2. If the arrival of a tsunami/other catastrophic event is estimated to be within a relatively short time (< 2 hours), the IM Short Team will notify the PIO. The primary means of notification to the public will be voice enhanced siren signals, which will be backed up by commercial radio (KVAK and KCHU). The PIO, or IC designee, will be responsible to notify each entity.
3. If the estimated arrival time of the tsunami/other catastrophic event is several hours or more away, the EOC will be activated, and the IC will collaborate with the PIO to issue notifications as soon as reasonably possible.
4. Secondary means of disseminating the warning is by a door-to-door evacuation plan implemented by the IM Short Team.

D. Consideration has been given as to how to effectively reach the following populations. For functional needs populations, see Annex O: Access and Functional Needs Population.
1. Non-English Speakers;
2. Local Businesses;

3. If a threat occurs during school hours, family will be notified by the appropriate school through the Valdez City Schools standard emergency notification protocols.
4. The Emergency Manager or his or her designee is responsible to contact special needs populations in town, including the elderly, the homebound, and physically challenged. A "Disaster Registry" volunteer sign-up list of the functional need's population will be established by the Emergency Manager. A copy of this list will be given to the PIO.
5. Tourists will be notified by sirens.

6. Organization and Assignment of Responsibilities

The person who has overall responsibility for Warning is the IC. The IC will issue the warning and immediately contact Dispatch to page out emergency services. Other notification means such as social media, internet (city webpage), TTY or TDD telephone system, phone calls to senior center, phone calls to schools, and American Sign Language will also be used.

A. Preparation

- ☐ City Manager (IC) or Designee
  - ☐ Warning messages will be pre-scripted and updated annually.
  - ☐ Review assignments of all personnel, and brief those who will have emergency tasks to perform.
- ☐ Emergency Manager
  - ☐ Maintain a personnel roster for call-out procedures, and update annually.
  - ☐ Roster call-out lists will be called/tested annually.
  - ☐ Maintain/update the Volunteer Disaster Registry, identifying Functional Needs Citizens.
- ☐ VPD
  - ☐ Have vital equipment in the condition necessary for warning procedures.
  - ☐ Review assignments of all personnel, and brief those who will have emergency tasks to perform.
- ☐ VFD
  - ☐ Have vital equipment in the condition necessary for warning procedures.
  - ☐ Review assignments of all personnel, and brief those who will have emergency tasks to perform.

B. Response

- ☐ Dispatch
  - ☐ Receive warning information.
  - ☐ Determine need and timeframe to warn citizens.
  - ☐ Disseminate warning.
  - ☐ Notify Short or Full IMT as the case may be.
- ☐ City Manager (IC)
  - ☐ Declare a local disaster, if circumstances warrant.
  - ☐ Notify DHS&EM of possible evacuation and State assistance required to support the response.
  - ☐ Refer to Annex E: Evacuation and Shelter in Place, if warranted, or Annex F: Mass Care & Sheltering.
- ☐ Emergency Manager

- ☐ Procure the Volunteer "Disaster Registry" for Functional Needs population groups and warn them. Patients and long-term care residents at PWMC may require ambulance transportation.
- ☐ Provide Chiefs with the current status of warning operations/resources.
- ☐ Maintain records accurately, including using NIMS logs daily (ICS Form 214).

☐ VPD
- ☐ Coordinate traffic and perimeter control, as well as security for affected area(s).
- ☐ Initiate door-to-door warning.
- ☐ Prepare for and receive short-term evacuees.
- ☐ Repeat warning for "stay-puts", if time warrants and it is safe enough.

☐ VFD
- ☐ Initiate door-to-door warning.
- ☐ Prepare for and receive short-term evacuees.
- ☐ Repeat warning for "stay-puts", if time warrants. and it is safe enough.

C. Recovery

☐ City Manager (IC)
- ☐ Take actions necessary to restore public confidence.
- ☐ Perform a post-incident briefing and an incident critique.

☐ Emergency Manager
- ☐ Complete and submit necessary reports and paperwork to appropriate agencies.

☐ VPD
- ☐ Take actions necessary to restore public confidence.
- ☐ Complete and submit necessary reports and paperwork to appropriate agencies.
- ☐ Restock supplies and equipment used in the event, and return any equipment obtained from other agencies after proper cleaning/inspection.
- ☐ Submit an itemized list of all damaged equipment and supplies to Finance Section.
- ☐ Perform a post-incident briefing and an incident critique.

☐ VFD
- ☐ Take actions necessary to restore public confidence.
- ☐ Complete and submit necessary reports and paperwork to appropriate agencies.
- ☐ Restock supplies and equipment used in the event, and return any equipment obtained from other agencies after proper cleaning/inspection.
- ☐ Submit an itemized list of all damaged equipment and supplies to Finance Section.
- ☐ Perform a post-incident briefing and an incident critique.

☐ PIO
- ☐ Prepare emergency public information about procedures to follow in the recovery phase.
- ☐ Perform a post-incident briefing and an incident critique.

TAB B-1: Warning Call-Out List

Who? (Title/Organization/Name)	Daytime Contact Info	Cell No.
Acting City Manager Nathan Duval	907-835-5478 ext. 1 nduval@valdezak.gov	907-202-0683
Fire Department Chief Tracy Raynor	907-835-4560 traynor@valdezak.gov	907-202-0017
Police Department Chief Bart Hinkle	907-835-4560-0412 bhinkle@pd.valdezak.gov	907-202-0412
Emergency Manager Aaron Baczuk	907-835-4560 abaczuk@pd.valdezak.gov	907-202-0573
Public Information Officer Ana Stroup	907-835-3400 astroup@valdezak.gov	907-202-0712
State Emergency Operation Center	1.907.428.7100 1.800.478.2337 seoc@alaska.gov	

ANNEX C: Communications

1. Purpose

A. Emergency Support Function #2, Communications, supports the restoration of communications infrastructure; coordinates communications support to response efforts, facilitates the delivery of information to emergency management decision makers, and assists in the stabilization and reestablishment of systems and applications from failure during incidents. This annex serves to support all departments and agencies with communications from both a hardware and software perspective as well as a public and private perspective.

B. Essential to all emergency organizations is an effective communications capability to support emergency operations. The magnitude of a particular emergency will determine the degree to which communications systems are used. Communications systems are relied upon to be used for direction/coordination of emergency operations, alerting and warning government and the public, and providing advice and instructions to the public. The Emergency Support Function #2, Communications stakeholders will work together within their statutory and regulatory authorities to effectively and efficiently coordinate during all four phases of Emergency Management. This annex supplements the daily communications plan of the COV.

2. Situation

A. The need to communicate effectively is of paramount importance during disaster response and recovery operations. History is replete with examples of operations that have failed due to the inability of response agencies to communicate and coordinate with each other.

B. It is essential that control centers, response agencies, and field units have available fixed, mobile, and hand-held radio devices to effectively coordinate disaster response activities.

C. Tab C-1 at the end of this Annex has a list of the COV's communications equipment.

3. Assumptions

A. Certain assumptions were used during the development of this plan. These assumptions translate into basic principles associated with conducting Emergency Management operations in preparation for, response to, and recovery from major emergencies. In plan development and emergency operations, "Assumptions" provide context, requirements, and situational realities.

1. Regular communications issues will be handled through logistics in the event of an EOC activation.
2. This function is activated when there is an area-wide communications interruption.
3. Communications is the transfer of information across a wide spectrum of technologies including radio, telephone, satellite, and internet.
4. Communications covers both the public emergency need for communications as well as the reestablishment of private communications systems within the community.
5. The COV has developed a robust IT department which handles the communications infrastructure for all city facilities.
6. Emergency radio communications infrastructure is maintained by the IT department.

7. Routine communications for local emergencies are coordinated through VPD for both dispatching services as well as through ALMR hardware.
8. The COV Continuity of Operations Plan identifies the redundant systems that would be implemented in the event of a communications outage.

4. Limitations

A. Although the telephone (including cell and satellite phones) remains one of the most effective means of communicating information even during emergency operations, it has shortcomings. Despite technical improvements that have occurred in recent years, telephones are still subject to failure and/or system overload.

B. Dispatch has a limited number of personnel available for extended emergency situations.

5. Concept of Operations

A. General

Emergency Support Function #2 acts to meet the telecommunications and essential elements of information needs of local, support and nongovernmental organizations; industry essential service providers; other private sector partners; and individuals, families, and households, including individuals with disabilities and others with access and functional needs. The following are responsibilities of ESF #2:

1. Provides emergency communications, which consists of the technical means and modes required to provide and maintain interoperable communications in an incident area.
2. Supports the establishment of the basic public safety communications infrastructure and assists in the support and recovery of the commercial telecommunications infrastructure.
3. Coordinates the provisioning of priority and other telecommunications services at incident support facilities, provides capabilities and services to aid response, short-term recovery operations, and ensures a smooth transition to long-term recovery efforts.
4. Facilitates the delivery of mission critical information to maintain situational awareness for Emergency Management decision makers and support elements.
5. Develops and maintains a communications common operating picture.
6. Coordinates and deconflicts incident communications issues.

B. The ESF#2 is responsible for three areas of communication including municipal communications systems, emergency communications systems, and private communications systems.

1. Preparedness

   Preparedness is a continuous cycle of planning, organizing, training, equipping, exercising, evaluating and taking corrective action in an effort to ensure effective coordination during incident response. Preparedness Activities for ESF#2 include:

   a. Develop and maintain the ESF#2, Communications Annex.
   b. Identify stakeholder roles, responsibilities, and statutory authorities.
   c. Initiate and oversee pre-emergency planning and coordination activities.

d. Conduct resource inventories, categorize resources, establish agreements for acquiring needed resources, manage information systems, and develop processes for mobilizing and demobilizing resources with the ESF#2 stakeholders.
e. Plan for short-term and long-term recovery operations.
f. Integrate After Action Reports and Corrective Action Planning into the ESF#2 exercise process.
g. Conduct regular ESF#2 meetings and assist with training events.
h. Support coordination for incident prioritization, critical resource allocation, integration of communications systems, and information coordination.
i. Create an Emergency Resource Directory providing the list of ESF#2 resources necessary to support operations and begin to identify and document resource types.
j. Create inventory agreements that are in place to support sharing of resources.
k. Assist with the documentation of how ESF#2 members communicate during an emergency, including primary and secondary systems and system redundancy.

2. Response

Response includes activities that address the direct efforts of an incident. Response includes the execution of the EOP and mitigation activities outlined to limit the loss of life, personal injury, property damage, and other unfavorable outcomes. Response activities for ESF#2 Primary Coordinator include:

a. Provides subject matter recommendations and guidance involving its members.
b. Coordinates assistance from support agencies and provides assistance within other EOC levels (as necessary).
c. Serves as the point of contact between the supporting/private agencies to the EOC.
d. Provides guidance and recommendations in resource request processing to EOC Sections to ensure the appropriate use of resources.
e. Acquires and processes discipline-specific intelligence and information.
f. Identifies and documents trigger points/thresholds that may indicate a need to increase the operational mode.
g. Documents how stakeholders mobilize resources to support incident response and operations. Also, assists with the tracking of resources during mobilization and demobilization.
h. Documents how ESF#2 organizes itself to support the emergency response within the EOC.
i. Participates in action planning, section and branch meetings scheduled during the operational period within the EOC.
j. Actively coordinates with ESF#2 stakeholders at other locations on incident response activities, consistent messaging, and technical assistance.
k. Acts as a conduit of information from the ESF#2 stakeholders to the EOC regarding stakeholder's intelligence and resource capabilities.

1.

3. Recovery
   The aim of the recovery phase is to restore the affected area to its pre-disaster state. It differs from the response phase in its focus; recovery efforts are concerned with issues and decisions that must be made after immediate needs are addressed. Recovery activities include:
   a. Supporting recovery activities with roles and responsibilities of ESF stakeholders.
   b. Working with other ESF#2 stakeholders to prevent duplication of efforts.

C. Operations
1. Area-wide communications leverage a variety of technologies in the event of an emergency or disaster. The following is a list of communications tools, the entities that provide support for those tools, and the departments that primarily use the tools.

a. Telecommunications:	AT&T:	Telecommunications:	All
b. Internet:	GCI:	Broadband Internet:	All
c. Email:	Microsoft Office Cloud:	Email:	All
d. Cellular Telephone:	Verizon:	Cellular	All
e. Radios: VHF	Motorola:	Radio Communications:	Fire and Public Works
f. Radios: ALMR	Motorola:	Radio Communications:	VPD, VFD, Public Works

D. Activation
1. This annex of the EOP may be activated for any of the following:
   a. By order of the IM Short Team.
   b. In the event of an area-wide outage affecting telecommunications.
   c. In the event of an area-wide outage affecting cellular communications.
   d. In the event of an area-wide outage affecting internet connectivity.
   e. In the event of an area-wide outage affecting emergency radio communications.

6. Organization and Responsibilities

A. IT Director (Primary Coordinator)
Due to their skills, knowledge and responsibilities with communications for the COV, the IT Director has been identified as the primary coordinator for Emergency Support Function #2. The primary coordinator is responsible for the development, maintenance, and implementation of the ESF #2, with input and assistance from the stakeholders. Additionally, the IT Director is responsible for establishing a seat at the EOC once ESF #2 has been activated. Upon arrival to the EOC, the primary coordinator will determine which supporting agencies or private partners are necessary to support the incident. In the event that the primary coordinator is not able to fill their EOC role, their position will be filled by their designee.

- ☐ Maintain the network and telecommunications systems.
  - ☐ Maintain redundant network and telecommunications systems.
  - ☐ Provide security to communications functions.

B. Supporting Agencies and Departments
a. VFD
   - ☐ Coordinate the development of communications systems.
   - ☐ Maintain communications equipment.

b. VPD
   - ☐ Coordinate the development of communications systems.
   - ☐ Maintain communications equipment.

c. Public Works Department
   - ☐ Coordinate the development of communications systems.
   - ☐ Maintain communications equipment.

d. Dispatch System
   - ☐ Serve as the primary public-safety answering point.
   - ☐ Serve as the primary police and fire dispatching.

e. Emergency Manager
   - ☐ Maintain a volunteer amateur radio capability.
   - ☐ Ensure efficient and safe movement of evacuees when returning.

C. Private Partners

The following private partners have been identified as being key to the operational response: GCI, AT&T, Copper Valley, and Verizon Wireless.

D. State Agencies

The role of State Agencies is dependent upon the specific nature of the emergency, including the scope of the response and recovery activities, and whether the incident affects State streets, highways, or State-owned buildings or grounds. Supporting State Agencies are those who can provide technical, policy, and subject matter expertise and include: DHS&EM, ALMR, and the Alaska State Troopers.

E. Federal Agencies

The NRF organizes federal resources and capabilities under ESFs. The interplay of ESF#2 and the Communications public and private sector stakeholders is a vital part of including whole community concerns into all phases of Emergency Management. Some of the following stakeholders work closely with ESF#2 on a regular basis: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, FEMA, Federal Communications Commission, and Department of Defense.

TAB C-1: City of Valdez Communications Equipment

Equipment Type	Department Use	Location Stored	Date of Purchase

ANNEX D: Emergency Public Information

1. Purpose

This Annex describes the framework for dissemination of accurate and timely public information regarding potential and actual large-scale emergencies to the public within the COV.

2. Situation

A. The COV will periodically experience emergency situations, which require the ongoing dissemination of emergency public information.

B. The coordinated flow of public information and facts concerning the event and respective responses are needed to protect the safety and well-being of the public. Before its release, participating agencies' disaster information will be coordinated to the maximum extent possible to ensure consistency and accuracy.

C. Emergency public information may be disseminated to the public via radio stations, newspaper, informational brochures, public forums, social media, internet, and phone calls.

D. In the time of emergency, a PIO will be established to organize and coordinate the dissemination of information. The PIO will serve as the official public information point of contact to prevent unfounded rumors and inaccurate information.

3. Assumptions

A. During emergencies, the public is entitled to information about the emergency and instructions on proper survival and/or response actions.

B. The media will request information about emergencies. The local media will perform an essential role in providing emergency instructions and up-to-date information to the public. Depending on the severity, real and/or perceived, of the emergency, state, national, or international media will also cover the story and demand information and comment from local officials.

C. In the response phase, coordinated, accurate, consistent, timely, and easily understood public information can directly affect the safety of affected populations, and can contribute to the overall safety and well-being of the community. Individual and regional public information functions and actions before, during, and following any emergency will be determined not only by the severity of the emergency and the involved agencies and organizations, but also by the perceptions of the public.

D. During recovery, emergency public information can be critical for helping people put their lives back in order.

4. Limitations

A. Depending on the severity of the emergency, telephone communications may be sporadic or impossible. Radio and television may also be off the air due to power failure.

B. Disaster may strike without warning, and the public information system may not be able to react quickly enough to inform the public about the hazard.

5. Concept of Operations

A. General

1. The EOC will ensure emergency information transmitted to the public clearly conveys the following information:
   a. The nature of the emergency;
   b. The location of the emergency;
   c. How the emergency can affect the public;
   d. What protective and/or responsive action to take;
   e. Where to get help;
   f. When the situation will be remedied; and
   g. The schedule for situational updates.
2. News media throughout the area will be requested to assist in the coordinated dissemination of emergency information to the public. Means of communicating may include: social media, internet (city webpage), TTY or TDD telephone system.
3. The IC will establish a centralized Emergency Public Information Office as the official point of contact for release of emergency information during major disaster situations. This office will be established during an incident to serve as the central contact point for all news media and to coordinate all incident-related public information activities.
4. The PIO will report to the IC to ensure accuracy of all emergency information and instructions prior to dissemination to the public.

B. Coordination of Public Information

1. In large-scale disasters, the PIO shall also coordinate with State and Federal PIOs to keep all departments and agencies abreast of the current situation and actions that are being taken. During any emergency/disaster situation, the PIO will coordinate with the State to synchronize official emergency/disaster-related public information.

6. Organization and Assignment of Responsibilities

A. Organization:

1. The COV has a full time PIO on staff. During normal operations, the overall responsibility for the dissemination of disaster-related public information rests with the IC.
2. During Partial Activation or Full Activation of the EOC, the City Manager may designate an official PIO for the incident. The PIO is a member of the EOC staff and reports directly to the IC. He or she will serve as the primary focal point for all information releases pertaining to the emergency. The PIO also provides his or her services to the City Manager in matters pertaining to the dissemination of emergency public information.
3. Additional staff members may be designated to assist the PIO, if necessary. The person selected to serve as the PIO should have experience in working with the media and be generally familiar with the operations and policies of the local government. Public information staff from local agencies not normally affiliated with emergency response may be called upon to assist the EOC.

B. Responsibilities:

- ☐ PIO
  - ☐ Keep the public and the news media apprised of the current situation.
  - ☐ Establish procedures to counter rumors with factual information.
  - ☐ Handle all requests for disaster-related public information.
  - ☐ Stay abreast of the current situation.
  - ☐ Coordinate information releases with the IC.
  - ☐ Checklists containing specific duties of the PIO are included in Tab D-1.
  - ☐ Develop information that can be utilized by the functional needs' community.

TAB D-1: Public Information Officer Checklist

☐ **PLANNING AND PREPAREDNESS PHASE**

- ☐ Organize and train public information staff assigned to emergency responsibilities.
- ☐ Establish procedures for the collection and verification of the authenticity of official information during an emergency.
- ☐ Maintain COV pages on social media sites that can be used in the event of a disaster.
- ☐ Develop procedures to assure that all information for dissemination to the public conforms to DHS&EM requirements.
- ☐ Update existing plans for the dissemination of emergency public information, and develop a priority system governing the release of emergency information.
- ☐ Coordinate with other COV officials.
- ☐ Disseminate emergency planning information to the general public.
- ☐ Consider how to identify and communicate planning information with the functional needs' community (Annex O).
- ☐ Review and recommend changes to emergency public information procedures.
- ☐ Develop and maintain a file of pre-scripted news releases (i.e., medical self-help guidelines, warning system operations, emergency preparedness information).

☐ **WARNING PHASE**

- ☐ Report to the EOC upon order from the IC or designee.
- ☐ Prepare for the collection, authorization, and dissemination of emergency information.
- ☐ Initiate and coordinate all press releases with EOC staff and the IC.
- ☐ Direct the printing and distribution of community evacuation and shelter plans and emergency information documents on the orders of the IC, explaining emergency dangers, effects, and protective measures.
- ☐ Prepare and disseminate advisory bulletins based on factual information provided by local, state, and federal officials (i.e., COV evacuation route movement, meaning of warning signals, when and where to listen to official broadcasts, and home shelter protection/upgrading information and designs).
- ☐ Prepare and disseminate news releases to keep the public informed of an impending emergency, its projected effects, and actions to take for self-protection.
- ☐ Use TTY or TTD Telephone System to warn functional needs community.
- ☐ Post emergency news releases and information to the COV's social media pages.
- ☐ Determine needs for additional staff, equipment, and supplies for effective emergency information dissemination.

☐ **EMERGENCY PHASE**

- ☐ Distribute all information releases on a regular basis upon direction from the IC with support from EOC staff.
- ☐ Keep the public advised of evacuation movement patterns and related actions.
- ☐ Prepare and disseminate information and instructions to the public regarding welfare, health and medical, and other assistance available within the shelter areas.
- ☐ Consideration should be given to how best to provide updates to the functional needs'

community.

- ☐ Inform the public about places of contact for missing relatives, continued emergency services, and restricted areas.
- ☐ Provide special evacuation news bulletins for dissemination to the public to minimize psychological stress, and to clarify the existing emergency situation.
- ☐ Prepare to counter unfounded rumors with facts.
- ☐ Inform public officials of current state and national requirements and situations affecting emergency information.
- ☐ Monitor EOC situation reports, information received from local shelters, and the state to provide the public with accurate and up-to-date information concerning the emergency situation.
- ☐ Inform the public of additional shelter space, as made available, to aid movement to shelter.
- ☐ Ensure that all emergency public information communication facilities operable under emergency conditions are manned and activated.
- ☐ Disseminate information relating to emergency and executive instructions and bulletins through active emergency communication networks, including social media.
- ☐ Provide information about briefing times and sources of latest updates.

☐ **RECOVERY PHASE**

- ☐ Coordinate with EOC staff and the IC to release information and instructions regarding return from shelter sites, conditions, resource situations, welfare, and medical and health assistance.
- ☐ Assist as possible, through timely announcements, the orderly return of evacuees from the shelter areas.
- ☐ Provide information regarding locations established to facilitate public and private assistance for recovery when appropriate.

ANNEX E: Evacuation and Shelter in Place

1. Purpose

This Annex provides for the orderly and expeditious movement of people to a safe area from an area believed to be at risk when emergency situations necessitate such action. This Annex also provides guidance for implementation of shelter-in-place procedures.

2. Situation

The COV is subject to a number of potential natural and man-made hazards which might require the evacuation of segments of or the entire population.

3. Assumptions

A. In most instances, there will be sufficient time available to warn the general public of an impending disaster and permit at least some evacuation effort.
B. People who refuse to follow evacuation instructions will be left alone until all who are willing to leave have evacuated. Time permitting, further efforts will be made to persuade the stay-puts to evacuate.
C. Some evacuees will seek shelter with relatives and friends outside of the evacuated area.
D. All MOUs needed for outside help are maintained in the City Manager's office and updated.

4. Limitations

A. Evacuation out of the COV will be difficult as there are limited transportation routes out of Valdez.

5. Concept of Operations

A. General
1. The City Manager or Assistant City Manager(s) may activate the EOC and order an evacuation to protect lives and property. The IM Short Team may activate the EOC and order an evacuation if the City Manager or Assistant City Manager(s) are unavailable.
2. There are a number of factors that will be considered prior to ordering an evacuation/shelter-in-place. These include:
   a. Overall threat and nature of threat.
   b. Time until onset.
   c. Weather.
   d. Evacuation routes and their susceptibility to the hazard.
   e. Availability of shelters.
3. The COV will provide for evacuation from any area within the community that is stricken or threatened by an emergency that jeopardizes human life.
4. Prior to an evacuation, local authorities should review this Plan and consider potential evacuation sites, within or outside the community.
5. Sheltering-in-place or remaining at home may be a safe alternative when evacuation is not possible.

6. Evacuation information will be coordinated through the EOC and will be disseminated by one of the following means:
   a. Mass media, possibly through the EAS.
   b. Mobile sirens of Police and VFD vehicles.
   c. Door-to-door contact by Police, Fire and other departments' personnel.
   d. TV and social media.
7. Area-to-area evacuations will be initially managed on-scene by the VFD, VPD, or Public Works, who will immediately alert the EOC if the size and scope of the evacuation exceeds their capabilities.
8. When the conditions that caused the evacuation cease to exist, the EOC will coordinate reentry with the VPD, VFD and Public Works.
9. Where communities must rely on external transportation resources for evacuation assistance, City officials should invoke established MOUs for evacuation and sheltering (see Appendix A) and consult with appropriate local and state offices. The SEOC will act as the coordinating agency to address federal officials as part of the decision-making or assistance process.
10. If local resources are determined to be inadequate for evacuation operations, officials may request SEOC assistance. The SEOC will coordinate external resources for evacuation and sheltering with the local IMT or local officials.
11. Rosters to account for evacuees should be maintained and, when possible, shared with agencies assisting with the evacuation. Coordinated information will assist in providing adequate transportation and sheltering as well as supporting the planning requirements to repatriate evacuees. Shelter managers and evacuation directors should consider unique situations created by short-notice evacuations.
12. Special measures to account for functional needs populations, inmates kept at the COV jail, non-English speakers, and their associated dietary, medication, security, and translation needs shall be taken during the evacuation.
13. In general, it is not the intent of the COV or the State to forcibly evacuate persons who refuse to leave affected areas. However, if imminent life safety is a concern, it may be necessary to remove individuals who refuse to evacuate as a law enforcement matter.

B. Evacuation

1. Public education will be provided to the citizens of Valdez regarding evacuation procedures.
2. Evacuation will be accomplished through the most efficient and orderly way possible. This will be facilitated by using the most efficient methods of transporting evacuees possible, whether utilizing personal vehicles, school buses, ferries, boats, or walking.
3. The City will maintain evacuation routes that are clearly marked, free of debris, and have appropriate levels of traffic to ensure an efficient evacuation effort.
4. The urgency of the need to evacuate will generally require a reception center that will be known to the citizens, safe from tsunamis, and always available to temporary shelter evacuees from inclement weather, until regular shelters can be opened. The High School is the designated temporary shelter/reception center.
5. Plans to return evacuees to their homes in an orderly and safe fashion will be initiated by the Planning Section as soon as it is evident that there WILL be evacuees. The VFD, Public Works, and family and friends will be assisting the return of evacuees,

including the special needs population, back to their homes. In the case of hospital residents and patients, the VFD and hospital personnel will assist in returning evacuees to the hospital. MOUs will be developed by the City to provide facility specific safe havens for special needs citizens.

6. Factors considered prior to making the decision to return evacuees to their homes/businesses will include:
   a. Overall threat.
   b. Condition of the individual homes or businesses.
   c. Condition of access routes.
7. The COV School Emergency plan includes detailed evacuation plans specific to the schools, as well as a reunification plan for the post-evacuation period.

C. Shelter-in-Place

1. Public education will be provided to the citizens of Valdez regarding shelter in place procedures.
2. Once a shelter in place is called, residents are expected to immediately go indoors, bring all children and animals with them, and to close and lock windows and doors.
   a. All ways in which outside materials may enter the shelter area should be eliminated, including closure of fireplace dampers, shutting off ventilation or climate control systems, if able to depending on the time of year.
   b. Prepare an area for pets to eliminate waste that does not require allowing them to do so outside.
   c. If told to do so via television or radio, those sheltering should seal their rooms with duct tape and plastic.
   d. Upon reaching shelter, those who were outside for a period of time seeking shelter after the shelter in place was called and who may have been exposed to chemical contaminants should remove all outer clothing, put it in a plastic bag, and wash with warm water.
   e. After an announcement that the shelter in place is over, residents should go outside, and open all doors and windows to ventilate the shelter. Similar processes should be followed in cars, workplaces, or schools.
3. Factors considered prior to making the decision to terminate sheltering-in-place will be:
   a. Input from technical experts.
   b. Weather and wind patterns.
   c. Condition of the affected area.

D. Pet Shelter-in-Place

1. If a shelter in place is called, owners are responsible to shelter their pets.
2. In an evacuation, pets will not be allowed in public shelters, but will be housed in the Animal Shelter, which will be operated by the Animal Shelter Manager. In a mass evacuation of the entire population, pets will be accommodated, but must have individual kennels.

6. Organization and Assignment of Responsibilities

A. Preparation

- ☐ City Manager
  - ☐ Identify areas that may require evacuation, based on different scenarios.

- ☐ Ensure evacuation/shelter-in-place plans and procedures are effective for different scenarios.
- ☐ Identify and establish evacuation routes, detour routes, road closures. (Share with IM Short Team)
- ☐ Ensure all MOUs are in place.
- ☐ Ensure evacuation procedures are communicated to Department Directors.

☐ Department Directors
- ☐ Ensure Department knows roles in an evacuation.
- ☐ Identify and maintain resources that may be used in an evacuation.

B. Response

☐ City Manager
- ☐ Order evacuations or shelter-in-place whenever necessary to protect lives and property.
- ☐ Communicate evacuation or shelter-in-place process to the public to achieve a coordinated effort.

☐ VPD
- ☐ Facilitate efficient movement of population.
- ☐ Protect evacuation routes.
- ☐ Provide for efficient movement of people and vehicles through traffic controls.
- ☐ Ensure public safety in evacuation and shelter-in-place events.

☐ Public Works
- ☐ Ensure evacuation route is clearly marked by signs and barricades.
- ☐ Ensure evacuation route is able to sustain efficient evacuation by clearing debris and maintaining facilities.

☐ VFD
- ☐ Ensure clear lines of communication exist between the EOC, evacuation centers, and other critical locations.
- ☐ Ensure all areas are evacuated.

C. Recovery

☐ City Manager
- ☐ Coordinate recovery effort.
- ☐ Communicate procedures about repopulating or ceasing shelter-in-place.

☐ VPD
- ☐ Ensure efficient and safe movement of evacuees when returning.

☐ VFD
- ☐ Ensure evacuated areas are safe for repopulation.

☐ Department Directors
- ☐ Return department operations to pre-operation state by restocking supplies and equipment used in evacuation effort.
- ☐ Report evacuation information to appropriate agencies by filing proper paperwork.

TAB E-1: Evacuation Checklist

- ☐ **INCIDENT COMMANDER (City Manager or their designee)**
  - ☐ Identify the areas that are at risk.
  - ☐ Compare the risks associated with evacuation with the risks of sheltering-in-place.
  - ☐ Identify the area of lower risk.
  - ☐ Identify evacuation routes.
  - ☐ Consider the time needed for:
    - ☐ Notification
    - ☐ Evacuee Preparation
    - ☐ Travel time to leave the risk area
  - ☐ Identify alternative transportation for people who are without private transportation or with functional needs.
  - ☐ Consider special facilities such as schools, medical facilities, and essential utilities that need to be maintained.
  - ☐ Open evacuee reception areas.
  - ☐ Prepare evacuation instructions to include:
    - ☐ Nature of the problem
    - ☐ Area involved
    - ☐ Evacuation routes
    - ☐ Shelter or reception locations
    - ☐ Pet specific information
    - ☐ What to bring to a shelter
      - ☐ Medications
      - ☐ Glasses
      - ☐ Important documents
      - ☐ Personal hygiene items
      - ☐ Blankets
      - ☐ Change of clothing
      - ☐ Supplies for infant care
  - ☐ Disseminate evacuation instructions to Department Directors and the public.
  - ☐ Gather information from Department Directors about the situation.

ANNEX F: Mass Care and Sheltering

1. Purpose

This annex provides information regarding the location, establishment, and operation of shelters and congregate care facilities during emergency situations.

2. Situation

The COV could easily overwhelm their resources during any season if the need arose to shelter a large number of people.

3. Assumptions

A. Depending upon the nature of the emergency and the time of year, many evacuees will be able to seek shelter with family or friends, thus reducing the need for public shelters. There are, of course, exceptions to this general statement. Another would be in the event of a major earthquake or hazardous materials incident in which large segments of the population are displaced from their residences.

B. In some instances, some advanced warning of impending disasters will be received, thus allowing a portion of the community to seek shelter.

C. During large-scale incidents, other agencies such as the American Red Cross or the U.S. Coast Guard may be able to provide assistance with sheltering. It will take some time before either option could be possible in Valdez.

D. It is assumed that associated MOUs have been established and updated.

4. Limitations

A. Some of the shelters may not have cooking facilities.

B. Survival supplies are not available at all of the shelters.

C. Structural damage may limit the use of some of the shelters after an earthquake, flood, or severe weather.

5. Concept of Operations

A. General

1. The COV will carry out mass care of emergency/disaster survivors. This may be accomplished through established local government organizations such as the fire and police departments, and Public Health Nurse and voluntary organizations such as churches.
2. A vital element of any emergency/disaster relief effort is the assistance provided to local government(s) by voluntary organizations in the distribution of food, medicine, and supplies; the provision of emergency shelter; and the restoration of community services.
3. The number of people to be sheltered depends on the type of situation and time of year. Experience has dictated that people generally look at public shelters as a last resort, preferring to stay with friends or relatives if that option is available. In small scale incidents, where only a few people are involved, use of motels or hotels are often the preferred alternative for those that have nowhere else to go. Conversely, major events such as wide spread flooding would require an extensive sheltering effort by the local government. It will require a coordinated effort on the part of all

public officials and volunteer agencies and will normally require activation of the EOC.

4. The decision on whether or not to open public shelters rests with the City Manager. If the City Manager or Assistant City Manager(s) are unavailable, then the IM Short Team may make the decision. Disaster events requiring the sheltering of only a few individuals or families may be handled through volunteer organizations or churches within the community. Once the EOC has been activated to address a sheltering emergency, the Operations Chief has primary responsibility. The Operations Chief must work closely with all functional elements in the EOC to ensure sheltering needs of the public are being met. The Operations Chief will assign an individual to be the shelter coordinator.
5. The local Animal Control Officer will be responsible for running the Animal Shelter for the pets of evacuees.

6. Organization and Assignment of Responsibilities

A. The selection of shelter sites that will be used for a particular disaster situation is the responsibility of the Shelter Coordinator. In making this decision, the Shelter Coordinator must determine that the proposed shelters are available for use; that they are accessible; that sufficient personnel and supplies are available to operate the facilities; and that they are accessible to the functional needs' community.

B. Assignment of Responsibility

- ☐ Shelter Coordinator
  - ☐ Keep the City Manager apprised of their operational status and any requirements they may have for additional personnel or supplies.
- ☐ Public Information Officer
  - ☐ Use every means possible to notify the public of the location and anticipated opening of the shelter.
- ☐ Operations Section
  - ☐ Provide traffic control and security for the selected shelter sites.
  - ☐ Maintain access roads to the various sites.
- ☐ Logistics Chief
  - ☐ Handles requests for additional supplies such as equipment, food, etc., needed within the shelters.
  - ☐ Any available trained volunteers will be asked to manage the shelters and congregate care facilities once the evacuees have reached the designated sites.

TAB F-1: Potential Shelter Locations

Site (Bold is Primary)	Location	Beds	Bath-rooms	Showers	ADA Accessible	Back-Up Power
Valdez High School	319 Robe River Drive					
Gilson Middle School	357 Robe River Drive					
Herman Hutchens Elementary School	1009 West Klutina					
Bayside Community Church	321 Egan Ave					
First Baptist Church	360 Klutina St					
Valdez Assembly of God	151 Eklutna St					
Faith Harbor Fellowship	509 Airport Rd.					
St Francis Xavier Catholic Church	341 Pioneer Dr					
Epiphany Lutheran Church	309 E Pioneer Dr					
Valdez Bible Baptist Church	3066 Bering St					
Valdez Apostolic Church	324 Dylen Dr					
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints	750 Meals Ave					
Valdez Seventh-Day Adventist Church	341 Klutina St					
Church of the Nazarene	1392 Richardson Hwy					
Kingdom Hall of Jehovah's Witnesses	515 Meals Ave					
Valdez City Animal Control Shelter	276 Egan Ave, Valdez					

TAB F-2: Shelter Coordinator Checklists

☐ **PLANNING AND PREPAREDNESS PERIOD**

- ☐ Obtain a listing of shelters and congregate care facilities from the EOP (Tab F-1).
- ☐ Develop plans to provide for the welfare of the sheltered population in the event of a disaster or emergency. This plan should contain provisions for special needs groups such as the handicapped, elderly, and those incarcerated in jail.
- ☐ Identify local resources for emergency welfare operations.
- ☐ Establish liaison and coordinate with Alaska DHS&EM Management and appropriate local public agencies, private agencies, non-profit, and volunteer disaster relief organizations.
- ☐ Coordinate with Alaska DHS&EM and American Red Cross to obtain formal training as a shelter manager.
- ☐ Identify and train shelter's volunteer managers and staff.
- ☐ Review and update this section annually to reflect facility and personnel changes.
- ☐ Develop emergency record keeping system to monitor the supply and distribution of shelter services resources.

☐ **WARNING PHASE**

- ☐ Develop information program with the PIO regarding operations of shelter services for release to residents.
- ☐ Establish liaison with local and private support services for the provision of resources and personnel required to augment operations of the shelter system.
- ☐ Prepare to activate and monitor emergency operations of the shelters.
- ☐ Assign unit supervisors and support staff and brief them on emergency responsibilities.
- ☐ Arrange for the marking of unmarked facilities. Report to EOC operations regarding shelter readiness.
- ☐ Designate staging facilities within commuting distance of the hazardous area for essential workers.
- ☐ Determine arrangements necessary to accommodate sheltered population requiring hospitalization, medication, or special care.
- ☐ Distribute necessary forms for sheltered population as required (i.e., registration forms, meal cards, food assistance, etc.).
- ☐ Coordinate food supply and storage requirements for mass feeding sites with EOC staff. Assign volunteers to perform mass feeding requirements.
- ☐ Coordinate with Medical Services to conduct inspections of sanitary conditions in shelter facilities and mass feeding sites.
- ☐ Coordinate with Public Safety to provide security and protection for shelters.
- ☐ Coordinate with Public Works to improvise shelters through upgrading of existing facilities and construction of expedient shelters. Expedient shelters will be used only after all appropriate upgradeable facilities have been used.
- ☐ Review and update shelter allocations for the residents in coordination with the Operations Section Chief.
- ☐ Review and update shelter assignments.
- ☐ Consult with the Logistics Section Chief to obtain additional supplies for shelters as required (i.e., bedding, clothing, personal hygiene supplies).

☐ **RESPONSE PHASE – EVACUATION RECEPTION**

- ☐ Direct staff to report for duty to designated shelters.
- ☐ Direct and supervise operations of shelter services.
  Shelter Manager would oversee occupancy load limits.
  Compile census reports of the sheltered population.
  Report daily to the IC and Operations Section Chief regarding status and needs of sheltered population.
- ☐ Implement emergency record keeping system to be submitted to the Logistics Section to monitor the supply and distribution of resources.
- ☐ Monitor surpluses/deficiencies of supplies, equipment, and staff.
- ☐ Maintain liaison with private support services.
- ☐ Continue to coordinate operations with the EOC and auxiliary personnel, as noted under increased readiness phase.
- ☐ Direct the stocking of shelters with public works, health and medical, and food services staff, in accordance with operational readiness requirements.
- ☐ Coordinate release of emergency information regarding shelter operations to the public with the PIO.
- ☐ Coordinate with Operations Section – Law Branch to provide security (possible sources may be corrections officers, U.S. Coast Guard) for shelters and supply storage areas.
- ☐ Coordinate with the Fire Chief to enforce strict fire prevention measures at all shelter facilities.
- ☐ Provide emergency welfare services (i.e., care of handicapped, elderly and crisis counseling) for the relocated population.
- ☐ Coordinate with the SEOC to obtain supply items (food, water).

☐ **RECOVERY PHASE**

- ☐ Determine post-emergency environment in conjunction with COV officials and the State regarding the return of evacuees.
- ☐ Coordinate and initiate the return of relocated population to the evacuated area as soon as feasible.
- ☐ Coordinate transportation and traffic control for returning population to evacuated areas.
- ☐ Develop public information with the PIO to disseminate recovery and disaster assistance information.
- ☐ Submit expenditure reports, personnel costs, unpaid supply requisitions, and other emergency records for reimbursement to the Finance Section Chief.

ANNEX G: Health and Medical Services

1. Purpose

The purpose of this annex is to provide guidance regarding the activities that are associated with lifesaving; treatment, transport, and evacuation of the injured; behavioral health; mass distribution of prophylactic vaccinations; disposition of the dead; and disease control activities related to sanitation, preventing contamination of water and food supplies, etc., during response and recovery operations. It focuses on health and medical problems under emergency conditions.

2. Situation

A. The COV, although limited by virtue of its geographical isolation, infrastructure capacity, and size, has a range of health services capabilities. Depending upon the length and severity of the emergency, those capabilities may become overwhelmed.

1. The **Providence Valdez Medical Center (PVMC)** is owned by the COV and operated by Providence St. Joseph Health Services in Alaska. The PVMC with Long Term Care has a normal capacity of 21 licensed beds. There are 5-6 Medical Doctors (MDs), 1 Certified Registered Nurse Anesthetist, 1 Registered Dietician, 3 lab technicians, 3 X-ray technicians, 1 pharmacist, 2 pharmacy technicians, 3 physical therapists, 1 occupational therapist, 1 Speech pathologist, 30 Registered Nurses (RNs) and 24 Certified Nursing Assistants working at the facility. There are 5 Facilities & Engineering staff, 6 Dietary staff, 9 Environmental Service workers, 13 Business Office workers, 7 Mental Health and Substance Abuse Counselors (several are licensed social workers), and 1 RN Case Manager. The hospital maintains a licensed drug room, and there is one private pharmacy in town.
2. A **State of Alaska Public Health Nurse** is located in COV; the office has one nurse and an administrative assistant. The Public Health Nurse is responsible for the National Stockpile cache and is the responsible party for mass vaccinations. The State of Alaska Public Health Nurse in COV has an up-to-date Points of Dispensing Plan as of June 17, 2020 which is located in Appendix E of this EOP.
3. **VFD** currently has 24 medics, ranging from EMTs to EMT III's. Additionally, there are three ambulances, ALS-certified.
4. First Aid/CPR trained individuals from other agencies, such as the Alaska Wildlife Trooper, the U.S. Forest Service (season worker), the Alaska State Parks Ranger (season worker), and the Valdez School District will also be called upon in a disaster. The U.S. Coast Guard may offer resources during an emergency if needed.

3. Assumptions

1. A disaster that causes numerous casualties and /or fatalities will immediately overwhelm local medical, health, and mortuary services capabilities.
2. It is assumed that, in any major disaster, all health and medical volunteers will first attend to their own families.
3. It is assumed that all MOUs needed for outside help are maintained and updated.
4. It is assumed that, due to the size of the community and the limited resources, health professionals may be asked to perform functions that are not normally in their job

description. There may be an overlap of responsibilities. For example, EMTs may be asked to work in the emergency room, which is not normally the case.

4. Concept of Operations

A. General

In general, there will be a medical decision-making entity, with representation from PVMC, Public Health Nurse, and Emergency Services. This entity will be called the "Medical Branch Representatives." The Medical Branch Representatives will collectively choose one person to send to the EOC, who will serve as the Medical Advisor within the Policy Section. This also includes coordination of any medical and healthcare services that may be made available by voluntary organizations of other agencies.

1. Delegation of the Medical Branch Representatives will include representatives from PVMC, Public Health Nurse, and Emergency Services. In the event that any of the delegated Medical Representatives are unavailable, the next in line of authority in each entity will take their place.
2. Any incoming Health and Medical response groups will coordinate with the Medical Branch Representatives, providing a representative to work alongside the Medical Branch Representatives.
3. Sources for potential medical and general health supplies that may be needed during a disaster are listed in the State of Alaska Public Health Nurse in Valdez Points of Dispensing Plan, which is found Appendix E.
4. Offices of each health and medical entity are as follows:

PVMC	911 Meals Ave.
Providence Valdez Extended Care	911 Meals Ave.
Valdez Public Health Center	1001 Meals Ave.
Valdez Medical Clinic	1001 Meals Ave.
Alpha Doc	154 Fairbanks Drive
VFD/Emergency Services	City Hall on Chenega

5. Hospitals/Clinics/Public Health
   a. The providers of routine health and medical services in the COV are the PVMC, Medical Clinic, and the Public Health Center. In the event of a disaster or a catastrophic event, these entities will combine resources and work together in an emergency under the Medical Branch Representatives.
   b. The PVMC will receive and treat injured/ill patients.
   c. The State of Alaska Department of Health and Human Services Public Health Nurse's concerns during a disaster would include identifying and controlling environmental health hazards, issuing health advisories to the public on water supplies, coordinating with Public Works for waste disposal, controlling disease vectors, monitoring food at mass care facilities, and distributing mass prophylactic vaccinations through a distribution center.
6. Emergency Services
   a. The provider of Emergency Services to the COV is the VFD. During a disaster emergency that result(s) in multiple casualties, the VFD would provide emergency medical services.

******See ANNEX I: FIRST RESPONDERS***

b. Additional Emergency Services resources are available through various State of Alaska and Federal government resources which can be accessed by contacting SEOC and requesting assistance. This would be a decision made by the IC, with input from the Medical Advisor.
c. The VFD will be the agency responsible for establishing the on-scene ICP, utilizing the NIMS ICS, using either single or UC, as appropriate. If the incident is localized to the airport, UC must be established with the ADOT.
d. The START triage system will be initiated with initial care provided in the field, and secondary care provided by PVMC. In the event that the hospital facility is overwhelmed with patients, provisions for the transfer of patients to the chosen alternate care site would be the responsibility of the Medical Representatives in coordination with the IMT commanding the incident.
e. Other agencies such as the American Red Cross, the Salvation Army, and various religious clergy can also provide behavioral health support. Additionally, if a local disaster has been declared, requesting state assistance, behavioral health services can be accessed by contacting the SEOC.
f. Behavioral health support for responders is provided by local resources specifically trained to work with first responders in the field of Critical Incident Stress Management (CISM), and who follow the model of the International Critical Incident Stress Foundation, Inc. Local resources should be utilized if available, and if not, State or Federal CISM resources should be requested. Behavioral health resources should be considered a part of the operational strategy and are to be activated as soon as possible following an incident. Activation can take place through the VFD or the VPD. See the resource list.

7. Fatality Management
   a. The mission of fatality management is that all human remains are handled, transported, and stored in an appropriate, dignified manner, consistent with policies and procedures found in the publication "*Catastrophic Fatality Management: Guidelines for Cities*". Our ability to respectfully handle the deceased will, in turn, support the well-being of the living.
   b. The well-being and safety of all responders participating in the recovery of human remains is of utmost importance. All personal protective gear and procedures will be utilized at all times.
   c. At present, PVMC has the capacity to hold two deceased patients. There is no private mortuary service provided in the community. The bodies of deceased patients require transportation to Anchorage.
   d. In the event of a multi-fatality incident, procedures to set up a temporary morgue will be initiated. The State of Alaska Medical Examiner is ultimately responsible for the collection, identification, and disposition of deceased persons and human tissue from a multi-casualty incident. In addition, FEMA has the capability to provide Disaster Mortuary Assistance Teams (DMORT) to respond to the scene of a multi-casualty incident. FEMA DMORT can be accessed by contacting the SEOC and requesting assistance. The COV must have declared a disaster in order to request this assistance, and the process of receiving the assistance may take considerable time. The COV can prepare itself for those instances when Valdez will be expected to manage fatalities until relief is available.

e. Until state support arrives, a Temporary Morgue Manager (TMM) will be appointed by the Medical Advisor. There is one temporary refrigerated van in Valdez. There are multiple freezer units in Valdez. Before moving human remains to any storage unit, **it is important to understand that, unless communications with the Alaska State Medical Examiner's Office (AKSMEO) are completely down, approval from the AKSMEO is recommended prior to moving bodies from the incident location.**

f. Report disaster deaths **to the AKSMEO as soon as practically possible**. In any emergency or disaster, deaths that result from the incident, or occurred during an incident are potentially unnatural deaths, and therefore are within the legal jurisdiction of the AKSMEO. Ideally, this reporting would be done by Law Enforcement as soon as the scene assessment has been completed.
   i. Examples: During an earthquake, if someone dies as a result of a structural collapse, the AKSMEO will take jurisdiction over the death.
   ii. Additionally, first influenza (or pandemic illness) deaths should be reported to the AKMSEO, unless otherwise notified by Public Health.

g. With regards to pronouncement of death, physicians provide this service unless the death(s) are expected and delegated to an registered nurse to do so.

h. With regards to certification of death, the PVMC provides this service. The AKSMEO may also certify deaths resulting from any type of disaster or mass fatality incident.

i. An outside funeral home or Medical Examiner facilitates the issuance of death certificates by providing documents to the State. If an individual is buried in Valdez and does not go to these two entities, then the PVMC will submit documents to the state of Alaska, and they will issue the death certificate. If the Medical Examiner releases the body to family without an examination, then it may go to an outside funeral home.

j. Responding to 911 calls concerning bodies/missing persons will be challenging. Immediately following a major disaster, the IC will create an EOC position to manage this need. This will assist in offloading calls concerning bodies and unaccounted for persons from 911 operators to allow Dispatch to respond to emergency calls. Once this position has been established, all calls concerning missing or deceased persons should be referred to him or her.

k. Behavioral Health needs of the community, as well as the Temporary Morgue staff, shall be attended to. Members of the clergy or the Valdez Counseling Center shall be retained for on-the-spot counseling at the Temporary Morgue. Additionally, in the event the community is isolated post-disaster, the Valdez Counseling Center will continue to support families of missing persons.

l. The City PIO will keep the public informed concerning the handling of human remains. Consistent and regular briefings should be delivered to the community.

m. In general, permission is recommended to be obtained from the AKSMEO before remains are removed from any incident site (see e above). In a mass fatality situation, Law Enforcement will aid the AKSMEO in conducting death investigations. In anticipation of law enforcement being overwhelmed, law enforcement may work with the COV in advance to train and organize people

from other disciplines to follow the appropriate steps and support law enforcement in the effort.

n. Tracking of the human remains, from the incident site to the temporary morgue, is of the upmost importance. In order to track human remains, body bag tags will be utilized in addition to maintaining a chain of custody. Instructions may be found on the last page of the publication "*Catastrophic Fatality Management: Guidelines for Cities.*" It is necessary that body bag tags are linked to associated remains until collection by authorized mortuary personnel.

o. The incident site (while human remains are still there) and the temporary morgue should be fully secured, at all times, with access limited to a minimal number of approved staff.

5. Organization and Assignment of Responsibilities

A. Organization

1. Located in the COV is a State of Alaska Public Health Nurse. The Public Health Nurse will have the primary responsibility to advise the IC on all things relating to activities that are associated with lifesaving; treatment, transport, and evacuation of the injured; behavioral health; mass distribution of prophylactic vaccinations; disposition of the dead; and disease control activities related to sanitation and preventing contamination of water and food supplies, etc., during response and recovery operations.

B. Assignment of Responsibilities

- ☐ Medical Representative
  - ☐ State of Alaska Public Health Nurse located in Valdez, Alaska.
- ☐ PIO
  - ☐ Use every means possible to notify the public of the location and anticipated medical facilities (both primary and temporary).
- ☐ Operations Section
  - ☐ Coordinate with other security personnel such as corrections officers or U.S. Coast Guard members.
  - ☐ Provide traffic control and security for the selected primary and temporary medical sites.
- ☐ Public Works Department
  - ☐ Maintain access roads to the various sites.
- ☐ Logistics Chief
  - ☐ Handles requests for additional supplies such as equipment, food, etc., needed within the medical community.
  - ☐ Any available trained volunteers will be asked to treat and care for the wounded to the level of their training at designated sites.

ANNEX H: Logistics and Resource Management

1. Purpose

This Annex will provide guidance and outline procedures for obtaining, managing, allocating, and monitoring the use of resources prior to, during, and after emergency situations or when such situations appear imminent.

2. Situation

A. All emergency response agencies manage equipment, facilities, and supplies to accomplish their day-to-day tasks. Large incidents, however, can require more specialized resources than the responding agencies may have available.

B. A major disaster or emergency may overwhelm the capabilities and exhaust the resources of the COV.

3. Assumptions

The City has established MOUs and agreements with entities that can supply resources in the event of a disaster.

4. Limitations

A. There are a limited number of resources available in the COV.

B. Outside resources may take days, or in extreme cases, weeks to arrive, and the COV has little control over logistics beyond its borders. The COV should prepare accordingly.

C. During the winter months, the COV may be only accessed by plane if Thompson Pass shuts down the only road in and out of the community. Damage to the runway would hamper the movement of resources into the community.

5. Concept of Operations

A. General

1. Resources will be inventoried, prioritized, and used in the most efficient manner possible, and will be applied to functions and areas of greatest need.
2. Acquisitions and purchases dedicated to saving life or property during an emergency will be given priority.
3. Response agencies are expected to be able to sustain themselves during the first seven days of an emergency.
4. Each household in the COV is encouraged to develop family disaster and emergency communication plans and to maintain essential supplies to be self-sufficient for at least seven days.
5. In the event all local resources are committed, assistance will be sought from surrounding jurisdictions where jurisdictional agreements may be established. Effective cross-jurisdictional coordination using processes and systems described in the NIMS is critical in the establishment of such agreements. Where possible, each jurisdiction will execute agreements in advance with groups and individuals for use of their resources.
6. Some of the resources needed for emergency operations may be available only from the private sector, individuals, or volunteer or non-traditional donations management

agencies. Hence, procedures are established for emergency purchasing and contracting.

7. Each agency is responsible for arranging the movement of its assets to locations where they are needed during emergencies and disasters. If the COV does not have suitable transportation capabilities, it may request assistance through the EOC.
8. Normal procurement procedures may be suspended during an emergency, although existing agreements and procedures should be used whenever feasible.
9. The EOC may request additional resources from the SEOC after all available COV resources have been exhausted.
10. During an emergency, the IC may request Department Directors suspend functions that do not contribute directly to response actions.
11. The IC may invoke temporary controls on local resources and establish priorities during an emergency. These may include fuel, food, shelter, and other resources necessary for human needs. If this situation occurs, the COV will endeavor to cooperate with the private sector and with the State in encouraging voluntary controls and to enforce mandatory controls when necessary.
12. When circumstances dictate, emergency response field personnel may be given purchasing authority after coordination with the purchasing officer. Payment for such needs is the responsibility of the requesting agency.
13. When high priority needs cannot be satisfied quickly through procurement and hiring, or when the cost begins to outweigh time as a consideration, an appeal can be made through the PIO for donations of goods or services in question.
14. Early and accurate documentation of costs and damage estimates are essential to the application for potential reimbursement from State or Federal disaster assistance.
15. At the close of an incident, all loaned equipment will be returned to its owners.

6. Organization

The IC is responsible for managing emergency resources at the incident site and shall be assisted by a staff commensurate with the tasks to be performed and resources committed to the operation. The ICS structure includes a Logistics Section, which is responsible for obtaining and maintaining personnel, facilities, equipment, and supplies committed to the emergency operation. The IC will determine the need to establish a Logistics Section. This decision is usually based on the size and anticipated duration of the incident and the complexity of support.

7. Responsibilities

A. Preparation Phase

- ☐ Department Directors
  - ☐ Maintain supplies to be able to sustain responders for seven days.
- ☐ City Manager
  - ☐ Negotiate and approve contracts for support of emergency actions.
  - ☐ Maintain a list of resources available for emergency response in accordance with NIMS.
  - ☐ Establish and maintain MOUs with potential suppliers and donors.
  - ☐ Coordinate mutual aid agreements with neighboring jurisdictions.

B. Response Phase

- ☐ Incident Commander

- ☐ Coordinate overall disaster response during major emergency.
- ☐ Assign Logistics Section to facilitate resource acquisition, if needed.
- ☐ Adjudicate competing resource needs.
- ☐ Establish limits on resource consumption.
- ☐ Limit functions that consume resources and do not directly support emergency operations.

☐ Finance Department
- ☐ Provide liaison support for donations request, including staff and volunteers.
- ☐ Facilitate acquisition of all supplies, equipment, and services necessary in support of response effort.

☐ City Manager
- ☐ Coordinate with State and Federal agencies to secure additional resources.

C. Recovery Phase

☐ Department Directors
- ☐ Restock supplies and equipment used in the event, and return any equipment obtained from other agencies after proper cleaning/inspection.
- ☐ Complete and submit necessary reporting paperwork to appropriate agencies, including an itemized list of all damaged equipment and supplies.
- ☐ Provide appreciation and recognition to volunteers, donors, and all who supported the response effort.

☐ Finance
- ☐ Arrange for timely reimbursement of private vendors who supplied equipment; a list should be available from the EOC or IC.

ANNEX I: First Responders

1. Purpose

The purpose of this Annex is to provide guidance to First Responders, in the event of an emergency. First Responders are the VPD and VFD that supply Emergency Services. Other State and Federal law enforcement are stationed in the community, including the AST, the Alaska State Parks Ranger (seasonal), and the U.S. Coast Guard.

2. Situation

A. VFD is the primary fire control agency in this jurisdiction.
   1. VFD roster includes 10 paid firefighters and 30 volunteer fire and rescue personnel.
   2. VFD maintains three ambulances, four engines, one squad, and two tankers.
   3. VFD has one fully staffed fire station and two auxiliary stations.

B. VPD is the primary law enforcement agency in this jurisdiction.
   1. VPD has 12 sworn law enforcement officers, including the Chief of Police.
   2. AST has one wildlife trooper assigned to this jurisdiction.

C. Due to its isolation, the community must rely exclusively on VFD and the agencies listed below for fire suppression:
   1. ARFF (DOT resources) at the airport.

3. Assumptions

A. Police, Troopers, Fire, Emergency Services are trained in the ICS.

B. In a disaster, the highest and most immediate priority will be given to the rescue and care of victims.

C. Every individual will know laws, rules, and regulations in emergency situations and will comply with the lawful directions of duly constituted authorities.

4. Limitations

A. Police, Troopers, Fire, and Emergency Services resources will be overwhelmed in any major disaster.

B. In a disaster, the rescue capability of the VFD must be augmented by the resources of other agencies and by trained citizen volunteers.

5. Concept of Operations

A. General
   1. Extrication from entrapment and/or endangered areas, stabilization, and transportation of the injured to the hospital, and provision of medical care will take precedence over all other emergency services operations.
   2. In a disaster, special rescue operations will start as soon as possible in order to rescue or evacuate the greatest number of people before hazards such as fire, explosion, impending structural collapse, rising water, etc., impede emergency operations.

B. Police
   1. The VPD will continue to function and operate in accordance with its normal operations, accepting additional responsibilities as may be imposed by a disaster.

2. Law enforcement functions, including judicial proceedings, in a disaster, will be carried out according to the requirements of law and to the extent feasible.
3. One of those additional duties will be to assist Public Works in performing the initial Windshield assessment of the community, information that is of vital importance to determine the affected areas for operational planning, conducting in-depth damage assessments, and requesting State assistance.
4. During a period of increased tension, the VPD will take precautionary steps to prepare it to ensure the maintenance of law and order under conditions of stress beyond those of normal operations.

C. Fire
1. The VFD will continue to function and operate in accordance with its normal firefighting operations, accepting additional responsibilities as may be imposed by a disaster.

D. Rescue
1. The VFD will continue to function and operate in accordance with its normal Search and Rescue (SAR) procedures, accepting additional responsibilities as may be imposed by a disaster. VFD is responsible for urban SAR and is also available to support SARs conducted by the Alaska Wildlife Trooper, if requested.

E. Emergency Services
1. VFD ambulances will continue to function and operate in accordance with their normal Emergency Services SOPs and Standing Orders, accepting additional responsibilities as may be imposed by a disaster.
2. Emergency Services will assess, treat, transport, and account for all injured or ill patients that are transported by VFD.
3. Additional medical supplies are found at the VFD fire station(s) and through other entities in the COV. When local medical supplies are in danger of becoming exhausted, a request for additional supplies will be made to the SEOC, through the Logistics Section Chief.

6. Organization and Assignment of Responsibilities

A. Organization
1. VPD's succession of command:
   a. Chief
   b. Lieutenant
   c. Sergeant
2. VFD's succession of command:
   a. Chief
   b. Captain
   c. Lieutenant

B. Assignment of Responsibilities
1. Preparation

☐ Police Chief
- ☐ Ensure vital equipment is in the condition necessary for major emergencies.
- ☐ Train responders and Department personnel.
- ☐ Develop/update plans and operating procedures for responders that are coordinated with those of other COV emergency services.
- ☐ Maintain an inventory of all first responder resources within the COV.

- ☐ Fire Chief
  - ☐ Update preplans by identifying structures susceptible to fire and preparing building layouts and IAPs.
  - ☐ Ensure vital equipment is in the condition necessary for major emergencies.
  - ☐ Train responders and Department personnel.
  - ☐ Develop/update plans and operating procedures for responders that are coordinated with those of other COV emergency services.
  - ☐ Maintain an inventory of all first responder resources within the COV.

2. Response

- ☐ Police Chief
  - ☐ Determine the priority of Department operations.
  - ☐ Ensure the safety of response personnel.
  - ☐ Determine the radio frequencies to use.
- ☐ VPD
  - ☐ Enforce laws of the COV, and maintain civil order.
  - ☐ Provide traffic control.
  - ☐ Ensure security of emergency operations, including shelter facilities, emergency supplies, and investigations.
  - ☐ Provide suitable detention facilities.
- ☐ Fire Chief
  - ☐ Determine the priority of Department operations.
  - ☐ Ensure the safety of response personnel.
  - ☐ Determine the equipment, strategies, and tactics for EMS and fire operations.
  - ☐ Determine the radio frequencies to use.
- ☐ VFD
  - ☐ Extinguish fires that pose a threat to life and property.
  - ☐ Provide equipment and manpower for conducting search, rescue, evacuation, and mass casualty response.
  - ☐ Conduct a thorough search of impacted areas for missing persons.

3. Recovery

- ☐ Police and Fire Chiefs
  - ☐ Perform a post-incident briefing and critique.
- ☐ VPD and VFD
  - ☐ Assist in restoring the incident area(s) to a safe condition and returning evacuees as appropriate.

ANNEX J: Public Works and Transportation

1. Purpose

The purpose of this Annex is to provide guidance for maintaining COV buildings, streets, waterlines, and sewers during a disaster. It also provides guidance procedures for damage assessments.

2. Situation

A. The COV has a variety of resources available for Public Works - resources operated by the Public Works Department and the Port, as well as support from the ADOT&PF and local contractors.

3. Assumptions

A. Associated MOUs have been established and updated.
B. Local non-COV public works resources will work within the IMS.

4. Limitations

A. The COV has limited resources.
B. The COV is only accessible by one highway, air, or by Prince William Sound from major hubs.

5. Concept of Operations

A. General
1. The Operations Section Chief, will manage the Public Works functions (as well as other Ops Branches) during a disaster from the EOC.
2. The Emergency Manager will ensure local personnel skilled in engineering and public works will be pre-identified and assigned to coordinate with State public works and engineering during emergencies or disasters. This will largely be accomplished through the City's Capital Facilities and Public Works departments.
3. In the event of a disaster, Public Works response includes:
   a. Monitor and report the status of and damage to the transportation infrastructure and public facilities;
   b. Provide for operations, maintenance, and restoration of essential transportation infrastructure;
   c. Provide for repair and restoration of essential public facilities;
   d. Identify temporary alternate transportation solutions to be implemented by others when primary systems and routes are unavailable or overwhelmed;
   e. Implement appropriate security measures for protection of transportation infrastructure and public facilities;
   f. Coordinate the issuance of regulatory waivers and exemptions;
   g. Provide for long-term coordination of the restoration and recovery of the affected transportation infrastructure and public facilities; and
   h. Activate emergency task forces, mutual aid agreements, and additional resources to support response and recovery of essential transportation.
4. The Operations Section Chief, will use both COV and non-COV resources to accomplish the objective of each operational period during disaster operations. Each

of the Divisions within Public Works (which are divided by functions) will be managed by the Supervisor of that Division, reporting directly to the Operations Section Chief.

5. The ADOT&PF will clear, repair, and maintain roads and airfields within their jurisdiction, as well as assist the COV, if requested.
   a. The ADOT&PF maintains the following roads/airfields:
      i. Airport.
      ii. Richardson Highway.
6. Request for ADOT&PF and engineering resources and services will be coordinated through the EOC. Requests made from the EOC will be coordinated with and approved through the SEOC before action is taken.

6. Organization

A. The Public Works Department of the COV is divided into three Divisions, by functional responsibility.
   1. Streets Division.
   2. Solid Waste Division.
   3. Water and Sewage Division.

7. Responsibilities

A. Preparation
- ☐ Department Directors
  - ☐ Take all feasible steps to remove and protect equipment in accordance with Departmental SOPs.
  - ☐ Communicate anticipated Departmental needs amongst other Departments.
- ☐ Public Works Director
  - ☐ Train operators for available equipment.
  - ☐ Maintain Hazmat certifications and training.
- ☐ Human Resources
  - ☐ Maintain a roster of personnel available for assignment during a disaster.

B. Response
- ☐ Department Directors
  - ☐ Report damages of Department resources.
- ☐ Public Works Director
  - ☐ Coordinate all available COV and privately-owned transportation and construction equipment.
  - ☐ Track all resources and the amount of time worked, and maintain cost sheets on all private equipment use and personnel. (This is performed in conjunction with the Finance Department).
  - ☐ Ensure shelters have adequate power supply, water supply, and waste disposal facilities.
  - ☐ Coordinate protecting and repairing the COV's water supply and waste disposal facilities.
  - ☐ Coordinate debris clearance and disposal.
  - ☐ Perform basic Windshield assessments throughout the community.
  - ☐ Assist Police Department in creating safety/security perimeters at hazard locations as needed.

- ☐ Inspect transportation/evacuation routes.
- ☐ Provide traffic control and security for Public Works operations.

C. Recovery

- ☐ Department Directors
  - ☐ Submit expenditure reports, personnel costs, and other emergency records to the Finance/Administration Section for reimbursement.
  - ☐ Order stand-down of responders, and resume normal operations.
- ☐ Public Works Director
  - ☐ Return equipment obtained from other agencies after proper cleaning and inspection.
  - ☐ Repair and restore roads, buildings, water lines, and sewer.

TAB J-1: Damage Assessment Form

☐ **Original** ☐ **Revision #_____**		**Date:**
Type of Disaster:		**Date(s) of Occurrence:**
Jurisdiction (town, county, agency, etc.):		**County:**
Area Affected (northeast, west side, etc.):		
Information provided by:		
Name:		**Title:**
Address:		**Day Phone:**
		Evening Phone:
PUBLIC DAMAGE		
A	**DEBRIS REMOVAL** (trees, building wreckage, sand, mud, silt, gravel, vehicles, and other disaster-related material)	$
B	**EMERGENCY PROTECTIVE MEASURES** (sandbagging, barricades, signs, extra police and fire, and emergency health measures)	$
C	**ROADS AND BRIDGES** (roads, culverts, bridges, and associated facilities)	$
D	**WATER CONTROL FACILITIES** (dams, reservoirs, shore protective devices, pumping and irrigation facilities, drainage channels, and levees)	$
E	**BUILDINGS AND EQUIPMENT** (buildings, supplies, inventory, vehicles, and equipment)	$
F	**UTILITIES** (water treatment plants and delivery systems, power generation and distribution facilities, sewerage collection systems and treatment plants)	$
G	**PARKS, RECREATIONAL, AND OTHERS** (playground equipment, swimming pools, bath houses, tennis courts, boat docks, piers, picnic tables, cemeteries, and golf courses)	$
	TOTAL	$
PRIVATE NONPROFIT (education, medical, custodial care, emergency [fire departments, search and rescue, and ambulances], utility, and other [museums, community centers, libraries, homeless shelters, senior citizen centers, health and safety services.])		$
PUBLIC DAMAGE—GRAND TOTAL		$

INDIVIDUAL DAMAGE

Jurisdiction:		**Date:**	
PEOPLE AFFECTED	**Number**	**ASSISTANCE PROVIDED**	**Number**
Deaths		**Persons Evacuated**	
Injuries		**Persons in Public Shelters**	
Missing			

RESIDENTIAL	**Primary**		**Secondary**	
	Number	**Value (if known)**	**Number**	**Value (if known)**
(ARC) 3 Houses destroyed		$		$
(ARC) 2 Houses with major damage		$		$
(ARC) 1 Houses with minor damage		$		$
Houses affected		$		$
(ARC) 3 Mobile homes destroyed		$		$
(ARC) 2 Mobile homes severely damaged		$		$
(ARC) 1 Mobile homes moderately damaged		$		$
Mobile homes affected		$		$
TOTAL		$		$
TOTAL RESIDENTIAL (primary plus secondary)				$

BUSINESS		
Businesses affected		$
Number now unemployed		
Estimated duration of unemployment (weeks)		
TOTAL BUSINESS		$

AGRICULTURE	
Farm buildings and equipment	$
Crop land (all crops)	$
Livestock	$
TOTAL AGRICULTURE	$
INDIVIDUAL DAMAGE TOTAL	$

CALL or FAX THIS INFORMATION to your
Borough EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
as SOON as POSSIBLE (BEFORE MAILING)

State of Alaska Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management
P.O. Box 5750, JBER, AK 99505-5750
Phone: 907-428-7000
Fax: 907-428-7009

ANNEX K: Oil and Hazardous Materials Spill Response

1. Purpose

This Annex provides for a coordinated emergency response by the COV and Industry to mitigate the adverse effects on the population and environment resulting from an uncontrollable release of/or exposure to hazardous materials (hazmat).

The COV has very little control over the local fishing industry, fuel storage, or other large storage of hazardous materials. In this regard, the COV would provide a supporting role to local industries in any response.

2. Situation

A. Hazardous materials pose a potential threat to a community at both fixed facilities and during transport (by road, pipeline, or waterway).
B. Numerous facilities use and transport chemicals which pose threats to public and private sectors. They routinely provide Safety Data Sheets (SDSs) (formerly known as material safety data sheets - MSDS) to supporting fire departments which are responsible for training fire fighters who respond to hazmat incidents.
C. Over 400 hazardous materials have been identified by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) as subject to the requirements for the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA) Title III.
D. The COV has identified many of these hazardous materials. The VFD has a list of hazardous material storage locations around Valdez.
E. Hazardous materials release/oil spills are unique not only due to their complex nature, but also due to the overlapping jurisdictional concerns and statutory mandates involved.
F. Significant cooperation and coordination will be required between multiple local, State, and Federal public safety and environmental organization to ensure successful operations.
G. The response to these spills must be quantitative, measured, and verifiable due to potential litigation which may come at a later date. In this instance, accurate record keeping and maintenance is important.

3. Assumptions

A. Safety of all responders is the number one priority.
B. The First On-Scene Responder may not be a highly-trained hazmat handling specialist, but as first on-the-scene, becomes the initial response force.
C. Local, State, and Federal hazardous materials response teams and other support agencies will respond with technical expertise and resources upon request by COV officials. Due to statutory requirements, it is important that all personnel involved in planning, response, and recovery operations be properly trained and certified by the appropriate controlling authority.
D. Emergency response personnel will be trained in hazardous materials control (within the capabilities and resources available and based on known local hazards) and all response vehicles will be equipped with emergency response reference materials guidebooks.

E. Facilities subject to reporting under the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of the SARA of 1986 will provide SDSs or a list of SDS chemicals to the Local Emergency Planning Committee per AS 26.23.073, COV Public Safety Department, and the Alaska State Emergency Response Commission (SERC).

F. Private agencies involved in the manufacture, use, storage, and transportation of hazardous materials will cooperate with local governments in preparing for response to hazardous materials incidents.

G. Spill emergencies are likely to result in significant media attention which can have second and third order affects that may influence response and recovery operations. Such media attention can bring with it a disruptive protest element which must be mitigated to ensure successful response and recovery operations.

4. Limitations

A. The COV has a limited number of resources for responding to a hazardous material incident.

B. Not all hazardous materials may be reported correctly, therefore, responders may not have complete information about the emergency.

5. Concept of Operations

A. General

1. The initial report should be investigated by the first responding agency. That First On-Scene Responder must act quickly.
2. Initial reports of an incident rarely reflect the true nature of the situation. The worst situation must be assumed, and an objective on-the-scene evaluation and assessment must be made as soon as possible.
3. It may not be immediately possible to identify the hazardous or toxic materials or chemicals involved in the spill, although every attempt should be made to do so. Stay UPWIND, UPHILL, and/or UPSTREAM at a safe distance. Look for information on labels, shipping paper, placards, license plate numbers, tank/container types, etc.
4. Emergency response personnel should always assume the materials are highly toxic, even in small quantities, and take protective action.
5. All facilities subject to the provisions of SARA Title III are required to immediately notify the local jurisdiction and the SERC if there is a release of a listed hazardous material that exceeds the reportable quantity for that material. The initial notification can be by telephone, radio, or in person. Emergency notification requirements involving transportation incidents can be satisfied by calling 911, calling the central district office of ADEC at 907-269-3063, or calling the ADEC spill hotline, 1-800-478-9300.
6. Once the jurisdiction has been tentatively identified, and the responsible Designated Emergency Response Agency (DERA) identified, established procedures will be utilized.
7. The Alaska Wildlife Trooper, as DERA for incidents occurring on highways outside COV limits, will follow their operations manual.
8. Major marine oil spills will be jointly managed by ADEC as the State On-Scene Coordinator and the U.S. Coast Guard as the Federal On-Scene Coordinator. This is applicable for releases of any size or quantity. The responsible party will be

responsible to hire cleanup companies as needed, under State/Federal oversight. Additionally, the joint ADEC/U.S. Coast Guard Area Contingency Plan for oil and Hazmat releases in the coastal zone contains a significant amount of response information. The Plan can be accessed at https://homeport.uscg.mil/Lists/Content/DispForm.aspx?ID=37282&Source=/Lists/Content/DispForm.aspx?ID=37282. See Tab K-1 at the end of this Annex for details about reporting to ADEC. Oil/fuel spills of a smaller scale will be handled by local contractors. See Tab K-2 for details.

9. Hazardous material emergency response personnel will operate as a team and will function under the concept of the ICS as described in the Direction and Control Annex A.
10. If the DERA determines not to have the equipment, personnel, or expertise necessary to handle a particular hazardous material incident, assistance will be requested.
11. The IM Short Team will be activated in support of the on-site IC if the hazardous material incident is of such magnitude as to pose a threat to human life or have a significant impact upon the environment. They will make a decision on whether to activate the EOC.
12. During the response, if evacuation of the public (or a community) is necessary to save lives and property, the Governor, the Alaska State Troopers, or the IM Short Team may order this action.
13. Public information and media relations will be given priority attention, especially for any hazardous material incident that will, or is likely to, affect the public. The Emergency Public Information Annex D establishes this function.
14. Cleanup and removal of the hazardous material involved in an incident will be monitored by the COV according to local, State, and Federal guidelines.
15. If a hazardous material incident or release occurs on private property, the owner or operator thereof may undertake the emergency response. If the owner or operator does not undertake such emergency response, or if in the judgment of the DERA there exists an imminent danger to the public health and safety, the DERA should initiate an appropriate emergency response.
16. Any facility that produces, uses, or stores any of the over 400 hazardous materials listed by the EPA in a quantity greater than its threshold planning quantity, is subject to the emergency planning and community right-to know provisions of SARA Title III.
17. Tier II forms are required to be on file with the State of Alaska. Facilities experiencing a hazardous material incident are advised to check with the ADEC to review their Tier II forms.
18. State involvement within COV for disaster damage assessment, emergency response (except for AST), and recovery processes will be coordinated by the ADEC.

6. Organization and Assignment of Responsibilities

A. Preparation Phase

- ☐ All Entities
  - ☐ Have vital equipment in condition necessary for response.
  - ☐ Update plans and operating procedures to ensure a coordinated response effort.

- ☐ VFD
  - ☐ Train and perform regular hazmat response drills.
  - ☐ Locate and document locations of stored hazardous materials.

B. Response Phase

- ☐ All Entities
  - ☐ Ensure clear communication between all responders and groups involved.
  - ☐ Provide IC and PIO with appropriate information.
- ☐ IC
  - ☐ Identify hazardous materials involved.
  - ☐ Mobilize response resources, ensuring they have adequate personal protective equipment (PPE).
  - ☐ Establish command structure and appoint a Safety Officer.
  - ☐ Direct and control on-scene response activity.
  - ☐ Contact ADEC for assistance and information regarding health dangers and population protection.
- ☐ VFD
  - ☐ Provide support for response effort, including equipment and manpower.
  - ☐ Establish a decontamination area for exposure victims, if necessary.
- ☐ VPD
  - ☐ Initiate perimeter control.
  - ☐ Assist in evacuation, if necessary.
- ☐ Public Works Department
  - ☐ Provide support for response effort, including equipment and manpower.
  - ☐ Monitor COV's water supply to ensure no contamination.

C. Recovery Phase

- ☐ All Entities
  - ☐ When feasible, restore the incident area to a safe condition, and return evacuees as appropriate.
  - ☐ Restore and maintain essential services.
  - ☐ Restock supplies and equipment used in the response, and return borrowed equipment after proper cleaning/inspection.
- ☐ VFD
  - ☐ Assist in ensuring all hazardous materials have been disposed of or neutralized.
- ☐ Public Works
  - ☐ Assist in disposal of contaminated products.

TAB K-1: Hazardous Material Spill Reporting Tools

ALASKA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION

OIL & HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES SPILL NOTIFICATION FORM

ADEC USE ONLY

ADEC SPILL #:	ADEC FILE #:	ADEC LC:

PERSON REPORTING:	PHONE NUMBER:	REPORTED HOW? (ADEC USE ONLY) ☐ Phone ☐ Fax ☐ PERS ☐ E-mail
DATE/TIME OF SPILL:	DATE/TIME DISCOVERED:	DATE/TIME REPORTED TO ADEC:
INCIDENT LOCATION/ADDRESS:	DATUM: ☐ NAD27 ☐ NAD83 ☐ WGS84 ☐ Other _____ LAT: LONG:	PRODUCT SPILLED:

QUANTITY SPILLED:	QUANTITY CONTAINED:	QUANTITY RECOVERED:	QUANTITY DISPOSED:
☐ gallons ☐ pounds	☐ gallons ☐ pounds	☐ gallons ☐ pounds	☐ gallons ☐ pounds

	POTENTIAL RESPONSIBLE PARTY:	OTHER PRP, IF ANY:	VESSEL NAME:
Name/Business:			
Mailing Address:			VESSEL NUMBER:
Contact Name:			> 400 GROSS TON VESSEL: ☐ Yes ☐ No
Contact Number:			

SOURCE OF SPILL:	CAUSE CLASSIFICATION: ☐ Accident ☐ Human Factors ☐ Structural/Mechanical ☐ Other
CAUSE OF SPILL: ☐ Under Investigation	
CLEANUP ACTIONS:	
DISPOSAL METHODS AND LOCATION:	

AFFECTED AREA SIZE:	SURFACE TYPE: *(gravel, asphalt, name of river etc.)*	RESOURCES AFFECTED/THREATENED: *(Water sources, wildlife, wells, etc.)*

COMMENTS:

ADEC USE ONLY

SPILL NAME:	NAME OF DEC STAFF RESPONDING:	C-PLAN MGR NOTIFIED? ☐ Yes ☐ No

DEC RESPONSE:	CASELOAD CODE:	CLEANUP CLOSURE ACTION:
☐ Phone follow-up ☐ Field visit ☐ Took Report	☐ First and Final ☐ Open/No LC ☐ LC Assigned	☐ NFA ☐ Monitoring ☐ Transferred to CS or STP

COMMENTS:

Status of Case: ☐ Open ☐ Closed **DATE CASE CLOSED:**

REPORT PREPARED BY:	DATE:

Revised 6/16/2014

TAB K-2: COV Oil/Fuel Spill Response–Small Scale

PURPOSE:
This tab defines the organization, strategies, equipment and manpower needed by the COV in the event of a small-scale oil spill which would most likely NOT impact the daily operations of the COV.

CURRENT RESOURCES:
Oil/fuel spill resources are stored throughout the City by these entities, in these locations:

Entity with Resources:	Location of Resources:	Resource Description:
U.S. Coast Guard	COV.	One pollution response trailer.
ADEC	State of Alaska DOT Airport Yard.	2 Conexes with basic spill resources.
Peter Pan Seafoods & Silver Bay Seafoods	Fish Processors have spill response supplies located at their processing plants.	Vinyl containment boom, boats, barge, skiffs, diving gear, misc. response equipment.
COV Harbor Department	With the City, behind the Harbor Master Office in a Conex.	Vinyl containment boom, boats, barge, skiffs, diving gear, misc. response equipment.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS:
In the event of a smaller-scale spill within Valdez or the local vicinity, these operations will be conducted within the community:

1. Dispatching of DERA to the spill in an expedient manner.
2. Dispatching of VFD to assist.

Small scale responses will happen quickly, through the effort of DERA and the VFD. If there is a prolonged period of cleanup, the COV may choose to contract cleanup to finish the job. If the spill exceeds the contractor's resource capabilities, they will then work as an arm of a larger spill response effort with additional contractors.

NOTIFICATION:
ADEC shall be notified per the Reporting Tab of this Annex.

ACTIONS:
The IC may direct the following actions:

A. Supervise on-scene VFD members (and Harbor personnel, if appropriate) during assistance to local contractors.
B. Direct the Finance Department to assign a special account number for tracking all expenditures and encumbrances relating to the spill.
C. Involve the PIO to communicate with the public.

MITIGATION MEASURES:
Oil spill recovery is expensive and usually preventable. The COV will institute mitigation measures by:

- increasing awareness of fuel tank stabilization (of both stationary and mobile tanks).
- monitoring derelict vessels.

TAB K-3: Hazardous Material Incident Checklist

Response Phase

If VFD has not been notified, do so immediately.
The Fire Chief will be the Initial Incident Commander.

☐ **Confirm, Assess, and Report the Situation**

VFD
U.S. Coast Guard
City Manager
DEC Central Area Response Team
DEC After Hours Spill Reporting
Alaska DHS&EM (24 hours)

- ☐ Report details of confirmed spills to ADEC before initiating major response activities.
- ☐ When did the accident occur?
- ☐ Where did the accident occur?
- ☐ What type of hazardous substance has been released?
- ☐ Does the release involve air, water, or ground contamination?
- ☐ Are radioactive hazards involved?
- ☐ What are the boundaries of the affected area?
- ☐ What are the current weather conditions?
- ☐ What is the forecast?

☐ **Evaluation of the Emergency**

- ☐ Have injuries been reported?
  - ☐ How many?
  - ☐ What type?
- ☐ Have casualties been reported?
  - ☐ How many?
- ☐ What facilities are isolated, in need of supplies, need to be evacuated, closed, or provided with alternative energy sources?
  - ☐ Valdez City Schools and Prince William Sound College
  - ☐ Medical Facilities
    - Providence Valdez Medical Center
    - Valdez Medical Clinic
    - Alpha Doc Medical Clinic
  - ☐ Other Emergency Facilities
  - ☐ Radio: KCHU-AM 770 and KVAK AM 1230
  - ☐ Homes with special needs, elderly, or infirm residents
  - ☐ Corrections (jail)
- ☐ What critical infrastructure and supply facilities require alternative energy sources, special shut down procedures, or need to be fortified?
  - ☐ Emergency Facilities
  - ☐ Water and Sewage (Public Works Dept)

- ☐ Utilities (Copper Valley Electric Company: 907-842-4301; after hours: 1-866-835-2832)
- ☐ Fuel supplies
- ☐ Emergency Communications
- ☐ Port of Valdez (907-835-4564)

☐ Initiate an evacuation of the area and areas downwind of the accident, if necessary.
☐ Estimate the number of evacuees.

☐ **Immediate actions**

☐ Initiate a warning and alert, if appropriate.
☐ Open and staff an EOC, if necessary.
☐ Disseminate public information.
☐ Isolate the area to ensure the safety of all persons.
☐ Is it appropriate to shelter-in-place?
☐ Establish road blocks, if needed.
☐ Identify evacuation routes out of the contaminated areas.

VPD	907-835-4560
ADOT&PF	907-834-1029

☐ Initiate an evacuation of the area(s) downwind of the accident, if necessary.
☐ Estimate the number of evacuees.
☐ Identify areas to establish emergency shelters and staging areas.
☐ Open emergency shelters.

☐ **Actions to be taken as soon as possible**

☐ Initiate patrols to protect and secure evacuated areas.

VPD	907-835-4560

☐ If people are injured, alert medical clinics.

PVMC	907-835-2249
Public Health Center	907-835-4612
Medical Clinic	907-835-4811

☐ Alert VFD of any fire, hazmat, or rescue situations.

VFD	907-835-4560

☐ Activate Search and Rescue if appropriate (locate missing persons, support emergency services)

By calling Police Dispatch at:	907-835-4560

☐ Ensure clear lines of communication and repair damaged communication links.
☐ Inventory and distribute food and supplies to emergency personnel (special clothing, hard hats, road barriers, flashlights, batteries, barrier tape, rescue tools, etc.).
☐ Inventory location and availability of heavy equipment and supplies (trucks, bulldozers, front loaders, graders, snowplows, fuel, barricades, etc.).
☐ Request assistance from mutual aid partners, as needed.
☐ Request additional assistance, as needed.

Alaska DHS&EM (24 hours)	800-478-2337

☐ Identify a staging area for equipment and supplies.
☐ Arrange for the security of incoming supplies by land, sea, and air.

☐ **Secondary actions**

☐ Issue a Disaster Declaration, if appropriate.
☐ Document the cost of material and labor involved with the emergency.

☐ Form a task force to document and estimate damage to public and private property.

Recovery Phase

☐ **Stabilization actions**

- ☐ Determine that all hazardous materials have been disposed of or neutralized.
- ☐ Initiate a survey of the area to identify and correct safety hazards as soon as possible.
- ☐ Initiate cleanup of debris.
- ☐ Initiate restoration of facilities, utilities, telephone service, and transportation links. Essential facilities such as medical centers, EOC, fire, police, emergency shelters, and schools will be given priority.
- ☐ Open volunteer resource center.
- ☐ When safe access is established, arrange for the return of evacuees.
- ☐ Use roadblocks and a permit system to control access and maintain security.
- ☐ Initiate services to help victims cope with the situation and to provide food, clothing, basic supplies, and temporary shelter for people displaced by the disaster.

American Red Cross-Disaster Coordinator	907-646-5423
Salvation Army-Fairbanks	907-452-3103
Alaska DHS&EM (24 hours)	800-478-2337

☐ **Recording actions**

- ☐ Compile and submit records of equipment used in response activity and arrange for reimbursements to be made as necessary.

ANNEX L: Donations Management

1. Purpose

The purpose is to outline the concept of operation, organizational arrangements, and responsibilities for coordinating the efforts of volunteer groups and local government to manage donations of goods and services that may occur in the aftermath of an emergency situation should news of the disaster reach national and international news organizations.

2. Situation

The COV is at risk from a number of hazards that could threaten public health and safety as well as private and public property. Should a major disaster or a lesser emergency occur where there is a high level of media interest, individuals may want to donate money, goods, and/or services to assist the victims or participate in the recovery process. The amount of donations offered could be sizable, and there could be extreme difficulties in receiving, storing, securing, sorting, transporting, accounting for, and distributing the donations to the disaster victims and supervising volunteer workers desiring to assist in the effort.

The COV designated Parks and Recreation employees to receive masks and PPE during the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic. A similar system would be used to collect, process, and distribute donations should an emergency occur.

3. Assumptions

A. Should a major emergency or disaster occur, donations may be given/delivered whether or not they are requested. In large quantities, such donations may overwhelm the capability of the community to handle and distribute them.

B. Donated goods may be offered to local volunteer groups or simply delivered to the COV. Donations of cash for disaster victims may be made to the COV.

C. Individuals may donate goods that are not needed by disaster victims or offer services that are not needed in the recovery process. Receiving and sorting unneeded goods or hosting volunteers who do not have needed skills wastes valuable resources; disposing of large quantities of unneeded goods can be a lengthy and very costly process.

D. In some cases, the amount of donations received may relate more to the media attention that the emergency situation receives than the magnitude of the disaster or the number of victims.

E. The problem of unneeded donations can be reduced, but not eliminated, by developing and maintaining a current list of disaster needs, screening donation offers, and providing information to potential donors through the media on current needs and those items and services that are not required.

F. Most personal donations are given little expectation of return other than the personal satisfaction of giving and perhaps some acknowledgment of thanks. However, some donations may be unusable, have “strings attached”, or be not really donations at all.

   1. They may:

      a. Be given with an expectation of some sort of repayment, publicity, or a tax write-off.

b. Be items that are out-of-date (such as food or pharmaceuticals); unusable (broken furniture or dirty/torn clothing); or unsuitable (food that requires refrigeration, winter coats in August).
c. Be volunteer services that do not meet the announced or advertised expectations or capabilities; skilled trades that are not properly licensed or certified.
d. Be provided illegally as a ruse in a fraudulent process to obtain money from disaster victims.
e. Be offered at a "discount" to disaster victims, with any real savings being minimal or nonexistent.
f. Be offered in limited quantity as a deception to simply show an "association with government or disaster relief as a basis for future advertising or publicity.

2. Donors may want to:
   a. Know what is needed in Valdez—cash, goods, and/or services.
   b. Know how they should transport their donation to the local area, or if there is someone who can transport it for them.
   c. Start a "drive for donations" to help disaster victims, but have no knowledge of what to do and how to do it.
   d. Earmark their donation for a specific local group or organization, such as a church, fraternal society, or social service agency, or want to know who, specifically, received their donation.
   e. Have their donation received by a local official and/or receive a letter of appreciation or public recognition.
   f. Want to be fed and providing with lodging if they are providing volunteer services.
3. Disaster victims may:
   a. Desire immediate access to donations before they are sorted and ready to be disseminated at appropriate distribution points.
   b. Believe that the donations have not been or are not being distributed fairly if they do not have information on the process of distributing donations.
   c. May have unmet needs which can be satisfied by additional donations.

4. Limitations

A. In a catastrophic disaster affecting Valdez, the COV may be adversely affected and may not be able to cope with a sizable flow of donations.
B. Donated goods may arrive in Valdez without warning, day or night. Delivery drivers will want to know where they should deliver their load and who will unload it. They typically want their cargo off-loaded quickly so they can minimize down-time.
C. Donations will frequently arrive unsorted and with minimal packaging and markings. Donations may be packed in boxes, crates, barrels, or garbage bags; some items may be in bins or on pallets. When such goods are received, they must typically be sorted, repackaged, and labeled, temporarily stored, and then transported to distribution points to be picked up by disaster victims.

5. Concept of Operations

A. Objectives

The objectives of the Donations Management program are to:

1. Determine the needs of disaster victims, and inform potential donors of those needs through the media and a variety of other means.
2. Receive, process, and distribute goods and cash donations to victims that can be used to recover from a disaster.
3. Accept offers of volunteers and donated services that will contribute to the recovery process.
4. Discourage the donations of goods and services that are not needed so that such donations do not in themselves become a major problem.

B. Operational Concepts

1. Experience has shown that volunteer groups can be overwhelmed by the scale of donations and need certain government assistance (such as traffic control, security, and help in identifying facilities to receive, sort, and distribute donated goods). Additionally, large numbers of donations may be sent to the local government itself.
2. Recognized local and national charities and voluntary agencies are skilled in the Donations Management process, and they are the first recourse for collecting and managing donations. Donors outside the local area should be encouraged to work through recognized community social service organizations or voluntary human resource providers in the community in which they live. These organizations are capable of receiving donations in areas across Alaska or nation and then earmarking assistance for a particular disaster.
3. Donations of cash for disaster relief allows the COV and volunteer groups to purchase the specific items needed by disaster victims or provide vouchers to disaster victims so that they can replace clothing and essential personal property with items of their own choosing. Cash donations also reduce the tasks of transporting, sorting, and distributing donation goods. Therefore, cash is generally the preferred donation for disaster relief.

C. Actions by Phases of Emergency Management

Donations Management, as a function, primarily occurs during the recovery phase of an emergency. However, some Donations Management activities should occur during the preparedness and response phases of Emergency Management.

1. Preparedness
    a. Oversee pre-disaster Donations Management planning and assign responsibilities for various Donations Management activities.
    b. Identify possible sites for storage and distribution points.
    c. Brief the PIO on a periodic basis about the local Donations Management program.
    d. The PIO will brief the local media so they understand how the donations program will work so they can be prepared to advise the public of specific donation needs, discourage donations of unneeded items, disseminate information on the availability of donated goods, and provide other information as applicable.
    e. Brief citizen groups on how they can contribute to disaster relief with their donations, and how a Donations Management program typically operates.
    f. Include consideration of Donation Management in local Emergency Management exercises to test procedures.

g. Ensure contingency procedures are established for rapidly activating a bank account to receive and disburse monetary donations.

D. Response

1. Identify and prepare specific sites for Donations Management facilities and begin assembling needed equipment and supplies.
2. Identify and activate staff for Donations Management facilities.
3. Provide the media (through the PIO) with information regarding donation needs and procedures, and regularly update that information.

E. Recovery

1. Set up storage and distribution points. Determine how each facility will be logistically supported.
2. Staff storage and distribution points.
3. Collect, sort, store, distribute, and properly dispose of donations, if necessary.
4. In coordination with the PIO, provide regular updates to the media on donations procedures, progress, status, and the Current Needs List (goods and services that are needed and not needed).
5. Continually assess Donations Management operations, and determine when the Donations Management facilities should close down or be consolidated, and when the Donations Management program can be terminated.
6. Keep records of donations received, and when appropriate, thank donors.
7. Provide continuing assistance to victims in need, depending upon the donations available.

6. Organization

A. EOC IC

- ☐ Designate a COV Department or Nonprofit to coordinate planning for and oversee the operation of the Donations Management program.

B. Donations Management Coordinator as selected by the IC

- ☐ Develop and maintain a Donations Management Operations Guide as a separately published document. In the pre-emergency phase, this Guide will contain general planning information with respect to facilities, equipment, staffing, and general operating guidance. When the Donations Management program is activated, the Guide will be updated with specific facility and equipment information, updated staff rosters, and detailed operating procedures. The Guide shall include:
  - ☐ Potential locations for storage and distribution points.
  - ☐ Equipment requirements.
  - ☐ Supply requirements.
  - ☐ Skeleton staff rosters for the storage and distribution points, if warranted.
- ☐ Determine, in conjunction with the COV attorney, the procedures for preparing for and handling liability issues involving volunteers if additional help is warranted. Since these individuals are performing volunteer services for the COV, they may be entitled to medical coverage, accident and injury claim compensation, workman's compensation coverage, reimbursement for stolen property, or even restitution for inappropriate comments, discrimination, or harassment.
- ☐ Provide the media, in coordination with the PIO, information on Donations Management for dissemination to the public.

- ☐ Ensure required donations system-related records are maintained.
- ☐ Provide information to the PIO.
  - ☐ Release information as to what supplies and quantities are needed.
  - ☐ Where and when can supplies be dropped off?
- ☐ Check supplies in.
- ☐ Report available supplies to the IC.
- ☐ Check supplies out as directed by the IC.

ANNEX M: Debris Removal

1. Purpose

Debris management operations are typically a long-term, complex process that continues all the way through the recovery phase of disaster management. The purpose of this Annex is to provide overall operational guidance for debris management and removal following any event that produces unusual or significant amounts of debris within the COV.

2. Situation

Catastrophic events such as earthquakes and tsunamis have the potential to produce enormous volumes of mixed debris. This would include wood debris and roofing materials, household goods and miscellaneous furnishings, metal and structural steel or appliances, hazardous waste from automobiles, and freon-containing units. Likewise, avalanches, landslides, and volcanic ash fall also pose unique debris clearing and removal requirements. A comprehensive approach to debris management is essential in order to effectively deal with large volumes of disaster-generated debris.

3. Assumptions

A. A catastrophic event will produce more debris than can be managed with existing COV resources.
B. The COV Solid Waste Department will be inundated with debris, even with small debris yield events such as a localized windstorm.
C. Household debris may contain hazardous materials.
D. There may be overlapping and complex regulatory implications for debris within the COV.
E. Public information operations will be critical in informing the population about debris disposal options for private property debris.

4. Concept of Operations

A. Debris Management
Following a major disaster, the COV Solid Waste Department will base debris management on the waste management approach of prioritizing reduction, reuse, reclamation, resource recovery, incineration, and landfilling.

B. Debris Clearing
During a major disaster, the initial debris management focus will be on clearing debris along critical transportation corridors to ensure access for emergency vehicles and response operations. These initial clearing operations consist of moving debris to roadway shoulders or away from the entrances/exits to critical facilities, critical infrastructure, and essential government buildings. Specialized equipment may be required for cutting and/or clearing debris to ensure access.

C. Debris Removal
The second priority of debris management will be the removal of debris from areas that are critical to long-term response and recovery operations. These include areas where debris is impeding restoration and repair of critical infrastructure such as electric,

telecommunications, and water and wastewater facilities. Debris removal and disposal sites have been identified throughout the COV. See figure below.



5. Responsibilities

A. State/Federal

State and Federal agencies will handle debris clearance and disposal from facilities, roads, and highways that are normally the responsibility of a State or Federal agency.

B. COV

The COV has the responsibility to provide debris management and removal operations for publicly-owned infrastructure located on COV property. The COV Solid Waste Department will implement debris management and disposal.

C. COV Property Owners

It is the private citizen/property owner's responsibility to remove and dispose of disaster-generated debris located on their property. Where local capabilities are exceeded and State/Federal assistance is requested, demolition of private structures requires condemnation by authorized COV officials before removal of this type of debris may be considered for State and Federal Disaster Assistance.

ANNEX N: Mass Fatality

1. Purpose

Whenever an event occurs that produces a significant number of fatalities, the entire local medical system within the COV must respond with a coordinated effort. The purpose of this Annex is to address how the COV will respond to any event that may threaten to potentially overwhelm local capabilities.

2. Situation

This Annex covers how local medical resources and capabilities will be coordinated to support mass fatality events. Mass fatality incidents are incidents resulting from man-made or natural disasters that can potentially exceed or overwhelm Emergency Services.

3. Assumptions

A. Mass casualty incidents are likely to impose a sustained demand for health and medical services during a major disaster. Federal and State assistance will be required for the movement of patients to other jurisdictions or out of state.
B. Hospitals, pharmacies, and other facilities for medical/health care may experience significant structural damage and be rendered unusable as a result of earthquakes or another major disaster.
C. The arrival of State and Federal medical aid may take up to seven days after request.
D. State and Federal medical aid will be required for mass casualty incidents associated with major disasters where there is damage to critical facility and transportation infrastructure.
E. Major disasters will likely result in shortages of critical medical resources either from supply chain disruption and/or a higher utilization rate that exceeds on-hand supplies.
F. Major disasters where there is significant structural damage will likely restrict first response operations for mass casualty incidents.
G. Weather conditions may encumber mass casualty response and increase the overall number of casualties/fatalities.
H. Damage to the electrical supply and water system will likely impact local hospital and medical center capabilities.
I. Diminished staff availability and medical capabilities will be degraded in a large-scale event.
J. Potential for disease would increase due to dead bodies and animal carcasses.

4. Limitations

COV resources may be overwhelmed.

5. Concept of Operations

A. Fatality Management
The AKSMEO is responsible for coordinating the collection, identification, storage, and transfer of human remains during a mass fatality incident. The COV will contact the AKSMEO as soon as possible when a mass fatality incident has been identified and will provide resource support for the AKSMEO's actions, as available. The AKSMEO, located in Anchorage, has limited capacity to manage fatalities. Federal assistance is

requested when the capacity is expected to be reached. Prior to the arrival of State or local resources or Federal support, the PVMC offers on-site storage.

B. Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Team
DMORT is a Federal resource activated through the SEOC and provides mortuary assistance such as temporary morgue services; victim identification; and processing, preparation, and disposition of human remains. The COV can request DMORT support through the SEOC.

6. Responsibilities

A. EOC IC
- ☐ Oversee strategic long-term planning and coordination of mass casualty needs within the COV during an emergency or disaster.
- ☐ Coordinate with ICs to confirm the number of fatalities and to determine the scope of the mass fatality incident(s).
- ☐ Coordinate with the AKSMEO's office to establish staging areas and temporary morgue facilities for mass fatality incidents that exceed or are expected to exceed local capacity.
- ☐ Forward a request for DMORT support to the SEOC.

B. Public Health Nurse
- ☐ Assess the impact of mass casualty events on public health.
- ☐ Participate in the COV's planning effort that may require deployment of DMORT resources.

C. PVMC Director
- ☐ Notify the EOC whenever hospital mortuary surge capacity is expected to be exceeded.
- ☐ Forward the hospital facility status to the EOC during mass casualty incidents.

D. VFD
- ☐ Establish procedures for mass fatality response.

E. VPD
- ☐ Coordinate security at COV temporary mortuary facilities.
- ☐ Coordinate with other first responder agencies for the recovery and transfer of human remains during a mass fatality incident.

ANNEX O: Access & Functional Needs Population

1. Purpose

People with access and functional needs live in and work in Valdez. Because of their specific needs, they may rely on a variety of means of communication, may need supportive services at work, and may need assistance in emergencies.

2. Situation

The individuals most impacted by an emergency have functional needs in the following areas:

A. Communications—relates to the individual's ability to receive critical warnings and other emergency information, communicate effectively with emergency response personnel, and understand information being communicated so that they can act to help themselves. Individuals may require auxiliary aids and services and may need to have information given to them in alternate formats.

B. Maintaining health—many will require continued access to specialized medical equipment, medications, supplies or personal assistance to maintain their health and prevent the decline of medical conditions if they are removed from their daily environments due to a disaster.

C. Independence—relates to support that people may need to remain independent and to take care of themselves like durable medical equipment, communication devices, service animals, and accessible facilities.

D. Safety, Support services, and Supervision—some individuals require the support of people (personal care assistants, family, or friends) and animals to cope with the challenges of emergencies; some may lack the cognitive ability to assess emergency situations and react appropriately without support and/or supervision.

E. Transportation—some individuals cannot drive, some need specialized vehicles for transport, and some do not have their own vehicles and rely solely on public transit.

3. Assumptions

A. The COV assumes that there are people with all types of disabilities and access and functional needs living within Valdez.

B. Functional needs are not always visible.

C. The functional needs population reflects a need rather than a condition, diagnosis, or label. Individuals may have additional needs before, during, and after an incident in functional areas, including but not limited to: people with disabilities; people who live in institutionalized settings; the elderly; children; people from diverse cultures; people with limited English proficiency; non-English speaking people; prisoners; and transportation disadvantaged individuals.

4. Limitations

People with access and functional needs and agencies who provide services for them may not be familiar with the EOP and disaster preparedness activities.

5. Concept of Operations

The IC will set up a liaison in the EOC to routinely check in with vulnerable populations and ensure that their functional needs are met.

6. Responsibilities

A. Preparation
- ☐ Liaison
  - ☐ Ensure that COV residents/caregivers/therapy pets and visitors with access and functional needs receive warning of pending emergencies and are prepared.
  - ☐ Transport COV residents/caregivers/therapy pets and visitors with access and functional needs to shelters if warranted.

B. Response
- ☐ Liaison
  - ☐ Ensure that COV residents/caregivers/therapy pets and visitors with access and functional needs are faring well during the emergency.

C. Recovery
- ☐ Liaison
  - ☐ Ensure that COV residents/caregivers/therapy pets and visitors with access and functional needs are okay after emergency.
  - ☐ Return COV residents/caregivers/therapy pets and visitors with access and functional needs to their homes or accommodations after the emergency has passed.

ANNEX P: Severe Weather

1. Scope

Severe weather in Alaska is more likely to be blizzards and wind chill temperatures far below zero. Valdez is particularly susceptible to heavy snows, blizzards, periods of extreme cold, ice storms, and high winds. Quick snow thaws and summer rain storms that bring inches of rain in several hours occur and often cause flooding.

A. **Winter Storm:** Heavy snow can accumulate as fast as 72 inches in 24 hours in Valdez. Winds and snow can combine to create white out, blizzard conditions in small pockets or across the entire Port of Valdez. Rain on top of snow or ice can create extremely icy, wet conditions. These kinds of storms can occur weekly throughout the winter in Valdez. Residents and COV staff are used to this weather and can handle a good deal of snow, wind and ice on their own. It is only when one of these conditions becomes abnormally extreme that emergency operations planning for severe weather is important.

B. **Heavy Snow:** More than four feet in 24 hours. The COV does not plow until a snow storm totals at least four inches, and often times if that four inches of snow falls in prime commuting times, the plow trucks will delay until a better time to clear the roads. School buses, resident cars, and commercial vehicles are used to and can easily operate in four to eight inches of accumulated snow on the road.

C. **Extreme Cold:** Colder than -20 degrees (including wind chill): Extreme cold events are uncommon in Valdez because the ocean keeps the temperature fairly stable in the winter. However, when arctic air from the north comes south and winds picks up in Valdez, cold air can become quite deadly, especially in Thompson Pass.

D. **Ice Storms:** More than 1/8” layer of ice: Ice storms result from the accumulation of freezing rain into a thin layer of ice. Freezing rain most commonly occurs in a narrow band within a winter storm that is also producing heavy amounts of snow and sleet in other locations. Ice storms can be the most devastating of winter weather phenomena and are often the cause of automobile accidents, power outages, and personal injury.

E. **High Winds:** Another major weather factor in the community is high winds. The wind chill factor can bring temperatures down to -50°F, which can lead to frozen pipes and dangerous conditions for outdoor activities. While most home and business owners are prepared for the heavy winds and low temperatures, construction practices must be followed to protect against high winds.

2. Situation and Assumptions

Severe weather events are largely seasonal and have some level of predictability.

3. Operations

Response and EOC activation for a severe weather event will be dictated and driven by the scope and locations of the event. The vast majority of severe weather events do not pose a major threat to the population or infrastructure.

For each functional response area, see the corresponding functional annex within this EOP for concept of operations and roles and responsibilities of key agencies.

Some of the primary functional areas that will need to be considered during a severe weather event include (but are not limited to):

- Warning – Annex B – Warning is a key capability in this event response both in a notice and no-notice event.
- PIO – Annex D – Public information is critical for information relating to avoidance of hazard areas by the public during times of threat as well as critical information during a response to an event.
- Public Works – Annex J – Public works will be a critical component to an event due to the nature of the operational capacities of the department. The heavy equipment and machinery needed to move large volumes of material as well as the department's function in restoring key infrastructure is critical in this event.
- Debris Management and Removal – Annex M – An event that occurs in or across populated or managed infrastructure (roads, etc.) will generate debris (i.e., snow). The management of that debris during a response, and the subsequent recovery will be a significant undertaking. The debris will be a large pile of snow and whatever debris is mixed with the snow.

4. Actions

Severe Weather Preparedness Phase

Preparedness actions

- ☐ Inventory and restock food and supplies for emergency personnel (special clothing, hard hats, road barriers, flashlights, batteries, barrier tape, rescue tools, etc.).
- ☐ Review and update emergency communications network capabilities.
  - ☐ Review and update amateur radio capabilities.
  - ☐ Review and update cell phone capabilities.
- ☐ Inventory location(s) and availability of heavy equipment and supplies (haul trucks, bulldozers, front loaders, graders, snowplows, fuel, etc.).
- ☐ Strategically pre-position supplies, equipment, fuel, and medical gear in safe areas, if appropriate.
- ☐ Identify staging area for equipment and supplies.
- ☐ Inventory auxiliary power equipment with KW rating and fuel supplies.
- ☐ Identify resources.
  - ☐ Snow trucks with plows (both COV and public).
  - ☐ Building maintenance (snow loads), develop standby schedules.
  - ☐ Backup Heavy Equipment Operators.
  - ☐ Extended hours for front desk phones.
- ☐ Check generators and backup power systems.

Severe Weather Warning Phase

☐ **Confirm and assess the situation.**

NWS, Forecast Office:	800-472-0390	24 hours
Anchorage Weather Service Office:	907-266-5105	
ADOT&PF:	907-465-5300	Call 511

- ☐ What is the degree of danger?
- ☐ What are the boundaries of the area at risk that could be affected by the extreme weather?
- ☐ How long is the storm expected to last?
- ☐ Are conditions improving or deteriorating?
- ☐ What are the current weather conditions?
- ☐ What is the forecast?

☐ **Evaluation of emergency.**

- ☐ Are there any special groups or areas that may be affected? (hikers, campers, hunters, scouts, cross-country skiers, snow machine clubs, etc.)
- ☐ How many people could be isolated by the storm?
- ☐ What facilities may be isolated, in need of supplies, need to be evacuated, closed, or provided with alternative energy sources?
  - ☐ School: 907-835-4728; Superintendent: 907-835-4357
    PWSC: 907-834-1600
  - ☐ Medical facilities (PVMC and Providence Valdez Extended Care: 907-835-2249; Valdez Public Health Center: 907-835-4612; Valdez Medical Center: 907-835-4811; Alpha Doc: 907-835-2532)
  - ☐ Emergency Services: 907-835-4560
  - ☐ Radio (KCHU-AM 770: 907-835-4665; KVAK AM 1230: 907-835-5825)
  - ☐ Homes with special needs, elderly, or infirm residents (Get listing, if available).
  - ☐ Homeless people affected.
- ☐ What critical infrastructure and supply facilities may require alternative energy sources, special shut down procedures, or need to be fortified?
  - ☐ Water and Sewage: Public Works: 907-835-4473
  - ☐ Copper Valley Electric: Office: 907-835-4301, After Hours: 866-835-2832
  - ☐ Fuel supplies: North Pacific Fuel: 907-835-8850; Crowley Petroleum: 907-835-4558
  - ☐ Emergency Communications: Copper Valley Telecom: 907-835-2231

☐ **Immediate actions to consider.**

- ☐ Issue public safety announcements or advisories or warnings, if appropriate.
- ☐ Should the EOC be activated?
- ☐ Is immediate evacuation appropriate? If so, estimate number needing shelter.
- ☐ Should a “shelter in place” advisory be issued instead if immediate evacuation is not appropriate?
- ☐ Should traffic be diverted or stopped?
- ☐ Should fuel tanks be dug out?
- ☐ Appropriate phone messages for after hours.

☐ **Alert appropriate emergency personnel of *possible* activation.**
- ☐ VPD (warning, security, help the vulnerable populations)
  VPD 907-835-4560
- ☐ VFD (fire, rescue, hazardous materials, medical transport)
  VFD 907-835-4560
- ☐ Emergency Services (trauma, medical transport)
  Medical facilities (PVMC: 907-835-2249; After hours, call 911.
  Valdez Public Health Center: 907-835-4612;
  Valdez Medical Center: 907-835-4811)
- ☐ SAR (help with warning & evacuation in remote areas)
  AST 907-835-4307

☐ **Check with other agencies regarding their preparations—ensure transportation plan is in effect to get critical workers to/from work.**
- ☐ Schools/College (possible school closure, use of school buses, and school buildings)
  - ☐ School: 907 835-4728; Superintendent: 907-835-4357
  - ☐ PWSC: 907-834-1600
- ☐ Emergency medical services (phone numbers are listed above on this page)
- ☐ U.S. Coast Guard: 907-834-5350
- ☐ Utilities
  - ☐ Water and Sewage: Public Works: 907-835-4473
  - ☐ Copper Valley Electric: Office: 907-835-4301, After Hours: 866-835-2832
  - ☐ Fuel supplies: North Pacific Fuel: 907-835-8850; Crowley Petroleum: 907-835-4558
  - ☐ Emergency Communications: Copper Valley Telecom: 907-835-2231
  - ☐ Radio (KCHU-AM 770: 907-835-4665; KVAK AM 1230: 907-835-5825)

Severe Weather Response Phase: Extreme Weather Exists

- ☐ **Review Warning Checklist from Warning Phase.**
- ☐ **Continue to monitor forecasts.**
  - ☐ What is anticipated duration of event?
  - ☐ What are the current weather conditions?
  - ☐ Are conditions improving, holding steady, or deteriorating?
  - ☐ What is the forecast?
- ☐ **Immediate actions to consider.**
  - ☐ Are people believed to be in need of special assistance?
    - ☐ How many?
    - ☐ Have any structures been damaged or destroyed? Are any structures capable of being damaged or destroyed?
    - ☐ What facilities are isolated, in need of supplies, need to be evacuated, closed, or provided with alternative energy sources?
    - ☐ Establish shelter(s) as needed.
- ☐ What critical infrastructure and supply facilities require alternative energy sources, special shut down procedures, or need to be fortified?
    - ☐ Water and Sewage: Public Works: 907-835-4473
    - ☐ Copper Valley Electric: Office: 907-835-4301 After Hours: 866-835-2832
    - ☐ Fuel supplies: North Pacific Fuel: 907-835-8850; Crowley Petroleum: 907-835-4558
    - ☐ Emergency Communications: Copper Valley Telecom: 907-835-2231
    - ☐ Radio (KCHU-AM 770: 907-835-4665; KVAK AM 1230: 907-835-5825)
- ☐ **Immediate actions**
  - ☐ Initiate a warning and alert, if appropriate.
  - ☐ Open and staff an EOC, if appropriate.
  - ☐ Disseminate public information.
  - ☐ Initiate the inspection of road conditions, if necessary. Are any roads blocked?
    Public Works 907-835-4473
    ADOT&PF 907-465-5300 After hours, call 911.
  - ☐ Develop an emergency snow removal system for essential roads, if appropriate.
  - ☐ Limit travel, if necessary.
    VPD 907-835-4560
    ADOT&PF 907-465-5300 After hours, call 911.
  - ☐ Establish evacuation route(s) and roadblock(s).
  - ☐ Initiate an evacuation, if necessary.
  - ☐ Estimate the number of evacuees.
  - ☐ Identify areas to establish emergency shelter(s), if needed.
  - ☐ Open emergency shelter(s), if needed.
  - ☐ Request special personnel: interpreters, clergy, counselors, technicians, retired medical. (Listing in reference)
  - ☐ Provide transportation of vulnerable populations to shelter(s), if needed.
- ☐ **Actions to be taken as soon as possible**
  - ☐ Initiate patrols to protect and secure evacuated areas.
    VPD 907-835-4560

- ☐ If people are injured, alert medical clinics.
  PVMC: 907-835-2249
  Valdez Public Health Center: 907-835-4612
  Valdez Medical Center: 907-835-4811
  Arrange for medical evacuations, as necessary.
  Establish emergency temporary medical care facilities.
- ☐ Alert VFD of any fire, hazmat, or rescue situations. VFD will evaluate and conduct SAR efforts, if warranted.
  VFD 907-835-4560
- ☐ Inventory Emergency communications network capabilities.
- ☐ Initiate the restoration of damaged communication links.
- ☐ Inventory cell phone capabilities.
- ☐ Inventory and distribute food and supplies to emergency personnel (special clothing, hard hats, road barriers, flashlights, batteries, barrier tape, rescue tools, etc.).
- ☐ Request assistance from mutual aid partners, as needed.
- ☐ Request additional assistance, as needed.
  AK DHS&EM 800-478-2337 (24 hours)
- ☐ Arrange for the security of incoming supplies by land, sea, and air.

☐ **Secondary actions**

- ☐ If conditions warrant, issue a Local Disaster Declaration, if appropriate.
- ☐ If conditions warrant, request a State Declaration of Disaster Emergency.
- ☐ Form a task force to document, and estimate damage to public and private property.
- ☐ Document the cost of material and labor involved with the emergency.

Severe Weather Recovery Phase: Severe Weather or High Winds have occurred.

- ☐ **Review Warning and Response Checklists from Warning and Response Phases.**
- ☐ **Immediate actions**
  - ☐ Use roadblocks and a permit system to control access and maintain security.
  - ☐ Initiate a survey of the area to identify and correct safety hazards as soon as possible.
  - ☐ Initiate cleanup of debris.
  - ☐ Perform damage assessments of essential public utilities and facilities.
  - ☐ Restore essential public utilities and facilities. Essential facilities such as clinics, EOC, fire, police, emergency shelters, and schools will be given priority.
  - ☐ Initiate restoration of facilities, utilities, telephone service, and transportation links.
  - ☐ Perform damage assessments of non-essential facilities.
  - ☐ Arrange for debris clearance.
- ☐ **Stabilization actions**
  - ☐ Coordinate recovery activities with State and Federal relief agencies, if warranted.
  - ☐ Provide storm damage report information for forwarding to NWS.
  - ☐ Establish disaster aid centers to process applications for the rehabilitation of individuals and families.
  - ☐ Request special personnel: interpreters, clergy, counselors, technicians, retired medical. (Listing in reference)
  - ☐ When safe access is established, arrange for the return of evacuees to assess damages.
  - ☐ Initiate services to help victims cope with the situation, and to provide food, clothing, basic supplies, and temporary shelter for people displaced by the disaster.

Alaskan Red Cross-Disaster Coordinator	907-646-5400
Salvation Army-Anchorage	907-375-3583
AK DHS&EM	800-478-2337 (24 hours)

  - ☐ Provide monetary figures necessary to support a request for disaster declaration.
  - ☐ Complete and submit necessary reports and paperwork to appropriate agencies.
  - ☐ Perform an incident critique.

ANNEX Q: Earthquake

1. Scope

Alaska is the most seismically active state and has had seven of the 10 largest earthquakes in the U.S. Every location in Alaska has some level of earthquake hazard, but the level of earthquake hazard varies significantly with location within the state. Valdez is located in the very high earthquake hazard area of Alaska.

Historically, awareness of seismic risk in Alaska has generally been high, among both the public at large and public officials. This high level of awareness reflects the high level of seismic activity in many parts of Alaska as well as the long-lasting memory of the Good Friday earthquake of March 27, 1964, which was one of the largest earthquakes experienced anywhere in the world in the past 100 years.

This annex describes the activities of the COV when a damaging earthquake occurs. Since earthquakes typically occur without warning, this annex focuses on response activities during and after an earthquake.

Six earthquakes are reported to have seriously affected Port Valdez from 1899-1964. During each of these earthquakes, events indicating submarine slides or possible liquefaction of the bottom sediments of Port Valdez were reported. "Seismic sea waves" (seiching) were also reported during four of these earthquakes. The following is a brief summary of the effects of these events at Port Valdez (Coulter and Migliaccio, 1966).

September 3, 1899 - A magnitude 8.3 earthquake occurred near Yakutat Bay (60° N 142° W). Strong ground shaking and "earthquake water waves" were reported in Valdez. It was also reported that a ship, which was anchored in 40 feet of water at the mouth of the Lowe River in 1898, was unable to reach bottom with 200 feet of cable at the same location after the 1899 earthquake. If these reports are factual, a massive submarine slide must have occurred in the deltaic sediments at the mouth of the Lowe River. The distance from Port Valdez to the reported epicenter of the 1899 event (165 miles) is such that bedrock accelerations were probably on the order of 0.05 g's, and rich with low frequency vibrations. Moreover, the depth of the sediments and their probable density leads one to believe the amplitude of shaking experienced by the soil deposit was also quite small. However, due to the magnitude of this earthquake, the duration of shaking was probably on the order of several tens of seconds. Seismic excitation of this nature is more apt to induce liquefaction in loose fine sand deposits such as those found at the mouth of the Lowe River, rather than slope failure due to over-stressing associated with inertial forces generated in the rather flat slope. It is probable that excess pore pressures gradually increased in the fine-grain non-cohesive sediments during this event until the soil's effective shear strength was reduced below that required for stability of the slope, thus precipitating a massive sub-aqueous flow slide.

February 14, 1908 – The second reported earthquake to significantly affect the Port Valdez occurred just north of Port Fidalgo (61°N 146.25°W). No magnitude was assigned to this event; however, Modified Mercalli Intensity of VI is attributed to the assigned epicenter. Again, violent ground shaking and sea waves were reported at Valdez. Additionally, the submarine communications cables linking Valdez and Sitka, and Valdez and Seward were broken and buried in several places along the bottom of Port Valdez. No evidence of submarine slides was

reported; therefore, faulting was thought to be the culprit. However, no manifestations of faulting could be detected anywhere on shore. It is very unlikely that faulting could have occurred across narrow Port Valdez, and not left a trace along the shore; therefore, a more probable explanation for burial of several sections of the cable is liquefaction of the sediments in Port Valdez. Liquefaction within these sediments is probable for the same reasons stated for the 1899 earthquake. The effects on the cables due to liquefaction would be much like those reported. That is, a complete loss of bearing (shear strength) due to liquefaction of the sediments supporting the cables would cause the cables to sink below the mud line. If only isolated areas along the continuously supported cable lost all bearing capacity, the cables would sag and stretch between the remaining sections supported in competent soil, would break, and would be buried by the surrounding sediments as they sunk into the "liquefied" soil. Furthermore, another phenomenon directly attributable to the submarine cables is a sub-aqueous flow slide in the soft upper sea bottom sediments. Flow slides within gently sloping sea bottom sediments have been reported during previous earthquakes in other regions of the world. "Flow slides", as the term implies, occur when saturated soil attains the consistency of a very thick viscous fluid with very little, if any, shear strength, and actually flows down slope. Flow slides have been known to occur in very flat slopes, and to have traveled overland great distances. Some slides of this nature have progressed down slope very slowly such that people could literally move out of their path on foot, and some have traveled at speeds in excess of 100 mph. It is quite possible that shallow flow slides could have been triggered in the sediments of Port Valdez by earthquake induced liquefaction and could have traveled along the sea bottom for enough to break and bury the submarine communications lines sometime after strong ground shaking ceased. It is also possible that the topographic effects of slides of that nature could go undetected during routine bathymetric surveys. Therefore, it is more probable that liquefaction of the fine sands within Port Valdez was the cause of the cable breaks rather than sub-aqueous faulting.

September 21, 1911 – A magnitude 6.5 earthquake and three aftershocks occurred between Seward and Whittier (60.5°N 149.0°W). Moderate ground motion was reported at Valdez, and minor talus slides were observed on Valdez Glacier. However, no cracking or distress of the glacier was observed. The submarine cables were again severed as in the 1908 event; however, the separation of the cables did not take place until "several seconds" after the earthquake stopped. The severing and burial of the cables was again attributed to faulting at the bottom of Port Valdez; however, no faulting was observed on shore. The fact that the cables were not broken until some moments after shaking subsided almost forces one to reject faulting as a cause of the cable breaks and accept some manifestation of liquefaction as the applicable phenomenon. The strongest evidence is that liquefaction quite often is manifested after ground shaking ceases, yet surface faulting must always be accompanied by near-field ground shaking. Non-liquefaction-induced sub-aqueous slides could have been the cause of cable burial; however, the probability is remote because the slope of the bottom fjord was only 50 feet to the mile (<1%) in the location where the cable was buried. It is very unlikely that accelerations at the mud line of the sediments associated with the magnitude and epicenter distance of this earthquake could have generated appreciable down slope movement of the sediments near enough to affect the cable.

January 31, 1912 – The fourth earthquake, not as well documented, is known to have affected Port Valdez. The earthquake was assigned a magnitude 7.25 and epicentral location at 61°N 147.5°W (40 miles west of Valdez). Once again, the submarine cables were broken in Port Valdez.

February 23, 1925 – The fifth earthquake occurred, west of Glennallen and Copper Center. No magnitude determinations were made for this event, but a Modified Mercalli Intensity of VII was assigned at the epicentral location (NOAA). Strong ground shaking caused structural damage to buildings and the dock at Valdez. Power lines were broken, and the submarine cables were severed once more. Seiching in Port Valdez also caused extensive damage to the boardwalk along Water Street.

March 27, 1964 The magnitude of this quake measured 8.4 - 8.6 on the Richter scale and was reported as a 9.2 Moment Magnitude. The massive shock waves ripped streets apart, damaged homes and destroyed buildings in town. Two docks in town were completely destroyed. $15 million dollars in damage was reported.

The most distinctive phenomenon in Port Valdez caused by this earthquake was a massive submarine slide involving approximately 98 million cubic yards of soil at the face of the Valdez Glacier Stream / Lowe River outwash delta. The slide destroyed the harbor facilities and many near-shore facilities. Several people were killed by the collapse of the docks and the incoming sea waves generated by the slide. The loss of material at the face of the outwash delta also contributed to a seaward ground stretching and subsidence of part of the shore area to an elevation below high tide level.

Several subordinate phenomena were imitated by the massive slide at the face of the delta outwash. A wave with a reported height of 40 feet was generated within Port Valdez. The wave traversed the length of the embankment several times at the approximate first mode period of the "basin." The run up of these waves caused further damage in Valdez beyond that associated with ground shaking. Subsidence, and ground cracking, and stretching linked to mass soil loss at the face of the delta also contributed heavily to the destruction within the city. Utilities ("life lines") were hard hit by this form of ground failure.

The true cause of the submarine slide, which contributed so heavily to the destruction of old Valdez; and which precipitated ground failure and general seaward progression of the landmass immediate to the pre-quake shoreline, is not precisely known. However, both liquefaction of sand layers and lenses, and failure of sensitive fine grain soil (silt, clay) could have produced similar effects as those that were reported to have occurred. According to aerial photo interpretation and published results of ground reconnaissance performed by members of the U.S. Geological Survey soon after the 1964 earthquake, most of the surface distress was generally limited to an area within 5,000 feet of the pre-quake shoreline. The exception to these limits was the area southwest of Knife Ridge along the dike (Dike Road) south of Valdez Glacier Stream. In that area, ground cracking and evidence of liquefaction were noted as far as 8,000 feet inland from the pre-quake shoreline.

Surface features accompanying some of the fissures and cracks on the outwash delta were indicative of liquefaction at depth. Sand and occasional gravel particles were ejected as far as 100 feet along extensive fissures. Graben-like depressions between fissures were also noted in areas of no reported ground stretching, indicating that the loss of ejected material at depth resulted in localized surface depressions of up to 12 inches deep. Test borings made by the Alaska Highway Department indicated that the soil fabric in the affected areas was generally coarser than that which is usually considered to be sensitive to liquefaction. The fact that the ground surface was frozen, and therefore, impermeable when the earthquake struck may have been the important contributing factor which made the critical difference and allowed a relatively

permeable soil to “liquefy.” It is, of course, also recognized that the 1964 seismic event was unique in its own right. That is, it was extremely violent and of unusually long duration (four to six minutes). All of these unusual factors may have combined under just the right circumstances to cause the reported ground failures in and about old Valdez.

The Valdez that exists today is a town rebuilt four miles west of the original Old Town. Valdez now is located near the mouth of Mineral Creek. Geologists recommended the Mineral Creek site because it sits on bedrock rather than on silty, water-drenched soil. Fifty-two buildings were moved and the other structures were burned and the ground razed.

The geologic instability of Old Town, which was constructed in the flood plain of Valdez Glacier, was noticed in 1899 by Edward Gillette. Gillette was an engineer working with Captain W.R. Abercrombie. "Where the small town of Valdez has been hastily built, there is danger at any time of having the buildings swept into the Bay by swift and quickly changing channels formed by the numerous streams flowing from uncertain and ever-changing parts of the Valdez Glacier situated some four miles north of town," Gillette wrote.

The drainage of Valdez Glacier not only put the town at flood risk, the water-saturated silt, fine sand, and gravel created an unstable foundation that proved disastrous when the big earthquake hit.

Saturated, fine-grain soils often feel as solid as concrete until violently shaken. In a process called liquefaction, solid ground suddenly acts as a liquid when earthquake movement alters the delicate structure of fine-grained soils that are buttressed by water. Liquefaction of the underlying soil of the Old Valdez waterfront caused an underwater landslide. The rapid sloughing of 97 million cubic yards of soils under the ocean surface caused a giant wave. The wave, estimated to be at least 30 feet high, slammed into the Valdez waterfront. As the wave bounced off the other side of the bay, Old Town was pummeled repeatedly. According to a plaque now standing on the Post Office foundation at the Old Town site, 32 people died as a result of the underwater landslide and resulting waves.

It took from two to four years for the new Valdez to become home for Valdez residents. Approximately 52 buildings were moved from the old Valdez to the new town site. Homeowners paid a fee of $400 for lots because the Corps of Engineers, along with Urban Renewal funds, replaced public facilities.

The table shows all 6.0 or greater Magnitude earthquakes since 1957 within 100 miles of Valdez.

Date	Time (Zulu)	Latitude	Longitude	Depth	Magnitude
28-Mar-64	3:36 AM	60.908	-147.339	25	9.2
28-Mar-64	2:47 PM	60.206	-146.767	12.5	6.4
28-Mar-64	2:49 PM	60.201	-146.842	12.5	6.3
30-Mar-64	7:09 AM	59.758	-145.854	10	6.4
4-Apr-64	4:54 AM	59.92	-146.813	20	6
18-Aug-70	5:52 PM	60.538	-145.537	25	6
12-Jul-83	3:10 PM	61.031	-147.286	37	6.6
7-Sep-83	7:22 PM	60.976	-147.5	45	6.4

Source: USGS, 2017

2. Situation and Assumptions

The community of Valdez was relocated to the present town site after the 1964 earthquake. The International Building Code and the International Residential Code place the COV in Seismic Zone D. This requires residential and commercial construction to meet specific standards for earthquake protection of structures. Although all structures are exposed to earthquakes, buildings within the City constructed with wood have slightly less vulnerability to the effects of earthquakes than those with masonry.

A. Tsunamis generated by an earthquake are considered to be a threat to Valdez based on the 1964 earthquake.

B. Extensive damage could occur to all forms of transportation infrastructure. Blockages could also occur from debris, landslides, and avalanches.

C. There may be outages or disruptions in all modern forms of communication.

D. Electric transmission infrastructure within the disaster area could be shut down. Industrial/technological emergencies such as fires, explosions, and hazardous materials incidents could occur.

E. All response assets will have degraded operational abilities.

F. Disaster impacts have the potential to increase over time due to cascading affects and aftershocks.

G. Aftershocks will cause a significant amount of additional damage during the response. Aftershocks may generate additional emergencies, fatalities, injuries, and unsafe structures.

H. Response resources in the impacted area will have limited capability to function, and some impacted areas will be isolated. Emergency response capabilities may be hindered.

I. Resources outside of the impacted area will have extended response times due to significant impact to transportation infrastructure. A large number of COV employees may be unable to make it to work or the EOC.

3. Operations

The Response and EOC activation for an earthquake event will be dictated and driven by the scope and locations of the impacted areas. The vast majority of earthquake events would pose a major threat to the population or infrastructure depending on the location of the epicenter and magnitude. A catastrophic earthquake event will require every functional area within the COV.

For each functional response area, see the corresponding functional annex within this EOP for concept of operations and roles and responsibilities of key agencies.

Some of the primary functional areas that will need to be considered during an earthquake event include (but are not limited to):

- Warning – Annex B – Warning is a key capability in this event response both in a notice and no-notice event.
- Communications – Annex C – Processes and infrastructure are critical to operations as a means and mechanism for both the PIO function as well as a coordinated response to an earthquake event where many different agencies will be operating.

- PIO – Annex D – Public information is critical for information relating to avoidance of hazard areas by the public during times of threat as well as critical information during a response to an event. Locations of shelters, status of infrastructure, and expectations of COV responders may be needed.
- Evacuation and Shelter in Place – Annex E – This function may be required on an area-to-area basis when conditions warrant the movement of people outside of the potential threat area.
- Mass Care and Sheltering – Annex F – Similar to Medical, an event that impacts a heavily populated area can dictate a large sheltering operation. Additionally, the loss of key infrastructure such as electricity to a large area can necessitate a large mass care operation. The mass care impact will increase over time with the continued loss of primary infrastructure.
- Health and Medical Services – Annex G – In an event that impacts a populated area, the public health and medical component could be a significant operation. A medical response may be required as well as longer term medical operations through DMORT and fatality management.
- Public Works and Transportation – Annex J – Public works will be a critical component to an event due to the potential loss of the operational capabilities and capacities of key infrastructure. The heavy equipment and machinery needed to move large volumes of material as well as the department's function in restoring key infrastructure is critical in this event. An earthquake event will have significant impact to transportation routes and hubs. Combined with the debris issue, transportation can impede an effective response, bringing response materials into the affected area as well as distributing those resources to those in need.
- Oil and Hazardous Materials Spill Response – Annex K – Industrial/technological emergencies such as fires, explosions, and hazardous materials incidents could occur.
- Debris Management and Removal – Annex M – An event that occurs in or across populated or managed infrastructure (roads, etc.) will generate enormous amounts of debris. The management of that debris during a response, and the subsequent recovery will be a significant undertaking.

4. Actions

Earthquake Preparedness Phase

Preparedness actions

- ☐ Inventory and restock food and supplies for emergency personnel (special clothing, hard hats, road barriers, flashlights, batteries, barrier tape, rescue tools, etc.).
- ☐ Review and update emergency communications network capabilities.
  - ☐ Review and update amateur radio capabilities.
  - ☐ Review and update cell phone capabilities.
- ☐ Inventory location(s) and availability of heavy equipment and supplies (trucks, bulldozers, front loaders, graders, plows, fuel, barricades, etc.).
- ☐ Strategically pre-position supplies, equipment, fuel, and medical gear in safe areas, if appropriate.
- ☐ Identify staging area for equipment and supplies.
- ☐ Inventory auxiliary power equipment with rating and fuel supplies.
- ☐ Identify resources.
  - ☐ Building inspectors, develop standby schedules.
  - ☐ Back up Heavy Equipment Operators.
  - ☐ Extended hours for front desk phones.
- ☐ Check generators and backup power systems.

Earthquake Response Phase: Earthquake is Occurring

☐ **Immediate response actions to consider.**

- ☐ Activate IMT or EOC as appropriate.
- ☐ Dispatch Center
  - ☐ Activate Outdoor Warning Sirens, if warranted based on an alert or warning received from appropriate agencies.
    - If the arrival of a tsunami/other catastrophic event is estimated to be within a relatively short time (< 2 hours), notify the IM Short Team. The primary means of notification to the public will be voice enhanced siren signals, which will be backed up by commercial radio (KCHU, KVAK), and notification. The City Manager or Assistant City Manager(s) if designated will make the decision on when to activate sirens per protocol established in Annex B: Warning.
    - If the estimated arrival time of the tsunami/other catastrophic event is several hours or more away, activate the EOC, and the IC will determine when the PIO should notify each entity.
- ☐ VPD
  - ☐ Immediately dispatch resources to the incident to report back information, to provide situational awareness, and to satisfy any immediate response as needed.
  - ☐ Maintain public order and crowd control.
  - ☐ Secure evacuated area(s).
  - ☐ Secure shelter(s) or gathering area(s) if EOC establishes the need for them.
  - ☐ Conduct continued reconnaissance to maintain situational awareness.
  - ☐ Arrange for handling and identification of fatalities and mental health support services with the AKSMEO, if warranted.

- ☐ VFD
  - ☐ Immediately dispatch resources to the incident to report back information, to provide situational awareness, and to satisfy any immediate response as needed.
  - ☐ Control fires and hazmat releases.
  - ☐ Activate rescue and medical response teams and/or task forces.
  - ☐ Establish safe locations for emergency medical care – consider mass causality procedures – arrange for medical evacuations as needed.
  - ☐ Evaluate and conduct SAR efforts, if warranted.
- ☐ Department of Public Works Director
  - ☐ Work with utility companies to restore essential public utilities and facilities.
  - ☐ Evaluate and respond to utility breaks/stoppages – consider a boil water order.
  - ☐ Determine the condition of the VMT, the Kelsey Dock, the Ferry Terminal, the airport, and the Richardson Highway. Be prepared to report this status to the IC who will report this information to the SEOC.
- ☐ Capital Facilities
  - ☐ Send building inspectors and COV engineers to evaluate the safety of critical infrastructure and essential buildings [i.e., EOC(s), hospitals, public utilities, shelters, schools, etc.].
- ☐ EOC IC
  - ☐ Gain situational awareness of the extent of damage and loss of infrastructure by receiving reconnaissance reports from the Police Chief, Fire Chief, and Department of Public Works Director. Based on information, focus and prioritize response efforts with the limited or constrained resources available.
  - ☐ If conditions warrant, request that the City Mayor sign a local emergency declaration.
  - ☐ Issue evacuation orders as appropriate.
  - ☐ Coordinate with liaisons with other local agencies (i.e., schools/college, medical centers, Alyeska, PWSC, U.S. Coast Guard, AST, ADOT&PF, etc.).
  - ☐ Account for all persons in the community.
  - ☐ Establish shelter(s).
  - ☐ Implement MOUs with grocery stores and hardware stores.
  - ☐ Be prepared to report status to the SEOC if State assistance is required.
  - ☐ Coordinate non-local support requirements with the SEOC.
- ☐ PIO
  - ☐ Warn citizens of the dangers of weakened or collapsing buildings. The PIO will draft initial public service announcements (PSAs) for approval of the IC. The PIO will issue PSAs as directed, and establish a schedule for periodic updates. Advise the public to remain outdoors until the safety of structures can be determined.
- ☐ AST
  - ☐ Assist VFD and VPD as needed.

☐ **Secondary actions**

- ☐ Arrange for the security of incoming supplies by land, sea, and air.
- ☐ Form a task force to document, and estimate damage to public and private property.
- ☐ Document the cost of material and labor involved with the emergency.

Earthquake Recovery Phase: Earthquake has occurred.

- ☐ **Review Response Checklist from Response Phase.**
- ☐ **Review Earthquake Stabilization and Restoration sequences on the following page.**
- ☐ **Immediate actions**
  - ☐ EOC IC
    - ☐ Contain to gain situational awareness of the extent of damage and loss of infrastructure by receiving reconnaissance reports from the Police Chief, Fire Chief, and Department of Public Works Director. Based on information, focus and re-prioritize response efforts with the limited or constrained resources available.
    - ☐ Coordinate recovery activities with State and Federal relief agencies.
    - ☐ Be prepared to report status to the SEOC if State assistance is required.
    - ☐ Coordinate non-local support requirements with the SEOC.
  - ☐ EOC Section Chiefs
    - ☐ Account for all persons in the community.
    - ☐ Arrange for emergency housing as necessary.
    - ☐ Establish disaster aid centers to process applications for the rehabilitation of individuals and families.
    - ☐ Request special personnel: interpreters, clergy, counselors, technicians, retired medical.
    - ☐ When safe access is established, arrange for the return of evacuees to assess damages.
    - ☐ Initiate services to help victims cope with the situation, and to provide food, clothing, basic supplies, and temporary shelter for people displaced by the disaster.

      Alaskan Red Cross Coordinator: 907-646-5400
      Salvation Army-Anchorage: 907-375-3583
      AK DHS&EM: 800-478-2337
    - ☐ Provide monetary figures necessary to support a request for disaster declaration.
    - ☐ Complete and submit necessary reports and paperwork to appropriate agencies.
    - ☐ Perform an incident critique.
  - ☐ Department of Public Works Director
    - ☐ Arrange for debris clearance.
    - ☐ Work to restore damaged utilities and transportation systems (airstrips, roadways, and port facilities).
    - ☐ Perform Assessment of critical infrastructure for the safety of operators/occupants.
    - ☐ Survey safety hazards and undertake corrective measures, including a health and sanitation survey and disease prevention measures.
    - ☐ Initiate immediate and long-range rehabilitation measures and programs.
    - ☐ Continue to restore and maintain essential public utilities and facilities.
    - ☐ Perform damage assessments.
    - ☐ Restore critical public utilities and facilities.
  - ☐ PIO

☐ Continue to disseminate public information regarding ongoing hazards and relief efforts.

☐ AST

☐ Arrange for handling and identification of fatalities and mental health support services.

Earthquake Stabilization and Restoration Sequence
The priorities reflected in this list are general guidelines for returning Valdez to operational and economic normalcy following an earthquake. Coordinate all stabilization/restoration activities with the U.S. Coast Guard Valdez and Alyeska Terminal, and share resources as appropriate. Assess all buildings and structures for stability before entering, especially multi-story buildings.

Type of Service	Priority 1	Priority 2	Priority 3
Communications	Emergency response EOC Dispatch	Essential phone circuits Public Radio	Non-EAS radio stations Data and other commercial
Facilities	EOC Dispatch Center Fire Stations Hospital/Centers Shelter(s) Water Treatment City Hall	Grocery Stores Public Works Sewer Treatment City offices Port/Harbor office State/Federal offices	Schools (non-shelters) College Library Businesses
Energy	Power to: Fuel Pumps EOC Shelter(s) Hospital Water Pumps	Heating/cooking Power to public facilities Power to sewer	Dwellings Businesses
Transportation	Primary routes Evacuation routes Airport	Secondary routes Port facilities	Harbor facilities
Equipment	Emergency generators Emergency response vehicles	Heavy equipment	Buses
Personnel	ICS staff Emergency response personnel	Workers essential to reconstruction, debris, and waste disposal	Personnel necessary for economic recovery
Water	Fire suppression Potable water Sanitation	Industrial processes Homes	

ANNEX R: Avalanche

1. Scope

This annex describes the types of avalanches and identifies known risk areas of avalanches. This hazard may range in scale occurring in remote areas or affect densely populated sections of Valdez. This hazard can damage key transportation routes, critical infrastructure, disrupt commerce, temporarily strand travelers, isolate residents, and have the potential to produce multiple casualties and/or fatalities.

2. Situation

Valdez has primarily a maritime snow climate. This means the region is typically wet and warm. Because of its coastal location, Valdez is subject to prolonged storms and frequent cloud cover. Snow accumulations of great depth are likely, and winter rains are common. Valdez can receive exceptionally heavy amounts of precipitation in short periods of time. During the winter of 1989-1990, total snowfall measured 561", with 47.5" measured in a single day in January 1990. The maximum snow depth at sea level, also recorded in January 1990, was 107".

Avalanches affecting lower elevations in the Valdez area (although there are marked annual variances) can typically occur between November and May, with the greatest potential for larger avalanches between January and April. From available historical records, February appears a prime month. Generally, in a maritime snow climate, the overall snow pack is often relatively strong with short-lived periods of instability associated primarily with storm events or spring warming. Even relatively small amounts of rain or cold, dry snow pack can lead to widespread instability. A snow pack that received consistent rain is less sensitive to additional rain. Glide cracks are common in maritime snow packs, particularly during deep snow pack years. Prone to develop mostly on steep, smooth, lubricated slopes, glide cracks are tensile failures, which can lead to slab avalanches releasing to the ground weeks, or even months after the glide crack forms.

It is important to note that maritime snow climates are often subject to pronounced changes in snow pack conditions with elevation due to differences in temperature, precipitation, and wind. This is especially true at northern latitudes. At higher elevations in the Valdez area, it is common to find colder temperatures, drier snow, and greater deposition of new and wind-loaded snow than at sea level. Colder conditions, more typical of a "continental" type climate, can be conducive to the formation of weak, poorly-bonded layers. The importance of this is that these weak layers can persist for long periods of time and become deeply buried under successive layers of heavier, more typically maritime snow. The result, often months later, can be large, deep slab releases. Even in a maritime climate, it is possible to have relatively-dry, cold snow layers at all elevations, a factor that allows avalanches to easily accelerate and entrain additional snow in their descent.

Annually, in mid to late spring, dozens of avalanches can be seen and heard on the higher elevations of the south-facing peaks surrounding the basin of Port Valdez. As a rule, the run-outs of these avalanches come nowhere near the mountain bases; and consequently, nowhere near developed areas of Valdez.

In the area north of Valdez, beginning in Keystone Canyon (Richardson Highway MP ~15) and ending near MP 50, there is significant potential for avalanche activity that can reach and block the Richardson Highway which is the only means of surface transportation in and out of Valdez.

In 2008, an avalanche occurred near MP 28.5 in Thompson Pass, resulting in the fatality of one man. In January 2014, a very warm and wet weather pattern for a couple of weeks over Southcentral Alaska resulted in numerous avalanches in the Chugach Mountains. Of note was the avalanche down Snow Slide Gulch, about 16 miles northeast of Valdez. Five to six inches of rainfall in the days prior to the avalanches are likely the reason these avalanches were so massive. The first avalanche occurred on the afternoon of January 24th, resulting in nearly 40 feet of snow blocking the Lowe River and Richardson Highway. This resulted in the water damming behind the avalanche about 1 to 1.5 miles upstream across the Richardson Highway. This was followed by a larger avalanche the afternoon of the 25th that added to the previous snow depth, increasing the blockage to over 70 feet of snow. The lake that formed behind the avalanche took over five days to drain low enough to allow ADOT crews to begin removing the avalanche snow from the road. The only known damages from this were some road signs and guard rail damaged. The cost for removal of the snow to reopen the road was in the thousands of dollars.

Though outside the municipal boundaries of Valdez, slides along Thompson Pass can have a very real impact on Valdez residents. The Richardson Highway is the only surface transportation route in and out. The Richardson Highway is the only road in and out of Valdez as the City is tucked between the Chugach Mountains and Prince William Sound. As recently as December 6, 2017, a winter storm produced more than 40 inches of snow on Thompson Pass and triggered an avalanche that shut down the highway to Valdez. In just 90 minutes, 15 inches of snow fell. The Richardson Highway was closed from Miles 12 to 42. The avalanche was 20 feet deep and 200 feet long. It was estimated to take about five hours to clear, but "depending on conditions, it could be a couple days before we get there," ADOT&PF Spokesperson Meadow Bailey said (Anchorage Daily News, *Snowstorm triggers avalanche in Thompson Pass, closing road to Valdez*, December 7, 2017).

The electrical transmission line between Valdez and the Copper Basin region runs parallel to the highway through Thompson Pass. Since 1998, five destructive avalanches have resulted in $2.675 million in damage to the support towers and transmission line. In 2014, nearly four-miles of the transmission line through Thompson Pass were relocated to minimize the risk of avalanche danger and to mitigate the risk to CVEA's linemen that would have to work on getting the line back together if it were struck by an avalanche, as it was on many occasions in the past.

The COV created an Avalanche Zoning District for specific areas of the community at risk to avalanche danger. Development and use within the zoning district are limited to low-density, seasonal use to mitigate the potential for life safety issues and property destruction. The only critical facility with the potential to be impacted is the Richardson Highway, preventing road access into and out of the community (see figures on the next page). This hazard affects access to the Valdez community and an unknown amount of people outside the Valdez community trying to access Valdez. Currently, a study is underway by the Alaska Division of Geological & Geophysical Surveys and will be beneficial to updating this avalanche section in the future. This study includes an Avalanche Hazard Map for the Valdez area, and this map will be added to the EOP when it is completed.


The Bulge Avalanche Area
29 Mile Avalanche Area
Worthington Flats Avalanche Area
School Bus Avalanche Area
Odessey Avalanche Area
46-1
45-6
45-5
46-6
46-5
46-4
46-3
46-2
To Valdez →
MP 29
Worthington Flats Avalanche Area
29 Mile Avalanche Area
The Bulge Avalanche Area
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
School Bus Avalanche Area
The Bulge Avalanche Area
Odessey Avalanche Area
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44-6
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MP 28
To Valdez →
The Bulge Avalanche Area
School Bus Avalanche Area
Odessey Avalanche Area
© 2003 Alaska Mountain Safety Center, Inc. (Photo: May 7, 2003 by D. Fesler)

3. Assumptions

A. Snow avalanches are considered either a loose snow (wet or dry) type or slab type. Dry, loose snow avalanches cause little damage while wet loose snow avalanches are more likely to cause damage. Slab avalanches are considered the most dangerous type and happen when a cohesive slab breaks away and travels down the mountainside.

B. Multiple avalanches occur every year but usually occur in more remote areas. Avalanches can occur naturally or also be triggered by human activity as well.

C. The general topography of the Valdez Area is near-level, ranging from sea level to 200 feet. Directly adjacent to the COV infrastructure, the Chugach Mountains rise steeply and generally reach between 3,000 – 4,500 feet.

4. Operations

Response and EOC activation for an avalanche event will be dictated and driven by the scope and location of the event. The vast majority of avalanches occur outside the COV in backcountry environments that do not pose a major threat to large populations or infrastructure.

For each functional response area, see the corresponding functional annex within this EOP for concept of operations and roles and responsibilities of key agencies.

Some of the primary functional areas that will need to be considered during an avalanche event include (but are not limited to):

- Warning – Annex B – Warning is a key capability in this event response both in a notice and no-notice event.
- Communications – Annex C – Processes and infrastructure are critical to operations as a means and mechanism for both the PIO function as well as a coordinated response to an avalanche event where many different agencies will be operating.
- PIO – Annex D – Public information is critical for information relating to avoidance of hazard areas by the public during times of threat as well as critical information during a response to an event.
- Evacuation and Shelter in Place – Annex E – This function may be required on an area-to-area basis when conditions warrant the movement of people outside of the potential threat area.
- Mass Care and Sheltering – Annex F – Similar to Medical, an event that impacts a heavily populated area can dictate a large sheltering operation. Additionally, the loss of key infrastructure such as electricity to a large area can necessitate a large mass care operation. The mass care impact will increase over time with the continued loss of primary infrastructure.
- Health and Medical Services – Annex G – In an event that impacts a populated area, the public health and medical component could be a significant operation. A medical response may be required as well as longer term medical operations through DMORT and fatality management.
- Public Works and Transportation – Annex J – Public works will be a critical component to an event due to the potential loss of the operational capabilities and capacities of key

infrastructure. The heavy equipment and machinery needed to move large volumes of material as well as the department's function in restoring key infrastructure is critical in this event. An avalanche event that closes the Richardson Highway will have significant impact to transportation routes, bringing all transportation in and out of Valdez to a standstill until the road is cleared. Combined with the debris issue, a transportation halt can impede an effective response bringing response materials into the affected area as well as distributing those resources to those in need.

- Debris Management and Removal – Annex M – An event that occurs in or across populated or managed infrastructure (roads, etc.) will generate enormous amounts of debris. The management of that debris during a response, and the subsequent recovery will be a significant undertaking.

5. Actions

Avalanche Preparedness Phase

Preparedness actions

- ☐ Inventory and restock food and supplies for emergency personnel (special clothing, hard hats, road barriers, flashlights, batteries, barrier tape, rescue tools, etc.).
- ☐ Review and update emergency communications network capabilities.
  - ☐ Review and update amateur radio capabilities.
  - ☐ Review and update cell phone capabilities.
- ☐ Inventory location(s) and availability of heavy equipment and supplies (trucks, bulldozers, front loaders, graders, snowplows, fuel, barricades, etc.).
- ☐ Strategically pre-position supplies, equipment, fuel, and medical gear in safe areas, if appropriate.
- ☐ Identify staging area for equipment and supplies.
- ☐ Inventory auxiliary power equipment with rating and fuel supplies.
- ☐ Identify resources.
  - ☐ Building inspectors, develop standby schedules.
  - ☐ Back up Heavy Equipment Operators.
  - ☐ Extended hours for front desk phones.
- ☐ Check generators and backup power systems.

Avalanche Warning Phase: Threat of an Avalanche Exists

☐ **IM Short Team**

- ☐ Receive and evaluate forecasts of avalanche potential.
- ☐ Identify areas and people at risk.
- ☐ Are conditions improving or deteriorating?
- ☐ Ensure evacuation routes are passable.
- ☐ Issue public safety announcements regarding avalanche-prone areas, evacuation areas and routes, and safety precautions.
- ☐ Arrange for public alert and warning.
- ☐ Evaluate need for sheltering.
- ☐ Notify local responders of potential need for SAR.
- ☐ Inventory heavy equipment for use in response and recovery.
- ☐ Pre-position emergency equipment, fuel, and medical supplies in safe area for use.
- ☐ Arrange for safe delivery of incoming response personnel and supplies.

Avalanche Response Phase: Avalanche is Occurring

☐ **IM Short Team**
- ☐ Review Warning Checklist for Avalanche.
- ☐ Are conditions improving or deteriorating?
- ☐ Establish EOC, if necessary.

☐ **Immediate response actions to consider.**

- ☐ EOC IC
  - ☐ Establish a watch/observation system for future avalanches.
  - ☐ Launch search and rescue efforts as needed.
  - ☐ Continue to disseminate public information, warnings, and instructions.
  - ☐ Limit travel/recreation in impacted areas.
  - ☐ Establish shelter(s) and care station(s).
  - ☐ Secure evacuated area(s).
  - ☐ Establish safe location for emergency medical care.
  - ☐ If conditions warrant, request that the City Mayor sign a local emergency declaration.
  - ☐ Request State declaration of disaster emergency, if conditions warrant.
  - ☐ Be prepared to report status to the SEOC if State assistance is required.
  - ☐ Coordinate non-local support requirements with the SEOC.
- ☐ VPD
  - ☐ Arrange for handling and identification of fatalities and mental health support services with the AKSMEO, if warranted.
- ☐ VFD
  - ☐ Evaluate and conduct SAR efforts, if warranted.
- ☐ AST
  - ☐ Assist VPD and VFD as needed.

Avalanche Recovery Phase: Avalanche has Occurred

☐ **Immediate response actions to consider.**

- ☐ EOC IC
  - ☐ Review Warning and Response Checklists for Avalanche.
  - ☐ Coordinate recovery activities with local, state, and federal agencies.
  - ☐ Identify safety hazards and undertake corrective action.
  - ☐ Perform an incident critique.
- ☐ EOC Section Chiefs
  - ☐ Arrange for emergency housing as necessary.
  - ☐ Request special personnel: interpreters, clergy, counselors, technicians, retired medical. (Listing in reference)
  - ☐ When safe access is established, alert the PIO to communicate with the public.
  - ☐ Provide monetary figures necessary to support a request for disaster declaration.
  - ☐ Complete and submit necessary reports and paperwork to appropriate agencies.
- ☐ VPD
  - ☐ Arrange for handling and identification of fatalities and mental health support services with the AKSMEO, if warranted.
- ☐ VFD
  - ☐ Evaluate and conduct SAR efforts, if warranted.
- ☐ AST
  - ☐ Assist VFD and VPD as needed.
- ☐ Department of Public Works Director
  - ☐ Identify safety hazards, and undertake corrective action.
  - ☐ Arrange for snow and debris clearance. Coordinate with ADOT&PF.
  - ☐ Work to restore damaged utilities and transportation systems (airstrips, roadways, and port facilities).
  - ☐ Perform damage assessments, post-incident cleanup, and utilities restoration.
  - ☐ Arrange for handling and identification of fatalities and mental health support services.
- ☐ PIO
  - ☐ Continue to disseminate public information regarding ongoing hazards and relief efforts.

ANNEX S: Landslide

1. Scope

This annex identifies known risk areas for landslides. This hazard may range in scale occurring in remote areas or affect densely populated sections of Valdez. This hazard can damage key transportation routes, critical infrastructure, disrupt commerce, temporarily strand travelers, isolate residents, and have the potential to produce multiple casualties and/or fatalities.

A landslide is a natural event that causes damage when human activities interface with slide areas. Landslides occur naturally when inherent weaknesses in the rock or soil combine with one or more triggering events such as heavy rain, snowmelt, changes in groundwater level, and seismic or volcanic activity, or erosion. Human activities such as road construction, excavation, and mining can also cause landslides. Landslide events, even for those properties unaffected directly, will suffer due to road closures, impacts to public safety (access and response capabilities), limited availability of perishable commodities, and isolation.

2. Situation

Landslides are a potential hazard in Valdez because of the climate, topography, and the presence of other hazards such as earthquakes that might increase the likelihood of a landslide. Currently, a study is underway by the Alaska Division of Geological & Geophysical Surveys (DGGS). This study includes a Landslide Hazard Map for the Valdez area, and this map will be added to the EOP when it is completed.

3. Assumptions

A. The general topography of the Valdez Area is near-level, ranging from sea level to 200 feet. Directly adjacent to the COV infrastructure, the Chugach Mountains rise steeply and generally reach between 3,000 – 4,500 feet.

B. Landslides are likely to occur in known areas and may affect major transportation routes in and out of the COV.

C. Landslides may occur in any number of areas and have the potential to impact well-developed areas as well as remote areas.

D. Landslides are a type of ground failure and can occur naturally or be triggered by human activities. Ground failures often occur as the result of another hazard such as an earthquake, volcanic eruption, or ground saturation.

4. Operations

Response and EOC activation for a landslide event will be dictated and driven by the scope and location of the event. Landslides within the COV pose a higher threat of infrastructure loss and affect to populations.

For each functional response area, see the corresponding functional annex within this EOP for concept of operations and roles and responsibilities of key agencies.

Some of the primary functional areas that will need to be considered during a landslide event include (but are not limited to):

- Warning – Annex B – Warning is a key capability in this event response both in a notice and no-notice event.
- Communications – Annex C – Processes and infrastructure are critical to operations as a means and mechanism for both the PIO function as well as a coordinated response to a landslide event where many different agencies will be operating.
- PIO – Annex D – Public information is critical for information relating to avoidance of hazard areas by the public during times of threat as well as critical information during a response to an event.
- Evacuation and Shelter in Place – Annex E – This function may be required on an area-to-area basis when conditions warrant the movement of people outside of the potential threat area.
- Mass Care and Sheltering – Annex F – Similar to Medical, an event that impacts a heavily populated area can dictate a large sheltering operation. Additionally, the loss of key infrastructure such as electricity to a large area can necessitate a large mass care operation. The mass care impact will increase over time with the continued loss of primary infrastructure.
- Health and Medical Services – Annex G – In an event that impacts a populated area, the public health and medical component could be a significant operation. A medical response may be required as well as longer term medical operations through DMORT and fatality management.
- Public Works and Transportation – Annex J – Public works will be a critical component to an event due to the potential loss of the operational capabilities and capacities of key infrastructure. The heavy equipment and machinery needed to move large volumes of material as well as the department's function in restoring key infrastructure is critical in this event. A landslide event that closes the Richardson Highway will have significant impact to transportation routes, bringing all transportation in and out of Valdez to a standstill until the road is cleared. Combined with the debris issue, a transportation halt can impede an effective response, bringing response materials into the affected area as well as distributing those resources to those in need.
- Debris Management and Removal – Annex M – An event that occurs in or across populated or managed infrastructure (roads, etc.) will generate enormous amounts of debris. The management of that debris during a response, and the subsequent recovery will be a significant undertaking.

5. Actions

Landslide Preparedness Phase

Preparedness actions

- ☐ Inventory and restock food and supplies for emergency personnel (special clothing, hard hats, road barriers, flashlights, batteries, barrier tape, rescue tools, etc.).
- ☐ Review and update emergency communications network capabilities.
  - ☐ Review and update amateur radio capabilities.
  - ☐ Review and update cell phone capabilities.
- ☐ Inventory location(s) and availability of heavy equipment and supplies (trucks, bulldozers, front loaders, graders, fuel, barricades, etc.).

- ☐ Strategically pre-position supplies, equipment, fuel, and medical gear in safe areas, if appropriate.
- ☐ Identify staging area for equipment and supplies.
- ☐ Inventory auxiliary power equipment with rating and fuel supplies.
- ☐ Identify resources.
  - ☐ Building inspectors, develop standby schedules.
  - ☐ Back up Heavy Equipment Operators.
  - ☐ Extended hours for front desk phones.
- ☐ Check generators and backup power systems.

Landslide Warning Phase: Threat of a Landslide Exists

☐ **IM Short Team**

- ☐ Receive and evaluate forecasts of landslide potential.
- ☐ Identify areas, facilities, infrastructure, and people at risk and potential mitigation measures.
- ☐ Are conditions improving or deteriorating?
- ☐ Ensure evacuation routes are passable.
- ☐ Issue public safety announcements regarding landslide-prone areas, evacuation areas and routes, and safety precautions.
- ☐ Arrange for public alert and warning.
- ☐ Evaluate need for sheltering.
- ☐ Evaluate existing landslide control structures/measures.
- ☐ Notify local responders of potential need for SAR.
- ☐ Inventory heavy equipment for use in response and recovery.
- ☐ Pre-position emergency equipment, fuel, and medical supplies in safe area for use after landslide.
- ☐ Check auxiliary power supplies.
- ☐ Arrange for safe delivery of incoming response personnel and supplies.

Landslide Response Phase: Landslide is Occurring

- ☐ IM Short Team
  - ☐ Review Warning Checklist for Landslide.
  - ☐ Are conditions improving or deteriorating?
  - ☐ Establish EOC, if necessary.
- ☐ **Immediate response actions to consider.**
  - ☐ EOC IC
    - ☐ Establish a watch/observation system for future landslides.
    - ☐ Launch search and rescue efforts as needed.
    - ☐ Continue to disseminate public information, warnings, and instructions.
    - ☐ Limit travel/recreation in impacted areas.
    - ☐ Establish shelter(s) and care station(s).
    - ☐ Secure evacuated area(s).
    - ☐ Establish safe location for emergency medical care.
    - ☐ Inform Dispatch of needed EMTs and ambulance transport.
    - ☐ Consider establishing a multi-casualty organization.
    - ☐ If conditions warrant, request that the City Mayor sign a local emergency declaration.
    - ☐ Request State declaration of disaster emergency if conditions warrant.
    - ☐ Be prepared to report status to the SEOC if State assistance is required.
    - ☐ Coordinate non-local support requirements with the SEOC.
  - ☐ VPD
    - ☐ Arrange for handling and identification of fatalities and mental health support services with the AKSMEO, if warranted.
  - ☐ VFD
    - ☐ Evaluate and conduct SAR efforts, if warranted.
  - ☐ AST
    - ☐ Assist VFD and VPD as needed.

Landslide Recovery Phase: Landslide has Occurred

☐ **Immediate response actions to consider.**

- ☐ EOC IC
  - ☐ Review Warning and Response Checklists for Landslides.
  - ☐ Review Earthquake Stabilization and Restoration Sequence.
  - ☐ Coordinate recovery activities with local, state, and federal relief agencies.
  - ☐ Identify safety hazards and undertake corrective action.
  - ☐ Perform an incident critique.
- ☐ EOC Section Chiefs
  - ☐ Arrange for emergency housing as necessary.
  - ☐ Request special personnel: interpreters, clergy, counselors, technicians, retired medical.
  - ☐ When safe access is established, alert the PIO to communicate with the public.
  - ☐ Provide monetary figures necessary to support a request for disaster declaration.
  - ☐ Complete and submit necessary reports and paperwork to appropriate agencies.
- ☐ VPD
  - ☐ Arrange for handling and identification of fatalities and mental health support services with the AKSMEO, if warranted.
- ☐ VFD
  - ☐ Evaluate and conduct SAR efforts, if warranted.
- ☐ Department of Public Works Director
  - ☐ Identify safety hazards, and undertake corrective action.
  - ☐ Arrange for debris clearance. Coordinate with ADOT&PF.
  - ☐ Work to restore damaged utilities and transportation systems (airstrips, roadways, and port facilities).
  - ☐ Perform damage assessments, post-incident cleanup, and utilities restoration.
- ☐ AST
  - ☐ Assist VFD and VPD as needed.
- ☐ PIO
  - ☐ Continue to disseminate public information regarding ongoing hazards and relief efforts.

ANNEX T: Tsunami/Seiche

1. Scope

This annex describes the activities of the COV when a tsunami occurs. Since earthquakes typically trigger tsunamis, refer also to Annex Q – Earthquake.

A ***tsunami*** is a series of ocean waves generated by any rapid large-scale disturbance of sea water. These waves can travel at speeds of up to 600 mph in the open ocean. Most tsunamis are generated by earthquakes, but they may also be caused by volcanic eruptions, landslides (above or under sea in origin), undersea slumps, or meteor impacts. Tsunami damage is a direct result of three factors:

1. *Inundation* (the extent to which the water covers the land);
2. *Wave action* that will impact structures and moving objects that become projectiles; and
3. *Coastal erosion.*

Tsunamis are categorized in one of two ways:

- Distant-source tsunamis; and
- Locally-generated tsunamis.

This distinction is made based on the time it takes the tsunami to leave the source disturbance and reach land.

A ***distant-source tsunami*** (Tele-tsunami) is the term for a tsunami observed at places 600 miles, or more, from the source of origin. Distant tsunamis are more likely to occur in the Pacific Ocean and are capable of traveling across the entire ocean in less than one day. Since distant-source tsunamis make such long trips with a relatively-constant speed, experts can predict their arrival with a fair degree of accuracy. This allows time for warnings and evacuation.

A ***locally-generated tsunami*** is a term for a tsunami that is generated near the coast, thus the first waves may reach the shore within minutes of the event. This gives little or no time for warning or evacuation.

A ***seiche*** is a wave that oscillates in partially- or totally-enclosed bodies of water. They can last from a few minutes to a few hours as a result of an earthquake, underwater landslide, atmospheric disturbance or avalanche. The resulting effect is similar to bathtub water sloshing repeatedly from side to side. The reverberating water continually causes damage until the activity subsides. The factors for effective warning are similar to a local tsunami, in that the onset of the first wave can be a few minutes, giving virtually no time for warning.

2. Situation

Six earthquakes are reported to have seriously affected Port Valdez from 1899-1964. During each of these earthquakes, events indicating submarine slides or possible liquefaction of the bottom sediments of Port Valdez were reported. “Seismic sea waves” (seiching) were also reported during four of these earthquakes. A brief summary of the effects of these events at Port Valdez is provided in Annex Q – Earthquake.

The Valdez that exists today is a town rebuilt four miles west of the original Old Town. Valdez now is located near the mouth of Mineral Creek. Geologists recommended the Mineral Creek site because it sits on bedrock rather than on silty, water-drenched soil.

A large tsunami could create major property damage at Port Valdez. Facilities and on-shore structures are adjacent to the shoreline. It is assumed that a tsunami could damage or destroy most of the infrastructure throughout the area. Transportation infrastructure could suffer from road damage, damage to the harbor, and damage to docking facilities. However, no tsunamis have occurred since 1964 when the town location was moved.

A tsunami warning signal system has been installed throughout the populated areas to alert the public of a tsunami warning or watch for Valdez. These warning signals are tested every Wednesday at 5:00 p.m. The tsunami-warning signal for the COV is a wavering tone for a three-minute repeating period. This signal indicates that according to the best available information, a tsunami wave is coming. Whenever this signal is sounded (except Wednesday at 5:00 p.m.), local residents should follow evacuation procedures outlined in the EOP.

Tsunami mapping had not been completed as of the 2018 Hazard Mitigation Plan. Currently, all coastal areas below 100 feet elevation and/or within one mile of Prince William Sound's edge are considered within the possible inundation zone. Tsunami inundation mapping may lead to a revision of vulnerable areas.

- *Property That May Be Affected:* Port and harbor facilities, public works facilities, structures, vehicles, equipment, transportation facilities such as docks, float systems, hospital/medical center, animal shelter, and roads.
- *Environment That May Be Affected:* Wetlands with inclusive flora and fauna, coastal vegetation.
- *Unusual Conditions:* Locations containing Hazardous Materials including the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Marine Terminal, and multiple fish processing facilities containing by example but not exclusively the following hazardous materials: Ammonia, Freon, Crude Oil, etc.; Psychological impacts due to major loss of life and traumatic injuries.
- *Sheltering for Displaced Populations.* The Trans-Alaska Pipeline Marine Terminal sits on the Port of Valdez, which if impacted could affect the economy of the entire U.S., most notably the West Coast to which it supplies 60% of the coast's oil.

3. Assumptions

A. Tsunamis generated by an earthquake are considered to be a threat to Valdez based on the 1964 earthquake.

B. Extensive damage could occur to all forms of transportation infrastructure. Blockages could also occur from debris and landslides.

C. There may be outages or disruptions in all modern forms of communication.

D. Electric transmission infrastructure within the disaster area could be shut down. Industrial/technological emergencies such as fires, explosions, and hazardous materials incidents could occur.

E. All response assets may have degraded operational abilities.

F. Disaster impacts have the potential to increase over time due to cascading affects and aftershocks.

G. Aftershocks will cause a significant amount of additional damage during the response. Aftershocks may generate additional emergencies, fatalities, injuries, and unsafe structures.

H. Response resources in the impacted area will have limited capability to function, and some impacted areas will be isolated. Emergency response capabilities may be hindered.

I. Resources outside of the impacted area will have extended response times due to significant impact to transportation infrastructure. A large number of COV employees may be unable to make it to work or the EOC.

4. Operations

Response and EOC activation for a tsunami event will be dictated and driven by the scope and locations of the impacted areas. The vast majority of tsunami/earthquake events would pose a major threat to the population or infrastructure, depending on the location of the epicenter and magnitude. A catastrophic tsunami/earthquake event will require every functional area within the COV.

For each functional response area, see the corresponding functional annex within this EOP for concept of operations and roles and responsibilities of key agencies.

Some of the primary functional areas that will need to be considered during a tsunami event include (but are not limited to):

- Warning – Annex B – Warning is a key capability in this event response both in a notice and no-notice event.
- Communications – Annex C – Processes and infrastructure are critical to operations as a means and mechanism for both the PIO function as well as a coordinated response to an earthquake/tsunami event where many different agencies will be operating.
- PIO – Annex D – Public information is critical for information relating to avoidance of hazard areas by the public during times of threat as well as critical information during a response to an event. Locations of shelters, status of infrastructure, and expectations of COV responders may be needed.
- Evacuation and Shelter in Place – Annex E – This function may be required on an area-to-area basis when conditions warrant the movement of people outside of the potential threat area.
- Mass Care and Sheltering – Annex F – Similar to Medical, an event that impacts a heavily populated area can dictate a large sheltering operation. Additionally, the loss of key infrastructure such as electricity to a large area can necessitate a large mass care operation. The mass care impact will increase over time with the continued loss of primary infrastructure.
- Health and Medical Services – Annex G – In an event that impacts a populated area, the public health and medical component could be a significant operation. A medical response may be required as well as longer term medical operations through DMORT and fatality management.
- Public Works and Transportation – Annex J – Public works will be a critical component to an event due to the potential loss of the operational capabilities and capacities of key infrastructure. The heavy equipment and machinery needed to move large volumes of material as well as the department's function in restoring key infrastructure is critical in this event. An earthquake/tsunami event will have significant impact to transportation routes and

hubs. Combined with the debris issue, a transportation halt can impede an effective response, bringing response materials into the affected area as well as distributing those resources to those in need.

- Oil and Hazardous Materials Spill Response – Annex K – Industrial/technological emergencies such as fires, explosions, and hazardous materials incidents could occur.
- Debris Management and Removal – Annex M – An event that occurs in or across populated or managed infrastructure (roads and the port, etc.) will generate enormous amounts of debris. The management of that debris during a response, and the subsequent recovery will be a significant undertaking.
- Earthquake – Annex Q – An event that often triggers a tsunami/seiche.

5. Actions

Tsunami Preparedness Phase

Preparedness actions

- ☐ Inventory and restock food and supplies for emergency personnel (special clothing, hard hats, road barriers, flashlights, batteries, barrier tape, rescue tools, etc.).
- ☐ Review and update emergency communications network capabilities.
  - ☐ Review and update amateur radio capabilities.
  - ☐ Review and update cell phone capabilities.
- ☐ Inventory location(s) and availability of heavy equipment and supplies (trucks, bulldozers, front loaders, graders, fuel, barricades, etc.).
- ☐ Strategically pre-position supplies, equipment, fuel, and medical gear in safe areas, if appropriate.
- ☐ Identify staging area for equipment and supplies.
- ☐ Inventory auxiliary power equipment with rating and fuel supplies.
- ☐ Identify resources.
  - ☐ Building inspectors, develop standby schedules.
  - ☐ Back up Heavy Equipment Operators.
  - ☐ Extended hours for front desk phones.
- ☐ Check generators and backup power systems.

Tsunami Warning Phase: Threat of a Tsunami Exists

- ☐ IM Short Team
  - ☐ Receive and evaluate forecasts of tsunami potential. Confirm reports with the Alaska Tsunami Warning Center, and gather as much information as possible.
  - ☐ Sound alarm/alert system: PIO provides message to Radio Station operators to disseminate to the public.
  - ☐ Develop the following estimates:
    - ☐ Wave size and estimated time of arrival.
    - ☐ Estimated inundation area.
    - ☐ Amount of warning time.
  - ☐ Establish EOC, if necessary.
- ☐ **Immediate response actions to consider.**
  - ☐ EOC IC

- ☐ Attempt to notify outlying populations via VHF radio or SSB (beyond city siren system).
- ☐ Initiate evacuation to high ground.
- ☐ Provide additional assistance to special populations as necessary.
- ☐ Identify safe location for sheltering evacuees. Establish shelter(s).
- ☐ Ensure evacuation route(s) are passable.
- ☐ Notify local responders of potential need for SAR.
- ☐ Inventory heavy equipment for use in response and recovery.
- ☐ Pre-position emergency equipment, fuel, and medical supplies in safe area for use after tsunami.
- ☐ Check auxiliary power supplies.
- ☐ Arrange for safe delivery of incoming response personnel and supplies.

☐ PIO

- ☐ Issue public safety announcement(s) regarding tsunami-prone areas, evacuation areas and routes, and safety precautions.

Tsunami Response Phase: Tsunami is Occurring

☐ IM Short Team

- ☐ Review Warning Checklist for Tsunami.
- ☐ Continue to monitor situation through the Alaska Tsunami Warning Center.
- ☐ Monitor sea conditions from a safe location.
- ☐ Are conditions improving or deteriorating?
- ☐ Establish EOC, if necessary.

☐ **Immediate response actions to consider.**

☐ EOC IC

- ☐ Continue to monitor situation through the Alaska Tsunami Warning Center.
- ☐ Monitor sea conditions from a safe location.
- ☐ Implement emergency utility cutoff as needed.
- ☐ Secure evacuated areas.
- ☐ Establish emergency medical care facilities, and arrange for medical evacuations, as necessary.
- ☐ Inform VFD of needed EMTs and ambulance transport.
- ☐ Consider establishing a multi-casualty organization.
- ☐ If conditions warrant, request that the City Mayor sign a local emergency declaration.
- ☐ Request State declaration of disaster emergency if conditions warrant.
- ☐ Be prepared to report status to the SEOC if State assistance is required.
- ☐ Coordinate non-local support requirements with the SEOC.

☐ VPD

- ☐ Arrange for handling and identification of fatalities and mental health support services with the AKSMEO, if warranted.
- ☐ Coordinate traffic and perimeter control, as well as security for affected area(s).

☐ VFD

- ☐ Evaluate and conduct SAR efforts, if warranted.

☐ AST

- ☐ Assist VFD and VPD as needed.

- ☐ PIO
  - ☐ Continue to disseminate public information, warnings, and instructions.

Tsunami Recovery Phase: Tsunami has Occurred

☐ **Immediate response actions to consider.**

- ☐ EOC IC
  - ☐ Review Warning and Response Checklists for Tsunamis.
  - ☐ Review Earthquake Stabilization and Restoration Sequence.
  - ☐ Coordinate recovery activities with local, state, and federal relief agencies.
  - ☐ Be prepared to report status to the SEOC if State assistance is required.
  - ☐ Coordinate non-local support requirements with the SEOC.
  - ☐ Identify safety hazards and undertake corrective action.
  - ☐ Perform an incident critique.
- ☐ EOC Section Chiefs
  - ☐ Arrange for emergency housing and sheltering as necessary.
  - ☐ Request special personnel: interpreters, clergy, counselors, technicians, retired medical.
  - ☐ Account for all persons in the community.
  - ☐ Establish disaster aid centers to process applications for the rehabilitation of individuals and families.
  - ☐ When safe access is established, arrange for the return of evacuees to assess damages.
  - ☐ Initiate services to help victims cope with the situation, and to provide food, clothing, basic supplies, and temporary shelter for people displaced by the disaster.

    Alaskan Red Cross Coordinator: 907-646-5400
    Salvation Army: Anchorage: 907-375-3583
    AK DHS&EM: 800-478-2337
  - ☐ When safe access is established, alert the PIO to communicate with the public.
  - ☐ Perform an incident critique.
  - ☐ Provide monetary figures necessary to support a request for disaster declaration. Complete and submit necessary reports and paperwork to appropriate agencies.
- ☐ VPD
  - ☐ Arrange for handling and identification of fatalities and mental health support services with the AKSMEO, if warranted.
- ☐ VFD
  - ☐ Evaluate and conduct SAR efforts, if warranted.
- ☐ AST
  - ☐ Assist VFD and VPD as needed.
- ☐ Department of Public Works Director
  - ☐ Identify safety hazards, and undertake corrective action.
  - ☐ Conduct health and sanitation surveys.
  - ☐ Initiate disease prevention measures.
  - ☐ Arrange for debris clearance, especially in culverts/drainage areas.

- ☐ Work to restore damaged utilities and transportation systems (airstrips, roadways, and port facilities).
- ☐ Perform damage assessments, post-incident cleanup, and utilities restoration.

☐ PIO

- ☐ Continue to disseminate public information regarding ongoing hazards and relief efforts.

ANNEX U: Flooding

1. Scope

This annex describes the activities of the COV during a flooding event. This annex presumes that flooding is imminent or has already occurred. Flood hazards in Valdez are created by storm surges, voluminous rainfall, snow and glacier melt, and release of glacier-dammed lakes.

A. Storm Surge Flooding

Storm surges are relatively long-term, local increases in water level resulting from offshore storms. The highest damage occurs when such a surge coincides with a maximum tide. Estimated combined storm surge and tide elevation in Port Valdez with a 100-year recurrence interval is 10.6 feet above sea level. Such flooding can occur along the entire Port Valdez shoreline. Because most of the Port Valdez coast is steep mountainside, the area affected by the hazard is generally small. The relatively flat land of the river deltas has the greatest storm surge flooding.

B. Rainfall, Snowmelt, Glacier Melt Flooding

Floods occur in rivers as a result of a large input of water to the drainage basin in the form of rainfall, snowmelt, glacier melt, or a combination of these inputs. In the Valdez area, as well as most coastal areas of Southcentral and Southeast Alaska, the floods due to snowmelt are typically lower in magnitude than those due to rainstorms in late summer or fall. Glacier melt is typically largest in late summer, increasing the potential magnitude of late summer rainfall floods in glacial streams.

C. Contaminated Water

Floodwaters pose a health hazard by picking up contaminants and disease as they travel. Outhouses (although rare in Valdez), sewers, septic tanks, and dog yards are all potential sources of disease transported by floodwaters. Individual wells in Valdez could be contaminated during flood events. The private well systems must be tested and disinfected after a flood. Lack of a water source is a significant concern for flood victims, especially if the flood has been extensive enough to contaminate the public water supply. In such a case, outside bottled water is at times the only source of clean water.

D. Riverine Flooding

The primary factors that affect the magnitude of riverine flooding include the size of the drainage basin contributing flow to the river; the amount and distribution of the precipitation that falls on the basin; the size and location of lakes, wetlands, or other water storage basins within the drainage basin; and the size and location of glaciers within the drainage basin. Frequent river flooding should be expected in the unvegetated flood plains of all the rivers in the area. Less frequent flooding occurs in overbank areas adjacent to rivers.

E. Glacier-Dammed Lake Releases

Glacier-dammed lake release can cause significant flooding and form when a stream is blocked by a glacier. Flooding occurs when lake water develops an escape route through,

under, or over the glacier dam. The escape route enlarges, allowing the lake to drain rapidly.

Little is known about factors affecting flooding from glacier-dammed lakes. Some potential factors include the mechanism by which the lake releases, the volume of water in the lake, and the route through which the lake water travels before reaching the area subject to flooding. The frequency of glacier-dammed lake releases is likely related to the time necessary for the lake to fill and for a drainage channel to become blocked, and the position and movement of the damming glacier. June 6-26 is the prime-time period for releases. Potential impact sites include Glacier Stream, dump road, construction and demolition pit, landfill, bridge, bike path, and the new dike on Copper Road.

Estimates of flood discharges resulting from glacier-dammed releases combined with potential concurrent rainstorm floods in the basins of Valdez Glacier Stream and Lowe River are 46,000 cubic feet per second (cfs) and 59,900 cfs, respectively.

2. Situation

Flooding occurs in Valdez. As of the 2019 Hazard Mitigation Plan, the following studies are underway. Relevant information will be added to the EOP when the studies are completed.

RiskMap Report for the COV. Currently, in progress by FEMA, RiskMap, and Resilience Action Partners. The scope of work of the COV Risk MAP Study includes:

- A detailed coastal flood hazard analysis including the collection of storm surge (coastal hydrology) and overland wave height analysis (coastal hydraulics), as well as floodplain boundaries for 1-percent and 0.2-percent-annual-chance (100- and 500-year) flood events. A draft map will be developed for the coastal analysis.
- A riverine analysis is being performed and will include:
  - hydrology and hydraulic modeling for 3.8 miles of Mineral Creek;
  - 11.7 miles of detailed riverine study on Lowe River;
  - 4.6 miles of detailed riverine study on Valdez Glacier Stream;
  - 2.2 miles of detailed riverine study on Robe River; and
  - 18.7 miles of approximate riverine modeling on various streams.

  A draft map is being developed for the riverine analysis.
- Floodplain delineations and the Flood Insurance Study were updated for the entire COV. The updated Flood Insurance Rate Maps and Flood Insurance Study became effective January 3, 2019.

In February 2017, the City Council granted approval to enter into a Feasibility Cost Sharing Agreement with the USACE for a Section 22 Planning Assistance to States (PAS) Study. The City Council provided approval of the written request to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) to initiate a PAS of eligibility of a Lowe River 10-Mile Area Project for a Continuing Authorities Program, Section 205, Small Flood Damage Reduction Project. It has taken the USACE additional time to work through the new guidance for providing technical assistance. They are now at a point where they are ready to execute signing for the PAS for technical assistance on Valdez Glacier Stream and Mineral Creek although the Lowe River is not included in this study.

The Unanticipated Serious Device Effects recommended adding Valdez on the National Level for a Continuing Authorities Program (Cap 205) project. The project area would be focused on a

portion of the Lowe River in the vicinity of the Alpine Woods and Nordic Village subdivisions, and the project will most likely involve design and construction of a levy system incorporating existing structures with new structures to reduce the risk of flooding of low areas in the subdivisions.

Currently, a study is underway by the Alaska DGGS and will include a Glacial Lake Outburst Flood Hazard Map when enough data points are collected. This map will be added to the EOP when it is completed. DGGS is also developing a monitoring system with alarms based on criteria from the NWS; COV would likely have 1 to 1.5-hour warning to respond.

3. Assumptions

A. Flooding events are largely seasonal and have some level of predictability.

B. River flooding in the COV does not generally threaten large populations of critical infrastructure.

4. Operations

Response and EOC activation for a flood event will be dictated and driven by the scope and locations of the impacted areas. The vast majority of flooding events do not pose a major threat to the population or infrastructure.

For each functional response area, see the corresponding functional annex within this EOP for concept of operations and roles and responsibilities of key agencies.

Some of the primary functional areas that will need to be considered during a flooding event include (but are not limited to):

- Warning – Annex B – Warning is a key capability in this event response both in a notice and no-notice event.
- Communications – Annex C – Processes and infrastructure are critical to operations as a means and mechanism for both the PIO function as well as a coordinated response to a flooding event where many different agencies may be operating.
- PIO – Annex D – Public information is critical for information relating to avoidance of hazard areas by the public during times of threat as well as critical information during a response to an event.
- Evacuation and Shelter in Place – Annex E – This function may be required if flooding conditions warrant the movement of people outside of the potential threat area. Evacuations in a flooding event need to be coordinated carefully to avoid congestion of residents travelling out of the area.
- Mass Care and Sheltering – Annex F – Similar to Medical, an event that impacts a heavily populated area can dictate a large sheltering operation. Additionally, the loss of key infrastructure such as electricity to a large area can necessitate a large mass care operation.
- Health and Medical Services – Annex G – In an event that impacts a populated area, the public health and medical component could be a significant operation. A medical response may be required as well as longer term medical operations through DMORT and fatality management.

- Public Works and Transportation – Annex J – Public works will be a critical component to an event due to the nature of the operational capacities of the departments. The heavy equipment and machinery needed to move large volumes of material as well as the department's function in restoring key infrastructure is critical in this event.
- Debris Management and Removal – Annex M – A flood event that occurs in or across populated or managed infrastructure (roads, etc.) will generate debris. The management of that debris during a response, and the subsequent recovery will be a significant undertaking. The debris will be mixed woody and household materials.

5. Actions

Flooding Preparedness Phase

Preparedness actions

- ☐ Inventory and restock food and supplies for emergency personnel (special clothing, hard hats, road barriers, flashlights, batteries, barrier tape, rescue tools, etc.).
- ☐ Review and update emergency communications network capabilities.
  - ☐ Review and update amateur radio capabilities.
  - ☐ Review and update cell phone capabilities.
- ☐ Inventory location(s) and availability of heavy equipment and supplies (trucks, bulldozers, front loaders, graders, fuel, barricades, etc.).
- ☐ Strategically pre-position supplies, equipment, fuel, and medical gear in safe areas, if appropriate.
- ☐ Identify staging area for equipment and supplies.
- ☐ Inventory auxiliary power equipment with rating and fuel supplies.
- ☐ Identify resources.
  - ☐ Building inspectors, develop standby schedules.
  - ☐ Back up Heavy Equipment Operators.
  - ☐ Extended hours for front desk phones.
- ☐ Check generators and backup power systems.

Flooding Warning Phase: Threat of Flooding Exists

- ☐ IM Short Team
  - ☐ Receive and evaluate forecasts and predictions.
  - ☐ Identify areas, facilities, infrastructure, and people at risk.
  - ☐ Develop the following estimates:
    - ☐ Anticipate flood levels and timeline.
    - ☐ Areas at risk.
    - ☐ How much warning time will elapse?
    - ☐ What measures can be taken to eliminate obstructions or otherwise aid the run-off of water in stream channels?
  - ☐ Evaluate status of existing flood control devices and barriers.
  - ☐ Evaluate need for evacuation, relocation, and sheltering.
  - ☐ Issue public safety announcements, if needed.
  - ☐ Disseminate public information about areas at risk, evacuation routes, and shelters.
  - ☐ Inventory heavy equipment, vehicles, and vessels for use in response and recovery.

- ☐ Pre-position emergency equipment, fuel, and medical supplies from threatened areas to higher ground.
- ☐ Establish EOC, if necessary.

Flooding Response Phase: Flooding is Occurring

☐ IM Short Team
- ☐ Review Warning Checklist for Flooding.
- ☐ Are conditions improving or deteriorating?
- ☐ Establish EOC, if necessary.

☐ **Immediate response actions to consider.**
- ☐ EOC IC
  - ☐ Establish a watch/observation system for flood progression/recession.
  - ☐ Conduct reconnaissance and search/rescue in flooded areas.
  - ☐ Limit travel/recreation in impacted areas.
  - ☐ Establish shelter(s) and care station(s).
  - ☐ Evacuate residents, if necessary.
  - ☐ Facilitate relocation of special needs residents.
  - ☐ Secure evacuated areas.
  - ☐ Consider establishing a multi-casualty organization.
  - ☐ Establish safe location for emergency medical care.
  - ☐ Inform VFD of needed EMTs and ambulance transport.
  - ☐ If conditions warrant, request that the City Mayor sign a local emergency declaration.
  - ☐ Request State declaration of disaster emergency if conditions warrant.
  - ☐ Be prepared to report status to the SEOC, if State assistance is required.
  - ☐ Coordinate non-local support requirements with the SEOC.
- ☐ VPD
  - ☐ Arrange for handling and identification of fatalities and mental health support services with the AKSMEO, if warranted.
- ☐ VFD
  - ☐ Evaluate and conduct SAR efforts, if warranted.
- ☐ AST
  - ☐ Assist VFD and VPD as needed.
- ☐ Department of Public Works Director
  - ☐ Estimate extent of damage.
  - ☐ Move emergency equipment, fuel, and medical supplies from threatened areas to higher ground.
  - ☐ Use existing MOUs with contractors to augment City resources.
- ☐ PIO
  - ☐ Continue to disseminate public information, warnings, and instructions.

Flooding Recovery Phase: Flooding has Occurred

☐ **Immediate response actions to consider.**

- ☐ EOC IC
  - ☐ Review Warning and Response Checklists for Flooding.
  - ☐ Coordinate recovery activities with state and federal agencies.
  - ☐ Identify safety hazards, and undertake corrective action.
  - ☐ Perform an incident critique.
- ☐ EOC Section Chiefs
  - ☐ Arrange for emergency housing as necessary.
  - ☐ Request special personnel: interpreters, clergy, counselors, technicians, retired medical.
  - ☐ When safe access is established, alert the PIO to communicate with the public.
  - ☐ Establish disaster aid centers to process applications for the rehabilitation of individuals and families.
  - ☐ Provide monetary figures necessary to support a request for disaster declaration.
  - ☐ Complete and submit necessary reports and paperwork to appropriate agencies.
- ☐ VPD
  - ☐ Arrange for handling and identification of fatalities and mental health support services with the AKSMEO, if warranted.
- ☐ VFD
  - ☐ Evaluate and conduct SAR efforts, if warranted.
  - ☐ Mitigate fire and other hazards.
- ☐ AST
  - ☐ Assist VFD and VPD as needed.
- ☐ Department of Public Works Director
  - ☐ Use existing MOUs with contractors to augment City resources.
  - ☐ Identify safety hazards, and undertake corrective action.
  - ☐ Conduct health and sanitation surveys.
  - ☐ Initiate disease prevention measures.
  - ☐ Arrange for debris clearance, especially in culverts/drainage areas.
  - ☐ Work to restore damaged utilities and transportation systems (airstrips, roadways, and port facilities).
  - ☐ Perform damage assessments, post-incident cleanup, and utilities restoration.
- ☐ PIO
  - ☐ Continue to disseminate public information regarding ongoing hazards and relief efforts.
- ☐ Floodplain Administrator
  - ☐ Participate in floodplain damage assessments following a flood, and make Substantial Damage Determinations.
  - ☐ Work on the permitting process for rebuilding in flood-damaged areas.
  - ☐ Identify flood mitigation programs and public outreach.

ANNEX V: Fire

1. Scope

Under certain conditions, wildland fires may occur in any area with fuel surrounding the COV. From 1939 to 2017, there were 21 fires near Valdez according to the Alaska Interagency Coordination Center. In 2019, there were two summer months without rain in Valdez, which increased the potential for fire.

2. Situation

Wildland fire events are likely to be attributed to lightning or human-caused events.

3. Assumptions

There are limited routes of fire apparatus ingress and population egress from wildland fire threatened areas. Those limited routes are shared by fire apparatus and citizens creating congestion points responding to, and evacuating from fires.

4. Operations

Response and EOC activation for a fire event will be dictated and driven by the scope and locations of the impacted areas. The vast majority of wildland fire events do not pose a major threat to the population or infrastructure.

For each functional response area, see the corresponding functional annex within this EOP for concept of operations and roles and responsibilities of key agencies.

Some of the primary functional areas that will need to be considered during a wildfire event include (but are not limited to):

- Warning – Annex B – Warning is a key capability in this event response both in a notice and no-notice event.
- PIO – Annex D – Public information is critical for information relating to avoidance of hazard areas by the public during times of threat as well as critical information during a response to an event.
- Evacuation and Shelter in Place – Annex E – This function may be required on an area-to-area basis when conditions warrant the movement of people outside of the potential threat area.
- Mass Care and Sheltering – Annex F – Localized flooding can dictate a sheltering operation for those who are displaced by the threatened areas.
- Health and Medical Services – Annex G – In an event that impacts a populated area, the public health and medical component could be a significant operation. A medical response may be required as well as longer term medical operations through DMORT and fatality management.
- Public Works and Transportation – Annex J – Public works will be a critical component to an event due to the nature of the operational capacities of the departments. The heavy equipment and machinery needed to move large volumes of material as well as the department's function in restoring key infrastructure is critical in this event.

- Debris Management and Removal – Annex M – A fire event that occurs in or across populated or managed infrastructure (roads, etc.) will generate debris. The management of that debris during a response, and the subsequent recovery will be a significant undertaking. The debris will be ash and charred materials.

5. Action

Wildfire Preparedness Phase

Preparedness actions

- ☐ Inventory and restock food and supplies for emergency personnel (special clothing, hard hats, road barriers, flashlights, batteries, barrier tape, rescue tools, etc.).
- ☐ Review and update emergency communications network capabilities.
  - ☐ Review and update amateur radio capabilities.
  - ☐ Review and update cell phone capabilities.
- ☐ Inventory location(s) and availability of heavy equipment and supplies (trucks, bulldozers, front loaders, graders, fuel, barricades, etc.).
- ☐ Strategically pre-position supplies, equipment, fuel, and medical gear in safe areas, if appropriate.
- ☐ Identify staging area for equipment and supplies.
- ☐ Inventory auxiliary power equipment with rating and fuel supplies.
- ☐ Identify resources.
  - ☐ Building inspectors, develop standby schedules.
  - ☐ Back up Heavy Equipment Operators.
  - ☐ Extended hours for front desk phones.
- ☐ Check generators and backup power systems.

Wildfire Warning Phase: Threat of a Wildfire Exists

- ☐ IM Short Team
  - ☐ Receive and evaluate forecasts of wildfire potential.
  - ☐ Identify areas, facilities, infrastructure, and people at risk and potential mitigation measures.
  - ☐ Assess staffing – assign additional personnel as needed.
  - ☐ Determine fire readiness of vehicles and equipment.
  - ☐ Determine water levels for fire-fighting.
  - ☐ Check auxiliary generators and other power, lighting, and communications equipment.
  - ☐ Restrict outdoor burning.
  - ☐ Establish contact with fire agencies (VFD, State, and Federal).
  - ☐ Survey existing communications.
  - ☐ Consider activation of EOC.
- ☐ PIO
  - ☐ Provide public information and direction regarding the hazard.

Wildfire Response Phase: Wildfire is Occurring

- ☐ IM Short Team
  - ☐ Review Warning Checklist for Wildfire.
  - ☐ Are conditions improving or deteriorating?
  - ☐ Establish EOC, if necessary.
- ☐ **Immediate response actions to consider.**
  - ☐ EOC IC
    - ☐ Assess and identify affected areas.
    - ☐ Issue evacuation orders as necessary.
    - ☐ Account for all persons in affected areas.
    - ☐ Limit travel/recreation in impacted areas.
    - ☐ Establish shelters and care stations.
    - ☐ Secure evacuated areas.
    - ☐ Establish safe location for emergency medical care.
    - ☐ Consider establishing a multi-casualty organization.
    - ☐ If conditions warrant, request that the City Mayor sign a local emergency declaration.
    - ☐ Request State declaration of disaster emergency if conditions warrant.
    - ☐ Be prepared to report status to the SEOC if State assistance is required.
    - ☐ Coordinate non-local support requirements with the SEOC.
  - ☐ VFD
    - ☐ Initial concerns are centered on the well-being of COV residents, rather than tactical fire operations, including:
      - ☐ Alert and warn threatened populations. Include Annex O as needed.
      - ☐ Evacuate areas at risk of fire encroachment.
      - ☐ Monitor air quality.
      - ☐ Relocate and shelter displaced residents and animals.
      - ☐ Coordinate with PIO to release timely and accurate emergency public information.
    - ☐ Implement tactical fire operations.
    - ☐ Evaluate and conduct SAR efforts, if warranted.
  - ☐ VPD
    - ☐ Shut down roads to potentially impacted areas.
    - ☐ Coordinate to secure evacuated areas.
    - ☐ Assist with the establishment of control points to limit ingress into hazard areas and to secure areas after that area has been evacuated.
    - ☐ Arrange for handling and identification of fatalities and mental health support services with the AKSMEO, if warranted.
  - ☐ AST
    - ☐ Assist VFD and VPD as needed.
  - ☐ PIO
    - ☐ Continue to disseminate public information regarding ongoing hazards and relief efforts.

Wildfire Recovery Phase: Wildfire has Occurred

☐ **Immediate response actions to consider.**

- ☐ EOC IC
  - ☐ Review Warning and Response Checklists for Wildfires.
  - ☐ Coordinate recovery activities with state and federal relief agencies.
  - ☐ Identify safety hazards, and undertake corrective actions.
  - ☐ Perform an incident critique.
- ☐ EOC Section Chiefs
  - ☐ Arrange for emergency housing as necessary.
  - ☐ Request special personnel: interpreters, clergy, counselors, technicians, retired medical.
  - ☐ When safe access is established, alert the PIO to communicate with the public.
  - ☐ Establish disaster aid centers to process applications for the rehabilitation of individuals and families.
  - ☐ Provide monetary figures necessary to support a request for disaster declaration.
  - ☐ Complete and submit necessary reports and paperwork to appropriate agencies.
- ☐ VFD
  - ☐ Initiate recovery operations per VFD protocol.
  - ☐ Evaluate and conduct SAR efforts, if warranted.
- ☐ VPD
  - ☐ Open roads when given instruction to by IC.
  - ☐ Open evacuated areas when given instruction to by IC.
  - ☐ Arrange for handling and identification of fatalities and mental health support services with the AKSMEO, if warranted.
- ☐ AST
  - ☐ Assist VFD and VPD as needed.
- ☐ Department of Public Works Director
  - ☐ Identify safety hazards, and undertake corrective action.
  - ☐ Arrange for debris clearance.
  - ☐ Perform damage assessments, post-incident cleanup, and utilities restoration.
  - ☐ Restore essential public utilities and facilities.
- ☐ PIO
  - ☐ Continue to disseminate public information regarding ongoing hazards and relief efforts.
  - ☐ Notify the public when it is safe to return to potentially affected area(s).

ANNEX W: Volcanic Eruption

1. Scope

Valdez is under direct volcanic threat from several active volcanoes in the southcentral region of Alaska including Mt. Spurr and Mt. Redoubt. While there is little threat of lava, exploding debris or lahar, the threat of ash fall could occur.

Volcanic ash, also called tephra, is fine fragments of solidified lava ejected into the air by the explosion or rising hot air. The fragments range in size, with the larger falling nearer the source. Ash is a problem near the source because of its high temperatures (may cause fires), burial (the weight can cause structural collapses), and the impact of falling fragments. Further away such as in Valdez, the primary hazard to humans are decreased visibility and inhaling the fine ash. Ash will also interfere with the operation of mechanical equipment including aircraft and boats.

Alaska is home to 41 historically active volcanoes although none are within the Valdez area. Volcanic ash nearly caused the greatest loss of life of any disaster event in Alaska. During the 1989 eruption of Mount Redoubt, a commercial airliner, with 245 passengers and crew aboard, flew into an ash cloud resulting in a loss of power to all four engines. The following figure shows ashfall from the 1912 Novarupta eruption compared to other Alaska eruptions.

Valdez has been impacted by one volcanic ashfall event – 1992 Mount Redoubt eruption. Air travel was impacted, and fishing vessels that were out in the grounds were unable to run through ash to return to the harbor.

2. Situation

There is little threat of lava or catastrophic impact to Valdez from nearby volcanoes.

3. Assumptions

A. Ash fall events will have notice from the Alaska Volcano Observatory.

B. Ash fall has the potential for significant disruption to the population in Valdez.

4. Operations

Response and EOC activation for a volcanic event will be dictated and driven by the scope and locations of the impacted areas. The vast majority of volcanic activity in Southcentral Alaska does not pose a major threat to the population or infrastructure within the COV. Ash fall operations are largely "maintenance" disaster operations meaning the response focuses around informing the public of mitigating measures.

For each functional response area, see the corresponding functional annex within this EOP for concept of operations and roles and responsibilities of key agencies.

Some of the primary functional areas that will need to be considered during a volcanic event include (but are not limited to):

- Warning – Annex B – Warning is the key capability in this event response both in a notice and no-notice event.
- Communications – Annex C – Processes and infrastructure are critical to operations as a means and mechanism for both the PIO function as well as a coordinated response to managing an ash fall event. Ash can physically damage motors, communications and telecommunications infrastructures, and water and wastewater treatment plant filters.
- PIO – Annex D – Public information is critical for informational material for citizens to mitigate the impacts of ash.
- Evacuation and Shelter in Place – Annex E – This function may be required on an area-to-area basis when conditions warrant that people shelter in place in their homes.
- Mass Care and Sheltering – Annex F – Sheltering may be needed for vulnerable high-risk populations who may need special attention or early evacuation.
- Health and Medical Services – Annex G –Ash can be hazardous to human health through respiratory inhalation. A medical surge response is not anticipated; however, local medical providers may see an increase in patient volumes regarding people prone to asthma or breathing conditions relating to inhaled ash.
- Public Works and Transportation – Annex J – Public works will be a critical component to an event due to the nature of the operational capacities of the department.
- Debris Management and Removal – Annex M – An ash fall event may generate enormous amounts of volcanic ash. Ash will not be managed like woody debris or household waste. It will be managed similar to snow. Ash can have significant impact to the operational status of heavy equipment, and preventative maintenance actions are required to handle ash.

5. Actions

Volcanic Eruption Warning Phase: Threat of a Volcanic Eruption Exists

- ☐ IM Short Team
  - ☐ Receive and evaluate forecasts and predictions.
  - ☐ Confirm risks with the Alaska Volcano Observatory.
  - ☐ Identify type of risk (ash cloud, etc.) and areas at risk.
  - ☐ Identify high-risk populations (respiratory problems, asthma, etc.) who may need special attention or early evacuation.
  - ☐ Identify quantities of needed supplies and secure more if needed.
  - ☐ Identify need for sheltering.
  - ☐ Ensure that evacuation routes are passable.
  - ☐ Prescript likely public service announcements.
  - ☐ Pre-position emergency equipment, fuel, masks, and medical supplies in a safe area for use after volcanic eruption.
  - ☐ Prepare City Departmental emergency operation procedures to maintain required COV function or essential services in the event of ash and dust environments.
  - ☐ Consider activation of EOC.
- ☐ PIO
  - ☐ Provide public information and direction regarding the hazard. Notify public of ash fall safety rules, vehicle travel considerations, roof load precautions, and other appropriate information.

Volcanic Eruption Response Phase: Volcanic Eruption is Occurring

- ☐ IM Short Team
  - ☐ Review Warning Checklist for Volcanic Eruption.
  - ☐ Are conditions improving or deteriorating?
  - ☐ Confirm risks with the Alaska Volcano Observatory.
  - ☐ Assess Risks/Threats/Need for Evacuation.
  - ☐ Brief School Superintendent and College Dean.
  - ☐ Establish EOC, if necessary.

- ☐ **Immediate response actions to consider.**
  - ☐ EOC IC
    - ☐ Determine if evacuation is necessary for high-risk population, refer to Annex E.
    - ☐ Mobilize personnel and supplies as needed.
    - ☐ Prepare Departmental emergency operation procedures to maintain required COV functions or essential services in the event of ash and dust environments.
    - ☐ Check on how the current situation is affecting the normal/essential operations of the following:
      - ☐ Schools
      - ☐ Hospital and Medical Centers
      - ☐ Utilities (Electric & Phone, Water & Wastewater)
      - ☐ Food Stores
    - ☐ If ash is starting to accumulate on the ground (at any thickness), consultation with local medical personnel will be initiated to determine the appropriate point to issue Advisory Notice #2 – restricting all outdoor activities until further notice.
    - ☐ If conditions warrant, request that the City Mayor sign a local emergency declaration.
    - ☐ Implement emergency utility cutoffs as needed.
    - ☐ Conduct reconnaissance of areas becoming impacted, especially by heavy ash fallout. Be alert to building and structural failure due to increased roof loading from ash and debris.
    - ☐ Request State declaration of disaster emergency if conditions warrant.
    - ☐ Be prepared to report status to the SEOC if State assistance is required.
    - ☐ Coordinate non-local support requirements with the SEOC.
  - ☐ PIO
    - ☐ Issue public service announcement, and assign incident number.
    - ☐ If any ash will pass over the area (at any altitude), issue Advisory Notice # 1 – Restricting outdoor activity of those with respiratory concerns.
    - ☐ Issue Advisory Notice #2 if IC warrants its release.

Volcanic Eruption Recovery Phase: Volcanic Eruption has Occurred

- ☐ **Immediate response actions to consider.**
  - ☐ EOC IC
    - ☐ Review Warning and Response Checklists for Volcanic Eruptions.
    - ☐ Coordinate recovery activities with state and federal relief agencies.
    - ☐ Identify safety hazards, and undertake corrective actions.
    - ☐ Perform an incident critique.
  - ☐ EOC Section Chiefs
    - ☐ Coordinate on how the situation affected the normal/essential operations of the following:
      - ☐ Schools
      - ☐ Hospital and Medical Centers
      - ☐ Utilities (Electric & Phone, Water & Wastewater)
      - ☐ Food Stores
    - ☐ Arrange for emergency housing as necessary.
    - ☐ Request special personnel: interpreters, clergy, counselors, technicians, retired medical.
    - ☐ When safe access is established, alert the PIO to communicate with the public.
    - ☐ Establish disaster aid centers to process applications for the rehabilitation of individuals and families.
    - ☐ Provide monetary figures necessary to support a request for disaster declaration.
    - ☐ Complete and submit necessary reports and paperwork to appropriate agencies.
  - ☐ Department of Public Works Director
    - ☐ Identify safety hazards, and undertake corrective action.
    - ☐ Arrange for debris clearance, especially in culverts/drainage areas.
    - ☐ Work to restore damage to utilities and transportation systems (water and wastewater plants, airstrips, roadways, and port facilities) if any.
    - ☐ Perform damage assessments, post-incident cleanup, and utilities restoration.
  - ☐ PIO
    - ☐ Issue public service announcement.

ANNEX X: Terrorism, Enemy Attack, and Civil Disturbance

1. Scope

The intent of this annex is to provide guidance for planning, response, and recovery operations concerning law enforcement-based events that include terrorist activities, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), enemy attack, and civil disturbances.

2. Situation

The VPD has 12 officers serving approximately 4,000 to 8,000 people depending on the time of year. There is one AST stationed in the COV.

3. Assumptions

A. Certain natural disasters or man-made events may place greater pressure on existing law enforcement resources.

B. A more aggressive law enforcement posture may be required from a natural disaster, such as an earthquake, that may trigger civil unrest due to societal factors or response to various terrorist and enemy attacks.

C. Significant coordination will be required between various COV, State, and Federal law enforcement agencies as well as public safety agencies to ensure timely and seamless jurisdictional operations and avoid duplication of effort.

D. Disruption of communications may present challenges to law enforcement efforts.

E. Disruption of transportation corridors may result in increased response times and coverage shortfalls.

F. In all cases, prompt safety and security measures will be essential for the protection of life and property.

4. Operations

Response and EOC activation for a Law Enforcement event will be dictated and driven by the scope and locations of the event. The vast majority of Law Enforcement events within the COV are day-to-day operations that do not pose a major threat to large populations or infrastructure. Terrorism-based or enemy attack events due to the Alyeska pipeline termination in Valdez pose a higher threat of infrastructure loss and affect to populations.

For each functional response area, see the corresponding functional annex within this EOP for concept of operations and roles and responsibilities of key agencies.

Some of the primary functional areas that will need to be considered during a Law Enforcement event include (but are not limited to):

- Law Enforcement – Law Enforcement operations may range in scale depending on the threat or size of the disaster. Additional resources from other Law Enforcement agencies may be required to support VPD.

- Warning – Annex B – Warning is the key capability in this event.
- Communications – Annex C – Interoperable communications with back-up capabilities is critical for events involving multiple Law Enforcement agencies. The ability to share critical information on the tactical and operational level will require a communications plan that is flexible and adaptable to changing conditions.
- PIO – Annex D – Public information is critical for information relating to the public during times of Law Enforcement events to avoid an area with an active threat.
- Evacuation and Shelter in Place – Annex E – This function may be required as an area-to-area evacuation if the threat conditions warrant the movement of people outside of a potential hazard area.

5. Actions

Terrorism/WMD/Enemy Attack Warning Phase: Threat of a Terrorist or Enemy Attack Exists

☐ IM Short Team
- ☐ Receive, evaluate, and confirm report.
- ☐ Investigate threats through local, state, federal law enforcement channels. Identify:
  - ☐ Type of threat.
  - ☐ What areas will be impacted and to what extent?
  - ☐ How much warning time will be available from the time that an attack is definitely imminent until the time that it actually occurs?
  - ☐ What are the possible consequences?
  - ☐ What measures can be taken to mitigate the possible effects?
- ☐ Estimate the nature and scope of outside assistance that may be required.
- ☐ Estimate the need for sheltering/evacuation.
- ☐ Arrange for shelter set-up, if necessary.
- ☐ Initiate evacuations, if necessary.
- ☐ Have VPD secure evacuated areas if the decision to initiate evacuations is made.
- ☐ Initiate incident communications plan.
- ☐ Publicize emergency public information to include:
  - ☐ Description of the situation and identification of areas at risk.
  - ☐ Discuss evacuation/shelter-in-place instructions, if necessary.
  - ☐ Sound alert and warning signals as needed.
  - ☐ Guidelines on the protection of real and personal property.
  - ☐ Location of emergency shelter(s) or need to shelter in-place; closures of schools, offices, and other facilities.
  - ☐ Evacuation routes and reception areas and how future warning and evacuation instructions will be disseminated.
- ☐ Maintain an alert or standby of personnel as necessary.
- ☐ Notify Dispatch and hospital/medical centers of potential injuries and decontamination needs.

- ☐ Inventory emergency response and public safety equipment availability, and establish emergency motor pool.
- ☐ Arrange for control of incoming air and vessel traffic.
- ☐ Inventory auxiliary power in case of outages.
- ☐ Notify the SEOC of the situation.
- ☐ Consider activation of EOC.

Civil Disorder Warning Phase: Threat of Civil Disorder

☐ **IM Short Team**

- ☐ Develop the following estimates:
  - ☐ What problem is anticipated and its duration?
  - ☐ What areas will be impacted and to what extent?
  - ☐ How much warning time will elapse?
  - ☐ What are the possible consequences?
  - ☐ What measures can be taken to mitigate the possible effects?
- ☐ Estimate the nature and scope of outside assistance that may be required.
- ☐ Initiate incident communications plan.
- ☐ Publicize emergency public information to include:
  - ☐ Description of the situation and identification of areas at risk.
  - ☐ Guidelines on the protection of real and personal property.
  - ☐ Closures of schools, offices, and other facilities.
  - ☐ Location of emergency shelters or need to shelter in-place.
  - ☐ Evacuation routes and reception areas and how future warning and evacuation instructions will be disseminated.
- ☐ Maintain an alert or standby of personnel as necessary.
- ☐ Notify Dispatch and hospital/medical centers of potential injuries.
- ☐ Consider activation of EOC.

Terrorism/WMD/Enemy Attack Response Phase: Terrorist or Enemy Attack Is Occurring

- ☐ IM Short Team
  - ☐ Review Warning Checklist for Terrorism/WMD/Enemy Attack.
  - ☐ Are conditions improving or deteriorating?
  - ☐ Establish EOC.
- ☐ **Immediate response actions to consider.**
  - ☐ EOC IC
    - ☐ Update the SEOC of the situation.
    - ☐ Inform EMTs, hospital/medical centers of injuries, especially if contaminated victims are involved.
    - ☐ Coordinate response with State and Federal agencies.
    - ☐ Implement emergency utility cutoffs as needed.
    - ☐ In case of attack involving hazardous materials, see hazmat checklist.
    - ☐ If anthrax is suspected, contain substance in double bag, and wash hands with soap and water, no decontamination is needed if substance is contained.
    - ☐ Establish a radiological monitoring strike team and/or task force(s) if radioactive materials are believed to be involved.
    - ☐ Consider establishing a multi-casualty organization.
    - ☐ Establish shelter(s) and care station(s) as-needed.
    - ☐ Establish emergency morgues, as necessary.
    - ☐ If conditions warrant, request that the City Mayor sign a local emergency declaration.
    - ☐ Request assistance from the Statewide Hazmat Response Team, if needed.
    - ☐ Request State declaration of disaster emergency if conditions warrant.
    - ☐ Be prepared to report status to the SEOC if State assistance is required.
    - ☐ Coordinate non-local support requirements with the SEOC.
    - ☐ Prepare to assist other areas/cities as appropriate.
  - ☐ VPD
    - ☐ Main public order – control crowds and protect property.
    - ☐ Secure evacuated areas.
    - ☐ Establish crowd control and reconnaissance.
    - ☐ Search for secondary devices.
    - ☐ Establish traffic control and roadblocks.
  - ☐ VFD
    - ☐ Control fires and the escapement and/or spread of hazardous or toxic substances.
  - ☐ AST
    - ☐ Assist VFD and VPD as needed.
  - ☐ Public Works Director
    - ☐ Assemble group of COV employees to conduct emergency decontamination.
    - ☐ Assess and document damage to public and private property.
  - ☐ PIO
    - ☐ Continue to disseminate public information, including:
      - ☐ Description of the situation and identification of areas at risk.
      - ☐ Guidelines on the protection of real and personal property.

- ☐ Closures of schools, offices, and other facilities.
- ☐ Location of emergency shelter(s) or need to shelter in-place.
- ☐ Evacuation routes and reception areas.
- ☐ How future warning and evacuation instructions will be disseminated.
- ☐ How to get information concerning victims.
- ☐ Other information and instructions concerning the public welfare.

☐ Issue evacuation orders as appropriate.

Civil Disorder Response Phase: Civil Disorder is Occurring

- ☐ **IM Short Team**
  - ☐ Review Warning Checklist for Civil Disorder.
  - ☐ Are conditions improving or deteriorating?
  - ☐ Establish EOC.
- ☐ **Immediate response actions to consider.**
  - ☐ EOC IC
    - ☐ Notify the SEOC of the situation.
    - ☐ Coordinate response with State and Federal agencies.
    - ☐ Implement emergency utility cutoffs as needed.
    - ☐ Consider establishing a multi-casualty organization.
    - ☐ Establish shelter(s) as-needed.
    - ☐ Establish emergency morgue(s), as necessary.
    - ☐ If conditions warrant, request that the City Mayor sign a local emergency declaration.
    - ☐ Request State declaration of disaster emergency if conditions warrant.
    - ☐ Keep the SEOC informed if State assistance is required.
    - ☐ Coordinate non-local support requirements with the SEOC.
  - ☐ VPD
    - ☐ Main order – control crowds, protect property, establish curfews and meeting size limitations if necessary.
    - ☐ Secure evacuated areas.
    - ☐ Establish crowd control and reconnaissance.
    - ☐ Attempt to resolve the causes of riots or disturbances.
  - ☐ VFD
    - ☐ Control fires and the escapement and/or spread of hazardous or toxic substances.
  - ☐ AST
    - ☐ Assist VFD and VPD as needed.
    - ☐ Provide medical triage treatment and transport.
  - ☐ PIO
    - ☐ Continue to disseminate public information such as:
      - ☐ Description of the situation.
      - ☐ Location of damaged areas.
      - ☐ Evacuation routes and reception areas.
      - ☐ How to get information concerning victims.
      - ☐ Issue evacuation order(s) as appropriate.

Terrorism/WMD/Enemy Attack Recovery Phase: Terrorist Attack/WMD/Enemy Attack has Occurred

☐ **Immediate response actions to consider.**

- ☐ EOC IC
  - ☐ Review Warning and Response Checklists for Terrorism/WMD/Enemy Attack.
  - ☐ Coordinate recovery activities with State and Federal relief agencies.
  - ☐ Identify safety hazards, and undertake corrective actions.
  - ☐ Initiate immediate and long-range rehabilitation measures and programs.
  - ☐ Perform an incident critique.
- ☐ EOC Section Chiefs
  - ☐ Arrange for emergency housing as necessary.
  - ☐ Request special personnel: interpreters, clergy, counselors, technicians, retired medical.
  - ☐ When safe access is established, alert the PIO to communicate with the public.
  - ☐ Establish disaster aid centers to process applications for the rehabilitation of individuals and families.
  - ☐ Provide monetary figures necessary to support a request for disaster declaration.
  - ☐ Complete and submit necessary reports and paperwork to appropriate agencies.
- ☐ VPD
  - ☐ Main order – control crowds and maintain security in evacuated areas.
  - ☐ Open evacuated areas once deemed safe to do so.
  - ☐ Take other actions necessary to restore public confidence and to solve problems at the root of the disturbances.
  - ☐ Initiate criminal investigations as needed.
  - ☐ Arrange for handling and identification of fatalities and mental health support services with the AKSMEO, if warranted.
- ☐ VFD
  - ☐ Evaluate and conduct SAR efforts, if warranted.
  - ☐ Control fires and the escapement and/or spread of hazardous or toxic substances.
- ☐ AST
  - ☐ Assist VFD and VPD as needed.
  - ☐ Provide medical triage treatment and transport.
- ☐ Department of Public Works Director
  - ☐ Identify safety hazards, and undertake corrective action.
  - ☐ Arrange for debris clearance.
  - ☐ Conduct health and sanitation surveys and disease prevention measures.
  - ☐ Work to restore essential public utilities and facilities.
  - ☐ Perform damage assessments, post-incident cleanup, and utilities restoration.
- ☐ PIO
  - ☐ Issue public service announcement regarding status and recovery.
  - ☐ Continue to disseminate public information regarding ongoing hazards and relief efforts.

Civil Disorder Recovery Phase: Civil Disorder has Occurred

☐ **Immediate response actions to consider.**

- ☐ EOC IC
  - ☐ Review Warning and Response Checklists for Civil Disorder.
  - ☐ Coordinate recovery activities with State and Federal relief agencies.
  - ☐ Take other actions necessary to restore public confidence and to solve problems at the root of the disturbances.
  - ☐ Identify safety hazards, and undertake corrective actions.
  - ☐ Initiate immediate and long-range rehabilitation measures and programs.
  - ☐ Perform an incident critique.
- ☐ EOC Section Chiefs
  - ☐ Arrange for emergency housing as necessary.
  - ☐ Request special personnel: interpreters, clergy, counselors, technicians, retired medical.
  - ☐ Arrange for mental support services if needed.
  - ☐ When safe access is established, alert the PIO to communicate with the public.
  - ☐ Establish disaster aid centers to process applications for the rehabilitation of individuals and families.
  - ☐ Provide monetary figures necessary to support a request for disaster declaration.
  - ☐ Complete and submit necessary reports and paperwork to appropriate agencies.
- ☐ VPD
  - ☐ Main order – control crowds, protect property until decision is made to discontinue. Discontinue curfews and meeting size limitations when able to.
  - ☐ Open evacuated areas once deemed safe to do so.
  - ☐ Take other actions necessary to restore public confidence and to solve problems at the root of the disturbances.
  - ☐ Initiate criminal investigations as needed.
  - ☐ Arrange for handling and identification of fatalities and mental health support services with the AKSMEO, if warranted.
- ☐ VFD
  - ☐ Evaluate and conduct SAR efforts, if warranted.
  - ☐ Control fires and the escapement and/or spread of hazardous or toxic substances.
- ☐ AST
  - ☐ Assist VFD and VPD as needed.
  - ☐ Provide medical triage treatment and transport.
- ☐ Department of Public Works Director
  - ☐ Identify safety hazards, and undertake corrective action.
  - ☐ Arrange for debris clearance.
  - ☐ Conduct health and sanitation surveys and disease prevention measures.
  - ☐ Work to restore essential public utilities and facilities.
  - ☐ Perform damage assessments, post-incident cleanup, and utilities restoration.
- ☐ PIO
  - ☐ Issue public service announcement regarding status and recovery.
  - ☐ Continue to disseminate public information regarding ongoing hazards and relief efforts.

ANNEX Y: Transportation Accident

1. Scope

The transportation system in the COV consists of air, road, and marine systems. See the following map from the 2019 Valdez Natural Mitigation Plan. All of these modes have the potential for accidents that could lead to a disaster.



Valdez has one airport, Valdez Pioneer Field. It is operational and open to the public. There is one air traffic control tower at this airport.

Currently, the community is not served by any statewide commuter airlines. There are several commercial helicopter companies that operate out of Valdez. In the summer, they often run sightseeing tours. In the winter, there are heli-skiing companies. In the summer, Valdez is also a popular destination for floatplane owners. The State of Alaska has leased a dock at Robe Lake for use as a seasonal floatplane landing site, but there is currently no one maintaining it.



As a coastal community, the COV has the potential for marine accidents. The type of accident of greatest concern involves barges transporting materials, fuels, or other hazardous materials. Alyeska has its own Port terminal to export petroleum products. Additionally, the State Ferry is part of the Alaska Marine Highway and has capacity to transport passengers and vehicles. The State Ferry typically stops in Valdez two or three times a week for approximately eight months of the year although its schedule varies widely and is more sporadic in the winter.

2. Situation

There are large amounts of transportation assets moving throughout Valdez. The transportation system within Valdez has statewide, national, and international significance.

3. Assumptions

A large-scale transportation event will exceed the resources of the COV and will require a multi-agency response.

4. Operations

Response and EOC activation for a transportation event will be dictated and driven by the scope and locations of the event. The vast majority of transportation events do not pose a major threat to the population or infrastructure.

For each functional response area, see the corresponding functional annex within this EOP for concept of operations and roles and responsibilities of key agencies.

Some of the primary functional areas that will need to be considered during a transportation event include (but are not limited to):

- Warning – Annex B – Warning is a key capability in this event response both in a notice and no-notice event.
- Communications – Annex C – Processes and infrastructure are critical to operations as a means and mechanism for both the PIO function as well as a coordinated response to a transportation event where many different agencies will be operating.
- PIO – Annex D – Public information is critical for information relating to avoidance of hazard areas by the public during the event.
- Evacuation and Shelter in Place – Annex E – This function may be required as an area-to-area basis to remove those threatened by the transportation event.
- Mass Care and Sheltering – Annex F – The mass care requirements for a large-scale transportation event will generally be a short-term operation to shelter those affected by the event or displaced by its size and scope.
- Health and Medical Services – Annex G – A large-scale transportation event will often have a strong need for medical and fatality management. A medical surge response may be required.
- Public Works and Transportation – Annex J – Public works will be a critical component to an event due to the nature of the operational capacities of the departments. Heavy equipment and machinery will be needed to move large volumes of material.
- Oil and Hazardous Materials Spill Response – Annex K – Industrial/technological emergencies such as fires, explosions, and hazardous materials incidents could occur.
- Debris Management and Removal – Annex M – A large-scale transportation event that occurs in or across populated areas or managed infrastructure (roads, etc.) may generate debris. The management of that debris during a response, and the subsequent recovery will be a significant undertaking.

5. Actions

Transportation Accident Response Phase: Major Accident has Occurred

- ☐ IM Short Team
  - ☐ Assess the situation.
  - ☐ Arrange for public alert and warning.
  - ☐ Establish EOC.
- ☐ **Immediate response actions to consider.**
  - ☐ EOC IC
    - ☐ Notify the SEOC of the situation.
    - ☐ Coordinate response with State and Federal agencies.
    - ☐ Implement emergency utility cutoffs as needed.
    - ☐ Consider establishing a multi-casualty organization.
    - ☐ Evaluate the need for evacuating and sheltering.
    - ☐ Ensure evacuation routes are passable.
    - ☐ Establish a radiological monitoring strike team and/or task force if radioactive materials are believed to be involved.
    - ☐ Establish shelter(s) as-needed.
    - ☐ If necessary, request assistance from the State hazmat teams through ADEC.
    - ☐ If conditions warrant, request that the City Mayor sign a local emergency declaration.
    - ☐ Request State declaration of disaster emergency if conditions warrant.
    - ☐ Keep the SEOC informed if State assistance is required.
    - ☐ Coordinate non-local support requirements with the SEOC.
  - ☐ VPD
    - ☐ Arrange for handling and identification of fatalities and mental health support services with the AKSMEO, if warranted.
    - ☐ Secure the area.
    - ☐ Control crowds.
    - ☐ Establish reconnaissance.
  - ☐ VFD
    - ☐ Evaluate and conduct SAR efforts, if warranted.
    - ☐ Control fires and the escapement and/or spread of hazardous or toxic substances.
  - ☐ AST
    - ☐ Assist VFD and VPD as needed.
    - ☐ Provide medical triage treatment and transport.
  - ☐ PIO
    - ☐ Disseminate public information such as:
      - ☐ Description of the situation.
      - ☐ Location of damaged areas.
      - ☐ Issue evacuation order(s) as appropriate.
      - ☐ Shelter locations.
      - ☐ Evacuation routes and reception areas.
      - ☐ How to get information concerning victims.
    - ☐ Continue to disseminate public information as needed.
  - ☐ EOC Section Chiefs
    - ☐ Arrange for emergency housing as necessary.

- ☐ Request special personnel: interpreters, clergy, counselors, technicians, retired medical.
- ☐ Arrange for mental support services if needed.
- ☐ When safe access is established, alert the PIO to communicate with the public.
- ☐ Establish disaster aid centers to process applications for the rehabilitation of individuals and families if warranted.

☐ Department of Public Works Director

- ☐ Identify safety hazards, and undertake corrective action.
- ☐ Arrange for debris clearance.
- ☐ Conduct health and sanitation surveys and disease prevention measures.
- ☐ Work to restore and maintain essential public utilities, facilities, and transportation systems.
- ☐ Perform damage assessments, post-incident cleanup, and utilities restoration.

Transportation Accident Recovery Phase: Major Accident has Occurred. Initial Response is Complete.

☐ **Immediate response actions to consider.**

- ☐ EOC IC
  - ☐ Review Response Checklist for Transportation Accident.
  - ☐ Coordinate recovery activities with State and Federal relief agencies.
  - ☐ Identify safety hazards, and undertake corrective actions.
  - ☐ Perform an incident critique.
- ☐ EOC Section Chiefs
  - ☐ Arrange for emergency housing as necessary.
  - ☐ Request special personnel: interpreters, clergy, counselors, technicians, retired medical.
  - ☐ When safe access is established, alert the PIO to communicate with the public.
  - ☐ Establish disaster aid centers to process applications for the rehabilitation of individuals and families if warranted.
  - ☐ Provide monetary figures necessary to support a request for disaster declaration.
  - ☐ Complete and submit necessary reports and paperwork to appropriate agencies.
- ☐ VPD
  - ☐ Maintain security at the scene.
  - ☐ Open evacuated areas once deemed safe to do so.
  - ☐ Arrange for handling and identification of fatalities and mental health support services with the AKSMEO, if warranted.
- ☐ VFD
  - ☐ Evaluate and conduct SAR efforts, if warranted.
  - ☐ Control fires and the escapement and/or spread of hazardous or toxic substances.
- ☐ AST
  - ☐ Assist VFD and VPD as needed.
  - ☐ Provide medical triage treatment and transport.
- ☐ Department of Public Works Director
  - ☐ Identify safety hazards, and undertake corrective action.
  - ☐ Arrange for debris clearance.
  - ☐ Conduct health and sanitation surveys and disease prevention measures.
  - ☐ Work to restore essential public utilities and facilities.
  - ☐ Perform damage assessments, post-incident cleanup, and utilities restoration.
- ☐ PIO
  - ☐ Issue public service announcement regarding status and recovery.
  - ☐ Continue to disseminate public information regarding ongoing hazards and relief efforts.

ANNEX Z: Health Crisis

1. Scope

This annex provides a framework for infectious disease-specific preparedness and response activities and serves as a foundation for further planning and emergency preparedness activities. Additionally, this annex does not replace the responsibility for specific departments involved in responding to an infectious disease emergency such as the PVMC, Valdez Medical Clinic, and Valdez Public Health Center to develop appropriate policies and procedures for their response.

2. Situation

An infectious disease is a clinically evident disease resulting from the presence of pathogenic microbial agents. Infectious diseases represent a major threat; millions die as a result of an infectious disease every year. Infectious disease can be transmitted through several methods, including physical contact with infected individuals, airborne inhalation, and contaminated objects.

3. Assumptions

The Alaska Division of Public Health Section of Public Health Nursing monitors several infectious diseases that occur or have occurred in different areas of the State, including:

- Human Immunodeficiency Virus;
- Foodborne diseases such as Salmonellosis and E Coli; and
- Vector borne diseases (diseases that are transmitted by an animal or insect) such as West Nile, Influenza, and COVID-19.

Pandemic influenza, or a global outbreak of a new influenza virus, could also impact Valdez. The impact of a pandemic outbreak could be significant, but the occurrence of such an outbreak cannot be predicted with certainty.

The planning assumptions below are based on the CDC's 2017 Update to the Pandemic Influenza Plan. Although these assumptions represent the conditions that occur during a pandemic influenza event, many of the assumptions would also apply should a non-influenza pandemic occur.

A. Delays in the availability of vaccines and shortages of antiviral drugs are likely, particularly in the early phases of the pandemic. Non-Pharmaceutical Interventions (NPIs) will be the principle means of disease control until adequate supplies of vaccines and/or antiviral medications are available. NPIs that all people should practice at all times are particularly important during a pandemic and include: staying home when sick, covering coughs and sneezes, frequent and appropriate hand washing, and routine cleaning of frequently touched surfaces.

B. The seasonality of a pandemic cannot be predicted with certainty. Although seasonal, non-pandemic influenza typically peaks in winter, cases of pandemic flu have been observed year-round.

C. The virus will have the ability to spread rapidly worldwide.

D. If the pandemic is characterized by severe disease, it will have the potential to disrupt national, state, and COV community infrastructures (including health care, transportation, commerce, utilities, and public safety) due to widespread illness, absenteeism, death among employees and their families, as well as concern about ongoing exposure to the virus.

E. During a pandemic, infection in a localized area (such as Valdez) can last about six to eight weeks. At least two pandemic disease waves may occur.

F. The percentage of the population that becomes infected could range from 20% to 30% of the population, but rates will vary.

G. The typical incubation period (the time between acquiring the infection and becoming ill) for influenza averages two days (but can range from one to four days).

H. Of those who become ill with influenza, up to 50% will seek outpatient medical care. This could significantly tax the available resources of the PVMC, Valdez Medical Center, and Valdez Public Health Center and other local providers.

I. Risk groups for severe and fatal infections cannot be predicted with certainty. Although certain groups such as small children and the elderly are more likely to have complications due to seasonal influenza, pandemic influenza may disproportionately affect a different demographic. During the 1918 pandemic, deaths were notably evident among young, previously healthy adults, and in 2009, elderly people experienced a lower infection rate.

J. Infected persons will shed the virus and may transmit it up to one day before the onset of illness and will continue to do so for five to seven additional days after becoming ill.

K. One or two secondary infections will occur as a result of transmission from someone who is ill.

L. Behavioral health and stress reactions are health risks in a pandemic that must be integrated into messages to mitigate individual psychological care, increase compliance with public health directives, and promote the resilience of the community population.

M. Pandemic events may cause major impacts to society (e.g., wide-spread restrictions on travel, closings of schools and businesses, cancellation of large public gatherings, etc.).

N. There is the potential for severe impact on the domestic and world economy during and after a pandemic.

4. Operations

The Alaska Division of Public Health Section of Public Health Nursing is responsible for protecting life from the effects of an infectious disease emergency. The State Chief Medical Officer will work closely with the State Governor. The EOC has the primary responsibility in Valdez for the management of an infectious disease emergency that occurs or impacts residents. The EOC is also responsible for coordinating amongst external agencies that also respond to an infectious disease emergency in Valdez. The EOC is also responsible for coordinating with local health and emergency officials as part of the response to an infectious disease emergency.

The EOC's top priorities during an infectious disease emergency are to:

- Protect the lives, health, and safety of residents, visitors, staff, and emergency responders;
- Ensure the security of the COV;
- Protect and restore critical infrastructure and key resources;
- Protect property and mitigate damage to property;
- Facilitate the recovery of impacted residents; and
- Restore COV functions.

For each functional response area, see the corresponding functional annex within this EOP for concept of operations and roles and responsibilities of key agencies.

Some of the primary functional areas that will need to be considered during a health crisis event include (but are not limited to):

- Warning – Annex B – Warning is a key capability in this event response.
- Communications – Annex C – Processes and infrastructure are critical to operations as a means and mechanism for both the PIO function as well as a coordinated response to a health crisis event where many different agencies will be operating.
- PIO – Annex D – Public information is critical for information relating to avoidance of public areas by the public during the event.
- Evacuation and Shelter in Place – Annex E – This function may be required as an area-to-area basis to remove those threatened by the health crisis event or keep residents safe in their homes.
- Mass Care and Sheltering – Annex F – The mass care requirements for a large-scale health crisis will generally be a short-term operation to shelter those affected by the event (i.e., homeless population) or displaced by its size and scope.
- Health and Medical Services – Annex G – A health crisis will often have a strong need for medical and fatality management. A medical surge response may be required.

5. Actions

Health Crisis Warning Phase: Threat of a Health Crisis May Occur

☐ IM Short Team
- ☐ Contact the State Department of Epidemiology:
  (907) 269-8000 during business hours and (800) 478-0084 after hours
- ☐ Activate the IMT and EOC.
- ☐ Notify SEOC of the situation.
- ☐ Contact the PVMC to activate HICS for disaster response.
- ☐ Contact Clinic and Public Health nurse for response.
- ☐ Notify Alaska DHS&EM of Health Crisis and have them stand by for assistance.

☐ EOC IC
- ☐ Issue evacuation order(s) or shelter-in-place order(s) as appropriate.
- ☐ Keep the SEOC informed.

☐ PIO
- ☐ Disseminate public information such as:

- ☐ Description of the medical emergency.
- ☐ How can residents help?

Health Crisis Response Phase: Health Crisis is Occurring

☐ **Immediate response actions to consider.**

☐ EOC IC
- ☐ Contact the PVMC to activate HICS for disaster response.
- ☐ Contact Clinic and Public Health nurse for response.
- ☐ Notify Alaska DHS&EM of Health Crisis and have them stand by for assistance.
- ☐ Issue evacuation order(s) or shelter-in-pace order(s) as appropriate.
- ☐ Keep the SEOC informed.
- ☐ Request AST and Red Cross assistance with temporary morgues and burials, as necessary.
- ☐ If conditions warrant, request that the City Mayor sign a local emergency declaration.
- ☐ Request State declaration of disaster emergency if conditions warrant.

☐ VFD
- ☐ Establish rescue and medical teams with EOC communications and the VPD, if needed.

☐ AST
- ☐ Arrange for handling and identification of fatalities and mental health support services with the AKSMEO if warranted.
- ☐ Assist VFD and VPD as needed.

☐ PIO
- ☐ Disseminate public information such as:
  - ☐ Description of the medical emergency.
  - ☐ How can residents help?
  - ☐ What should people do?
  - ☐ Continue to disseminate public information as needed.

Health Crisis Recovery Phase: Health Crisis is Over

☐ **Immediate response actions to consider.**

- ☐ EOC IC
  - ☐ Contact the State Department of Epidemiology:
    (907) 269-8000 during business hours and (800) 478-0084 after hours
    Notify them that the crisis is over.
  - ☐ Contact Clinic and Public Health nurse to demobilize crews brought in for the crisis.
  - ☐ Notify Alaska DHS&EM of Health Crisis and release equipment and supplies as appropriate for demobilization.
  - ☐ Coordinate with the PVMC to release patients once conditions have stabilized and health has returned to normal.
  - ☐ Keep the SEOC informed.
  - ☐ Issue return orders for the public through public service announcement(s).
  - ☐ If conditions warrant, request that the City Mayor sign a local emergency declaration.
  - ☐ Request State declaration of disaster emergency if conditions warrant.
- ☐ VPD
  - ☐ Arrange for handling and identification of fatalities and mental health support services with the AKSMEO, if warranted.
- ☐ AST
  - ☐ Arrange for handling and identification of fatalities and mental health support services with the AKSMEO if warranted.
  - ☐ Assist VFD and VPD as needed.
- ☐ PIO
  - ☐ Disseminate public information such as:
    - ☐ Return orders for the public.
    - ☐ Continue to disseminate public information as needed.
    - ☐ Notice to residents that restrictions have been lifted.

ANNEX AA: Energy Shortages

1. Scope

Due to interdependency among the energy services serving the COV and regional jurisdictions, a disruption of service, no matter the cause, is likely to have a broad-based affect requiring a coordinated response.

While disruptions in electrical service could occur in a catastrophic event such as an earthquake, prolonged cold spells and high wind events can also trigger an energy emergency. A prolonged power outage can lead to damaged critical infrastructure and facilities, impact hospital capabilities, disrupt commerce, and require extensive support and assistance for recovery.

2. Situation

While COV residents are accustomed to occasional electrical outages, prolonged disruption of energy supply could have damaging consequences, particularly in winter when heating is critical due to the climate.

3. Assumptions

A. Energy emergencies are not limited to catastrophic events but may also occur as a result of a supply problem as well as an extended widespread power outage.

B. Extreme weather events such as prolonged cold spells or high winds may threaten the integrity of the electricity delivery system or create widespread power outages.

C. Interdependency among energy utilities increases the complexity of an energy emergency and also increases the likelihood of a regional event that crosses jurisdictional boundaries.

D. A widespread energy emergency or prolonged power outage will likely affect Valdez City Schools operations, commerce, and the normal daily activity of government and the population.

E. CVEA is a privately-owned organization that produces and/or distributes electrical power for the COV.

4. Operations

An energy-based emergency has some specific public and private response operations that have been designed, trained, and exercised.

Coordinated Energy Conservation Measures and Energy Watch/Alert is the designated response program used for this emergency. The primary goal of coordinated energy conservation measures is to help preserve the electricity system integrity. An energy watch condition would be issued whenever additional energy conservation or load reduction measures are necessary to ensure there is no disruption of service or to minimize the impact of a disruption. The City Manager in conjunction with the CVEA determines the level of the energy emergency.

Yellow Condition “Yellow” / “Red”: The COV will issue an Energy Condition “Yellow” (caution) or “Red” (alert) in conjunction with CVEA whenever immediate load reduction measures are necessary to ensure there is no disruption of service. Additional load reduction

measures may also be implemented by the COV to include limitations on non-essential COV government services and/or school hours.

For each functional response area, see the corresponding functional annex within this EOP for concept of operations and roles and responsibilities of key agencies. Some of the primary functional areas that will need to be considered during an energy emergency include (but are not limited to):

- Warning – Annex B – This event is unique in that the general population knowledge and action can be critical to minimizing the impact. When users can reduce their use and consumption of power, that directly impacts the ability to assist in the response.
- PIO – Annex D – Public information is critical.
- Mass Care and Sheltering – Annex F – With the extended loss of power, the need for mass care will be significant. Many homes can maintain using alternate methods for a period of time. Homes will be structurally intact but may be uninhabitable and unusable depending on the duration of the event. The mass care impact will increase exponentially over time; the problem will get worse, the longer it persists.
- Health and Medical Services – Annex G – The loss of electricity and heat may directly affect all the hospital and medical providers, possibly resulting in a sharp drop in capacity.
- Public Works and Transportation – Annex J – In conjunction with private industry response assets, public works provides services for critical infrastructure and key facilities. The Department may encounter staffing capability issues when faced with numerous conflicting and competing priorities. Also, as part of the public works mission, the damage survey process will have a substantial impact on efficient operations. The loss of electricity will have dramatic infrastructure impacts both in private homes as well as COV facilities. Loss of heat can have significant and long-lasting damage to the internal systems of facilities such as plumbing, heating, cooling, and electrical components. The damage survey in a post-freeze up condition is both time-consuming and necessary to prevent further damage upon thawing.

5. Actions

Energy Shortage/Interruption Warning Phase: Threat of Energy Shortage Exists

☐ **IM Short Team**

- ☐ Develop the following estimates:
  - ☐ What problem is anticipated and its duration?
  - ☐ What areas will be impacted and to what extent?
  - ☐ Identify people at risk.
- ☐ Establish and maintain contact with other affected areas.
- ☐ Initiate incident communications plan.
- ☐ Coordinate with other state and federal agencies.
- ☐ Alert utilities, and review emergency shutdown procedures.
- ☐ Estimate nature and scope of assistance required by the community and threatened utilities.
- ☐ Publicize emergency public information to include:
  - ☐ Arrange for public announcements via social media, radio, and television.

Energy Shortage/Interruption Response Phase: Energy Shortage/Interruption is Occurring

- ☐ IM Short Team
  - ☐ Review Warning Checklist for Energy Shortage.
  - ☐ Are conditions improving or deteriorating?
  - ☐ Establish EOC.
- ☐ **Immediate response actions to consider.**
  - ☐ EOC IC
    - ☐ Update the SEOC of the situation.
    - ☐ Determine the extent of the interruption.
    - ☐ Keep gas station operators and fuel distributors advised of emergency methods of pumping gasoline and fuel.
    - ☐ Arrange for emergency and backup power for critical services.
    - ☐ Monitor public health and safety, and respond to developing hazards.
    - ☐ Develop energy conservation plan. Review COV legal powers to impose restrictions and curtailments, etc.
    - ☐ Identify potential "back-up" fuels, such as cut wood, and plan for allocation.
    - ☐ Establish daily consumption reports.
    - ☐ Prepare to activate shelter(s) or locate emergency housing for evacuees.
    - ☐ Provide special assistance to low income and the homeless as needed.
    - ☐ Gather information to support requests to the Alaska Public Utilities Commission or DHS&EM for Fuel "set-aside" or "State Reserve" deployment.
    - ☐ If conditions warrant, request that the City Mayor declare a local emergency.
    - ☐ Request State declaration of disaster emergency if conditions warrant.
    - ☐ Be prepared to report status to the SEOC if State assistance is required.
    - ☐ Coordinate non-local support requirements with the SEOC.
    - ☐ Prepare to assist other areas in the region as appropriate.
  - ☐ VPD
    - ☐ Be ready for problems such as inactivated street lights.
  - ☐ VFD
    - ☐ Be ready for problems such as low water pressure.
  - ☐ AST
    - ☐ Assist VFD and VPD as needed.
  - ☐ Public Works Director
    - ☐ Be ready for problems such as heating and low water pressure.
    - ☐ Assess and document damage to public and private property.
  - ☐ PIO
    - ☐ Continue to disseminate public information, including:
      - ☐ Description of the situation and identification of areas at risk.
      - ☐ Closures of schools, offices, and other facilities.
      - ☐ Location of emergency shelter(s) if needed.
      - ☐ Evacuation routes and reception areas.
      - ☐ How future warning and evacuation instructions will be disseminated.
      - ☐ Other information and instructions concerning the public welfare.
    - ☐ Issue evacuation orders as appropriate.

Energy Shortage/Interruption Recovery Phase: Energy Shortage/Interruption has Occurred

☐ **Immediate response actions to consider.**

- ☐ EOC IC
  - ☐ Review Warning and Response Checklist(s) for Energy Shortage.
  - ☐ Coordinate recovery activities with State and Federal relief agencies.
  - ☐ Identify safety hazards, and undertake corrective actions.
  - ☐ Perform an incident critique.
- ☐ EOC Section Chiefs
  - ☐ Arrange for emergency housing as necessary.
  - ☐ When safe access is established, alert the PIO to communicate with the public.
  - ☐ Establish disaster aid centers to process applications for the rehabilitation of individuals and families.
  - ☐ Provide monetary figures necessary to support a request for disaster declaration.
  - ☐ Complete and submit necessary reports and paperwork to appropriate agencies.
- ☐ VPD
  - ☐ Maintain security.
  - ☐ Open evacuated areas.
- ☐ AST
  - ☐ Assist VFD and VPD as needed.
  - ☐ Department of Public Works Director
  - ☐ Identify safety hazards, and undertake corrective action.
  - ☐ Work to restore essential public utilities and facilities.
  - ☐ Perform damage assessments.
- ☐ PIO
  - ☐ Issue public service announcement regarding status and recovery.
  - ☐ Continue to disseminate public information regarding ongoing events and relief efforts.

ANNEX AB: Dam Failure

1. Scope

Dam failures involve the unintended release of impounded water. A dam failure can destroy property and cause injury and death downstream. A dam failure does not always involve a total collapse of the dam. Dams may fail due to structural deficiencies, poor initial design or construction, lack of maintenance or repair, weakening of the dam through aging, debris blocking the spillway, or other disasters such as earthquakes, improper operation, or vandalism.

The failure of a dam can result in a major catastrophe with substantial economic impacts and loss of life. There are varying degrees of failure that can contribute to the uncontrolled release of water from the reservoir, ranging from improper gated spillway operation to the partial or full breach of the main structural component of the dam. Lesser degrees of failure often occur in advance of a catastrophic failure.

2. Situation

Valdez has one dam within COV limits, and no other dams affecting the community or the watershed.

The Solomon Gulch Hydroelectric Project (SGHP) is a 12-megawatt facility serving Valdez and the Copper Basin. It is located on Solomon Gulch Creek, on Valdez Bay, directly across from Valdez and was built in 1981. The project was developed by constructing a dam and dike at the outlet of Solomon Lake, raising the elevation of this natural lake by 77 feet. The project consists of: a dam and dike on Solomon Gulch Creek, approximately 3,800 feet upstream of the bay, and 600 feet above the powerhouse, impounding some 31,650 acre-feet of water in a 660-acre reservoir; a powerhouse located near tidewater; and two 48-inch diameter, above-ground steel penstocks to convey water down slope to the powerhouse turbines.

The Valdez Salmon Hatchery, owned and operated by Valdez Fisheries Development Association, is located immediately below the Solomon Gulch Powerhouse, just across Dayville Road. Dayville Road connects the Project Powerhouse with Valdez. It also connects Valdez with the Alyeska Marine Terminal facility, located approximately two miles west of the SGHP. The Dayville Road Bridge crossing Solomon Creek is immediately west of the SGHP Powerhouse.

In addition to CVEA's internal procedures, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) sets standards for Solomon Gulch Dam, and these standards are governed by regulations and guidelines that are used every day at the SGHP. The plant is staffed 24 hours a day, 365 days per year with a qualified Operator. The Operator controls all the shutoff valves necessary to stop water from flowing down the two pipes (penstocks). If there was a break in the penstock or a malfunction at the turbine, the Operator can stop the water with remotely-controlled switches. This gives the Operator a chance to immediately address penstock related problems at the first indication of any leaks or unusual changes in water flow.

To assist the Operator, highly-technical arrays of sensors and monitors that provide real time feedback have been installed. These sensors tell the Operator about any problems such as too much volume coming down Solomon Gulch Creek or the penstock. In addition, the sensors tell the Operator about high temperature/fire warnings, vibration warnings, lake level readings, and other variables all related to the safety of the equipment and the personnel in the vicinity of the plant.

This array of sensors feed into the Early Warning System and the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system. In additional to monitoring water conditions, CVEA has a strict inspection standard to look at the Dam and other structures. As an example, there are 32 monuments built into the dam, dike, and spillway. A professional surveyor regularly visits these monuments and measures for movements to one hundredth of an inch. The structures are measured for front and back movement. Any movement larger than 0.02 inches requires action or increased inspection.

Information and data for this section was taken from the following

source:

www.Cvea.org/resources/pdfs/ruralite2/pg4Augst11DamSafety.pdf

3. Assumptions

A. A dam failure can be a notice or no-notice event.

B. Per the 2018 USACE Database, the hazard potential is high if the dam failed. Approximately 31,500 acre-feet of water would be released.

4. Operations

Response and EOC activation for a dam failure event will be dictated and driven by the scope and locations of the event.

For each functional response area, see the corresponding functional annex within this EOP for concept of operations and roles and responsibilities of key agencies. Some of the primary functional areas that will need to be considered during a dam failure include (but are not limited to):

- Warning – Annex B – This event is a key capability in this event response both in a notice and no-notice event.
- PIO – Annex D – Public information is critical for information relating to avoidance of hazard areas by the public during times of threat as well as critical information during a response to a dam threat or failure event.
- Evacuation and Shelter in Place – Annex E – A dam threat or failure event near a populated area may require an area-to-area evacuation.
- Mass Care and Sheltering – Annex F – A dam failure event may create a condition where citizens have a loss of use or access to their residences. This may generate a mass care response that could be long term in nature.
- Health and Medical Services – Annex G – If a dam failure event impacts Valdez, the medical surge response could be major. Fatality management capability may be required as well.
- Public Works and Transportation – Annex J – Public works will be a critical component to an event due to the nature of the operational capacities of the department. The heavy equipment and machinery needed to move large volumes of material as well as the department's functions in restoring key infrastructure in this event will be essential.
- Debris Management and Removal – Annex M – A dam failure event that occurs in or across populated or managed infrastructure (roads, etc.) will generate enormous amounts of debris. The management of that debris during a response, and the subsequent recovery will be a significant undertaking and a long-term operation.

5. Actions

Routine inspections of the Dam are conducted every week, and the Dam is also inspected when earthquakes occur. The Dam has an Emergency Action Plan, and training is conducted at least twice a year with COV emergency response agencies.

ANNEX AC: Cyberthreat

1. Scope

Cybersecurity events may impact the entire COV organization and possibly the community. The COV experienced a cyberthreat attack in 2018.

2. Operations

Cybersecurity incidents and attacks that impact IT systems can disrupt interlocking critical infrastructure such as SCADA, Dispatch, security appliances, administration etc. Impacts at the local facility may be part of a larger coordinated attack that may impact the entire IT sector. Such cyber-attacks can have serious consequences that lead to other hazards, such as communications failures. These cascading hazards increase the potential impact of cyber incidents within the environment and employee safety.

Cybersecurity attacks are events that may impact a facility for more than one operational period (8 and/or 12 hours) and as long as 60 days in some instances. Established policies and response and communication protocols provide guidance for escalating incident management and IT and EM coordination.

3. Actions

Reporting System Anomalies

It is important to report computer anomalies, system performance issues, strange defects in operation, etc. to corporate IT Department and the IT Director. Early warning signs of Indication of Compromise (IoC), reported early, can prevent possible cascading outages.

Staff should be encouraged and feel empowered to report such system behaviors. When reporting attempt to provide the following:

Time of day of Indication of Compromise	Type of device
Description of behavior	Manufacturer
Name, phone, email of Point of Contact	If noticed by others

Other personnel notification and reporting too include:
Legal Officer

- Is this an Internal Threat or an External Threat?
- Management of co-investigation with IT Director will assist in remediation under work-product privilege
- Reporting to State and Federal agencies

Supporting Agencies:
FBI Anchorage - Cyber/Counterintelligence
Office - 907-265-8186

Department of Administration - Office of Information Technology **OIT**
https://oit.alaska.gov

MS-ISAC CYBERSECURITY
24×7 Security Operations Center
Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC)
Elections Infrastructure Information Sharing and Analysis Center (EI-ISAC)
SOC@cisecurity.org
1-866-787-4722
https://www.cisecurity.org/ms-isac/

Severity Classification and Reporting Matrix - The following matrix establishes a common framework for evaluating and assessing cyber incidents to ensure a common understanding of the severity of the incident and assist in plan of action, notification and response.

	General Definition	Entity Actions	Threat Intended Consequence
Level 5 Emergency (Black)	*Poses an imminent threat*	Employee Safety*	Cause physical consequences
Level 4 Severe (Red)	*Significant Impact* - Sector (Ex. Most or all IT systems taken off line for significant amount of time)	Disconnect & Isolate Systems	Damage to computer and/or networking software/hardware Deny availability to a key system or service
Level 3 High (Orange)	*Likely to result in a demonstrated impact* - Sector (Ex. malware contained to small amount of infected computers or equipment)	Localize Threat	Corrupt or destroy data Commit a financial crime
Level 2 Medium (Yellow)	*May Impact* - Sector. (Ex. Possible HIPAA violation)	IT Response / Contact Authorities	Steal sensitive information
Level 1 Low (Green)	*Unlikely to impact* - Sector (Ex. malware infected on single computer or non-vital IT System)	IT Response / Contact Authorities	Denial of Service (DoS)
Level 0 Baseline (White)	(Ex. Nuissance popups or defacement of website)	Preparation	Nuisance or defacement

A. Emergency Quarantine of Systems

In rare events, compromised systems may have the interest of law enforcement (LE) that may request an area be “sealed off”. That is, to establish a temporary perimeter that would secure access to the device.

In the event of an alleged criminal act, after the area is secured, photographs should be taken of the area (desk, bench, room, etc.) to capture the environment where the alleged event took place.

In emergency situations staff may be requested to disconnect infected device from the backbone network. Available staff should be designated that are trained to remove the appropriate network connection in an urgent situation. This may require coordination with legal, privacy, IT, etc.

B. Interface with IT Personnel

Developing relationships with IT personnel prior to an incident is highly advantageous. It is recommended that EM's develop horizontal partnerships with IT personnel that are performing incident response and recovery activities.

IT personnel should be consulted regarding the vulnerability of other systems that may rely on cyber and IT systems; such as door access, climate control systems (air conditioning, industrial controls, electric power systems, etc.).

Failures of certain IT systems may directly impact EM systems; e.g. information sharing, electronic mail, Internet access, and other information and communications systems. EM's are advised to develop dialogue with IT about potential disruption to critical infrastructure caused by a cybersecurity incident.

C. Physical Protective Measures

Coordination with physical security may be necessary to identify physical areas that may be susceptible to vandalism, unauthorized access, sabotage, etc. This includes exposed network components, unsecured doors to phone closets, etc. Coordination with physical security to identify such vulnerabilities will enable proper mitigation activity to reduce such hazards.

D. Access Control and Identity Verification

Cyber adversaries can create physical diversions and decoy incidents to distract personnel from monitoring of physical access points. During the operational tempo of emergency response, staff members should be asked to politely challenge strangers and unidentified individuals that may have entered sensitive IT and CI areas.

E. Recovery Prioritization

Bringing systems back online is priority 1, but which systems within the facility or system do you prioritize over another. Items to consider include:

- Staff daily use systems?
- Prioritize systems individually or group (administrative, logistic, fiscal or facilities)

APPENDIX A: Memorandums of Understanding

Agreements				
MOU #	**With**	**For**	**Contact**	**Date Signed**
	Valdez City Schools and Providence Valdez Medical Center	Short-term temporary facilities as available in one of the school facilities		May 25, 2018; expires December 31, 2020
	Prince William Sound College	Develop and implement comprehensive preparedness plans and conduct joint exercises to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of their response to any emergency or disaster		May 15, 2008

APPENDIX B: Valdez Hazard Vulnerability Analysis

The source of natural hazards in this table is the City of Valdez Hazard Mitigation Plan which was FEMA-approved March 12, 2019. Man-made hazards in this table were developed specifically for this EOP.

	Hazard	Flood and Erosion	Earthquake	Avalanche
Vulnerability Analysis	Vulnerability zone	Riverine and glacier-dammed outburst flooding on Glacier Stream, Lowe River, and Mineral Creel. Alpine Woods Subdivision. Port and Harbor facilities.	Entire Valdez area	Primarily Thompson Pass 25 miles north of Valdez on the only road into the community
	Percent of population within vulnerability zone	20	50	15
	Percent of geographic area that may be affected	20	50	15
	Percent of building stock that may be affected	15	50	0
	Percent of Critical Facilities and Utilities that may be affected	0	50	15
Risk Analysis	Probability of Occurrence	Likely	Likely	Highly Likely
	Consequences to People	Damage or loss of shelter, hardship due to disruption of transportation. Loss of some medical services.	Injuries or deaths, loss of shelter, disruption of vital services such as medical, water, sewer, power, and transportation.	Possible loss of shelter, injury, or death; road blockage and its consequences as there is only one road in/out of Valdez.
	Consequences to Property	Water erosion undercuts foundations, footings, and stream banks. Flooding can close roads and cause well contamination.	Damage to structures, roads, utilities, runways.	Loss or damage of structures, vehicles.
	Consequences to Environment	Potential contamination from hazardous materials, sewage tanks present in flood plain, sedimentation of salmon	Contamination from hazardous materials released by damaged facilities; landslides; uplift and subsidence	Possible contamination from hazardous materials released depending on location of avalanche.

Severity Rating		spawning habitat, floating debris.	and their effects (tsunami, seiche, etc.).	
	Probability of Simultaneous Emergencies	Moderate (high winds associated with storms)	High (fire, tsunami, hazardous material)	Low (earthquake, severe weather extremes)
	Duration	<1 Week	<6 Hours	<24 Hours
	Warning Time	1 - 24+ Hours	1- <6 Hours	1 - <6 Hours
	Warning Time (.15)	1 - 24+ Hours	4 - <6 Hours	4 - <6 Hours
	Magnitude/Severity (.30)	4 - High	4 - High	4 - High
	Duration (.1)	2 - <24 Hours	1 - <6 Hours	4 - 1+ Week
	Probability (.45)	3- Likely	3 - Likely	4 – Highly Likely
	TOTAL (Range of 1 to 4)	2.9	3.25	4.0

	Hazard	Severe Weather	Volcanic Ashfall	Tsunami
Vulnerability Analysis	Vulnerability zone	Entire area	Fallout with an easterly prevailing wind	Coastal areas within the inundation zone
	Percent of population within vulnerability zone	50	50	50
	Percent of geographic area that may be affected	50	50	50
	Percent of building stock that may be affected	50	50	50
	Percent of Critical Facilities and Utilities that may be affected	50	50	50
Risk Analysis	Probability of Occurrence	Highly Likely	Unlikely	Unlikely
	Consequences to People	High winds can cause injury or death, delays in ferry or air service. Severe cold can cause hypothermia and frostbite. Elderly and school age children could suffer harmful effects from the elements if not protected.	Illness & death from respiratory distress; injuries & death caused by accidents due to lower visibility; Disruption of transportation and services. Harmful health-effects, especially to elderly and those with respiratory problems.	Injuries or deaths, loss of shelter, disruption of vital services such as medical, water, sewer, power, and transportation. Potential for injury or loss of life in the inundation zone. Population may be displaced.
	Consequences to Property	Damage to roofs, utility lines, disruption of fuel and essential supplies, disruption of communications. Damage to structures, utilities, vehicles, and aircraft.	Structural damage due to weight of ash and damage to electronic equipment & machinery. Harmful to motorized vehicles, boats, and aircraft. Potential for structural damage in the event of extreme events.	Damage to structures, utilities, and vehicles in inundation zone.
	Consequences to Environment	N/A	Potential contamination for ash in Prince William Sound, lakes, and streams could cause disruption of salmon-spawning habitat.	Contamination from hazardous materials released by damaged facilities.
	Probability of Simultaneous Emergencies	Moderate (flooding, fire, transportation accidents, avalanche)	Low (earthquake)	High (earthquake, fire, avalanche, seiche)
	Duration	<1 Week	<1 Week	<6 Hours

	Warning Time	24+ Hours	<6 Hours	<6 Hours
Severity Rating	Warning Time (.15)	1 - 24+ Hours	4 - <6 Hours	4 - <6 Hours
	Magnitude/Severity (.30)	2 - Limited	1 - Negligible	2 - Limited
	Duration (.1)	3 - <1 Week	3 - <1 Week	1 - <6 Hours
	Probability (.45)	3 - Likely	1 - Unlikely	1 - Unlikely
	TOTAL (Range of 1 to 4)	2.4	1.65	1.75

Hazard		Wildland Fire	Landslide	Hazardous Material
Vulnerability Analysis	Vulnerability zone	Wooded areas around the City primarily during extremely dry weather which is unusual for Valdez	Coastal areas into Prince William Sound, resulting in a tsunami; Earthquake-created landslides above the Gilson Middle School/Valdez High School	Areas around fuel-storage facilities, refrigeration facilities, and other locations with Hazmat storage; Prince William Sound
	Percent of population within vulnerability zone	25	10	15
	Percent of geographic area that may be affected	25	5 (depending on whether school is in session)	50
	Percent of building stock that may be affected	25	5	50
	Percent of Critical Facilities and Utilities that may be affected	25	10	75
Risk Analysis	Probability of Occurrence	Likely	Possible	Possible
	Consequences to People	Illness & death from respiratory distress; Injuries or death due to fire, heat, smoke and structure collapse. Potential for injury or loss of life in extreme events. Smoke may aggravate respiratory problems. Population may be displaced.	Possible loss of shelter, injury or death.	Harmful health-effects or loss of life. Probable loss of commercial fishing opportunity and income, loss of subsistence and recreation.
	Consequences to Property	Damage or loss of property.	Damage or loss of property. Disruption of school and roads.	May make buildings and property uninhabitable.
	Consequences to Environment	Loss of wildlife habitat.	Potential pollution and environmental contamination.	Potential pollution of water supply and harm to wildlife and plants and fish resources.
	Probability of Simultaneous Emergencies	Low (earthquake)	Moderate (earthquake, avalanche)	Likely Hazardous Material could occur because of an Earthquake event.
	Duration	<1 Week	<1 Week	<1 Week
	Warning Time	<6 Hours	<6 Hours	<6 Hours
Severity	Warning Time (.15)	4 - <6 Hours	4 - <6 Hours	4 - <6 Hours
	Magnitude/Severity (.30)	1 - Negligible	4 - Catastrophic	2 - Limited

	Duration (.1)	3 - <1 Week	3 - <1 Week	3 - <1 Week
	Probability (.45)	3 - Likely	2 - Possible	2 - Possible
	TOTAL (Range of 1 to 4)	2.55	3	2.7

Hazard		Transportation and Utility Disruption	Dam Failure	Terrorism
Vulnerability Analysis	Vulnerability zone	Entire area depending on type of event	Entire area	Entire area (although likely concentrated more toward the pipeline and port)
	Percent of population within vulnerability zone	100	100	100
	Percent of geographic area that may be affected	100	100	100
	Percent of building stock that may be affected	100	100	100
	Percent of Critical Facilities and Utilities that may be affected	100	100	100
Risk Analysis	Probability of Occurrence	Unlikely	Unlikely	Unlikely
	Consequences to People	Loss of heating, electrical power, and communications. Disruption in food supply and other essential goods. Mass casualties, fatalities, disruption of travel, and medical services.	Loss of heating, electrical power, and communications. Mass casualties, fatalities, disruption of travel, and medical services.	Mass casualties, fatalities, disruption of travel, and medical services.
	Consequences to Property	Potential frozen pipes or thawed frozen-goods. Unknown depending on what type of transportation disruption.	Damage or destruction.	Damage or destruction.
	Consequences to Environment	Possible fuel spill(s) into Prince William Sound.	Potential pollution and environmental contamination.	Degradation of air and water quality.
	Probability of Simultaneous Emergencies	Likely Transportation Disruption during Flooding, Earthquakes, Severe Weather and Ashfall events.	Low (earthquake)	Low
	Duration	<1 Week	<1 Week	<1 Week
	Warning Time	<6 Hours	<6 Hours	<6 Hours
ity	Warning Time (.15)	4 - <6 Hours	4 - <6 Hours	4 - <6 Hours

	Magnitude/Severity (.30)	2 - Limited	4 - High	2 - Limited
	Duration (.1)	3 - <1 Week	4 - 1+ Week	4 - 1+ Week
	Probability (.45)	2 - Possible	1 - Unlikely	1 - Unlikely
	TOTAL (Range of 1 to 4)	2.4	2.65	2.05

	Hazard	Cyberthreat
Vulnerability Analysis	Vulnerability zone	Entire area where computer networks exist
	Percent of population within vulnerability zone	100
	Percent of geographic area that may be affected	100
	Percent of building stock that may be affected	100
	Percent of Critical Facilities and Utilities that may be affected	100
Risk Analysis	Probability of Occurrence	Likely
	Consequences to People	Loss of any type of data including City data, heating, electrical power, and communications. Disruption of government services, travel, and medical services.
	Consequences to Property	Damage or destruction.
	Consequences to Environment	Unknown depending on what type of disruption.
	Probability of Simultaneous Emergencies	Low
	Duration	>1 Week
	Warning Time	<6 Hours
Severity Rating	Warning Time (.15)	4 - <6 Hours
	Magnitude/Severity (.30)	4 - High
	Duration (.1)	4 - 1+ Week
	Probability (.45)	4 – Highly Likely
	TOTAL (Range of 1 to 4)	4.0

The following maps and tables are from the City of Valdez Hazard Mitigation Plan which was FEMA-approved March 12, 2019.



Figure 1 - Locations of the In-Town Subdivisions



Figure 2 - Locations of the In-Town Subdivisions



Figure 3 – Subdivisions Outside of the Central Business District

Table 2—Identified Critical Facilities for the COV

Occupancy Type	Facility Name	Location	Avalanche	Dam Failure	Earthquake	Flood & Erosion	Landslides	Severe Weather	Tsunami	Volcanic Hazards	Wildfire
Government Facility	City Hall	212 Chenega Ave.			✓			✓	✓	✓	
	Court Building	213 Meals Ave.			✓			✓	✓	✓	
	Post Office	221 Tatitlek Ave.			✓			✓	✓	✓	
	Public Works Shop	220 Pioneer Dr.			✓			✓		✓	
Transportation Facilities	Valdez Pioneer Field	300 Airport Rd.	✓		✓			✓	✓	✓	
	Seaplane Base	4099 Robe Lake Rd.			✓			✓	✓	✓	
	Heliport Hospital	911 Meals Ave.			✓			✓	✓	✓	
	City of Valdez Heliport	300 Airport Rd.			✓			✓	✓	✓	
	AK MHS Terminal/Dock	520 Ferry Way			✓			✓	✓	✓	

Occupancy Type	Facility Name	Location	Avalanche	Dam Failure	Earthquake	Flood & Erosion	Landslides	Severe Weather	Tsunami	Volcanic Hazards	Wildfire
	John Kelsey Muni Dock	460 Ferry Way			✓			✓	✓	✓	
	Valdez Container Terminal	1460 Container Terminal Rd.			✓			✓	✓	✓	
	Valdez Small Boat Harbor	300 N. Harbor Dr.			✓			✓	✓	✓	
	New Boat Harbor	198 S. Harbor Dr.			✓			✓	✓	✓	
	Trans-AK Pipeline Terminal	300 Dayville Rd.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Emergency Response Facility	Valdez Police Department	212 Chenega Ave.			✓			✓	✓	✓	
	Fire 1	212 Chenega Ave.			✓			✓	✓	✓	
	Fire 3	124 River Dr.			✓			✓		✓	
	Fire 4	7111 Richardson Hwy.			✓			✓		✓	
	Alaska State Trooper	213 Meals Ave.			✓			✓	✓	✓	
Educational Facility	Herman Hutchens Elementary	1009 W. Klutina St.			✓			✓		✓	
	Gilson Middle School	357 Robe River Dr.	✓		✓			✓		✓	
	Valdez High School	319 Robe River Dr.	✓		✓			✓		✓	
	Prince William Sound College	303 Lowe St.			✓			✓		✓	
	PWSC Dorms	Pioneer & Alatna			✓			✓	✓	✓	
Care Facility	Providence Valdez Medical Center	911 Meals Ave.			✓			✓	✓	✓	
	Valdez Medical Clinic	1001 Meals Ave.			✓			✓	✓	✓	
	PWSC Wellness Center	303 Lowe St.			✓			✓		✓	
Roads	City-owned Roads	393,339 linear ft	✓	✓	✓			✓	✓	✓	
	State-owned Roads	305,595 linear ft	✓	✓	✓			✓	✓	✓	
Bridges	Solomon Gulch Bridge	61.0838 N, -145.8939 W	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓		✓	
	Richardson Highway Bridge-Glacier Stream	61.1373 N, -146.3445 W	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	
	Mineral Creek Bridge	61.1296 N, -146.3546 W	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓		✓	
u n	City of Valdez	720 Glacier Haul Rd.			✓	✓		✓		✓	

Occupancy Type	Facility Name	Location	Avalanche	Dam Failure	Earthquake	Flood & Erosion	Landslides	Severe Weather	Tsunami	Volcanic Hazards	Wildfire
	Landfill										
	Jess & Maxine Whitney Museum	303 Lowe St.			✓			✓		✓	
	Valdez Museum & Historical Archive	217 Egan Ave.			✓			✓		✓	
	Valdez Museum Annex	436 Ferry Way			✓			✓	✓	✓	
	Old Town Valdez	2380 7th Ave.			✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	
	Historic Cemetery	2880 Richardson Hwy.			✓	✓		✓		✓	✓
	Valdez Salmon Hatchery	1561 Dayville Rd.		✓	✓	✓		✓		✓	
	Keystone Canyon Shootout Site (Tunnel)	AK 4	✓		✓			✓		✓	
	Senior Center	1300 E. Hanagita St.			✓			✓		✓	
	Valdez City Library	212 Fairbanks Dr.			✓			✓	✓	✓	
Utilities	Copper Valley Telephone Coop	329 Fairbanks Dr.	✓	✓	✓			✓	✓	✓	
	CVEA CoGen Plant	2501 Dayville Rd.			✓			✓	✓	✓	
	Alyeska Pipeline Service Company	300 Dayville Rd.	✓	✓	✓			✓	✓	✓	
	Solomon Gulch Hydroelectric Facility	1550 Dayville Rd.	✓	✓	✓			✓	✓	✓	
	Valdez Diesel Plant/Don Smith Substation	527 W. Egan Dr.			✓			✓	✓	✓	
	Water and Wastewater Treatment Facility	800 Sawmill Dr.			✓			✓		✓	
	Mineral Creek Canyon Reservoir	1231 Mineral Creek Rd.			✓			✓		✓	
	Blueberry Hill (West Egan) Reservoir	1080 W. Egan Dr.			✓			✓		✓	
	Airport Industrial Subdivision Reservoir	300 Atigun Dr.			✓			✓	✓	✓	
	Robe River Subdivision Reservoir	311 Dylen Dr.			✓	✓		✓		✓	
	City-wide piped water	235,606 linear ft	✓		✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	
	City-wide piped wastewater	204,642 linear ft	✓		✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	

Occupancy Type	Facility Name	Location	Avalanche	Dam Failure	Earthquake	Flood & Erosion	Landslides	Severe Weather	Tsunami	Volcanic Hazards	Wildfire
Fuel	Crowley Petroleum	105 Airport Rd.			✓			✓	✓	✓	
	North Pacific Fuel	254 Fidalgo Ave.			✓			✓	✓	✓	
	Petro Star Bulk Storage Facility	402 Egan Ave.			✓			✓		✓	
	Petro Star Refinery	2.5 Dayville Road	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Critical Infrastructure - Town Center



Number	Name	Grid	Number	Name	Grid	Number	Name	Grid	Number	Name	Grid
1	AK DOT Office	F3	12	CVEA Diesel Plant	C6	23	N. Crowley Marine Fuel Dock	E8	34	Senior Center	F2
2	Alyeska SERVS	F9	13	CVTC	D6	24	New Boat Harbor	G9	35	Silver Bay Bunk House	E9
3	Animal Shelter	F5	14	Ferry Terminal	C9	25	North Pacific Fuel	D8	36	Silver Bay Dock	E9
4	ATT Alascom	F5	15	Fire Station 1	D6	26	Peter Pan	E9	37	Silver Bay Seafoods	E9
5	Bette Cato Bridge	A4	16	Food Bank	F6	27	Peter Pan Store	E9	38	Small Boat Harbor	F8
6	Captain Joes Tesoro	E6	17	Gilson M.S.	D2	28	Petro Star Tank Farm	C7	39	Teen Center	D3
7	City Hall & VPD	E6	18	Harbor Boat Launch	F7	29	Prince William Sound College	D4	40	USCG Dock	E8
8	Civic Center	D8	19	Harbormaster Office	F7	30	Public Works Maintenance	C6	41	USCG MSO	E8
9	Clinic	F3	20	Herman Hutchens E.S.	B5	31	PWSC Wellness Center	E4	42	USCG Radar	E9
10	Courthouse	E6	21	Hospital	E3	32	S. Crowley Marine Fuel Dock	E8	43	USCG Shop	E8
11	CVEA	D6	22	Kelsey Dock	D9	33	Safeway	E5	44	Valdez Container Terminal	J9
									45	Valdez H.S.	D2

Figure 4—Valdez Town Center Critical Infrastructure



Figure 5—Valdez Outside of the Town Center Critical Infrastructure

Land Development Trends

The COV is a unique community as its location was moved four miles to the west of the existing town site after the 1964 earthquake. Some of the historical buildings from "old town" were relocated but the majority of existing structures were built after 1965. This has enabled the community to redesign itself, creating subdivisions located on collector streets with many cul-de-sacs and diverse housing, from single-family residences and zero lot line homes to multi-family housing and mobile homes. Housing outside of the town proper is also diverse and typically on larger tracts of land that are mostly served by on-site water and sewer. However, larger subdivisions with smaller lot sizes that have grown up along the Richardson Highway now desire COV sewer and water, and it is a COV priority to eventually accommodate these citizens. Lack of adequate and affordable housing continues to be a problem, even when the population of Valdez remains relatively steady at approximately 4,000 permanent residents. This figure increases substantially in the summer with seasonal employment. The COV has encouraged filling in when possible, and the most logical expansion continues to be in the Cottonwood Subdivision, located west of the Betty Cato Bridge across Mineral Creek. This expansion has been discussed since 1991 but recent interest in building the area out has increased. Edison Chouest, the oil tanker escort and spill response company, built 10 new single-family homes for their employees in 2017. Although the shortage in housing continues to be an obstacle to growth and development, the COV has plans for increased land sales where feasible.

Commercial land use is centered in the central business district and the area around the boat harbor. The COV has maintained a beautification effort of the downtown district and is attempting to create a friendly, healthy shopping atmosphere for citizens and tourists alike. Large snow lots double as COV parks in the summer and host a variety of events and activities. There are not many retail sales outside of the COV proper, only a small convenience store located approximately four miles east of town towards the airport. However, light industrial use exists along the Richardson Highway, and on West Egan Drive, most notably the currently expanding Petro Star tank farm.

The prominent industrial land use in Valdez is the Alyeska Terminal Facility that supports the Trans Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS). This facility occupies 576 acres of land across Port Valdez and remains the largest employer and industrial land use in Valdez. The proposed Trans Alaska Gas System (TAGS) would require an additional 650 acres of industrially zoned land. The area south of and adjacent to Anderson Bay is the location most often recommended for the TAGS. Other industrial uses include gravel extraction, cement processing, and fish processing operations.

APPENDIX C: Glossary

°F
Degrees Fahrenheit.

Activation
Implementation of the Emergency Operations Plan, whether in whole or in part. Also, applies to the process by which a facility is brought up to emergency mode from a normal mode of operations.

ADEC
Alaska Division of Environmental Conservation.

ADOT&PF
Alaska Department of Transportation and Public Facilities.

Alaska DHS&EM
Alaska Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management.

Alert
A notification or advisory that an emergency has occurred or that a hazard is approaching but is less imminent than implied by warning message.

All-Hazards Plan
An Emergency Operations Plan (EOP). It recognizes flexibility in disaster and hazards planning and the need to combine hazard specific activities with a core approach that encompasses responses that are appropriate to all hazards.

AKSMEO
Alaska State Medical Examiner's Office.

Alaska Land Mobile Radio (ALMR)
Provides Alaskan Public Safety First Responders with interoperable communications that are cost-effective, reliable, and adhere to national standards.

APCS
Alyeska Pipeline Service Company.

Assumptions
Basic understandings about unknown disaster situations that the Emergency Operations Plan is based on.

ASEOC
Alaska State Emergency Coordination Center.

AST
Alaska State Troopers.

Attack
Hostile actions taken against the U.S. by foreign forces resulting in destruction of military targets, civilian targets or both.

Avalanche
Mass of sliding snow, occurs in mountainous terrain where snow is deposited on slopes of 20 degrees or more.

AVV
Advocates for Victims of Violence.

CBRNE
Weapons that are Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, or Explosive.

cfs
Cubic feet per second.

Civil Disorder
Terrorist attack, riot, violent protest, demonstrations, or illegal assembly.

Chain of Command
A series of management positions in order of authority.

CISM
Critical Incident Stress Management.

COV
City of Valdez.

Clear Text
Use of plain language in radio communications transmissions. Ten codes or agency specific codes do not constitute clear text. Example: Instead of saying "10-4", use "okay".

Cold Zone
The clean area outside of the contamination control line. Equipment and personnel are not expected to become contaminated in this area. Assembly area for emergency response.

Command
The act of directing, managing, and/or controlling personnel and resources by virtue of explicit legal, agency, or delegated authority.

Command Center
A facility used for direction and control of response and recovery operations. (See also, Emergency Operations Center).

Command Staff
An Incident Command System (ICS) term. The Command Staff consists of the Legal Officer, Public Information Officer, Safety Officer, and Liaison Officer. The Command Staff reports directly to the Incident Commander.

Control
The authority to direct strategic and tactical operations in order to complete an assigned function. "Control" includes the ability to direct the activities of other agencies engaged in the completion of a function. "Control" of an assigned function also carries a responsibility for the health and safety of those involved.

CVEA
Copper Valley Electric Association.

CVTC
Copper Valley Telephone Cooperative.

Damage Assessment
The appraisal or determination of the actual effects resulting from a disaster emergency. This estimate serves as the basis for the Governor's request for a Presidential Disaster Declaration.

DERA
Designated Emergency Response Agency.

DGGS
Division of Geological and Geophysical Surveys.

DHS&EM
Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management .

Direction and Control
The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander, chief, or director over a staff in the accomplishment of a mission or assignment.

Disaster
Occurrence or imminent threat of wide-spread or severe damage, injury, loss of life, or property resulting from a natural or man-made cause including: Attack, Avalanche, Civil Disorder, Earthquake, Fire, Flood, Hazmat, Passenger Accident, Power Failure, Tsunami, Volcano, Winter Storm.

Disaster Emergency
The condition declared by proclamation of the Governor or declared by the principal executive officer of a political subdivision to designate the imminence or occurrence of a disaster. (AS 26.23.900).

Division
A unit arranged by geography, along jurisdictional lines if necessary, and not based on the makeup of the resources within the Division. Led by a Division Supervisor who reports, depending on the size of the response, to either a Branch Director or Section Chief.

DMORT
Disaster Mortuary Assistance Teams.

Earthquake
A sudden motion of the ground which may cause surface faulting ground rupture, ground shaking, and ground failure.

Emergency
An unexpected situation or event, which places life, property and/or natural resources in danger and requires an immediate response to protect life and property.

Emergency Alert System (EAS)
Formally the Emergency Broadcast System. Consists of broadcast stations and interconnecting facilities that have been authorized by the Federal Communications Commission to operate in a controlled manner during emergencies.

Emergency Operations Center (EOC)
A facility from which management officials exercise direction and control in an emergency or disaster. It is equipped and staffed to provide support in coordinating and guiding emergency operations. EOCs are activated on an as needed basis.

Emergency Operations Plan (EOP)
A document that contains policies, authorities, concept of operations, responsibilities, and emergency functions to be performed. Agency response plans, responder standard operating procedures, and specific incident action plans are developed from this strategic document.

Emergency, Declaration of
Grants authority for the use of emergency procedures and assets in order to safeguard life, property, and natural resources as outlined in an Emergency Operations Plan. A State of Emergency will be declared and terminated at the discretion of the Mayor or Mayor Pro-tempore.

EOC
Emergency Operations Center.

EOP
Emergency Operations Plan.

EPA
Environmental Protection Agency.

EPCRA
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986.

Evacuation
The removal of potentially endangered, but not exposed, persons from an area threatened by a hazard. Entry into the evacuation area should not require special protective equipment.

Exercise
A simulated emergency condition involving planning, preparation, and execution; carried out for the purpose of testing, evaluating, planning, developing, training, and/or demonstrating Emergency Management systems and individual components and capabilities, to identify areas of strength and weakness for improvement of the Emergency Operations Plan.

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
Agency established to oversee Federal assistance to local government in the event of major disasters. Also administers the Emergency Management assistance program, which provides Emergency Management funds to local governments through the States.

Finance/Administration Section Chief
Tasked with tracking incident-related costs, personnel records, requisitions, and administrating procurement of required contracts.

Fire Wildland
Any instance of uncontrolled burning in grasslands, brush, or woodlands.

Fire Urban
Uncontrolled burning in residential, commercial, industrial, or other properties in developed areas.

Flood Coastal
Flooding along coastal areas associated with severe storms, hurricanes, or other events.

Flash Flood
Quickly rising small streams and rivers after heavy rain or rapid snow melt.

Riverine Flood
Periodic overbank flow of rivers and streams.

Urban Flood
Overflow of storm sewer system usually due to poor drainage, following heavy rain or rapid snowmelt.

GDP
Glennallen Diesel Plant.

GIS
Geographic/Geospatial Information Systems.

Group
A unit arranged for a purpose, along agency lines if necessary, or based on the makeup of the resources within the Group. Led by a Group Supervisor who reports, depending on the size of the response, to either a Branch Director or Section Chief.

Hazard
A situation or condition that presents the potential for causing damage to life, property, natural resources, and/or or other types of harm or loss.

Hazard Mitigation
The process of alleviating hazards or reducing the risk of hazards by the use of proactive measures.

Hazardous Material (hazmat)
Any material which is explosive, flammable, poisonous, corrosive, reactive, or radioactive, or any combination thereof, and requires special care in handling because of the hazards it poses.

Hot Zone
The inner most of the three zones of an emergency site. Special protection is required for all personnel while in this zone. The area where contamination does or could occur.

Incident
An occurrence or event, either natural or man-made, that requires action by Emergency Service personnel to prevent or minimize loss of life or damage to property and/or natural resources.

Incident Action Plan (IAP)
Contains general control objectives reflecting the overall incident strategy, and specific action plans for the next operational period. The Incident Action Plans will have a number of attachments. All incidents require an action plan. For simple incidents, the action plan is not usually in written form. Large or complex incidents will require that the action plan be documented in writing.

Incident Commander (IC)
The individual responsible for overall management of all incident operations.

Incident Command Post (ICP)
A facility located at or in the immediate vicinity of the incident site and is the focus for the conduct of direct, on-scene control of tactical operations. The ICP may perform local Emergency Operations Center-like functions in the context of smaller or less complex incidents. An ICP Commander and staff will be designated by the Incident Commander.

Incident Command System (ICS)
Allows rapid incorporation of personnel from a variety of agencies into a common management structure to effectively accomplish stated objectives pertaining to an incident.

IM
Incident Management.

Incident Management Team (IMT)
A group of trained personnel that respond to an emergency.

Interoperability
The ability of systems or communications to work together.

IT
Information Technology.

lbs
Pounds.

Legal Officer
Under the Incident Command System (ICS), a member of the Command Staff responsible for providing legal advice on all aspects of emergency response and recovery. The Legal Officer should be aware of response operations and provide guidance to the Incident Commander.

LEPC
Local Emergency Planning Committee.

Liaison Officer
Under the Incident Command System (ICS), a member of the Command Staff responsible for serving as the primary contact for supporting agencies assisting at an incident.

Logistics Section Chief
Tasked with providing all resources, services, and support required by the incident.

MACS
Multi-Agency Coordination System.

MOUs
Memorandums of Understanding.

MP
Milepost.

National Warning System (NAWAS)
The Federal portion of the Civil Defense Warning System, used for the dissemination of warning and other emergency information from Federal and State warning points. It is a dedicated, nationwide, party-line telephone system operated on a 24-hour basis.

NGOs
Non-Government Organizations.

National Interagency Incident Management System (NIMS)
A common system consisting of five major sub-systems that collectively provide a total systems approach to all risk incident management. The sub-systems are the Incident Command System, standardized training, qualifications and certification system, publications management, and supporting technologies.

National Response Framework (NRF)
The national body responsible for coordinating Federal planning, preparedness, and response actions related to oil discharges and hazardous substance releases. Guide to how the nation responds to all types of disasters and emergencies. It is built on scalable, flexible, and adaptable concepts identified in the NIMS to align key roles and responsibilities. This framework describes specific authorities and best practices for managing incidents.

NOAA
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.

NPIs
Non-Pharmaceutical Interventions.

NWS
National Weather Service.

Operations Section Chief
Tasked with directing all actions to meet the incident objectives.

PAS
Planning Assistance to States

Passenger Accident
An accident involving passenger air, highway, rail, or marine travel that threatens or results in death or injury.

PPE
Personal Protective Equipment.

Planning Section Chief
Tasked with the collection and display of incident information, primarily consisting of the status of all resources and overall status of the incident.

Preparedness
Those activities, programs, and systems that exist prior to an emergency that are used to support and enhance response to an emergency or disaster.

Power Failure
Interruption or loss of electrical services for an extended period of time requiring emergency operations to provide food, water, heat, or other necessities.

PSAs
Public Service Announcements.

Public Information Officer (PIO)
Under the Incident Command System, a member of the Command Staff responsible for interfacing with the public, media, and others as to information about an incident.

PVMC
Providence Valdez Medical Center.

PWSC
Prince William Sound College.

Safety Officer
Under the Incident Command System, a member of the Command Staff responsible for identifying and giving notice on undue risks. The Safety Officer, when acting on behalf of the Incident Commander, may enforce best practices for personal safety in the conduct of a response to an incident.

SAR
Search and Rescue.

SCADA
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition.

SDS
Safety Data Sheets.

SEOC
Alaska State Emergency Operation Center operated by the DHS&EM.

SERC
State Emergency Response Commission.

SGHP
Solomon Gulch Hydroelectric Project.

SITREP
Situation Reports.

SOPs
Standard Operating Procedures.

Staging Area
Located at or near an incident scene where tactical response resources are stored while they await assignment. Resources in staging area are under the control of the Operations Section and are always in available status. Staging Areas should be located close enough to the incident for a timely response, but far enough away to be out of the immediate impact zone. There may be more than one Staging Area at an incident.

Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA)
Title I deals with health and safety issues for hazardous waste workers and emergency response personnel. Title III specifies requirements for organizing the planning and community right-to-know process at the state and local level. Also known as the Emergency Planning Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA).

SWAN
Sound Wellness Alliance Network.

TDD
Telecommunications device for the deaf.

Tsunami
A series of traveling ocean waves of great length and long period, usually generated by submarine geophysical displacement. May or may not be preceded by an earthquake.

TTY
Teletypewriter.

Unified Command (UC)
Used on larger incidents usually when multiple agencies are involved. A Unified Command typically includes a command representative from major involved agencies who act as the spokesman for their agency, though not designated as an Incident Commander. A Unified Command acts as a single entity.

USACE
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.

VDP
Valdez Diesel Plant.

VFD
Valdez Fire Department.

Vital Records
Records, documents, or other information which are essential to the continuous operation of government and essential to fulfill government's responsibilities to the public. If damaged or destroyed, would cause considerable inconvenience and/or require replacement or recreation at considerable expense.

Valdez Marine Terminal (VMT)
Private terminal on the south side of the Port of Valdez that serves as a private marine terminal for the loading of oil tankers.

VPD
Valdez Police Department.

Vulnerability
Susceptibility to hazards or attack.

Volcano
An eruption from the earth's interior producing lava flows or violent explosions issuing rock, gases, and debris.

Warm Zone
That area between the Hot Zone and Cold Zone. This zone contains the personnel decontamination station and may require a lesser degree of personnel protection then the Hot Zone. This area separates the contaminated area from the clean area and acts as a buffer to reduce contamination of the clean area.

Warning
Dissemination of a message signaling an imminent hazard, which may include advice on protective measures.

Winter Storm
Includes ice storm, blizzard, and extreme cold.

WMD
Weapons of mass destruction.

APPENDIX D: Sample Disaster Declaration

WHEREAS, commencing on (date, year), the City of Valdez, Alaska sustained severe losses and threats to life and property from an earthquake and resulting tsunami that caused widespread severe damage or destruction of the city's power plant and transmission lines, sewer and water collection facilities, and transportation infrastructure; and,

WHEREAS, the following conditions exist as a result of the disaster emergency: widespread flooding within the City area resulting in inundation of, and severe damage to, approximately 14 homes, requiring evacuation and sheltering of the residents; severe damage to four local businesses and five public buildings; severe damage to personal and real property and subsistence equipment; deposition of vegetation and building debris on major roads and the airport runway requiring debris removal; loss of electrical power citywide, which required temporary repair and future permanent repairs; reduced capability of the water and sewer lines, which will require professional inspection and permanent repairs; washouts along four major roads and significant loss of embankment along the north side of the airport runway, requiring emergency protective measures to be taken; and,

WHEREAS, the severity and magnitude of the emergency is beyond the timely and effective response capability of local resources; and there are insufficient regularly appropriated funds to cover these expenses; and,

THEREFORE, be it resolved that the Mayor of Valdez does declare a disaster emergency per AS 26.23.140 to exist in the City of Valdez.

FURTHERMORE, it is requested that the governor of the State of Alaska declare a disaster emergency to exist as described in AS 26.23 and provide disaster assistance to the City of Valdez in its response and recovery from this event. The City specifically requests individual disaster relief for 14 homeowners with flooded homes and damaged personal, real, and subsistence property, public disaster assistance for emergency protective measures, temporary and permanent repairs to the city sewer, water, and transportation infrastructure, with technical assistance and funding to evaluate the damage to, and perform needed repairs to, the city water collection and transmission systems.

FURTHER, the undersigned certifies that the City of Valdez has or will expend local resources in the amount of $_____as a result of this disaster, for which no State or Federal reimbursement will be requested.

SIGNED this_____day of Month_____, Year_____

*Signature*_____
John Q. Doe, Mayor
City of Valdez

APPENDIX E: Contact List

City of Valdez

Who? (Title/Organization/Name)	Daytime Contact Info	Cell No.
Acting City Manager Capital Facilities Dept. Nathan Duval	907-835-5478 ext. 1 nduval@valdezak.gov	907-202-0683
Fire Department Chief Tracy Raynor Operations Section	907-835-4560 traynor@valdezak.gov	907-202-0017
Police Department Chief Bart Hinkle Operations Section	907-835-4560-0412 bhinkle@pd.valdezak.gov	907-202-0412
Emergency Manager Aaron Baczuk	907-835-4560 abaczuk@pd.valdezak.gov	907-202-0573
Communications Dept. Ana Stroup Public Information Officer	907-835-3400 astroup@valdezak.gov	907-202-0712
Public Works Dept. John Witte Logistics Section	907-835-4473 jwitte@valdezak.gov	907-385-6677
Building Maintenance Stan Porritt Logistics Section	907-835-5412 sporritt@valdezak.gov	907-202-0682
Planning Dept. Kate Huber Planning Section	907-834-3401 Khuber@valdezak.gov	907-202-0599
Parks & Recreation Dept. Ken Wilson Sheltering Coordinator	907-835-2531 kwilson@valdezak.gov	907-202-0079

COV Emergency Operations Center

Who? (Title/Organization/Name)	Daytime Contact Info	Cell No.

Local Stakeholders

Who? (Title/Organization/Name)	Daytime Contact Info	Cell No.

State of Alaska

Who? (Title/Organization/Name)	Daytime Contact Info	Cell No.
State Emergency Operation Center	1.907.428.7100 1.800.478.2337 seoc@alaska.gov	

Federal Government

Who? (Title/Organization/Name)	Daytime Contact Info	Cell No.

APPENDIX F: Resource List